Youth Investment and Police Mentoring

Recommendations for Policy and Action by Government and Foundations 1

Executive Summary 6

Part I Introduction to the First Generation of Replications 10

1. Centro Sister Isolina Ferre and the San Juan Police 18
2. The Campus Boulevard Corporation and the Philadelphia Police 39
3. The Dorchester Youth Collaborative and the Boston Police 46
4. Youth Guidance and the Chicago Police 56
5. The Baltimore Jobs in Energy Youth Center and the Baltimore Police 66

6. Lessons 74

Part II Introduction to the Second Generation of Replications 86

7. Koban, Inc. and the Columbia Police 111
8. The Goodwill Boys and Girls Club and the Memphis Police 143
9. The Maryland Boys and Girls Club and the Baltimore Police 175
10. The Tomberlin Community Development Center and the Little Rock Police 206

11. The Telesis Corporation and the Washington DC Metropolitan Police 224

12. Lessons 240

Appendix 1. Methodology and Evaluation of 1st Generation Replications 259

Appendix 2. Methodology and Evaluation of 2nd Generation Replications 273

Bibliography 282
Youth Investment and Police Mentoring

The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation
Washington, DC

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND ACTION BY GOVERNMENT AND FOUNDATIONS

1. Adequately funded youth safe havens integrated with police ministations that share the same space and that provide multiple solutions to multiple problems should be legislated at federal and local levels. They should be replicated much more widely — with, for example, federal funding from the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Justice and Health and Human Services. Special incentives should be provided to innovative police chiefs.

2. Police and youth development leaders who already have replicated successful youth safe haven/police ministations should become national trainers who train their counterparts in new replications across the nation. The training should be funded by a public-private partnership.

3. In unsafe inner city neighborhoods, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services should create job training centers for out-of-school-youth and welfare-to-work that are integrated into safe haven/police ministations at the same locations.

4. Legislators and the federal Department of Education should reform the D.A.R.E. program based on the lessons in Youth Investment and Police Mentoring.

5. The White House and the National Office of Drug Control Policy should create a new generation of public service and commercial messages based on the "bubble up" grassroots model of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative’s youth media enterprise, not based on messages by traditional, national establishment organizations. Local youth leaders should create and act in the messages.

6. The private foundation community should speak out on the limits of "volunteerism," "self-sufficiency" and "mentoring." Foundations should finance more evaluations of the cost-benefits of paid staff (civilian and police) versus unpaid volunteers in youth development, employment training, community development and crime prevention programs. The cost-benefits of "mentors" versus "advocates" (as in San Juan) versus "near peers" (as in Boston) should be evaluated.

7. The private foundation community should finance more evaluations of the cost-benefits of one-on-one "volunteer" mentoring (which has been estimated to actually cost perhaps as much as $5B to $15B per year nationally) versus more proven investments in children and youth (like HeadStart preschool, which will cost about $7B more per year nationally to serve all eligible poor children).
8. Private foundations should facilitate a "small is beautiful" funding process in which private and public funders invest at least as much in unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations as in more powerful national organizations, which have more ability to lobby for their affiliates.

9. The private foundation community should educate both the public and private sectors that many well conceived and well implemented programs in the private and public sectors work — when they are adequately funded over long enough time.

10. The private foundation community should finance a Communicating What Works movement that makes clear to the average citizen and to decision makers that we know a great deal about what works — and what doesn’t. The need is to replicate what works to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem and to remove the impediments that currently prevent this from occurring (like the impact of big money on legislation).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Youth Investment and Police Mentoring was written by Lynn A. Curtis, President of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation and the Corporation for What Works.

Keith A. Baker and Imre R. Kohn were Co-Directors of the evaluations in the report.

Joy G. Dryfoos and Elliott Currie reviewed the manuscript and provided helpful feedback.

The manuscript was prepared by Pam J. Green and edited by Cynthia F. Young.

The Trustees of the Eisenhower Foundation wish to thank the Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for funds to help publish the report.

The Trustees of the Foundation wish to thank the many funders of the development, implementation and evaluation of the police and youth development programs documented in the report. In alphabetical order, those funders were: the Center for Global Partnership, the Hitachi Corporation, the Hitachi Foundation, the Keidanren (the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations), the Matsushita Corporation, the Mitsubishi Corporation, the NEC Corporation, the Sony Corporation, the Toshiba Corporation, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission. For the new police-youth development replications, reported in Section 9 and in progress at the time of this publication, the Trustees wish to thank, in alphabetical order, the Center for Global Partnership, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
We wish to thank Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Senator Strom Thurmond, Senator Judd Gregg and Representative Marcy Kaptur.

At the U.S. Department of Justice, we wish to thank Kathleen Kennedy Townsend (now Lieutenant Governor of Maryland), Laurie Robinson, Sheldon C. Bilchik, Nancy E. Gist, and Robert Brown.

At the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, we wish to thank (former Secretary) Henry G. Cisneros, Michael E. Stegman, Gloria J. Cousar, Kevin E. Marchman, Sonia L. Burgos and Malcolm E. Main.

At the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, we wish to thank Elaine M. Johnson and Vivien L. Smith.

At the Center for Global Partnership, we wish to thank the following executive directors: Minoru Kusuda, Nagayo Homma, Yoshihisa Ara and Yoshihiko Wakumoto.

American police departments assigned commanders and officers as in-kind match for most of these replications. The police were crucial for the success we have documented. The Foundation wishes to deeply thank the Chiefs of Police and Superintendents in Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and San Juan.

Soji Teramura shepherded the program over many years, provided leadership, arranged events as the initiative developed, wrote excellent news articles and secured considerable funding. Our appreciation is extended to him.

Isamu Nitta, the National Police Agency of Japan and the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. kindly and wisely sponsored and guided this work as it related to Japanese concepts, especially in the early years as delegations to Japan were planned and carried out.

At the National Police Agency of Japan, we wish to thank the following Commissioners-General: Hideo Yamada, Akio Kanazawa, Ryoichi Suzuki, Yasumitsu Kiuchi, Takaji Kunimatsu and Yuko Sekiguchi.

At the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, we wish to thank the following Ambassadors: Nobuo Matsunaga, Ryoei Murata, Takakazu Kuriyama and Kunihiko Saito. We also wish to thank the following National Police Agency of Japan representatives at the Embassy: Hideshi Mitani, Shinichi Uematsu, Goro Aoki and Naomasa Yoshida.

Douglas E. Rake orchestrated the delegations, raised the Japan-side funds and provided inspiration with his Public Broadcasting System documentary, *Forces of Order*, on Japanese policing. David H. Bayley wrote the book, of the same name, on which the documentary was based, and provided helpful input during our early work.
Elliott L. Richardson, Delwin A. Roy, Kazuo Kumagai, Kazuo Nukazawa, Takeshi Kobayashi and Jun Wada were especially helpful and supportive.

Baltimore Police Commissioner Thomas C. Frazier and Columbia, SC Police Chief Charles P. Austin, Sr. provided crucial guidance and leadership, and were responsible for significant funds raised.

Vesta Kimble directed the original replications. Eddie W. Banks is directing the new generation of replications reported in Section 9, which is being evaluated by David M. Chavis.

Bobby W. Austin and Marilyn Melkonian facilitated funding for the new generation of work, allowed for flexibility of implementation and provided excellent models to emulate. Some of this new work is being done as part of the National African American Male Collaboration.

The front cover of the report shows Officer Charles Nellums of the Little Rock Police Department with Jennifer Purifoy and Keith Williams.

While in keeping with the mission and policy positions of the Eisenhower Foundation, the views in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the positions of funders.

**FOREWORD**

**Elliott Currie**  
*Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California School of Law, Berkeley, CA*

*Youth Development and Police Mentoring* is a welcome addition to practical, evaluation and management based policy analysis on what works to develop youth and prevent crime in America’s cities. The report confirms that development and prevention, when they are done right, can indeed work — and that we have alternatives to ever-harder sentences and the heedless construction of more and more prisons. The programs described in this report demonstrate, in particular, that linking innovative, community-oriented policing with consistent efforts to reach out to vulnerable youth can bring substantial dividends — even on very modest budgets and in the face of harsh and deteriorating social environments.

But even more importantly, the report teaches us some crucial lessons about the *ingredients* of success — about what makes development and prevention programs effective, and what may doom them to failure. These lessons are especially important now, because we are increasingly hearing a mixed and often confusing message from government about how to deal with youth and crime. On the one hand, youth
development and crime prevention seem, at least rhetorically, to be back on the national agenda. There is much talk of "investing" in children and youth, and a growing recognition that simply pouring more and more resources into incarceration hasn’t had the positive effects that some naively expected.

But the emerging rhetoric hasn’t been backed by a commitment of resources on anything like the scale that is required. We say we want to invest in youth — but also that we want to shrink government; we say we need effective social programs, but also that we want them to be run on a shoestring and staffed by unpaid volunteers. The Foundation’s report, based not on rhetoric but on years of concrete experience on the streets of some of our most impoverished communities, suggests that this approach is likely to be self-defeating.

These programs often worked well — sometimes astonishingly well — despite meager and uncertain funding. But they could not have worked without the paid staff that public funding made possible, and their impact seems to have been significantly weakened when federal funding was cut back. And it is even more clear that expanding and replicating these and other successful programs to match the need cannot even begin to happen without a stable commitment from the public sector.

The basic lesson is simple and unavoidable: development and prevention can work, but only if we take them seriously enough to provide the resources necessary to get the job done. If this report helps to get that lesson across to Congress and the White House, it will have done its own job very well indeed.

Joy G. Dryfoos
Independent Researcher, Hastings-on-Hudson, NY

Youth Investment and Police Mentoring represents a significant marriage of art and science. In theory, art builds on human ingenuity, that unanalyzable creative power that gives light, color, substance, to our activities. Art carries an almost mystical aura. Science is defined as the systemization of knowledge attained through careful study and observation. Science is objective and impersonal.

We have always had youth development programs, even though we called them other names (like prevention, at-risk...even schools) but they have largely been designed as works of art, loaded with ingenuity, but serendipitous, lacking strong theory, and certainly not backed up by strong evidence that they would succeed. What the Eisenhower Foundation has done here is to introduce science into the art of youth development.

In an intrepid experiment, a number of youth development agencies were able to implement comprehensive programs that included the participation of the police. These efforts were tracked over time, and solid data produced to show that they made a difference in crime rates. Now we have substantial proof that having trained sympathetic police persons on the premises can clearly add significant dimensions to youth development programs.
How do we take this science and use it to stimulate action across the country? How do we convince the decision-makers to invest in effective programs rather than ineffective ones? Based on the dollar estimates in this report ($100,000 for starters), think how far the funds from the Drug Free Schools and Safe Communities program could go toward helping community agencies and schools to add police mentors to their staffs.

Currently, Drug Free Schools gives states almost $600 million to pass on to localities. A big piece of that goes to support DARE, the police run classroom-based drug prevention program. DARE is definitely more art than science; repeated evaluations have shown that the program does not result in lower substance use rates. Students do, however, enjoy meeting the police, and would benefit from entering into more meaningful relationships with them, following some of the ideas used in the programs documented here. From what I have observed visiting Eisenhower programs, the police selected for this duty benefit as well and appreciate the opportunity to provide support services in partnerships with other youth workers.

This publication should encourage policy makers to rely on scientific evidence for program planning in the emerging field of youth development. The critical need among our youth for support and the fierce struggle for resources dictate the most rational and informed decisions possible.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Youth Investment and Police Mentoring* reports on 10 years of Eisenhower Foundation programming, evaluation and analysis directed at policy for the truly disadvantaged and the inner city — beginning with a delegation to Japan of American police chiefs and community leaders in the late 1980s. Over this time, the Foundation has raised almost $10M in grants and local matches for the work reported here and related work, past and ongoing.

As the quotes that preface the report suggest, the ideas in *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring* have been recognized by media across the political spectrum and by street level, federal and international observers.

The report provides new evidence that unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations in partnership with innovative police chiefs, commanders and line officers can replicate the principles underlying successful models. In 4 cities — San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago — a quasi-experimental evaluation design showed serious crime to decline by at least 22 percent and by as much as 27 percent over a minimum of 3 years. Across the 4 cities, the decline in the 4 target neighborhoods where the police-community partnerships were replicated was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or their cities as a whole. Figure 1 shows some of these findings. In a fifth city, Baltimore, a quasi-experimental design showed that program youth had less high risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than comparison youth over 18 months. The differences were statistically significant.
Success was attributable to multiple solutions to multiple problems, solutions that complemented one another in different combinations in different programs. The solutions included safe havens off the street for youth; residential and nonresidential police ministations, called "kobans" in Japan; counseling of youth by paid civilian staff, "advocates," "near-peers" and mentors; counseling and mentoring of youth by police; community-based education and remedial education; community organization outreach to schools; youth leadership programs and youth media enterprise; sports as a means of youth development; employment training and placement; joint police-community patrols that sometimes included visits to homes of families in the neighborhood; and problem-oriented policing. We have used the term "community equity policing" to describe how police and nonprofit youth development organizations in these initiatives created a more balanced partnership than in many other such partnerships attempted elsewhere in the past.

Our findings suggest that paid civilian staff and police were more effective with youth than volunteers. It remains to be proven whether one-on-one work with youth is more effective than group work, or some combination. It also remains to be proven whether work with youth by adults is more effective outside of safe haven settings than inside such settings, which have reinforcing interventions. We concluded that the distinction between adult mentors and adult counselors remains unclear in the youth development
field and that other concepts may be more cost-beneficial to implement. For example, in
the Boston program, "near peers" were very effective. These were counselors just a few
years older than program youth. In San Juan, the concept of the "intercessor," or
"advocate," appeared more effective than the concept of a mentor. Advocates in San Juan
mentor youth. But the advocates have roles beyond that. They are trained to mediate
among all players -- resolving conflicts, or potential conflicts, among youth, police and
community. Perhaps most important, they are assertive change agents who address a wide
range of issues affecting the community.

Overall, then, our findings cautioned against excessive policy reliance on one-on-one
volunteer adult mentoring of youth in non-safe haven settings.

The report provides evidence that well conceived and well replicated programs work
when they are adequately funded. In San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, the
programs were more or less fully funded for their first 2 years of operations. Serious
crime dropped by an average of 18 percent from Year 1 to Year 2. In the third year, the
funder, the U.S. Department of Justice, made sharp cuts, because Department funds
needed to be diverted from community crime prevention to other priorities that year. Paid
staff members were cut to the bone, and more reliance had to be placed on volunteers. As
a result, from Year 2 to Year 3, serious crime dropped by an average of just 3 percent. Figure 2 summarizes these findings, which were statistically significant.

The present volume provides the principal findings and lessons learned from our evaluations. We believe that those findings and lessons have implications for national and local policy for innovative policing, youth development, crime prevention, and drug and community and economic development. The full, final report, published separately under the same title, integrates the findings and lessons into the literature on what works, and what doesn’t, for the truly disadvantaged in America’s inner cities.
Part I

Introduction to the First Generation of Replications

The first generation began with a look at Japanese police ministations -- called "kobans" -- in the late 1980s. There are about 1,200 kobans in Tokyo alone.

For the most part, one officer stays at the ministation. A partner undertakes foot patrol, or uses a standard white frame police bicycle. There is some problem-oriented policing. The territory patrolled ranges from a few blocks to a few square miles, depending on the population. The officer on foot patrol is treated like a friend and neighbor. This is reflected in the respectful term that Japanese use for police officers -- OH-mawari-san, or Honorable Mr. Walking Around.

Every home, apartment building and business is known to Mr. Walking Around. This is crucial -- because Japanese cities usually do not have street names or house numbers that proceed in any logical sequence. Unless a person knows the neighborhood, it often is necessary to find a specific building by inquiring at the nearest koban.

Kobans serve other functions as well. They are the local lost and founds. Umbrellas are lent out by police. Officers pass the word to neighborhood residents when someone is ill, has a baby or is admitted to a prestigious college.

Most such ministations are non-residential. However, there also are residential kobans -- at the outskirts of big cities and in rural areas. A police officer lives above the ministation with his wife and children. During the first day of his assignment, the officer typically will walk door-to-door with his wife. He introduces himself and his wife. They invite residents over to their house for tea. The wife acts as an assistant to the police officer and receives a stipend from the National Police Agency. Typically, the officer and his wife know each of the families in the patrol area by name. This can mean 300 or more families.

To American ideas of community-based and problem-oriented policing, then, Japanese kobans add the notion of highly accessible physical locations from which police operate. Residential or nonresidential, the kobans provide security anchors for their neighborhoods. Kobans are within a 10 minute walk of most residents in a neighborhood.

Several times each year, koban officers make home visits to each residence in the patrol area. The officer sits with the home owner and inquires about experiences that are related to crime. Police give tips on
crime prevention. They keep detailed records on each household and everyone in it.

Japanese police also mentor neighborhood youth in a variety of ways. Probably the most popular is the teaching of martial arts. Such teaching is not done out of the kobans -- which are too small. Rather, it is undertaken at district police stations -- which are about the same size as typical American precinct stations. Japanese police believe that martial arts instill self-control and improve self-esteem among young people.

The Japanese police officers who undertake this work are far better trained than in the United States. For example, American police typically are trained for 5-8 months before they begin work. In Japan, police cadets with college degrees (and there are many) are trained for about 12 months. Cadets with high school diplomas are trained for about 18 months. This training is accompanied by a more enriched experience compared to American police. For example, Japanese police are taught English and become computer-literate. Training academy courses include tea ceremony and flower arrangement. When American police chiefs see such courses they often are amused -- initially. However, Japanese police supervisors then explain to the Americans that the courses instill a respect for Japanese culture. The Japanese believe that officers on patrol should understand the values of the residents in their neighborhoods. Often, this explanation then motivates American police chiefs to better sensitize cadets at academies back home to the cultures of the different ethnic and racial groups that live within any given neighborhood beat.

The Japanese have built a relatively free and most prosperous society which has crime rates far lower than what western nations have come to accept. For example, Tokyo has 20 times the population of Washington, DC but about half as many homicides each year. Japan also has far fewer rapes and robberies per capita -- and far fewer police officers, judges and jails.

These differences can be explained in a variety of ways. Japan has a more egalitarian economic structure than the United States -- with, for example, the highest income bracket paying about 50 percent in income taxes in Japan compared to about 28 percent in the United States. Japan has strict gun control -- imposed by General MacArthur after World War II. The koban system and related innovations like home visits also may help explain some of the tremendous disparities in crime between Japan and the United States, in our view.

**The 1988 Delegation to Japan**
Intrigued, the Eisenhower Foundation took a number of delegations of American police chiefs, police supervisors and inner-city community leaders to Japan. There, they observed Japanese methods under the sponsorship of the National Police Agency of Japan. When the Americans returned home, the Eisenhower Foundation worked with the youth development organizations and police departments that were on the delegations to replicate Japanese principles and integrate them with homegrown successes indigenous to American communities. Part I of this report documents the successes of several cities which were represented on the first Eisenhower delegation to Japan, in 1988.

Thirteen major American cities participated in that delegation. In most cases, decisions on which cities to invite were based on the Foundation locating a nonprofit, community-based, youth development organization that might run a replication in a low income, high crime, neighborhood and a city police department that had the potential to partner with the neighborhood organization in the planning and replication of community/police, Japan/American hybrids.

The 13 cities selected were: Albuquerque, NM; Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Newark, NJ; New York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; San Juan, P.R.; Washington, DC and Wilmington, DE. The delegation to Japan included 6 police chiefs or commission-ers, 10 midlevel police commanders, and 7 leaders from community-based, inner-city youth development organizations. We did not have enough funds to include youth development leaders from all cities. In later delegations, we took to Japan the Chicago, IL Police Superintendent; a second Baltimore, MD, Police Commissioner; a second Newark, NJ Police Chief; the police chiefs or directors of Columbia, SC, Des Moines, IA, Honolulu, HI, Little Rock, AR, Memphis, TN, and Phoenix, AZ; and youth development leaders from some of these cities.

After an initial briefing, the delegation was shown examples of police training, early intervention with youth, and koban-based community policing in Tokyo and Osaka. Here are excerpts on what they saw, from an article on the delegation in the New York and Asian editions of the Wall Street Journal:*  

*The Eisenhower Foundation's agenda was to observe the Japanese system and bring ideas back to their own communities.*

*In Japan, local police have a close and extensive relationship with community residents. The relationship is fostered by a network of police outposts called koban, one*
or two-room offices located in each neighborhood.

The visiting Americans tagged along with the koban police. They watched their Japanese counterparts give people directions, answer mundane requests and make regular visits to residents' homes to update details on their households -- a kind of intrusion many Americans might reject. And they observed that Japanese streets feel safe -- partly because the police are so heavily involved in the community.

Often, retired Japanese businessmen volunteer as non-police probation officers, and parents rotate helping the police in sports events for children....

In Japan, drugs and poverty aren't yet a huge problem, handguns are illegal and police are well-trained and adequately staffed. As a result, Japanese police spend much of their time dealing with incidents that their American counterparts have no time for.

In Japan, two years of police training reinforce a single set of common values. Police are taught not only self-defense, but such cultural skills as tea ceremony and flower arrangement.

**The Need for Youth Development Organizations**

Why were police joined by inner-city youth development organization community leaders on the delegation? In Japan, the community usually trusts the police. In American inner cities, there often is mistrust. Accordingly, the Foundation decided, from the beginning, that variations on Japanese themes probably could be best replicated back home through a collaboration between police and indigenous youth development organizations that were trusted in the community.

In addition, the community groups had experience back home with the principles underlying the other elements which we sought to replicate -- like counseling and safe havens where youngsters come after school.
The Foundation hoped that, if youth, community and police leaders could spend time together in Japan, and perhaps get to better appreciate one another, the youth groups conceivably could enhance their effectiveness through police support. The police, we thought, might create more impact in tough neighborhoods by working on a truly equal basis with civilians, and not just by asking for citizen support of police-run programs.

A debriefing was held in Tokyo at the end of the delegation. Delegates with an interest in follow-up back home were encouraged to draft workplans for how the youth development organizations and police might partner in replicating hybrids of Japanese and American successes. The planning was "bubble up" and process oriented. The Eisenhower Foundation did not impose rigid guidelines, but did help guide the process.

After a few months, a national cluster workshop was held in Washington, DC with all delegates. The workshop further developed workplans based on what police and the community groups were prepared to do together.

Most cities eventually carried out replications inspired in part by what was observed in Japan, and then combined with American concepts. Some did it on their own, with minimal involvement of the Eisenhower Foundation. But the Foundation also was committed to raising money for replicating hybrids of Japanese principles and American models, raising funds for technical assistance and evaluation, providing that technical assistance, and evaluating the outcomes over 2 to 3 years of implementation (the minimal length of time which past evaluations by the Eisenhower Foundation usually have found to be necessary to show success).

Part I of this report summarizes the evaluations in 5 of the initial delegation cities where such funding, technical assistance and evaluation was possible -- San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and Baltimore.

The Foundation received 3 years of funding from the U.S. Department of Justice (Bureau of Justice Assistance) for grants to the police-community ventures in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago. Most of the funding was for local program operations. For the third year of funding for program operations, Eisenhower technical assistance and evaluation was sharply cut by the Justice Department -- for this program and other grantees in the same community-based crime prevention funding category at the Justice Department -- because in that year Justice needed to reallocate funds to cover overtime of police in some of its other programs. In what follows, we have tried to document the impact of this drop in funding.
In Baltimore, primary funding for operations came from another source, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Center for Substance Abuse Prevention). Here, funding was constant over 3 years.

The Justice Department grants were implemented locally over 3 years from early 1991 to early 1994. The Department of Health and Human Services grant for Baltimore was implemented locally over 3 years from early 1990 to late 1992. We will simply refer in our tables to Years 1, 2 and 3.

Table 1 summarizes levels of funding to the 5 replications for direct operations over the 3 years of the federal grants. It also summarizes local matching grants. Most matches were in-kind, not cash. Included in the in-kind matches were partial salaries of existing staff from the youth development groups, as well as much of the cost of the police officers assigned to work with the community groups. For the Department of Justice funding, the Eisenhower Foundation was the grant recipient, and subgrants were made both to the youth development groups and police, who had the status of equal partners. For the Department of Health and Human Services funding, the community organization was the grant recipient, and the Eisenhower Foundation received a subgrant for evaluation and technical assistance from that group.
Before and during the years of implementation, funding on the U.S. side also was received by the Eisenhower Foundation from the Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation, the Hitachi Foundation and the U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission. Japan-side funding was received by the Eisenhower Foundation from the Keidanren (the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations), the Mitsubishi Corporation, the Hitachi Corporation, the Toshiba Corporation, the NEC Corporation, the Matsushita Corporation and the Sony Corporation. The funding covered pre-delegation planning, the 1988 delegation, 2 years of planning and development in between the delegation and U.S. federal funding, local site needs assessments and workplan development and some match funding to sites. The funding covered Eisenhower Foundation national cluster workshops, direct hands-on technical assistance, proposal writing, fundraising, communication and support staff work for the 5 community-police partnerships presented in this report. It covered partial early costs of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Grants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td>$37,500</td>
<td>$202,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
<td>$50,850</td>
<td>$210,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$85,000</td>
<td>$45,500</td>
<td>$227,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$89,315</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>$234,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>$143,741</td>
<td>$166,606</td>
<td>$181,670</td>
<td>$492,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Matches</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>$63,575</td>
<td>$78,575</td>
<td>$60,310</td>
<td>$202,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>$179,300</td>
<td>$201,950</td>
<td>$125,350</td>
<td>$506,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>$249,900</td>
<td>$211,339</td>
<td>$86,100</td>
<td>$547,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>$167,800</td>
<td>$67,109</td>
<td>$50,215</td>
<td>$285,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>$26,880</td>
<td>$16,880</td>
<td>$16,880</td>
<td>$60,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$153,575</td>
<td>$153,575</td>
<td>$97,810</td>
<td>$404,960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Program budgets approved by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
the evaluation. In addition, these funders covered costs of planning the other delegations to Japan, the delegations themselves and followup work by the Eisenhower Foundation -- including national cluster workshops, technical assistance evaluation and communication. Some of this funding was applied to the second round of replications (ongoing at the time of this publication) in partnership with the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Center for Global Partnership and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development -- as summarized in Section 9. Some of this funding was applied, as well, to technical assistance to other community-police partnerships that undertook local variations on Japanese themes but received no federal funds.

Over the 3 years of local replications at the 5 sites reported on here, the Eisenhower Foundation held annual national cluster workshops in Washington, DC, San Juan and Los Angeles. Community leaders and police chiefs, supervisors and officers attended from the 5 sites and from other cities where similar partnerships were emerging, some as a result of later delegations to Japan. Most time at these meetings was spent in practical sessions on day-to-day implementation, what was working and what was not, revision and midcourse correction of workplans, exchange of "war stories" on implementation and bonding between community and police representatives. The San Juan workshop had an especially great impact -- because San Juan implemented its refinement of a residential koban and, as we shall see, integrated it into the workings of a premier youth and community investment program.
1. Centro Sister Isolina Ferre and the San Juan Police

Summary

Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in Caimito, the highest crime neighborhood of San Juan, was the only organization included in both the first and second generations of replications.

The assistant superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police and the executive director of Centro were members of the original 1988 delegation to Japan.

Centro replicated a residential and nonresidential ministation at the entrance to a beautiful safe haven campus with many buildings for programs that invested in children, youth, parents, adults, families and the community. The campus contained basketball courts and a nursery for a horticultural business. Centro civilian staff also trained over 500 police at the Puerto Rico Police Academy in community equity policing.

During the first generation replication, funded by the Justice Department, Index crime was reduced by over 26 percent over 4 years in the residential safe haven-ministation neighborhood. Over the same period, Index crime in San Juan declined only 11 percent and Index crime in the precinct surrounding the target neighborhood increased by 3 percent. Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation at that time through a grant from the Justice Department, the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or the city as a whole.

Centro also was included in the second generation, over 4 more years, as a model for new sites. During the second generation, funded by HUD, Index crime declined over 10 percent more in the original target neighborhood. But HUD asked for a priority on outreach by civilian "advocates" and community equity police -- into Villa Esperanza, a large, crime ridden public housing project in the police precinct surrounding the original target neighborhood. Over the same 4 years in this surrounding precinct, Index crime declined by 36 percent, and much could be attributed to the Centro outreach. (Reported Index crime declined by 25 percent in the rest of San Juan.)

The Centro replication continues on through Puerto Rico Department of Education funding. In 1999, by keynoting a well attended crime prevention conference in San Juan, the Foundation publicized the 10 years of success, and set the stage for a new round of fundraising in Puerto Rico and from the federal government.
The First Generation Replication Supported
By the Justice Department

The most successful first generation site was Centro Sister Isolina Ferre (Centro) in the Caimito neighborhood of San Juan. Because of this success, we continued to fund Centro with second generation HUD monies -- to provide a model for the other HUD sites, which were new. Centro was the only Justice Department site that we continued with HUD funding. Chapter 1 summarizes the first generation, Justice-funded success, and then goes on to describe the second generation, HUD-funded success.

Where Was the Justice Department Replication Located?

Founded in the 1960s in Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico, Centro began to replicate in San Juan in the late 1980s. Centro's founding premise was that, "If family and community can be strengthened, and meaningful employment made available, it might be possible to make substantial progress in the struggle against neighborhood crime and violence."

In San Juan, Centro operates in the semi-rural Caimito neighborhood -- characterized by a very high school dropout rate (averaging 30 percent), high unemployment of close to 50 percent among adults and 80 percent among youth, and extreme poverty. Seventy percent of the families receive public assistance. According to police reports, Caimito constitutes one of the highest delinquency and drug dependence communities in San Juan. Caimito also is the most remote part of San Juan, and delivery of public services to Caimito has lagged behind the rest of the metropolitan area. For example, the first Caimito police station was opened in 1985. The school system is overloaded, and school violence is common.

How Much was Spent and What Activities Were Carried Out in the Justice-Funded Replication?

Funding Levels

By 1990 and before Justice funding, Centro in San Juan built up an annual total budget of about $500,000. It secured local funds to build a police ministration. The following year, the Eisenhower Foundation subgranted funds from the U.S. Justice Department to Centro and arranged for local matches. Three years of funding was secured. Table 2 shows the amounts. The replication received $90,000 in Year 1, $75,000 in Year 2 and $37,500 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. For the first 2 years, 46 percent of the Justice Department funding was allocated to Centro -- mainly for salaries and benefits for
staff, as well as for related operating expenses. Fifty-four percent was allocated to the Puerto Rico police -- for partial coverage of salaries of 2 koban police and related benefits, operating expenses and training expenses at the Puerto Rico Police Academy. The percentages were about the same for the second year. However, for the last year, when Justice Department funding dropped from $75,000 to $37,500 (See Chapter 1), all of the Justice funding was allocated to Centro -- for staff salaries, benefits and related operating expenses. Over the 3 years, about 61 percent of the total match was covered by Centro and 39 percent by the police.

Replication Activities

Centro Caimito in San Juan created a beautiful, park-like campus. The campus included the residential police ministation, a central building with classrooms and administrative offices at the bottom of the palm-tree lined driveway that began with the ministation, a series of A-frame buildings that held classrooms, workrooms and businesses; a tree nursery and a recreational area. In effect, the entire campus was the safe haven, with the police ministation at the entrance.

Table 2
Justice Budget Summary
San Juan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Justice Year 1 1991</th>
<th>Justice Year 2 1992</th>
<th>Justice Year 3 1993</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice Department Grants</strong> Via the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Centro)</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Puerto Rico Police)</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td>$37,500</td>
<td>$202,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local In-Kind and Cash Matches</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Centro)</td>
<td>(56%)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(59%)</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Puerto Rico Police)</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(41%)</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$63,575</td>
<td>$78,575</td>
<td>$60,310</td>
<td>$202,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Centro)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(75%)</td>
<td>(58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Puerto Rico Police)</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$153,575</td>
<td>$153,575</td>
<td>$97,810</td>
<td>$404,960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Program budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice
With Justice Department funding (matched by other sources), Centro in Caimito ran 10 interrelated programs with a staff of 56. During the day, an alternative school program worked with dropouts on school remediation and the acquisition of general education degrees. A computer literacy and office skills training initiative, using donated IBM equipment, had students attending 30 hours per week. Adults attended cooking classes and other events. Young mothers came to classes while their children were cared for in a nursery. Immunizations and screenings were provided on-site by the Health Department. After school, a special safe haven program for 6 to 12 years olds helped youngsters with homework and involved them in arts, sports, and culture.

One building was used for the honey bee project -- begun to train high school dropouts and to self-employ them as beekeepers and producers of bee byproducts. (In Puerto Rico, pure bee honey is in demand, but it is not mass produced locally.) The project began with 5 beehives provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The honey and wax processing facilities were located at Centro.

A huge tree nursery, the Horticultural Project, was set up by Centro with support from the Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico, after a hurricane demolished much of the island's coastal vegetation. Centro had to promise to produce 100,000 baby trees in its first year as a condition of the grant. In Centro's semi-rural location, the project thrived -- and served as a visual affirmation of hope and respect for the community. In 1996, a grant of $500,000 from the Rural Economic and Community Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Agriculture expanded the nursery and generated jobs for 15 Caimito residents. Sales averaged $6,000 to $7,000 per week. As of 1997, the ambitious program had produced 600,000 trees for reforestation of the devastated areas.

Almost all Centro programs were designed to increase the leadership, confidence and competence of community youth -- many of whom came to Centro while they still were gang members. The most important innovations at Centro were the "intercessors" or "advocates" -- young, streetwise, paid staff members drawn from the community. The advocates acted as intermediaries and mediators between youth in trouble or on the verge of trouble and the community, the schools, the police and the rest of the criminal justice system. The role of advocates proceeded far beyond individual "counseling" or "mentoring" -- words that remain imprecisely defined today in the field of "youth development." Advocates were charged with "getting to know the youth and his or her peers and family, looking into the school, family and work situation, and understanding the day-to-day behavior of the youth." Advocates involved youth in the full range of developmental programs at Centro -- including job training, recreation, and tutoring. The police worked closely with the intercessors,
often calling them when a youth had been detained. If arrests were made, advocates helped youth in the court system.

The police ministation at the entrance to the Centro campus was a pleasant looking 3 level structure. It was modeled after a residential Japanese koban, but it also enhanced and added to the Japanese concept. Residential quarters for a family were on the top floor, ministation offices on the ground floor and an IBM computer training education center on the lower level. The police presence helped to protect the IBM equipment and to create a sense of security for the entire safe haven campus.

Several different officers -- male and female -- have lived in the ministation over the years, all with their spouses and children. Non-residential police officers, a civilian ministation director and advocates worked out of the ground floor offices. The residential officer typically was someone who grew up in the neighborhood and usually tried not to make arrests. This helped engender trust. Arrests were made, but generally by the other officers. Ministation police mentored youth, organized sports teams and made visits to schools and residences along with advocates to discuss problems experienced by youth.

Advocates and police practiced problem-oriented, community equity policing. For example, when the ministation began and mistrust of police by the community was high, a complaint was made by a family in the neighborhood about a dead cow that was in its yard. Neither the San Juan Sanitation Department nor the Health Department wanted to take away the cow. Finally, the residential koban officer and other koban police brought in a can of gasoline and cremated the cow. This made a great impact on the citizens, who increased their trust in and support of the police as a result of the experience.

The Centro executive director and other civilians actually trained police -- at a formal course at the Puerto Rico Police Academy. There was no scientific assessment of this training. But Centro staff observed changes for the better in the attitudes and behavior of the officers who participated. The Puerto Rico police agreed. A total of 500 officers eventually were trained. A training manual was written and distributed. The training process made it easy for Centro staff to be on the screening committee -- and to select the most qualified officers for the koban.

We concluded that this Centro police training was a potential model for use across the nation. Except for the training done by Professor James P. Comer at Yale University with the New Haven Police, as recently discussed in Youth Today,1 we know of few comparable attempts to train, and retrain, police at a local police academy, employing community leaders as teachers. None of the other replications supported through
Justice Department funds in the early 1990s was able to negotiate such comprehensive training at the local police academy. Given the crime-reducing success of the San Juan program, documented below, the need for such training cannot be dismissed as feel-good social work. Without such training, new police hired through federal community policing legislation may not have nearly as much impact as with the training, in our view. The need for such training is all the greater, we believe, given the police brutality, deteriorating race relations and deteriorating community relations associated with the current fashion of "zero tolerance" police in New York City and other places. (There are few scientific evaluations of such "zero tolerance" policing, despite the great publicity accorded it.)

How Was the Replication Managed and How Were Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?

Management

Caimito had excellent management. Centro Caimito was run by an intelligent, charismatic, tough, caring, politically savvy problem-solving nun who won everyone's heart. She surrounded herself with many committed, qualified staff members. They carried out their functions with great enthusiasm. In his study of Centro in Ponce, Charles Silberman observed:2

No community organization can succeed unless people conceive of it as belonging to them. In Puerto Rico, as in most Latin countries, "belonging" is thought of in terms of personal relationships, rather than power and control... To the Puerto Rican, power is derived from, and exercised through, personal relationships rather than through formal organization, and preserving those relationships takes precedence over achieving organizational goals. As a result, mainland Americans often see Puerto Ricans as inefficient, while Puerto Ricans regard mainlanders as cold and impersonal.

The genius of the program director was that she had the skill to both exercise power through personal relationships and to create sound organizational, time, financial and personnel management on a day-to-day basis.

Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training

San Juan civilian staff and police received training from Eisenhower staff and consultants via the original delegation to Japan, the national cluster workshops, funds to allow visits to observe other programs and site visits by Eisenhower personnel to San Juan. In turn, San Juan civilians trained police.
The San Juan director believed the best assistance was the direct funding from the Foundation, the ability of the Foundation to generate the involvement of the Puerto Rico police on the Japan delegation and day-to-day back home, the consequent matching of 2 or 3 police officers per year to the ministation, the willingness of the Foundation to lend its prestige to local fundraising, and the ability of the Foundation to let the director draw on local culture and tradition to create a replication that would be effective in a Puerto Rican context. Toward the end of the funding, the Foundation also gave an extra grant to Centro, so it could produce a training video for use by civilians and police in the second generation of replications. The video was excellent and used extensively.

What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?

The Justice Department-funded evaluation in San Juan (and in Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, as discussed in Chapter 1) was based on process information and on a pre-post quasi-experimental design using crime reported to the police in the target neighborhood, precinct and city.

In San Juan, there were 3 years of funding from the Justice Department. But Centro Caimito completed the residential ministation and began some operations the year before Justice Department funding began. Hence, we thought it valid to look at crime over 4 years in San Juan. (Local funders financed the ministation. During the year before Justice funding began, there were no funds for civilian operations, but advocates already employed by Centro spent some time on ministation-related activities. The police provided an officer as match.)

Crime as reported to the San Juan police was what the FBI in its Uniform Crime Reports calls "Part I Index crime" -- a summation of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, auto theft and larceny. Crimes of violence, like criminal homicide, occur with less frequency than crimes of theft, like burglary. The combined measure of the 7 Part I Index crimes, therefore, was relatively more a measure of theft than violence. In this report, we will refer to the 7 crime aggregate as "Index crime reported to police," "Index crime" "serious crime" or "crime" -- all meaning the same thing.

We were able to collect Index crime statistics from 3 geographic areas. The smallest area -- the "target area" -- was the immediate neighborhood served by the San Juan program. We used police data as closely matched to the geographic area served by the program, as the Puerto Rico Police crime reporting system would allow. The second area was the larger police precinct within which the Centro program was located (after we removed the target neighborhood crime counts from the precinct data). The third
area was the City of San Juan as a whole (after we removed the precinct and therefore the target neighborhood crime counts from the city data).

Index crime reported to police first increased in the target neighborhood in the pre-Justice year when police came on the scene and the program started. Then Index crime in the target neighborhood began to decline, in the first 2 years of Justice Department funding. This is shown in Table 3, Figure 1 and Figure 2.

The number of Index crimes also declined for the entire city. However, Index crime increased in the surrounding police precinct. Part of the precinct-level increase may have been due to a police crackdown on drug dealers in central San Juan at the time. Some dealers may have relocated to distant Caimito with its steep rugged hills and narrow twisting valleys. It is easier to hide there. If this interpretation has some merit, then the data suggested that, an exodus to Caimito notwithstanding, the police, advocates and community had some success in keeping dealer-related crime out of the immediate Centro neighborhood of Caimito.

After 4 years of the program's operation, total Index crime in the program's target area declined by almost 26 percent, compared to a decline of 11 percent for the city and an increase of about 3 percent for the precinct.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department in the early 1990s (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago), the improvement in Index crime for the target neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either of the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts.
### Table 3

**Justice Funding**

**Number of Index Crimes For The Target Neighborhood, Surrounding Precinct, And The City of San Juan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Pre-Justice Year Startup 1990</th>
<th>Year 1 1991</th>
<th>Year 2 1992</th>
<th>Year 3 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>35,218</td>
<td>32,170</td>
<td>35,812</td>
<td>31,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>1,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>33,661</td>
<td>30,678</td>
<td>34,427</td>
<td>29,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Change in Index Crime Over 4 Years**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-11.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-25.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI and Municipality of San Juan
The details of Centro's experience suggest that the extent of Index crime reduction produced by the program depended on the amount of Justice.
Centro experienced a decline in effectiveness when the Justice Department funding was reduced, with the drop in Index crime produced in the target neighborhood declining from 23 percent during the period of higher Justice Department funding to 4 percent when the budget was cut (see Table 3 and Figure 3.). Table 2 shows that the sharp drop in Justice funding in Year 3 was not compensated for by an increase in local match.

There also was process evaluation evidence from area school teachers that the program influenced youth. The police and the advocates worked with 100 high-risk youth as part of ministration operations. Among these youth, school absenteeism often diminished, according to teachers. School staff observed changes in the attitudes of the koban youth—including better language, improved dress, more responsiveness to authority, increased willingness to take on responsibility, and an improved ability and willingness to work. Some of these youth become school leaders. Grades improved among many of these youth.

**Continuation of the Program**

For a number of months, there was no federal continuation funding. There was a clear break in federal support. Then, in 1994, the Foundation was able to secure a final, one year, grant of $50,000 from the Justice Department. This grant was directly from Justice to Centro San Juan. No Justice funds were available for Eisenhower Foundation technical assistance.
Figure 3 However, before the year was up, the Foundation secured 3 more years of funding, from HUD as part of the second generation of replications. HUD funds also were available for Foundation technical assistance and evaluation. Because of the clean break in federal funding, we considered the second generation of San Juan replications to run from 1994 to 1998 -- covering the last Justice grant plus the three years of HUD support. Through all 4 years, the Puerto Rico police continued to match 3 officers in Caimito operations —1 resident and 2 non-residents.

**FIGURE 3**

**JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING AND PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME SAN JUAN TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD**

The final Justice Department grant was for operations in the same Caimito neighborhood in San Juan where the Centro safe haven campus with its residential and nonresidential minestation was located. However, the new HUD grant was for operations in 2 locations -- the original Centro San Juan safe haven campus and a nearby public housing project, Villa Esperanza. Villa Esperanza was a large development, well known for high crime, drug dealing and gang activity. HUD wanted Centro to give first priority to the Villa Esperanza location.
How Much Was Spent and What Activities Were Carried Out in the Replication?

Funding Levels

In addition to the final grant of $50,000 from the Justice Department to Centro in 1994 and the resulting $119,834 in police in-kind matches in 1994 -- all of which carried over into 1995 -- the Foundation made direct grants to Centro via HUD and the Center for Global
Partnership from 1995 to 1998. During the same period, the Foundation raised in-kind police matches. Table 4 shows the amounts. Centro received $49,275 from the Foundation in 1995-1996, $32,000 in 1996-1997 and $34,000 in 1997-1998 -- all for civilian operations. In addition, local in-kind matches were $119,834 for each of the 3 HUD funding periods, and primarily covered the salaries of the three police officers assigned to work with Centro.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HUD Year 1 (9/95-8/96)</th>
<th>HUD Year 2 (8/96-8/97)</th>
<th>HUD Year 3 (9/97-8/98)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants via The Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>$49,275&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$32,000&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$34,000&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$115,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local In-Kind</td>
<td>$119,834&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$119,834</td>
<td>$119,834</td>
<td>$359,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$169,109</td>
<td>$151,834</td>
<td>$153,834</td>
<td>$474,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>To make this Table 4 comparable to similar tables for HUD-funded sites in later chapters, we have only included HUD resources here. However, as discussed in the text, we considered a final Justice Department grant directly to center in 1994 as part of the second generation of HUD work. This grant was made in 1994. It was for $35,000 from Justice. It generated $119,834 in local match. Before it ran out, the first HUD grant began. Technically then, for San Juan, the second generation ran from 1994 to 1998.

<sup>2</sup>This figure includes $35,000 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as $14,275 from the Center for Global Partnership.

<sup>3</sup>This figure represents HUD funding only.

<sup>4</sup>This figure represents HUD funding only.

<sup>5</sup>The local in-kind figures refer to in-kind services from the local police departments and other local agencies that include salaries, youth advocate, utilities, supplies, field trips, awards, transportation, space, equipment, and phones.

<sup>1</sup>To make this Table 4 comparable to similar tables for HUD-funded sites in later chapters, we have only included HUD resources here. However, as discussed in the text, we considered a final Justice Department grant directly to center in 1994 as part of the second generation of HUD work. This grant was made in 1994. It was for $35,000 from Justice. It generated $119,834 in local match. Before it ran out, the first HUD grant began. Technically then, for San Juan, the second generation ran from 1994 to 1998.

<sup>2</sup>This figure includes $35,000 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as $14,275 from the Center for Global Partnership. This figure represents HUD funding only.

<sup>4</sup>This figure represents HUD funding only.

<sup>5</sup>The local in-kind figures refer to in-kind services from the local police departments and other local agencies that include salaries, youth advocate, utilities, supplies, field trips, awards, transportation, space, equipment, and phones.
Replication Activities

The final year Justice funds, the in-kind police matches to Justice, some of the HUD funds, and some of the in-kind matches to HUD continued work at the original site -- the Caimito Centro campus. A portion of the HUD funds and of the in-kind police matches was focused on Villa Esperanza. No new safe haven-ministation was set up in Villa Esperanza, but some of the time of the civilian advocates and of the trained ministation police now was spent there. This was outreach -- mainly in the form of counseling youth, involving youth in athletic activities and undertaking police-citizen patrols. Some of the Villa Esperanza youth also ended up coming to the main Centro campus to participate in the full range of activities there.

How Was the Replication Managed and How Were Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?

Management  The high quality of civilian replication management characteristic of the first generation continued during a little more than half of the HUD-funded period. Then the executive director departed, after almost 8 years of developing and running the Centro San Juan campus, because, as a nun, she was reassigned by her order -- to work with the elderly and the terminally ill in New York. It took many months to find a qualified replacement. During this time, a hurricane devastated the island of Puerto Rico, damaging much of the campus and tearing roofs off the buildings. For a while there was no electricity and no communications. The campus closed down. Then it reopened, and a civilian, with a master's degree in social work, was named director. The new director slowly brought the program back to life, but, understandably, for months before and after she came on, it was impossible to maintain the past high levels of management. To the great credit of the Puerto Rico police superintendent, the 3 police continued to be assigned to Centro.

Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training

Ideally, the Eisenhower Foundation would have wanted to invest emergency resources after the hurricane. But such funds were not available. During the first part of the HUD funding, Eisenhower technical assistance continued through national cluster workshops and site visits. Centro staff also assisted the second generation sites. There was little technical assistance and training during the months when Centro San Juan was without a director and was functioning at reduced capacity because of the hurricane's devastation.

What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?
During the first generation replication, 1990 to 1993, total Index crime in the original target area neighborhood declined by almost 26 percent, compared to a decline of 11 percent for the city and an increase of 3 percent for the precinct. (See above.) The original target neighborhood was where the Centro San Juan campus was located and where police and advocates also did outreach work with families and schools. It encompassed police sectors 813 and 814 in the overall Caimito police precinct.

From 1993 to 1994, Index crime increased in the police sector 813 and 814 target area. Then, as the second generation replications of the 1994-1998 period began, Index crime decreased. Later into the 1994-1998 second generation period, Index crime began to inch up again.

Overall, Index crime in the target police sector 813 and 814 neighborhood declined almost 11 percent when we compared the 1994 base year to the average for 1995 through 1998. (Table 5, Figure 2 and Figure 3.)

We are not really certain why Index crime rose from 1993 to 1994 in the target police sector 813 and 814 neighborhood. We would hope that it might have been related somehow to the clean break in federal funding for a time. However, we are more confident that the drop in Index crime from 1994 to 1995 in 813 and 814 reflected the renewed functioning of the full ministration and safe haven campus program -- via the carryover Justice funding, the new HUD funding, the return of Eisenhower technical assistance and the continued presence of 3 police. Index crime then began to inch up, we believe, because of the management decline due to the departure of the executive director and the devastation of the hurricane. In addition, perhaps partly as a result of the sense of security engendered in 813 and 814 as a result of the first generation success, there was a burst of commercial development in 813 around 1995 and 1996. This appears to have attracted new crime.

During the HUD funding, the 11 percent drop in Index crime in the original target police sectors 813 and 814 was quite remarkable, we concluded -- given that (1) the neighborhood already had sharp crime drops from 1990 to 1993 (so diminishing returns may have set in) (2) The Caimito precinct where the program operated was the highest crime area in San Juan, (3) the second generation HUD funds and police matches were being stretched between the original target neighborhood and the higher priority Villa Esperanza public housing project, (4) the director departed and (5) the hurricane disrupted the interventions.

More remarkable is what happened in the rest of the Caimito precinct. Roughly speaking, the 813 and 814 police sectors are in the middle of the Caimito precinct. Police sectors 811 and 812 are above and contiguous.
Police sector 815 is below and contiguous. 811, 812, 813, 814 and 815 compose the entire Caimito police precinct. When we looked at the rest of the precinct minus the original 813 and 814 target neighborhood, we first saw an increase in Index crime reported from 1993 to 1994 and then a very dramatic drop in Index crime from 1994 to 1995. When we compared the base year of 1994 to the average for 1995 through 1998, Index crime dropped over 36 percent in the rest of the precinct (police sectors 811, 812 and 815). This was much greater than the 11 percent drop in the original 813 and 811 target neighborhood (as could be expected, given the above explanations) -- but also considerably greater than the 25 percent drop over the same years in the City of San Juan (excluding the highest crime Caimito precinct and including all other precincts -- high, medium and low crime areas). Table 5, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the details.

The Villa Esperanza public housing project is in police sector 812. We attribute the decline there to the new outreach of advocates and police into the project. We also believe there was spillover into the contiguous 811 sector from these new interventions. The new program director also attributes much of the decline in the 815 police sector to new outreach there.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BASE YEAR</th>
<th>PROGRAM YEARS 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>469.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,080.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>31,461</td>
<td>23,595.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>610.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>29,978</td>
<td>22,515.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE BETWEEN BASE YEAR AND PROGRAM YEARS AVERAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td>-24.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI and Municipality of San Juan
Continuation of the Program

The program used several strategies to continue the safe haven-ministration, based on interviews with the new director. After the Eisenhower grants via HUD expired, Centro submitted a proposal to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Department of Education. The Department approved a $50,000 grant for fiscal year 1998-1999 -- for the director and civilian advocates. The grant may be reviewed annually during the next four years, provided an annual proposal is submitted.

However, the Department of Education required the safe haven-ministration to work only with children ages 6 to 12 years old. The important teen programs had to be dropped, as was the work with Villa Esperanza.

The number of police at the campus ministration had gone down to 2, but the Puerto Rico Police later added back the third, and the team reportedly is working well together. Our concept of community equity policing remains in place. Unfortunately, at least for now Centro training of police no longer is allowed in the Puerto Rico Police Academy.

The Centro and the safe haven-ministration also obtain small donations in kind from different businesses in the locality.
In order to assist the new director, who is energetic and has a very positive attitude, the Eisenhower Foundation organized a crime prevention Congress in San Juan in early 1999 at the InterAmerican University of Puerto Rico, where a Foundation Trustee is Professor of Law and Criminology. The President of the Foundation keynoted, and a distinguished panel of practitioners, scholars and other experts presented. A large audience included the Police Academy director, police, police cadets, the Centro staff, scholars, practitioners, civic leaders, and media.

The objective of the Congress was to generate renewed public interest in the consistently successful replications in Puerto Rico, introduce the new program director, identify new funders, maintain police support and return to Centro training by civilians of police at the Police Academy. Building on this momentum, the Foundation will approach the governor of Puerto Rico and Mayor of San Juan for a new generation of replications on the island. The Foundation also will approach federal agencies to fund the original San Juan model and new sites, with Centro San Juan, taking the lead in training trainers and staff. The full array of Centro programs, including crucial interventions for teenagers and the business enterprises, will be reestablished.

There are few youth development or community policing programs that can claim 10 years of success. Centro is one. Especially given the nativity of the currently political buzz word "self-sufficiency," the Foundation believes it is both cost-effective and, more important, morally imperative, to keep the flame burning bright at Centro.
Footnotes

2. The Campus Boulevard Corporation and the Philadelphia Police

Begun in 1978, the nonprofit Campus Boulevard Corporation (CBC) already had a long term working relationship with the Philadelphia Police when Justice Department funding began via the Eisenhower Foundation in the early 1990s. CBC's mission is to promote neighborhood, commercial and institutional revitalization, as well as to strengthen working relationships among all residents in the community. At the time of the replication, CBC had a budget of about $160,000 per year.

CBC undertook the replication in the Logan neighborhood of North Philadelphia. Logan is poor, with an annual average income of less than $20,000. It is roughly a 20 minute drive from downtown Philadelphia. The neighborhood incorporates 146 blocks, ranging from totally abandoned buildings to blocks fully occupied by home owners. There are approximately 8,000 residents. Most are African-American, although the Asian and Hispanic populations are growing. The neighborhood has a higher density of children and youth than almost any place in Philadelphia. Thirty-four percent of the population is under the age of 18, and the majority of children are high-risk.

The CBC Replication and its Funding

The CBC replication centered on a former crack house that the police closed down and that was rehabilitated into a nonresidential koban police ministation. Table 6 summarizes the budget for the Philadelphia program over the 3 years of funding. The program received $100,000 in Year 1, $60,000 in Year 2 and $50,850 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. For all 3 years, the entire Justice Department allocation was to CBC -- mainly for civilian staff salaries, benefits, travel, equipment and related operating expenses. None of the Justice Department funding was allocated to the Philadelphia Police. Over the 3 years, about 26 percent of the total match was covered by CBC and 74 percent by the police. The police match was mainly for the 3 officers assigned to work at and undertake foot patrols from the ministation. Besides CBC and the police, the third partner to the venture was the Logan Koban Advisory Council. The Advisory Council was composed of both community residents and the police. The Philadelphia Police and the Advisory Council signed a contract to define their roles and responsibilities in the operation of the koban. The Captain of the 35th Police District, where the koban is located, trained civilian Advisory Council members in public safety and law enforcement procedures. In turn, the Advisory Council trained the koban officers and other 35th District officers in human relations and community organizing strategies.
The Advisory Council training of police was not as well developed as in San Juan, but it was similar in concept.

### Table 6
**Budget Summary, Philadelphia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice Department Grants</strong></td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
<td>$50,850</td>
<td>$210,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>via the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent CBC)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Philadelphia Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local In-Kind and Cash</strong></td>
<td>$179,300</td>
<td>$201,950</td>
<td>$125,350</td>
<td>$506,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent CBC)</td>
<td>(84%)</td>
<td>(74%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td>(74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Philadelphia Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$279,300</td>
<td>$261,950</td>
<td>$176,200</td>
<td>$717,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent CBC)</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(42%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Philadelphia Police)</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(58%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Program budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice*

### The Nonresidential Koban

The ministation was the hub of civilian and police activity, and the point of departure for police foot patrols. The Japanese mass daily newspaper, *Mainichi Shimbun*, observed:*  

People drop by very casually to the Logan koban. After all, it is run by both police and citizens. Police officers visit each household and urge them to have their children immunized. Children can get shots if they come to the koban. A troop of young volunteers depart from the koban to help elderly neighbors prune trees and cut grass. The telephone keeps ringing all the time. "A street light is burned out," says one caller. "Somebody parked illegally in front of my garage," says another.

### The Lead Role of Youth
The most prominent activity operating from the ministation was youth development. Because 34 percent, or nearly 3,000 Logan residents, were under the age of 18, virtually everyone in Logan agreed that youth development activities were needed. The Eisenhower grant provided funding for a full-time paid staff member to coordinate youth activities and to manage the koban on a daily basis. Coordinating programs with the City of Philadelphia, this staff member was able to supervise scores of teenagers during summer youth clean-up programs.

One youth activity was the championship East Logan Drill Team. It grew in numbers and status over the three years of Eisenhower funding. Funds were raised to travel to Atlanta to perform in the Martin Luther King, Jr. Parade and to Washington, DC in 1994 to perform before the Attorney General of the United States for a National Night Out commemoration. The Attorney General later was made an honorary member of the Drill Team. The Drill Team also became more organized, with an advisory group assisting in fund-raising and planning.

Unlike Centro in San Juan, there was no attempt to create remedial education, youth job training and job placement programs. One-on-one mentoring by police with individual youth was not as intense as in San Juan or Boston -- although mentoring by police of youth in groups was as extensive in Philadelphia as it was in San Juan.

**Evaluation**

Index crime declined in the Logan neighborhood. Index crime also declined for the entire City of Philadelphia and in the surrounding police precinct. However, after 3 years of the program's operation, total Index crime for the city had declined about 11 percent and by less than 4 percent in the precinct, but total Index crime in the Logan target area declined more than 23 percent. This is shown in Table 7 and Figure 5. The drop in Index crime was more than twice as great where the program operated than where it did not operate.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago) the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. See Appendix 1 for details of the design of the evaluation, statistical analyses used, validity and reliability of the data, selection biases and regression artifacts.
Table 7
Number of Index Crimes for the Target Neighborhood, Surrounding Precinct, and the City of Philadelphia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td></td>
<td>109,139</td>
<td>97,359</td>
<td>97,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,080</td>
<td>7,065</td>
<td>7,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>821</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td>101,059</td>
<td>90,294</td>
<td>90,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,259</td>
<td>6,432</td>
<td>6,999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change in Index Crime Over 3 Years

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-23.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change in Index Crime in Target Neighborhood With Higher and Lower Justice Department Funding^

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2 (Higher Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-22.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3 (Lower Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The declines for the years of higher Justice Department funding and lower Justice Department funding do not add up to the 3 year total because different baseline years are used for calculating the amount of change.

Source: City of Philadelphia Police
As Table 7 and Figure 6 show, Index crime in the Logan neighborhood declined almost 23 percent from Year 1 to Year 2. Total Justice
Department funding for those 2 years was $160,000. But Index crime declined less than 1 percent from Year 2 to Year 3. Justice Department funding was reduced to $50,850 in Year 3. Table 5 also shows that the third year drop in Justice Department funding was not compensated for by an increase in local match.

That Index crime went down more in the area of Philadelphia served by the program than it did for the whole city or in the police precinct surrounding the program area indicates the program was effective in reducing crime. The effectiveness of the program is confirmed by the sensitivity of the program's effect on Index crime to the program's level of funding.

After the funding drop from the original levels of about $100,000 per year, the program needed to rely more and more on volunteers. On the relationship between funding and success, the program director concluded, "Volunteering is really good, but people need a program to volunteer for, and in order to do that, you have to have dollars."

**Management**

We concluded that sound management and careful oversight were among the reasons for the replication's success. CBC had the same executive director for most of the program, with a new executive director on board toward the end. Both were good managers and organizers. The first executive director wrote a handbook to guide others in the start-up of a nonresidential koban. The handbook contains practical nuts-and-bolts sections on choosing a location, staffing, equipping the koban, opening the program through a media event that maximizes attention and involvement, operating foot patrols and crime prevention day-to-day, and collecting information to assess needs and evaluate outcomes.

The second executive director brought management skills refined as Director of Economic Development for the City of Camden. Also crucial to the success, in our view, was the Philadelphia Police Precinct Captain assigned to direct work with the ministration and community. He remained in this position throughout the program, did a good job in guiding the officers assigned to the ministration and was a particularly articulate and savvy advocate.

The joint community-police Advisory Council oversaw all activities of the koban ministration. The Council met monthly. It had responsibility for local fundraising, maintaining the physical facility, recruiting volunteer staff and communicating the needs of the neighborhood to the police. Through the Council, community members really were equal partners with CBC and the police. In many other community-police partnerships across
the United States, community residents are in a more passive role. Sometimes they are perceived more as window dressing, part of the public relations program of the police department. This definitely was not the case with the Logan non-residential koban.

**Continuation of the Program**

After Justice Department funding ended, the program continued, but at lower levels of funding, in part because the police chief who supported the replication moved on to another city.
3. The Dorchester Youth Collaborative and the Boston Police

The Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) was established in the late 1970s, in Field's Corner, Dorchester, a low income, rapidly changing Boston neighborhood. Today, Field's Corner is racially and ethnically mixed, with large Hispanic, African-American, Asian-American (Vietnamese and Cambodian) and white populations. An extended family safe haven and sanctuary after school and in the summers, DYC provides nontraditional services, activities and advocacy for local youth deemed to be at high risk of delinquency, teen pregnancy, school failure and substance abuse. DYC fills an important prevention gap in Dorchester -- between programs for youth who will make it anyway and youth who are deep into the juvenile justice system.

The Replication and its Funding

Through the Eisenhower grant of Justice Department funds, the DYC replication built on the youth media enterprise and counseling that DYC pioneered in the 1980s and integrated it with new prevention roles for police.

At the time of the replication in the early 1990s, DYC's core budget was about $600,000 per year, not counting Justice Department funds. Table 8 summarizes the resources that we added, showing the budget for the 3 years of Justice funding and local matches. The program received $100,000 in Year 1, $85,000 in Year 2 and $42,500 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. For the first 2 years, 65 percent of the Justice funding was allocated to DYC, mainly for staff salaries, benefits and travel. Thirty-five percent was allocated to police, mainly for salaries and benefits. For the last year, 76 percent of the Justice funding was allocated to DYC and 24 percent to police. Over the 3 years, about 33 percent of the total match was covered by DYC and about 67 percent by the police. The police match mainly covered salaries and benefits of officers and supervisors.
With this funding, the civilian part of the replication was led by a full-time, salaried Neighborhood Services Coordinator, who also served as counselor for "near-peers." This staffer was an adult, but the near-peers he supervised were younger adults who worked for pay part-time, a minimum of three days per week. These near-peers served as role models for the youth in the program. The near-peers were teenagers 2 to 6 years older than the targeted youth who had already successfully resolved many of the crises that the target youth faced -- such as recruitment from gangs and from drug dealers. In groups and one-on-one, the near-peers interacted with youth in positive ways and monitored their behavior. The near-peer concept had been employed by DYC for a number of years, and the new initiative extended past operations by adding more paid near peers.

In addition to help with homework and sporting activities, the priority at DYC was to organize "prevention clubs," which provided structured activity around areas of interest identified by youth. For example, three clubs -- the Center for Urban Expressions (CUE), Extreme Close Up and the Public Speaking Club -- developed youth as actors in local productions, presenters in public service announcements and on paid

| Table 8 |
| Budget Summary, Boston |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Department Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>via the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$85,000</td>
<td>$42,500</td>
<td>$227,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent DYC)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Boston Police)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local In-Kind and Cash Matches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent DYC)</td>
<td>$249,900</td>
<td>$211,339</td>
<td>$86,100</td>
<td>$547,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Boston Police)</td>
<td>(34%)</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
<td>(42%)</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Boston Police)</td>
<td>(66%)</td>
<td>(71%)</td>
<td>(58%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$349,900</td>
<td>$296,339</td>
<td>$128,600</td>
<td>$774,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent DYC)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td>(53%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Boston Police)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td>(47%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Program budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice
commercials, hosts of community service television and radio talk shows, stars of community service videos marketed through Blockbuster Video and K-Mart and, in 1997, the acting leads in a Hollywood-financed motion picture, titled Squeeze. There are a number of community-based programs around the nation which are creating such media productions, in which youth communicate to peers as well as to adults. But none has the cutting edge status of the DYC ventures, in our experience. In our view, there is a compelling need for a comprehensive, grassroots national media strategy that communicates to the public that we do know what works. The DYC model is integral to the development of such a national media strategy, in our view. The DYC model is both a program intervention that develops youth and a grassroots venue for communicating what works.

In the past, public service and paid television announcements on inner city-related issues, like crime and drugs, typically have been by establishment, national organizations that have claimed to have an impact but never demonstrated it in a scientific way. Some of the ads also have been racially insensitive. We believe a new generation of television messengers should be bubble up, not top down -- created and acted in by youth leaders in nonprofits, like DYC, that have proven themselves in youth media enterprise. As we shall see, there is scientific evidence backing the success of DYC.

The prevention clubs were racially integrated and bilingual. They were about equally divided among African American, Asian, Hispanic and white youth. The youth really did relate to one another, as any observer who spent a day hanging around the DYC headquarters could attest. There was a constant flow of young people in and out, with hugs, handshakes, amusement and good will. This was a significant achievement in a community which -- like all too many others in urban America -- was wrecked by frequent racial conflict among its youth. Developing an integrated youth program was an important goal, rarely tried by other agencies, and an important accomplishment. DYC, therefore, also is an integration model that works -- in response to the continuing divisions of race and poverty in America. It sets forth solutions that the national dialogue on race can embrace, turn into action and replicate.

The prevention clubs served as magnets to draw youth into group and individual relationships with DYC adult staff, near-peers and police. The relationships allowed youth to deal with personal problems on a day-to-day and sometimes crisis basis, and also to develop individual skills. Some of the skills had considerable glamour attached to them -- like becoming successful actors and public speakers. There also were jobs for youth who could not achieve "star" status in glamorous roles. For example, these were jobs in scheduling events, producing the art work that was the backdrop for performance videos and live performances, and setting up
stage sets. Such skill-building was designed to increase the confidence of program youth. The work skills also were displayed to adults in the community through the performances. As a result, skill building served to increase understanding by adults in the community of the youth, and to reduce the fear the adults had of the youngsters.

DYC staff concentrated heavily on problem-solving skills. Such skills included resolving conflicts and expressing feelings through words rather than acting them out through, for example, violence. Adult staff and near-peers sought to reduce episodes in which youth would "tear down" each other. Such behavior was particularly common among younger kids who began at DYC — who really didn't know how to fight fairly. Their behavior often was a natural result of the trauma and desensitization they experienced by being exposed to violence at home and on the street. By contrast, older youth had successfully graduated to making jokes about each other, but not doing it in a negative, "tearing down" way. The older youth could laugh at themselves without becoming defensive or self-defeating. They expressed themselves through love rather than disregard.

In turn, such skill building was used by DYC staff to help with preemployment training, employment training and placement. Over the summers, about two-thirds of the targeted youth were placed in summer youth employment programs, coordinated by the City of Boston, a community development corporation and private-sector businesses. During the summer, DYC also functioned like a camp, operating from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Scheduled activities included pool, bowling, art, Afrocentric and multicultural education, basketball, swimming, breakfast and lunch.

The safe havens represented by DYC — and Centro Sister Isolina Ferre -- are the kind of settings advocated in the Carnegie Corporation report, A Matter of Time: Risk and Opportunity in the Nonschool Hours.

The Role of Police

Police then were brought into the process of outreach, counseling, near-peering, and skill development. This was a radical innovation for Fields Corner, because, in the past, police had always been viewed as the enemy. Two young African-American officers became, in effect, paid, adult staffers and near peers, making regular visits to the safe haven three times a week. Initially, there was a considerable degree of mistrust by the youth of the police, and vice-versa. Yet bonds formed, and the officers ended up counseling youth on personal matters and receiving calls from the young people during off hours. Often relationships became deeper as a result of crises, as when a local teenager was killed and the DYC youth and officers sat down to discuss their feelings.
Nationally, the NBC Today show covered the program in 1994. The President and Attorney General featured it that same year in a Washington, DC rally at the Justice Department for the 1994 Crime Bill:

Attorney General Reno (with President Clinton): I learned from Eddie Kutanda in Boston on my last trip there as we discussed the crime bill and anti-crime initiatives. Eddie is an example to me of the young people of America, people who want to belong, who want to contribute, who want to make a difference -- and who need a little bit of support along the way.

Eddie Kutanda (of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative): I'd like to thank President Clinton and Attorney General Reno for being here. I'd like to introduce community police officers Harold White and Tony Platt. And I'd like to introduce two friends of mine, Tyrone Burton and Fung Du Ung. They're in my acting group, Extreme Close Up, at the Dorchester Youth Collaborative. We do writing and acting. Back in the days, I used to hate the police...Harold and Tony have changed all that....

The Field's Corner Police Commander concluded, "Although this type of initiative may not be welcomed with open arms by policing traditionalists, an analysis of the end results would surely justify this type of interaction in other cities." As a result of their work with DYC, the police began to reach out to other youth organizations in the area, where similar relationships were developed.

The Boston Peoples' Tribunal (a coalition of churches, the Black Educator's Alliance, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, and Citizens for Safety) presented its Police and Youth Leadership Award for 1993 to the police mentors and to program youth -- for setting a standard of commitment and dedication that improved the community.

The community policing part of the Justice Department-funded initiative was based on work typically done by the Japanese koban officer who is assigned to walk the neighborhood, rather than the officer who stays at the koban. Foot patrols were begun in the summer of 1991. A local television evening magazine did a feature story on them. Police averaged 600-700
patrol hours a month in the target area. Officer presence also was increased at school crossings, bus pick-ups and bus drop-offs.

Police worked with merchants to remove pay phones from premises -- because they were used extensively by drug dealers. In problem-oriented ways, police also worked with DYC and landlords in identifying housing units that were used for drug sales. For example, DYC staff identified 3 abandoned houses to police near DYC that were being used for illegal drug activity by addicts. The houses were demolished.

The police and DYC youth participated in a graffiti abatement day. Working with landlords and merchants in the area and using paint donated by the police, participants cleaned up two large walls in the target area. In one location, the names of 3 youths who had been killed were graffitied onto the wall as a way of memorializing them. This led to a larger project in which an African-American mural was designed on this space. The Boston Deputy Superintendent concluded that this graffiti abatement program led to something much larger, a perception by the youth that the police were sensitive to their needs.

**Evaluation**

Index crime declined in the Field's Corner neighborhood targeted by the program. Index crime also declined for the entire City of Boston. However, as Table 9 and Figure 7 show, after 3 years of the replication's operation, total Index crime for the city had declined about 11 percent, but total Index crime in the target area declined 27 percent. Index crime also declined in the surrounding police precinct, down 20 percent.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago), the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhood was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. See Appendix 1 for details of the design of the evaluation, statistical analyses used, validity and reliability of the data, selection biases and regression artifacts.

Table 9 and Figure 8 show that, in the program neighborhood, Index crime declined more than 27 percent from Year 1 to Year 2. Total Justice Department funding for these 2 years was $185,000. But Index crime increased slightly from Year 2 to Year 3. Justice Department funding was reduced to $42,500 in Year 3. Table 8 shows that the third year drop in Justice Department funding was not compensated by an increase in local match. Instead, local match dropped even more precipitously than Justice Department funding.
Table 9

Number of Index Crimes for the Target Neighborhood, Surrounding Precinct and the City of Boston

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Crimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>62,039</td>
<td>56,403</td>
<td>55,555</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>532</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>60,547</td>
<td>55,018</td>
<td>54,142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>401</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Change in Index Crime Over 3 Years**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-19.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-26.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Change in Index Crime in Target Neighborhood With Higher and Lower Justice Department Funding**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2</td>
<td>-27.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Higher Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3</td>
<td>+0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lower Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The decline for the years of higher Justice Department funding and the increase for the year of lower Justice Department funding do not add up to the 3 year total because different baseline years are used for calculating the amount of change.

Source: City of Boston Police
Figure 7
Changes in Index Crime for the Target Neighborhood, Surrounding Precinct and the City of Boston, 1991-1993

Source: City of Boston Police
The greater reduction in Index crime for the area of Boston served by the program than for the whole city or for the surrounding police precinct indicates the program was effective in reducing Index crime. The effectiveness of the program is confirmed by the sensitivity of the program's effect on Index crime to the program's level of funding.

Although Index crime did not decline as much in the surrounding precinct as it did in the target area, the decline in Index crime in the surrounding precinct was almost twice as large as the decline in Index crime for the whole city. We conclude that the greater decline in Index crime in the precinct than in the city may have been a beneficial side effect of the program. The impact of the program may have spilled over into nearby communities and reduced their Index crime as well, but not as much as Index crime was reduced in the target Field's Corner area.

**Management**

Beyond the program interventions, we concluded that the success of the Boston replication was due to good management. The replication was well
implemented. Especially impressive were the initial planning sessions between DYC and the Boston Police, the ongoing implementation and midcourse correction meetings that were held, and the sustained commitment of the Boston Police at the highest levels as well as at local command levels.

**Continuation of the Program**

After Justice Department funding ended, the program did not carry on as originally designed, but merged into a broader alliance among community groups and police in Dorchester that resulted in continuing drops in crime. Boston emerged as perhaps the best model in the nation for how to both reduce crime and improve relations between police and minority communities.
4. Youth Guidance and the Chicago Police

In Chicago, the Eisenhower Foundation used the Justice Department support to fund Youth Guidance. Youth Guidance has been a private, non-profit social service agency serving inner city youth in Chicago since 1923. Its historic mission has been to help disadvantaged inner city youth become responsible, productive adults. Since 1968, almost all of the agency's services have been delivered from within the Chicago public schools. Collaboration is with both the school and community agencies. Youth Guidance programs include counseling and creative arts, school-to-work transition, the Comer School Development Program, parental involvement, and wellness. The agency utilizes a variety of cutting edge methods that are continually evaluated and updated. In the early 1990s, the annual budget of Youth Guidance was about $2M.

The program was implemented in the Hyde Park neighborhood. Founded in 1873, Hyde Park is a community of about 20,000 located 7 miles south of Chicago's Loop and characterized by considerable racial, cultural, economic and age diversity. Its eastern boundary is Lake Michigan. The largest institution in Hyde Park is the University of Chicago, which adds even greater diversity to the neighborhood with its faculty and student population. Although Hyde Park has its share of urban problems, there is nevertheless a small town atmosphere and a strong sense of community pride. In spite of its economic diversity, the neighborhood is predominately middle class.

Hyde Park is surrounded on the north, south and west by poor African-American communities, like Washington Park and Woodlawn, and by public housing projects. Hyde Park's attractive 53rd Street shopping district, home of the only movie theater on the massive South Side and many fast-food restaurants, has always been a magnet for African-American teenagers from the outside communities looking for a safe hangout from the gang violence of their South Side neighborhoods. During the time of the program, the great majority of these poor African-American youth, aged about 15 to 19, were well behaved. However some of the youth, also about 15 to 19 and also from the surrounding communities, were less well behaved, especially those who traveled in groups. They often intimidated others on the street, and engaged in law breaking behavior, such as vandalizing community businesses, stealing from people on the street and demanding food from people who had just made purchases. In addition, young African-American adults, aged about 19 to 25, came into Hyde Park from the surrounding communities with the intent of robbing and burglarizing in an oasis with money and valuable property. Youth from the Hyde Park neighborhood itself also congregated on 53rd Street. Some were well behaved and some were not.
In the early 1990s, a subcommittee of neighborhood residents began to meet and discuss the increased level of cultural conflict, racial conflict, teen violence and crime on 53rd in the aftermath of the large crowds attending such violent movies as "New Jack City" and "Boyz N the Hood." The Hyde Park Theater catered almost exclusively to the African-American teenage trade. A great deal of community discussion centered on how police should handle these teenagers on 53rd Street on summer weekend evenings.

**The Replication and its Funding**

In response, Youth Guidance created a citizen coalition that consisted of itself and 3 nonprofit organizations. The citizens groups were indigenous to Hyde Park, and therefore close to the action. They were the Blue Gargoyle Youth Services Center, the Hyde Park Neighborhood Club and the South Side YMCA.

Based on case management of youth aged 10 to 18 and problem-oriented policing along the 53rd Street commercial strip, the replication was funded over 3 years as shown in Table 10. The program received $100,000 in Year 1, $89,315 in Year 2 and $45,000 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. The proportion of these amounts allocated to Youth Guidance varied from 65 percent in Year 1 to 76 percent in Year 2 and 100 percent in Year 3. The Justice Department funds allocated to Youth Guidance mainly covered salaries and benefits for staff at Youth Guidance, with small subgrants (ranging from $7,500 in the first year to $3,000 in the last year) each to the Blue Gargoyle, Hyde Park Neighborhood Club and the South Side YMCA, for staff salaries. The South Side YMCA also received $7,200 in Year 1 and $7,200 in Year 2 to pay for 100 Y memberships for low-income youth. The Justice Department funds to the police covered foot patrol officer and supervisor salaries and benefits. Over the 3 years, about 40 percent of the total match was covered by Youth Guidance and 60 percent by the police. The police match mainly was for foot patrol officer and supervisor salaries and benefits.
Case Management

Through case management, solutions were tailored to specific teenagers. Youth were recruited by street outreach workers as well as by staff from the community agencies and from surrounding schools. Recommendations from the schools came from teachers and principals. The planning team reviewed and screened applications of youth who were referred. The goal was to include about 100 at-risk youth at any one point in time. Selection criteria were flexible. But the emphasis tended to be on youth on the verge of serious trouble who, in the opinion of planning team members, could nonetheless still be saved. An example might be a youth with problems in school, but who still attended school. Or a youth might have been picked up for shoplifting and released, but had not gone to jail. For youth who were selected through street outreach, the planning team also was interested in how often they came to the 53rd Street area, how things were going at home and whether they were sincerely interested in the program. Almost all of the youth selected were African-American. About two-thirds were male. Most were aged 14 to 17.

As teenagers were recruited into the program, they were given a membership to the South Side YMCA and assigned a case manager. Most of the case managers were staff from the Blue Gargoyle, the Hyde Park Neighborhood Club and the South Side YMCA. One case manager was a University of Chicago police officer who also had been trained as a social worker. The case managers played some of the roles of the San Juan

Table 10

Budget Summary, Chicago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Department Grants</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$89,315</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>$234,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>via the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Youth Guidance)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Chicago Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local In-Kind and Cash Matches</td>
<td>$167,800</td>
<td>$67,109</td>
<td>$50,215</td>
<td>$285,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent to Youth Guidance)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent to Chicago Police)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$267,800</td>
<td>$156,424</td>
<td>$95,215</td>
<td>$519,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Youth Guidance)</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td>(83%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Chicago Police)</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td>(17%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice
advocates, like counseling with youth who already were in trouble with police but who had not been arrested. Throughout the program there were 3 to 7 case managers at any one time. Each case manager developed a plan of action with each youth. The plan included one-on-one counseling, group counseling and activity somewhat akin to the DYC Prevention Clubs in Boston. In groups, members worked out mutual problems and were organized by age, maturity and gender.

There appeared to be considerably less direct mentoring of high-risk youth by the Chicago City police than by the police in Boston and San Juan, though the University of Chicago Police case manager did an exceptional job.

Beyond individual and group counseling projects, other strategies were organized around events. For example, a job program was organized each summer, encompassing a wide range of tasks and serving 20 to 40 youth with paying jobs. Among the accomplishments of the summer employment projects was a beautiful African-American cultural mural painted at one end of the 53rd Street commercial strip under a train viaduct. Supervised by a renowned muralist and funded by local business people, the work attracted a great deal of attention at its opening ceremonies, which included the Mayor's wife and the new Chicago Police Superintendent. The participation by the Superintendent deepened his support of the initiative.

**Street Outreach and Community Policing**

During each of the 3 summers when the program operated, outreach workers from the youth agencies and foot patrol officers from the Chicago Police Department and the University of Chicago Police walked 53rd Street every Friday and Saturday night. The civilian outreach workers and the police cooperated closely and supported one another.

Using non-threatening conversation, the street workers talked to young people, even known gang members, to identify themselves and convey their purpose. For example, a street worker might say, "How you doing? I'm a street worker from the YMCA (or the Blue Gargoyle or Youth Guidance). I work in a project that tries to keep this area a peaceful crime-drug- and violence-free environment. We need your cooperation. If you see any trouble, just tell people to cool it. There are not a lot of places where kids can come and have 4 movie theaters and all of these shops. We don't want people clamping down on you." The street workers sought the cooperation of youth in maintaining what they hoped would be, in effect, a safe haven zone.
This activity can be criticized as merely trying to keep a lid on. But the street workers also tried to identify young people who were able and willing to be involved in case management mentoring. The street workers did not themselves counsel high-risk youth nearly as much as the advocates in San Juan and the near-peers in Dorchester, but the case managers did.

At the same time, the Chicago Police Department and the University of Chicago Police expanded foot patrols during the summer months in the 53rd Street area. Foot patrols increased by 50 percent in the summer of 1992, compared to the summer of 1991. The foot patrol officers did not receive the kind of training by citizens provided by Centro Sister Isolina Ferre at the San Juan Police Academy. But the Eisenhower Foundation did facilitate brief workshops in Chicago on problem-oriented community policing for both Chicago Police Department and the University of Chicago Police, as well as for community members. By 1993, as a result of the program, the entire 21st District became part of the new community policing initiative created by the new Police Superintendent in selected police districts.

**Evaluation**

As Table 11 and Figure 9 show, Index crime in the target neighborhood declined by 22 percent over the 3 years, while Index crime for the City of Chicago declined by 11 percent.

Index crime in the surrounding Precinct declined by 27 percent -- more than the 22 percent in the target neighborhood. This could imply that the Index crime drop vis-a-vis the city was due to some precinct-level effect, rather than due to the Hyde Park program.

However, the Hyde Park program appeared to show its own, independent, impact when we looked at the effect of the Justice Department budget cuts. Index crime dropped by 20 percent from Year 1 to Year 2 in the Hyde Park target neighborhood. Total Justice Department funding for these 2 years was $189,315. But Index crime declined by only 2 percent from Year 2 to Year 3 in the Hyde Park neighborhood. Justice Department funding was reduced to $45,000 in Year 3. (See Table 10, Table 11, and Figure 10.) The Year 3 decline in the precinct was 12 percent. If precinct-level effects had been solely responsible for changes in the Hyde Park neighborhood, we might have expected the Year 3 Hyde Park decline to be much closer to the precinct-level decline.

Thus, the effectiveness of the program was confirmed by the sensitivity of the program's effect on Index crime to the program's level of funding.
Table 10 shows that the third year drop in Justice Department funding was not compensated by an increase in local match.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago) the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. See Appendix 1 for details of the design of the evaluation, statistical analyses used, validity and reliability of the data, selection biases and regression artifacts. Appendix 1 also discusses how minor variations from the central tendency of the statistics can be ignored. (An example of such a minor variation consists of the Chicago precinct-level Index crime trends discussed above.)
### Table 11

**NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, SURROUNDING PRECINCT, AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Index Crimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td></td>
<td>323,909</td>
<td>299,625</td>
<td>287,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,816</td>
<td>10,561</td>
<td>9,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>1,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td></td>
<td>311,093</td>
<td>289,064</td>
<td>278,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,290</td>
<td>9,342</td>
<td>8,192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Change in Index Crime Over 3 Years**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>-10.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-27.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-21.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Change in Index Crime With Higher and Lower Justice Department Funding**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2 in the Target Neighborhood (Higher Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td>-20.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3 in the Target Neighborhood (Lower Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2 in the Precinct Minus Target</td>
<td>-17.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3 in the Precinct Minus Target</td>
<td>-12.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The declines for the years of higher Justice Department funding and lower Justice Department funding do not add up to the 3 year total because different baseline years are used for calculating the amount of change.*

Source: City of Chicago Police
Figure 9

Changes in Index Crime for the Target Neighborhood, Surrounding Precinct and the City of Chicago, 1991-1993

Source: City of Chicago Police
The counseling and mentoring by citizens and police seemed to us to be a key element in the Hyde Park crime drops. About 20 of the youth in case management participated over the entire 3 years of funding. Among these 20, almost all were on their way toward high school graduation and employment by the end of the case management. By contrast, the dropout rates in the 2 high schools which primarily served these youth were extremely high. For example, in 1991, the drop out rate for Hyde Park High School was 44 percent and for Martin Luther King High School was 63 percent. The case management program also gave the police the opportunity to acquire new skills.
**Management**

We found that Youth Guidance managed the program well. However, we are not certain that the grassroots, civilian, nonprofit coalition worked particularly well as a management tool. The key reason was that a great deal of time was spent in meetings among the implementing nonprofit agencies. By contrast, the Justice Department-funded initiatives in San Juan, Philadelphia and Boston concentrated relatively more time on direct service provision. Still, the Chicago program was successful -- in part, we concluded, because it carried out multiple solutions. When a battery of solutions is in place, one (here the coalition) might not necessarily work as well as intended. But the other solutions can pick up the slack and lead to positive outcomes.

**Continuation of the Program**

After Justice Department funding ended, much of the program continued, through City of Chicago funding.
5. The Baltimore Jobs in Energy Youth Center and the Baltimore Police

For decades, the people of South Baltimore worked at the giant Bethlehem Steel plant and shipyards that line the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. Not long ago, 60,000 well paid workers were employed by Bethlehem Steel. Many of them lived in South Baltimore. But by the mid-1990s, Bethlehem Steel's labor force was fewer than 15,000, and South Baltimore was home to the chronically unemployed. The collapse of South Baltimore's economic base in the 1980s wreaked havoc on family life. Breadwinners found themselves out of work and with few prospects of finding good new jobs.

Created in 1981, the nonprofit Baltimore Jobs in Energy Project (BJEP) set out as a modest response to these economic trends. Its mission was to create jobs for unemployed South Baltimore residents in the home weatherization business. BJEP was a licensed home improvement contractor specializing in energy efficiency. From smaller weatherization jobs, BJEP grew by specializing in comprehensive rehabilitation contracts for nonprofit housing developers, shelters and nonprofit service organizations. From the beginning, BJEP also advocated for fair low-income energy and housing policies by utility companies, banks and government agencies. BJEP's annual budget grew from less than $100,000 in 1982 to over $2M in the late 1980s. At this time, BJEP purchased an old Victorian building, a former police station in South Baltimore. BJEP took over one part of the building. Other parts were rented to other nonprofit organizations. A full scale, nonresidential koban and youth safe haven were planned. However, the Baltimore Police Commissioner who had been to Japan passed away and his successor had other priorities. But interest in the youth safe haven continued to grow, and eventually resulted in a 3 year grant from the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The grant was to BJEP, which subcontracted to the Eisenhower Foundation for evaluation and technical assistance.

The Replication and Its Funding

The CSAP grant provided BJEP with $143,741 for operations in Year 1, $166,606 in Year 2 and $181,670 in Year 3. (Table 12.) Most of the funding was for staff salaries and benefits. Other CSAP funds covered the Eisenhower Foundation evaluation. In-kind and cash matches were at much lower levels than for the Justice Department-funded programs.
The South Baltimore Youth Center

The safe haven space was designated the South Baltimore Youth Center. Principal staff consisted of 4 full-time workers paid by the CSAP grant -- Program Director, Assistant Director, Arts and Literary Program Coordinator and Administrative Assistant. There also were two part-time street workers. The Center also had volunteers -- especially Loyola College students, who visited twice a week, took youth on outings and retreats, held a drug prevention contest and undertook art projects.

Youth aged 11 to 21 came to the Youth Center after school. The Center was open weekdays between 3:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., and very much addressed the recommendations in the Carnegie Corporation report, A Matter of Time. Activities were relatively informal and unstructured. Youth at the Center usually could be observed in a variety of activities: doing homework, playing ping-pong, watching a video, playing games on the personal computer (a favorite activity), shooting pool, or just in conversing with peers, staff or volunteers.

Two hundred youth were involved in trips and some special activities, such as parties, but about 70 youth, aged 14-16, were considered to be the Center's core "family." These youth were frequent attenders, or those who could be counted on when they were needed to help. At any one point in time, up to 20 youth were at the Center.

---

**Table 12**

**Budget Summary: Baltimore**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health</td>
<td>$143,741</td>
<td>$166,606</td>
<td>$181,670</td>
<td>$492,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Human Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local In-Kind and Cash</td>
<td>$26,880</td>
<td>$16,880</td>
<td>$16,880</td>
<td>$60,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$170,621</td>
<td>$183,486</td>
<td>$198,550</td>
<td>$552,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Budget approved by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services*
Most of the participants at the Center came from the 10 square block Sharp Leadenhall neighborhood within South Baltimore. Sharp Leadenhall is the most at-risk neighborhood in South Baltimore. In 1990, Sharp Leadenhall had the highest crime rates within South Baltimore, the highest percentage of single parent households (33 percent), the lowest levels of education (78 percent had less than a high school education), the lowest median household income ($11,285), the highest poverty rate (34 percent), the lowest percentage of homeowners (30 percent), the lowest mean rent ($121 per month) and the highest unemployment rate (20 percent). The neighborhood was about 60 percent African-American and 40 percent white.

**Youth Leadership**

The Youth Center was a magnet. Once there, a young person usually developed a near peer, counseling or mentoring relationship with a staff member. At the Center youth could do anything within reason. However, the rule was that, if a youth wanted to do something, she or he would have to assume the major responsibility for making it happen -- or, generally, it did not happen.

The Center believed that providing teens with opportunities to exercise leadership was essential in helping them grow into fully functional adults. For example, the more senior youth provided leadership for the planning and implementation of a retreat held in the second year of the Center. In addition, before hiring, all potential staff members in the program were interviewed by youth. Youth were an integral part of all major decisions faced by the Center, including the development of by-laws. This was a very contentious process because adult members of the Steering Committee -- the council that oversaw the program -- wanted to dilute the power of the youth in policy making at the Center.

Over the course of the program, activities developed jointly by youth and staff that seemed to generate enthusiasm included visual arts, literary projects, trips to see other successful youth programs, computer training and summer job training. Center youth also published a newsletter. The Baltimore Sun funded publication. The newsletter featured a Reading Club at the Center, in cooperation with the Mayor's reading initiative. The newsletter included interviews with the "man on the street" about current events. There were articles and poetry on contemporary issues written by youth at the Center, including essays on drugs, violence and race relations.

A computer room was very popular. Formal computer instruction failed. Staff then made the computers available to youth and waited to see what happened. As might be guessed, computer games became a popular use of
the computers. This helped lead to using the word processing program to do homework. Few of the economically deprived families of South Baltimore can afford a word processor at home. The Center filled this gap, giving the youth of South Baltimore the same kind of educational technological advantage that middle class parents can afford.

Based on its experience and expertise, BJEP was able to organize summer jobs and job training for youth. The Center helped develop positive relationships between youth and supervisors. Kids learned the meaning of work.

**Evaluation**

The evaluation was based on self-report youth survey questionnaires. The questionnaires were designed by incorporating valid and reliable measures from the evaluation literature, including Eisenhower evaluations. The self-report survey questionnaires were administered to 68 participant youth and 132 comparison group youth twice, 18 months apart. The evaluation plan was a quasi-experimental panel design with 3 matched, nonequivalent, untreated comparison groups.*

Our major findings were that participating youth had less high-risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than the comparison youth. These differences were statistically significant. On no measure did the participants perform worse than the comparison youth. The findings are summarized in Table 13. The Center had a positive impact on the youth development of its members and reduced a variety of socially undesirable behaviors. It appears that high-risk behavior decreased among the program youth in direct proportion to the time between surveys. This indicates that not only was there a positive program effect, but that the magnitude of the effect grew with time.

The program demonstrated that crime, delinquency and drug prevention can be achieved by nonprofit youth development organizations without police partnerships.

**The Unstructured Safe Haven**

The evaluation supported the notion that successful youth development programs have multiple solutions and multiple good outcomes -- and that such solutions can flower in an unstructured setting. Being basically unplanned, but responsive to the needs of the youth, the program was virtually guaranteed to generate multiple activities. Being unconstrained by bureaucratic structure, the program could easily, and quickly, move
into a variety of activities that addressed the at-risk environment or strengthened the resiliency of participants to socially undesirable behavior.
Table 13

Summary of the Outcome Evaluation of the South Baltimore Youth Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) IMPACT MEASURE</th>
<th>(2) Participants were better or worse than the comparison group at:</th>
<th>(3) Did the participants improve or worsen compared to non-participants between Time 1 and Time 2?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background or Contextual Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment of risk</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer culture</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate Impact Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active cognitive coping</td>
<td>Better*</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance coping behavior</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future outlook</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer bonding</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family bonding</td>
<td>Better*</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-risk behavior</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol consumption</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs involvement</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious delinquency</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor delinquency</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-social behavior</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Statistically significant Group X Time difference, p < .05.
* Reflects a very small difference.

Source: See Baker et al. (1995), which also has more explanations of these differences.
Thus, we concluded that perhaps the most fundamental reason for the Center's success was its informal structure. The Center's safe haven was less formal in structure than the 4 Justice Department programs (although both the San Juan and Boston initiatives allowed for some unstructured time). Nonetheless, all 5 replications succeeded in terms of program interventions having an impact.

When the staff of the South Baltimore Youth Center said the most important thing they did was to provide a place for the kids to hang out, they did not mean getting kids off the street to make adults happy. They meant providing a setting that allowed for informal interactions and exchanges between adults and youth.

As an informal safe haven, the South Baltimore Youth Center had few rules, and the number of rules declined markedly over time. At the beginning, there were formal by-laws for and membership in the Center. Youth were required to sign in and out at the door of the Center. There was a long list of proscribed behaviors, and violations were supposed to be punished with a fine for each offense. All these formal elements were quickly abandoned, either because kids refused to follow the rules, or the rules were counter-productive in that they kept kids away from the Center. At the end, the Center had only 4 rules:

- No drugs
- No fighting
- No shoes on the furniture
- Youth had to enforce the rules

Unlike the original extensive set of rules which were widely violated or ignored, these short rules were followed by all the youth at the Center. In addition, with the Center's lack of structured activities and its "just drop in" philosophy, the typical interaction at the Center was not rigidly time structured. There also was a strong emphasis on the emotional aspect of adult/youth exchanges.

As the Eisenhower Foundation continues replications, it will be important to work out when and where informal institutions operate best — and with what populations.

Management and Continuation of the Program

The founding institution, BJEP, was devoted to economic development. BJEP then gave birth to a youth development organization, housed in the same Victorian building. Over time, after the original BJEP director and the original youth Center director left and each was replaced, a growing incompatibility of institutional goals and staff personalities emerged.
BJEP staff was more interested in business-like economic development through contracts and grants. Center staff was more dedicated to rites of youthful passage, via an unstructured setting. The Eisenhower Foundation has observed such incompatibility before, in the 1980s when we experimented with integrating youth investment programs into the operations of nonprofit groups working in economic development. Sometimes -- not always -- managers of economic development do not deal well with the more emotionally complicated world of youth development.

The end result of this conflict, and of poor management by BJEP and the Center, was that both BJEP and the Center closed down. The institutional shut down occurred even though the Eisenhower Foundation evaluated the Youth Center's program as successful. The Foundation tried to mediate, but it had little leverage because it received a subcontract from BJEP. By contrast, with Justice Department sites, the Foundation had fiduciary control. Of the 5 successful replications in this report, the Center was the only program that closed down.

By the time BJEP and the Center ceased operations, a third Baltimore Police Commissioner had been appointed. Dedicated to community policing, he was a member of one of the Foundation's later delegations to Japan. Afterward, with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development funding which he helped secure for the Foundation, a koban ministation was begun in Baltimore public housing. This was part of the Foundation's second generation of replications (see Chapter 9). Hence, the Foundation came full circle in Baltimore -- back to the objectives of the original 1988 delegation to Japan.

*See Baker, et.al (1995) for details of the design, methods, data and analyses. The Unstructured Safe Haven*
6. Lessons from the First Generation

Table 14 summarizes some of the key program components that were present in the replications in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and Baltimore. Table 15 summarizes some of the key process, training, technical assistance and management components in the 5 cities. Mindful of these summaries, we reached some conclusions about the 5 replications. We found that the replications:

1. Demonstrated the effectiveness of multiple solutions carried out by grassroots, unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations.
2. Provided some of the clearest evidence to date that well conceived and well implemented programs work when they are adequately funded.
3. Showed that programs can succeed and innovate when police and grassroots groups partner roughly as equals.
4. Illustrated the limits of volunteerism, self-sufficiency and grassroots community coalitions.
5. Reaffirmed that internal youth development organization capacity and external technical assistance are factors in success.

Consider each conclusion:

**1. The replications worked -- and demonstrated the effectiveness of multiple solutions carried out by grassroots, unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations**

In San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, the quasi-experimental design showed Index crime to decline by at least 22 percent and at most 27 percent over a minimum of 3 years. Across the 4 cities, the decline in the 4 target neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or their cities as a whole. In Baltimore, the quasi-experimental design showed that program youth had less high risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than comparison youth over 18 months. The differences were statistically significant.

The success of most of these programs has been acknowledged at the national level. The Attorney General brought the Boston and Philadelphia programs to Washington, DC as models that illustrated what was needed in the 1994 crime bill. The Boston program was praised in front of the President by the Attorney General, who became an honorary member of the Drill Team from the Philadelphia program. At about the same time, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development gave the Hispanic Heritage Award to Sister Isolina Ferre, Founder of Centro.
All 5 programs had multiple solutions. The outcome evaluations were not elaborate enough to identify the separate impact of each solution. Rather, the outcome evaluations measured the impact of all the solutions working together in a program. We concluded that the key, complementary interventions, found in different combinations in different replications, were one-on-one and group counseling and mentoring of youth by paid civilians and police to provide social support and discipline, the safe haven and police ministation settings, youth leadership and youth media enterprise, community-based education and remedial education, community-school linkages, employment, sports as part of mentoring, and problem-oriented patrols by police and citizens. Volunteers also were involved.
Table 14
Some Key Program Components in the Replication Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups by paid civilian staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring one-on-one by paid civilian staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups or one-on-one by paid police staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups or one-on-one by volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy by paid staff who mediate among youth, community and police -- like intercessors and near-peers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe haven extended family sanctuary off-the-street</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstructured program settings</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-school links, help with homework, remedial education, rites of passage through high school and to college</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment training and job placement</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth leadership training and entrepreneurial training</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth media enterprise, newspapers, and dramatic productions with a message</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and sports</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police kobs/minisations/ drop in centers</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented patrols by police</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented patrols by police with citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police home visits</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = Presence of component.
Table 15
Some Key Process, Training, Technical Assistance and Management Components in the Replication Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had a prior working relationship with the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had a commitment to multiple solutions to multiple problems</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had acceptable management and financial management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had competent paid staff to work with youth and police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization received group technical assistance by the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization received one-on-one technical assistance by the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was overseen by a local advisory/planning council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police went to Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and community leaders “bonded” in Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our findings did not lend support to the assertion that one-on-one mentoring by volunteers in non-safe haven settings necessarily is the most effective or cost-beneficial intervention for high-risk youth. When the greatest impacts occurred in these replications, paid civilian and paid police staff were more responsible than volunteers. Recruitment of qualified volunteers with time to give was difficult in the low income neighborhoods where the replications were carried out. When volunteers had an effect, they usually came from the immediate neighborhood, not from the middle class suburbs. To the extent that they were effective, volunteers were helped by the multiple solutions located at the safe havens. In these replications, we do not believe that counseling by volunteers at just any location would have been as helpful as counseling at the safe haven (although excursions to outside events were part of the mix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The police attended follow-up Eisenhower Foundation workshops, especially in San Juan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police chief approved the program</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was overseen day-to-day by competent commander-level police supervisors</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police officers who worked with the community day-to-day were competent and open to learning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police received separate one-on-one Eisenhower Foundation training</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization provided informal on-the-job training to police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization provided more formal training to police</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program succeeded in part because of local coalition building among grassroots organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was able to easily recruit and retain qualified volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was able to compensate for Year 3 Justice budget cuts by increasing Year 3 local matches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = Presence of component or process. N.A. = Not applicable because police did not implement the replication after the Japan delegation and initial national cluster workshops.
used by both paid staff and volunteers). For these programs, it was inaccurate and simplistic to conclude that mentoring was a solution separate from the other interdependent solutions. Therefore, we conclude that, independent of other reinforcing interventions, volunteer mentoring should not be oversold.

In our replications, paid civilian youth counselors and mentors earned less than $30,000 per year -- usually much less. They mentored in one-on-one and group settings. By contrast, Public/Private Ventures has estimated that it costs about $1,000 per year to screen, train, orient and supervise one volunteer who mentors one youth for a few hours a month.* Which approach generates a better cost-benefit ratio? The answer to this question is not entirely clear, in our experience. Nor is it clear that such mentoring is more cost-beneficial than other interventions for the truly disadvantaged, like preschool or employment training.

The youth safe havens where counseling took place in our replications were not just hang-out rooms. For the most part, they were the headquarters of the grassroots nonprofit agencies that received the grants. These grants, and the publicity secured through the agreement of the police to work with the nonprofits as partners, helped the agencies to secure new grants and to build their institutional capacities. As institutions, they were financially empowered to better represent impoverished constituencies in a society where the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer.* In modest ways, the nonprofit organizations that were funded had more resources to address broader issues facing the United States. For example, the DYC Clubs promoted racial integration at a time when America is becoming more segregated,* and DYC's youth media enterprises communicated what works to national audiences through Blockbuster Video and the motion picture, Squeeze. By contrast, initiatives that rely mostly on volunteerism usually do not build much institutional capacity in grassroots organizations.

If adequately funded, nonprofit youth development organizations can change the lives of individuals and also improve the community as a whole. For both individual and community change, we concluded that the San Juan concept of the civilian intercessor, or advocate, may be more effective than the concept of a civilian mentor, based on these replications. Advocates in San Juan mentor youth. But the advocates have roles beyond that. They are trained to mediate among all players -- resolving conflicts, or potential conflicts, among youth, police and community. Perhaps most important, they are assertive change agents who address a wide range of issues affecting the community.
We also concluded that the DYC notion of civilian near-peers may be more effective than the concept of civilian adult mentors. DYC has found that the age of a youth counselor is important. High-risk youth tend to be more receptive to role models who are just a few years older, like near-peers, than to grown adults. It can be easier for a risk-taking 15 year old youth in trouble to be influenced by a cool-but-responsible 18 year old than by a 45 year old banker or carry-out manager.

Accordingly, we believe that too much emphasis on civilian adult mentoring -- especially the volunteer variety -- can lose site of concepts that can be more effective, like advocates and near-peers. Future replications would do well to consider civilian staff members who integrate the roles of advocates, near-peers, counselors and mentors.

As part of multiple solutions, police ministations were integrated with safe havens in 2 replication sites (San Juan and Philadelphia). A third site, Boston, created the police drop-in center at the safe haven -- a variation on the koban theme. In all of these places, trust built between youth and police. We concluded from process observations that the problem-oriented patrols by police, often originating in the immediate safe haven locations and extending into the surrounding neighborhood, helped to explain the crime reduction that was documented. We could not identify the effect of patrols separate from the effects of the other interventions. Yet it is difficult to believe that the crime reduction community-wide could have occurred only through the work of civilians and police back at the safe haven locations. The patrols included youth development workers and advocates out with police, in one form or another, at certain times in all 4 of the Justice Department replications. Through such involvement, the police work was integrated more with youth development than is the case with most police foot patrols.

All of the replications were undertaken by unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations. Their success led us to caution against a top down national strategy in which reform for high-risk youth in the inner city is undertaken predominantly by national nonprofit organizations -- which tend to have more access to money and power than unaffiliated grassroots groups. Our experience reasserts the promise of a "bubble up" strategy in which unaffiliated grassroots groups are funded, technically assisted, and encouraged to creatively vary their solutions, based on local circumstances, while still sharing some underlying principles about what works.

2. The replications provided some of the clearest evidence to date that well conceived and well implemented programs work when they are adequately funded.
After demonstration programs in the 1980s which were funded in the "lean and mean" spirit of the times, the Eisenhower Foundation concluded that, for adequate professional staff, support staff, equipment and infrastructure, a nonprofit community-based youth development organization needed somewhere in the range of about $80,000 to $100,000 per year for at least 3 years for an initiative like the kind in this report. Standards remain very imprecise in the fields of youth development and crime prevention, but experience suggested that such a funding range was a reasonable ballpark estimate.

This was roughly the formula that was implemented with Justice Department funds in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago. Over the first 2 years, the average grant per year at each site was in the $80,000 to $100,000 range. Local matches, especially in terms of police salaries and benefits, added considerably more. By the second year, the decline in Index crime in the 4 target neighborhoods in the 4 cities averaged about 18 percent. The sharp budget cuts came in the third year -- and at that time the decline in Index crime in the 4 target neighborhoods averaged just 3 percent. As Appendix 1 details, the differences were statistically significant, with the chances being about 9 out of 10 that the budget cuts seriously impeded crime reduction. Many paid staffers were released, paid less or paid part time. More reliance had to be made on volunteerism. The result was a loss of program impact. The striking earlier reductions in crime were greatly reduced.

Eventually, we expect the impact of any inner city intervention to lessen. For example, no program can cut Index crime by 20 percent a year forever. So it is appropriate to ask whether the dramatic change in crime reduction in the third year was only the expected decline in program impact or whether it was the effect of the budget cut. We concluded it was the budget cut. Why? The change was very abrupt. The natural decline in effectiveness, what economists call diminishing marginal returns, is almost always more smooth and gradual. In addition, the decline came too soon in the history of the programs. Much of the first year of a program's life is spent in organizing and implementing the program. Most programs don't really become operational or reach optimal performance until the second or third year -- or later. We would expect at least a few years of strong program effects before diminishing returns set in. But these programs were pulled up short after their second year of full operation. It appears that the budget cut adversely affected Index crime in these target neighborhoods.

3. The replications demonstrated that programs can succeed and innovate when police and grassroots groups partner roughly as equals.
The Justice Department-funded programs were a form of problem-oriented policing in which police and youth development nonprofit organizations worked roughly as equals. The grassroots organizations had their own budgets. In all cases, the program was run through an advisory and planning council composed of police and civilians who had equal voices.

The police assigned officers as part of the local match and had ultimate control -- in that they could have crippled the programs by pulling out. Yet they did not pull out of the Justice Department-funded replications.

A process played out in which trust built, civilians learned from police and police learned from civilians, informally, working side-by-side -- whether the activity was counseling, near-peering, advocacy, mentoring, foot patrolling, teaching sports, consulting teachers at school or consulting parents during home visits. The informal, mutual learning process also included the delegation to Japan and the follow-up workshops (especially in San Juan). In Japan, for example, home visits initially were frowned upon by American police delegates as too intrusive for the United States. But several of the police-community partnerships later found home visits to work back home. In San Juan, there also was more formal training by civilians at the Police Academy. In many ways, the crime-reducing successes of the Justice Department-funded initiatives depended, in our view, on the community, safe haven and koban setting in which officers used their natural intelligence as well as street savvy to improve on what they already knew. Thus, for example, as recounted in Section 3, the koban police recognized that no other agencies would dispose of the dead cow in San Juan -- so the police burned it and engendered long-run trust in the community by their common-sense, problem-oriented behavior.

The police took on new roles as counselors and mentors. (The concept of mentor fits police, who might think that the notion of advocate is beyond the mission of the police department and who tend to be older than near-peers.) The police showed that paid public servants can be investors in youth, and that the outcome is not do-gooder social work -- but less crime. The notion of paid civil servants -- in this case, police -- working as mentors may run counter to the reemergence of volunteerism in the 1990s. But can we find anywhere near the number of qualified volunteers who are needed? Based on the findings of Public/Private Ventures,* and given that the country needs $7B more to pay for Head Start for all eligible, can we afford to pay for the $5B to $15B required per year to screen, orient, train and supervise enough new volunteers for all youth who may need them? By contrast, Congress has appropriated significant funds for community police who already are on the streets, and some are quite capable of counseling at-risk youth based on the evidence in our evaluations.
The kind of community equity policing suggested by our replications must secure the initial support of the Police Chief -- and often the Mayor -- in any city where it is tried, in our experience. For any chance at permanence, such community equity policing ideally needs to run long enough to reduce crime before the Police Chief retires or moves on. Opportunities like cross cultural trips (as Japan) will continue to be needed -- to challenge creative chiefs, expand horizons and provide any-from-home opportunities for youth development staff to bond with police. Without interfering with local initiative and creativity, some standardized training materials -- written and video -- are needed to document success to date and to lay out underlying principles. Local technical assistance and national group workshops ought to continue. National staff are needed to train trainers at local police academies, building on the training experience of Centro at the San Juan Police Academy. National private and public funders might consider revising their funding guidelines to better allow for this kind of community equity policing with youth development agencies. And to allow for new roles by police officers -- as, for example, paid civil servant mentors.

In our replications, Police Chiefs agreed up front to relative equity between grassroots organizations and police. *It took a very special kind of Police Chief to buy into the process. And it took wise police supervisors at the precinct command level and skillful police officers on the streets to carry out the equality day-to-day.*

4. **The replications illustrated the limits of volunteerism, self-sufficiency and grassroots community coalitions.**

All 5 replications utilized volunteers and found them helpful to the overall effort. The extent of screening, orientation and monitoring varied. Some of the sites, like those in Boston and Philadelphia, had difficulty in identifying and retaining qualified volunteers to work with their high risk populations, even though some volunteers were offered stipends. More volunteers were needed in the 4 Justice Department sites when their budgets were cut, but this voluntarism was not able to do much about Index crime.

Among other meanings, "self-sufficiency" often signals that the original funder will pull out of a seed grant after, perhaps, 2 to 4 years, and that other funding streams need to be in place by then to assure program continuity. We applaud the creative self-sufficiency of programs like Delancey Street in San Francisco, and call for long term investments by funders in technical assistance that will help teach others the lessons of Delancey Street.* But we also believe that, for relatively young inner city organizations working with high-risk youth in a national environment in which class and race divides are increasing and domestic funding is being
reduced, self-sufficiency is an unrealistic notion. In this vein, we applaud the initiative of the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Ford Foundation and other leading foundations in making longer term funding commitments to some community-based programs.

At the time of this report, the site among the 5 that had the most continuity with the replications as originally planned in 1987-1990 was San Juan -- and that, in no small part, was due to continued funding by the Eisenhower Foundation, via the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, matched by San Juan police resources. At the other end of the scale, the South Baltimore Youth Center had zero self-sufficiency. It closed down. Among the other sites, the nonprofit organizations that were funded were doing reasonably well. The specific programs that were designed in 1988-1990, however, were operating at more modest levels.

Only one of the 5 replications, Chicago, stressed coalition building among a number of grassroots community organizations, above and beyond the police partnership. We did not find this to be particularly effective. A great deal of time needed to be spent in interagency meetings. Chicago did succeed in terms of outcomes, but we thought that was more a result of direct services than of coalition building. To a lesser extent, the Baltimore program engaged in coalition outreach with other community organizations, but the effort tended to demand a great deal of staff time and resulted in considerably less benefit than direct work with youth.

5. The replications reaffirmed that internal youth development organization capacity and external technical assistance are factors in success.

There were variations among sites, but all the Justice Department-funded programs developed a clear mission; had adequate to superior leadership; involved qualified, flexible and tenacious paid civilian and police staff; and carried out minimally acceptable to more sophisticated management and financial management.

The Baltimore program succeeded in program content, but ultimately failed because of mission conflicts between economic development staff and youth development staff, and because new executive directors were not sufficiently skilled as conflict resolvers, managers and financial managers. The Foundation was a subcontractor for the evaluation only in Baltimore. If the grant had come through the Foundation, or if the Foundation had been more successful is raising more resources for technical assistance for Baltimore, it might have been possible to keep the program alive. As the prime grant recipient, the Foundation might have had more leverage to resolve conflicts and to put in place more qualified staff. This has been effective in work with some other groups. But even
with a greater and more effective Eisenhower presence, more positive managerial outcomes would by no means have been assured.

We believe that the Eisenhower Foundation was a needed catalyst and assistor -- for the 10 year period over which the replications evolved. The Foundation began planning and raising funds for the Japan delegation in 1987. Several planning trips to Japan were necessary. The 30 member 1988 delegation was very costly, as were 2 later delegations. But they provided information and opportunities to build trust among the Foundation, the police and community leaders. Two years went by between the 1988 delegation to Japan and Justice Department and Department of Health and Human Services funding. The Foundation provided planning technical assistance, applied for operating funds for proposed sites and raised money to keep its own development work moving forward. This work was not just for the sites reported here, but also for other partnerships between police and community groups that matured after the delegations. Once Justice Department funding was obtained, mostly for local operations, the Foundation raised local cash match funds, secured the local in-kind matches from police, raised funds for Eisenhower Foundation technical assistance and evaluation, carried out that assistance and evaluation, submitted the final report to the Justice Department, financed a number of public policy forums and presentations on the experience, and secured the resources to complete and disseminate this evaluation.

The Foundation provided one-on-one and group technical assistance, led by a national program director who provided day-to-day management and quality control, along with support staff and consultants. Most effective, we thought, were the national cluster workshops, like the one in San Juan, where police and civilians could teach one another, see one of the sites in operation and meet with technical assistors on subjects they had requested beforehand. More was needed, we concluded, for formal training of police, though we did not discount the day-to-day informal learning that occurred as citizens, youth and police worked together.

The Foundation insured that the programs were replications of principles. Police and community leaders were not pressured in Japan, or in later planning, to copy specific Japanese -- or American -- models. The Foundation can be criticized, perhaps, for too few ground rules when it came to replicating American variations on Japanese themes. However, cross cultural replications are very tricky. Just as good mentors are not overbearing, we found that a more relaxed, but continually attentive process worked best in the long run, especially for the very intelligent, assertive, experienced and independent police and civilian members of our delegations.
Part II

Introduction to the Second Generation of Replications

Most second generation funding was secured from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Other sources included the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Center for Global Partnership and local matches. The replications were implemented over 3 years from Fall 1995 to Fall 1998.

HUD required that the replications be in or around public or other low income housing. As a result, there were 4 partners, at a minimum, working at each site -- the Foundation, a grassroots nonprofit youth development organization which had the local lead, the police and the local public housing agency.

When we began, there were no scientific evaluations of safe haven-ministations in public housing. The most comparable evaluation with acceptable methodology was published in 1992 by a Columbia University team. The team compared public housing developments with Boys and Girls Clubs to public housing developments without Boys and Girls Clubs. The evaluation found that drug-related activities and property damage were less in developments with a Boys and Girls Club program than those without. The Boys and Girls Club included paid staff and volunteer counseling through formal and informal activities.\(^1\)

The HUD sites were in San Juan, PR; Columbia, SC; Memphis, TN, Baltimore, MD; Little Rock, AR; and Washington, DC. San Juan was the only city in which we funded the same nonprofit organization (Centro) during both the first and second generations. To allow for local continuity, we discussed both first and second generation San Juan programs in Part I, Chapter 1. The other 5 second generation replications are summarized here, as Chapter 7 to 11 in Part II.

In terms of selection criteria for second generation cities, we chose places where the police chief or a high ranking deputy had been on a delegation to Japan. Police from all cities also had traveled to see the San Juan safe haven-ministration, which emerged as our most comprehensive first generation model. We chose cities with chiefs who accepted our replication principles (below) and who agreed in writing to match 2 or 3 police officers to work in and around the safe haven-ministration. Beyond having the backing of police, a city needed to demonstrate to the Foundation that its Public Housing Authority (PHA) bought into the program. The PHA director needed to agree in writing to provide a furnished public housing unit as space for the safe haven-ministration. We chose cities where there was agreement among the Foundation, the police
and the public housing authority on a good nonprofit youth development organization located in or near the target public housing neighborhood which would take the organizational lead in the local replication. That organization then needed to agree ahead of time to take the lead in replicating the safe haven-ministation.

A partial exception was Washington, DC. We replicated in Paradise at Parkside, a private low income housing development owned and managed by a private for-profit entity, the Telesis Corporation, which provided a housing unit as space for the safe haven-ministation.

Initially, there was a seventh site, in Newark, which received some start-up funding. However, this site was discontinued, with approval from HUD, because the original police chief, who had been to Japan and was supportive, retired. A new police director, who had not been to Japan, was appointed, and he would not guarantee in writing that 2 or 3 police officers would be matched.

Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, the nonprofit youth development organization in San Juan that was funded and was extremely successful in the first round of replications, also was funded in the second round. This was done to provide new sites with an established model. We also continued to work in Baltimore, because a new police commissioner had been named, had gone to Japan and was interested in partnering. However, a new nonprofit organization was chosen in Baltimore -- because the youth group in the first round had closed (in spite of positive evaluation findings). The other 4 sites -- Columbia, Memphis, Little Rock and Washington, DC -- were new.

Three of the 6 sites (San Juan, Columbia and Little Rock) were unaffiliated with national organizations. This reflected our first generation caution against a national top down strategy in which reform for high-risk youth in the inner city is undertaken primarily by national nonprofit organizations -- which tend to have more access to money and power than unaffiliated grassroots groups. The other 3 replications in the second generation -- Memphis, Baltimore and Washington, DC -- had affiliations to national organizations. This allowed us to further compare the performances of unaffiliated and affiliated organizations.

In 5 sites, the host organization was a nonprofit youth and community development organization. In the sixth site, Washington, DC, the host organization was the for-profit economic development and housing and rehabilitation Telesis Corporation, which had a nonprofit subsidiary. We included this group in part because we wanted to further test whether safe haven-ministations could work within an economic development organization. In the first round, the Baltimore nonprofit organization with
which we worked undertook economic development and home weatherization. It created a youth development component which carried out the replication. Our evaluation showed the replication to be successful, but youth development staff members often were in conflict with economic development staff members.

**Second Generation Principles**

All second round replication sites were funded for 36 months. Planning took place over the first few months, and then implementation began. The second generation programs were asked to replicate the principles that the evaluation suggested were fundamental to the success of the first generation. Because we had more experience, we included more principles in the HUD-funded second generation than in our more open-ended approach to first generation replication with Justice Department funds after the original 1988 delegation to Japan. However, based on what we learned in the first round, the operators of second generation replications nonetheless were encouraged to vary the details of their programs to fit neighborhood circumstances and so create local ownership.

The main second generation principles were as follows:

- The outcomes of the program were to keep youth aged approximately 6 to 18 in school or alternative schools, improve school performance, keep them out of the criminal justice system, reduce drug and alcohol use, position youth for responsible adulthood, reduce crime in their neighborhoods and improve the quality of life in those neighborhoods.
- All funding for the program from the Eisenhower Foundation was to a qualified 501(c)(3) youth development or similar organization, devoted to human betterment. The organization had legal, fiduciary responsibility for the program and hired a civilian director. The program was framed as a youth investment and youth development venture, not as a criminal justice initiative.
- Civilian safe haven staff needed to include some persons who had skills as near-peers, as developed by the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston in the first generation, and some who had skills as advocate intermediaries among the community, youth and police, as developed by Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in San Juan in the first generation.
- The safe haven-ministation was most active from about 3:30 p.m. to 10 p.m., for reasons set forth in the Carnegie Corporation report, *A Matter of Time*.²
- The police chief agreed to the program's principles in advance, and assigned as match at least 2 police officers, who developed a ministation that shared space with or was adjoining to the safe
haven. The officers partnered with the civilians, but did not control the program. Officers were carefully selected jointly with the youth development organization.

- Safe haven-ministation facilities could be residential, nonresidential or both. Even if the safe haven-ministation was nonresidential, it was encouraged (but not required) that the officers live in the neighborhood where they served.
- Police spent about half their time counseling and mentoring youth and about half their time undertaking community equity policing (as defined in Chapter 1) on foot or on bicycle, using the safe haven-ministation as home base. Patrol activity included safe passage of youth to and from school.
- Civilians and police performed outreach to neighborhood schools and worked with school staff on development of youth who participated in the safe haven-ministation.
- Police received training from civilians in the program, above and beyond training in the local police academy. A good guide was the training of police by civilians at Centro Sister Isolina Ferre. (See Chapter 1.) The Foundation also distributed a training manual and video, which were required to be understood by all staff before they began work.
- The executive director of the public housing authority agreed to the program's principles in advance. The public housing authority provided as minimal match adequate space and furniture that was kept in good repair.
- The community supported the safe haven-ministation. An advisory board was created, consisting of representatives from the community, youth, police, civilian staff, public housing authority, business community and schools.
- The advisory board, program director, police and public housing authority leveraged additional funds for the program.
- Implementation did not begin and funds to replication sites were not released until a strategic work plan and budget were completed. The work plan was informed by the kind of multiple solutions to multiple problems that we found were successful in the first round of replications.
- Programs needed to possess or soon develop flexible, caring and tenacious staff; solid organizational and financial management; and the ability to sustain themselves.
- Technical assistance was supplied by the Eisenhower Foundation - including civilian and police training as mentors, advocates and near peers.

**Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance**
More comprehensively, the technical assistance supplied by the Eisenhower Foundation embraced:

- Fundraising and local resource leveraging.
- Work plan development and approval.
- Financial management, oversight and monitoring with the sites and accountability to HUD.
- Training and assistance on the content of local program replications and on how to enhance the institutional capacity of the local nonprofit youth development organizations.
- Evaluation.
- Preparation of a final report and implementation of a strategic media plan to communicate the findings.

In what follows, we summarize each form of technical assistance.

**Fundraising and Local Resource Leveraging**

The most important technical assistance role of the Foundation was fundraising. Without Eisenhower Foundation-secured funding, the second round of replications would not have been possible. The Foundation raised $2M from HUD and co-targeted $150,000 more nationally from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation and the Center for Global Partnership -- for a total of $2,150,000 in national funding. The Foundation leveraged this national money to secure a total of $2,125,197 in local match funding from sites over 36 months. Hence, for every national dollar raised, slightly more than one additional dollar was leveraged locally. The total amount raised was $2,150,000 (national funds) plus $2,125,197 (local matches) equals $4,275,197. The $2,150,000 in national funds were used for grants to the 6 replication sites (plus an initial grant to the seventh site, Newark, which later was dropped), fundraising, training, technical assistance, financial management and administration, evaluation, report preparation, publications, dissemination, communications and media. The $2,125,197 in local matches was used entirely by the sites.

The largest proportion of the $2,125,197 in local matches was the in-kind value of 2 or 3 police assigned per site to the safe haven-minestation. The Foundation was able to secure these matches based on the Foundation's national reputation, the prior relationships it had formed with police chiefs on the earlier delegations to Japan and Puerto Rico, and the successes documented in the first generation of replications.

Here, it is important to note that most community-based, problem-oriented policing is led by the police. Police receive most of the money for this work. Nonprofit groups assist. In our replications, the lead organization is the nonprofit group. A part of the community equity policing concept,
nonprofit youth development organizations and police are equal partners. To a considerable extent, our replications focused on federal government resources on nonprofit groups and drew in as local match police officers. Sometimes, these officers were funded by the federal Justice Department Community Oriented Policing (COPS) program. The net effect was to target more federal money to the priorities of the nonprofit groups, while still addressing the needs of police. In a very modest way, this reversed present overall federal budget priorities -- which give substantial resources to police and relatively few resources to nonprofit groups.

Local matches also included the value of space and furnishings by the public housing authorities, along with cash grants to sites. The most significant cash grant to a local site was $100,000 secured by the Columbia safe haven-ministation via the Columbia public housing authority from HUD SuperNOFA funds. HUD SuperNOFA guidelines specifically referenced safe haven-ministations as eligible for awards -- based on HUD knowledge of the Foundation's first generation success.
In our first generation of replications, Justice Department-funded sites averaged about $87,000 per year in funding for the first two years. Justice Department funding then was cut in half the third year (see the Introduction to Part I.) Index crime dropped dramatically in the first two years, but declined very little in the third year. That is why we concluded that national funding in the $80,000 to $100,000 per year range seemed about right for this type of replication. To test this hypothesis, we decided to reduce the amount of national funding per year, per site by the Foundation in the second generation of replications, with HUD. Specifically, the average level of national funding per year, per second

---

**Table 16**

**Sources of the Operating Funds Used Locally Over Three Years by the Second Generation Replications in Baltimore, Columbia, Little Rock, Memphis, San Juan and Washington, DC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grants from the Eisenhower Foundation$^1$</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>68,275</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>145,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>44,275</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>110,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock</td>
<td>44,275</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>110,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>44,275</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>110,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>49,275</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>115,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>32,275</td>
<td>35,450</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>102,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Local Matches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>103,612</td>
<td>114,334</td>
<td>108,977</td>
<td>326,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>79,962</td>
<td>106,667</td>
<td>191,814</td>
<td>375,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock</td>
<td>120,653</td>
<td>120,652</td>
<td>120,652</td>
<td>361,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>82,658</td>
<td>96,658</td>
<td>110,658</td>
<td>289,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>119,834</td>
<td>119,834</td>
<td>119,834</td>
<td>359,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>175,932</td>
<td>152,666</td>
<td>82,800</td>
<td>411,398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>171,887</td>
<td>157,334</td>
<td>142,977</td>
<td>472,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>121,237</td>
<td>138,667</td>
<td>225,814</td>
<td>485,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock</td>
<td>164,928</td>
<td>152,652</td>
<td>154,653</td>
<td>472,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>126,933</td>
<td>128,658</td>
<td>144,658</td>
<td>400,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>169,109</td>
<td>151,834</td>
<td>153,834</td>
<td>474,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>208,707</td>
<td>188,116</td>
<td>116,800</td>
<td>513,623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Foundation grants were based primarily on funds from HUD, with much smaller amounts from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation and the Center for Global Partnership.
generation replication site was $38,533. We set out to test whether, on balance, the second generation sites could achieve about the same kind of outcomes as the first generation sites achieved during the first two years of the first generation. We knew from the onset that we could only make very crude comparisons -- because many other factors also influenced the outcomes (i.e., there were many other independent variables, and we could not statistically control for them).

**Work Plan Development and Approval**

Each site developed a detailed work plan that distinguished between program interventions and outcomes (inputs and outputs, or independent and dependent variables). Foundation staff worked meticulously with local sites to develop these work plans. (Local staff often confused inputs and outcomes. Eisenhower Foundation staff facilitated appropriate revisions.) Contracts were not signed and implementation funds were not released until work plans were approved.

**Financial Management Oversight and Monitoring**

*With the Sites and Accountability to HUD*

The Foundation monitored the management and financial management of each site, mainly through quarterly progress and financial reports from the sites to the Foundation and telephone conference calls. In turn, the Foundation submitted quarterly progress and financial reports to HUD on all local and national operations. The Foundation also participated in many accountability meetings with HUD staff.

**Training and Assistance on the Content of Local Program Replications and on How to Enhance the Institutional Capacity of the Local Nonprofit Youth Development Organizations**

Figure 11 summarizes our training and technical assistance on program content and nonprofit capacity building. Our strategies included:

- National and off-site training and technical assistance.
- Local, on-site training and technical assistance.
- Remote technical assistance and coaching.
- Distribution of resource material.

Consider each strategy:
**Figure 11: Eisenhower Technical Assistance Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies/Methods</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL AND OFF-SITE TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>National Cluster Workshops covering issues such as program planning, youth development, grant-writing, staff development, media planning and management, and continuation planning. Travel grants allowing sites to attend national, regional or local training events, or to visit model organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ON-SITE TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>Site Visits by Eisenhower Foundation staff that focused on across-the-board civilian and police staff development and problem solving, management, capacity building, and operating relationships among the nonprofit organization, police and public housing agency. Mentor Training sessions to complete work begun at National Cluster Workshops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMOTE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND COACHING</td>
<td>Biweekly phone calls between Eisenhower Program Director and individual sites to assess program implementation and to trouble-shoot. Periodic conference calls with all sites to address issues common to all. Periodic conference calls between technical assistance consultants and individual sites to provide follow-up assistance on training initiated at national cluster workshops or other training events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCE MATERIAL</td>
<td>Periodic mailings to sites to pass on information about youth development, community equity policing, and other issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National and Off-site Training and Technical Assistance: National Cluster Workshops.**

The Foundation hosted five national cross-site workshop training events in the course of this initiative. Figure 12 provides summary information. The workshops were designed to provide several categories of assistance. First, "core courses" were offered to ensure that sites acquired knowledge and skills that were key to successful operation of a safe haven-ministation -- such as coaching, mentoring, near peer coaching, advocacy, youth development, staff development, time management, and fundraising. The Foundation's experiences in other replications have shown the need to build basic organizational capacity in these areas. We also have learned that, with every new initiative, all sites need to take part in a detailed briefing that covers goals, objectives, expected outcomes and timelines.
Beyond this core curriculum, the national cluster workshops offered a choice of *site-specific training opportunities* on topics that were of interest to one or more cities. The Foundation selected the topics based on the results of a needs assessment conducted at the beginning of the initiative, in which the sites were asked to list and prioritize the training areas they felt would be most useful to their organizations.

Third, national training sessions were a cost-effective mechanism for making mid-course corrections: sites received training and technical assistance to address their challenges and barriers to success. And finally, by having the sites identify and discuss their common problems, the national cluster workshop fostered peer learning and cross-site interaction that extended beyond several days of training.

What follows is a brief description of the major topics and issues covered during each workshop.
1. September 1995 National Cluster Workshop (San Juan). This was the inaugural meeting for the sites that were to take part in this initiative: Baltimore, Columbia, Little Rock, Memphis, San Juan and Washington, DC. (The Newark site also was present, but later was dropped -- as discussed above.) Site-by-site introductions allowed participants to share information on their target neighborhoods, programs, and staff. The Foundation then provided an in-depth review of the history, first generation evaluation and resulting principles (above) which were the basis for replicating safe haven-ministations in HUD sites.

*Note that, because Columbia, SC hosted the workshop, police officers from all of its kobans were able to attend. Columbia also accounted for more than half of the police department personnel represented at this workshop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Major Training Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 16-20, 1995</td>
<td>San Juan, PR</td>
<td>Youth Agency Staff: 7, Police Officers: 10, Other Partners: 1, Trainers: 4, Foundation Staff: 3</td>
<td>☒ Time Management, ☒ San Juan Elements of Safe Haven-Ministations, ☒ Replication, ☒ Grassroots Fundraising, ☒ Staff Development and Management, ☒ Strategic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12-15, 1996</td>
<td>Little Rock, AR</td>
<td>Youth Agency Staff: 8, Police Officers: 12, Other Partners: 3, Trainers: 3, Foundation Staff: 3</td>
<td>☐ Mentoring Training and Trainers Sessions, ☐ Youth Entrepreneurship, ☐ Program Evaluation Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 6-9, 1997</td>
<td>Columbia, SC</td>
<td>Youth Agency Staff: 9, Police Officers: 20*, Other Partners: 1, Trainers: 4, Foundation Staff: 4</td>
<td>☒ Identifying Program Outcomes, ☐ Academic Achievement, ☐ High-Risk Youth, ☐ Problem-Oriented Police, ☒ Parental Involvement in Youth Programs, ☐ Site Continuation Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27-31, 1998</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Youth Agency Staff: 6, Police Officers: 0, Other Partners: 0, Trainers: 4, Foundation Staff: 5</td>
<td>☒ Fundraising, ☘ Media as a Fundraising Tool, ☘ Program Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second full day of training began with an introductory session on time management, "Improving the Performance of Staff: The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People," based on the teachings of Stephen R. Covey in his book of the same name. Participants had received a copy of the Covey book in advance for study, and each principle was reviewed in detail with a Covey-trained instructor. This session was followed by an extended site visit to Centro Isolina Ferre in San Juan -- our model for second generation sites. The Puerto Rico site had police officers who resided on site, and had expanded its activities well beyond youth development and mentoring to include remedial education, child care, job training, and economic development. (See Chapter 1.)

The next day of training focused on fundraising and work plan development. In the fundraising session, led by a veteran development specialist, participants learned that the bulk of philanthropic dollars came from individuals, not foundations or corporations. The trainer also covered the importance of unrestricted funding, the need for a balanced funding portfolio, and the linkages among fundraising, evaluation and the media. During the session on work plan development, each site was asked to specify goals, objectives, responsibility centers, outcomes, and timelines for its safe haven-ministration replication.

As part of the Foundation's commitment to continual review and refinement of its work, the sites were asked to complete an evaluation form providing feedback on the value of the training sessions, the quality of the instructors, and their overall satisfaction.

2. September 1996 National Cluster Workshop (Little Rock). This training event occurred shortly after the Eisenhower Foundation received a second HUD grant to continue replication activities at participating sites. The grant was announced at a press conference held in the Rotunda of the Little Rock City Hall. There was extensive local media coverage of the announcement, made by a HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary.

More than half of the workshop was devoted to training on mentoring, advocacy and near-peering. A trainer began a 10 module curriculum -- to train civilian and police staff to work with youth and also to train others. The curriculum included a module on "Mentoring and Cultural Sensitivity" which examined issues of cultural awareness, respect, and identification; a module titled "Building Communications Skills," designed to help trainees identify, develop, and practice effective methods of communicating with young people; and a module titled "Setting and Achieving Goals," which offered guidelines to help mentor/mentee pairs set goals for the mentoring relationship. These introductory sessions were followed by on-site training sessions at each site during the months that followed.
In addition to the mentoring sessions, the Little Rock workshop included a tour of the local safe haven-ministration in public housing and site-by-site updates.

3. January - February 1997 National Cluster Workshop (Washington, DC). The Foundation's trainer on mentoring, advocacy and near peers conducted a day-long session in Washington, DC. The event was part of a 3 day workshop that also covered midcourse correction issues. It was attended by the civilian director and a police officer/mentor from each safe haven-ministration.

The trainer led participants through a comprehensive review of the Mentor Training Curriculum, the 10 part training system which has been used by organizations such as the Metropolitan Police Boys and Girls Clubs. The trainer's sessions covered the principles of adult learning, workshop preparation, and an in-depth review of the 10 mentor training modules.

4. November 1997 National Cluster Workshop (Columbia). This 4 day event re-reviewed the skills needed to run an effective safe haven-ministration. It included workshops on youth development and community equity policing. A local educator conducted a session on "Improving Academic Achievement in High-Risk Youth." The 2 hour training began with a brainstorming exercise to help safe haven-ministration staff identify strategies for getting young people to make the necessary choices and investments (e.g., attending school regularly, completing homework assignments, seeking out tutors to help with areas of weak academic performance) that would lead to academic success. Each site prepared a work plan for improving the academic assistance provided by their safe haven-ministations.

A staff member of the first generation Dorchester Youth Collaborative led an interactive workshop on "Conflict Resolution," based on his work in a racially and ethnically diverse neighborhood in Boston. Relationships among the youth participants were hostile, and there was often the threat of violence. Dorchester Youth Collaborative staff sought a mechanism for helping young people resolve their conflicts and reach a better understanding of each other's culture. Staff identified an ideal mechanism for achieving these goals: they developed a theater arts program that allowed youth to write autobiographical scripts offering a glimpse of the challenges they faced -- and gave racial groupings an opportunity to see their peers as not so different from themselves. The theater concept was an immediate success: tensions began to dissipate, friendships began to form across racial and ethnic lines, there were fewer and fewer conflicts, and those that developed were resolved peacefully.
The new theater arts program became enormously popular. The Dorchester Youth Collaborative received invitations throughout the city and state to perform their mini-plays at other youth programs. And there was another important outcome: participants' self-esteem increased because they were receiving public approbation. The theater arts program gave young people a constructive outlet for their energies, and instead of getting peer notice and respect for anti-social behaviors (smoking, alcohol/drug use, gang membership) the theater program was a pro-social, positive way to garner such attention. Live theater led to film: the group established a production company which developed a series of public service announcements. Youth wrote, acted in, filmed, and produced the spots, and raised $30,000 to complete a full-length feature film, Squeeze; it can be found in Blockbuster Video stores.

The Dorchester Youth Collaborative staffer also described DYC's "near peers" program, in which young adults who were only 5 to 10 years older than program participants were brought in for informal discussions. These young people were extremely effective role models because they had grown up in the same neighborhoods as program participants, but had managed to escape their "lives of quiet desperation" through college education and fulfilling work.

Another trainer then led a 2 hour session on "Increasing Parent Involvement in Youth Programs." After a group-participation ice breaker, a parent volunteer shared her positive experiences with a local program. She was first recruited through door-to-door outreach, and remained active because she felt welcomed, she was treated with respect, and she wasn't made to feel "stupid" just because she "only had a GED." She and the trainer also stressed that, because many parents may have difficulty reading, safe haven-ministration staff should communicate with them by phone and in person as well as through letters, brochures and flyers. The workshop offered a menu of ideas for securing parental involvement. Among the options that were discussed:

- one-time commitments, such as chaperoning an outing;
- home-based volunteering (stuffing envelopes, for example) for parents with very young children who are unable to volunteer on-site; and
- project-specific volunteering (helping to plan a fundraising event, for example), that require parental involvement for intense but relatively short-term assignments.

Sites developed a preliminary implementation plan for using the workshop recommendations.
An Eisenhower Foundation staff member also led an interactive session designed to help sites identify expected youth outcomes. Each site team of civilian and police was given a small jar of colored water, additional food coloring, and instructions to mix them to achieve a certain shade of blue. After 10 minutes of experimentation, the Eisenhower staffer explained that the exercise was a metaphor for their work:

- the youths they served were "bottles of water" that were already "colored" or shaped by family background, educational ability, neighborhood conditions, and personal strengths and weaknesses;
- the food coloring represented the program interventions used by each site to turn the jars of water "a certain shade of blue," the activities that would help turn youths into responsible, productive adults. Each replication would identify the programs that would best suit their target populations, which could range from sports to computer classes to cultural activities; and
- turning these jars of water "a certain shade of blue" was equivalent to working with these youths to achieve positive youth outcomes -- i.e., helping them become responsible, productive adults.

Workshop participants then were asked to list their program interventions and identify outcomes that could be reasonably expected to occur as a result of these interventions. Each site presented and explained its list of interventions/outcomes, and the workshop ended with a review of the youth outcomes that the Eisenhower Foundation hoped would result from the replications.

Finally, the Columbia national cluster workshop ended with a 2 hour session to help sites begin work on obtaining funding and support to sustain their work after HUD funding ended. Led by Eisenhower staff members, the session on "Site Continuation Plans" reminded sites that HUD funding would end in 10 months -- in August of the coming year, and included discussion of the following:

- the use of electronic and print media to increase awareness of a program's successes, and generate interest on the part of the philanthropic community;
- the desirability of launching a safe haven-minestation newsletter;
- gaining access to local cable television and local newspapers;
- securing ongoing support from the local public housing authority; and applying for government funding (local, state and national) and private dollars (businesses, corporations, foundations, and individuals).

A detailed review then was made of the success of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in raising money. Youth participants developed public
service announcements and other media materials that led to the creation of a video production company. "Site Continuation Planning" ended with each site preparing a written document which noted which of the above activities they would begin to plan for, and the expected date of completion.

Like other workshops, the Columbia event included a tour of that city's safe haven-ministation replications, and an evaluation of the workshop.

5. May 1998 National Cluster Workshop. With the safe haven-ministation replications slated to end in August, 1998, this final workshop focused much of its attention on the issue of sustainability. During the first day there were 4 modules on fundraising issues, led by an experienced development consultant. After presenting principles of fundraising, the consultant guided participants through the following exercises:

- Developing a ‘Case Statement' that includes the mission statement, goals and objectives, organization history and structure, and fundraising plan;
- Reviewing the "Ten Phases of Fundraising";
- Completing a "Taking Stock" exercise to identify the organization's strengths and weaknesses;
- Preparing a Budget which listed "barebones," "reasonable" and "ideal" budgets for staffing, programmatic and indirect costs, and also identifies "worst," "likely" and "best" potential funding sources;
- Choosing Funding Partners, with a review of the advantages and disadvantages of special events fundraising, government funding, and United Way funding.

The session ended with each site further refining its fundraising planning, begun in the previous workshop.

Next, the Foundation's media trainers conducted an intensive, hands-on, session that showed how to use the media to: 1) convey messages about "what works" and 2) raise the organization's profile and increase awareness and support for what works (which, in turn, helps to raise money).

The trainers began with strategic media planning -- helping sites identify when to use media and which medium was most effective in achieving specific goals. Each site then was charged with developing a handful of "main messages" that they would always seek to convey during media encounters, whether with print journalists or in television or radio broadcasts. After developing their messages, each workshop participant was taped live by a professional cameraman. There was instant review of
each videotape, with candid feedback from the workshop leader and the participants, followed by a second taping.

Media training concluded with a mock television news conference (again, videotaped live) designed to give participants some experience in maintaining control of media encounters and ensuring that their "main messages" are heard.

Why did we include this media training? The Eisenhower Foundation has been at the forefront of a movement to dispel the commonly-held belief that inner city programs, on the whole, are ineffective and that "nothing works." The Foundation's Communicating What Works initiative attempts to counteract these misconceptions by identifying promising programs; building their capacity; evaluating their effectiveness using scientific standards that include control or comparison groups; disseminating information about program successes through various media; and engaging local residents and program staff in dissemination efforts.

A major goal of the Eisenhower Foundation's media workshop therefore was to help sites to educate policy makers about effective programs. An organization is more likely to be noticed and heard by policy makers if it has a high media profile -- e.g., op-eds are published in the local paper, staff are frequently interviewed on local news and cable access shows, and staff conduct door-to-door campaigns to inform and mobilize their communities. The goal, over time, is to re-cast the media so that there is no longer a sole focus on stories of failure and crisis, but rather an expansion of "news" to include stories of success and uplift.

As with other cluster workshops, the May 1998 session included a site visit to a local safe haven-ministation, in this case the replication at Paradise at Parkside in Washington, DC.

**National and Off-Site Training and Technical Assistance: Travel Grants.** On occasion, the Foundation provided travel grants so that sites could attend national or regional conferences, or visit model programs. One such grant was awarded to the San Juan safe haven-ministation so that staff could visit the Portland House of Umoja (Portland, OR). San Juan was planning to extend program services to high-risk youth, and the House of Umoja had developed a successful model working with court-adjudicated young black males. A second grant was awarded so that new staff from the safe haven-ministation in Paradise at Parkside (Washington, DC) could visit the San Juan model.

**On-Site Training and Technical Assistance: Monitoring Visits.** Periodically, the Eisenhower Foundation national program director made site visits to monitor performance. As needed, the visits included
assistance on program strategies, civilian and police staff development, board development, management, financial management, nonprofit capacity building, and operating relationships among the nonprofit organization, police and public housing authority.

**On-Site Training and Technical Assistance: Mentoring.** The trainer on mentoring, advocacy and near peers made a one-day visit to each site to provide follow-up assistance for civilian and police training programs. As noted earlier, those who attended the February 1, 1997 workshop in Washington were to return to their home agencies and refine mentor training programs. During her on-site follow-up visit, the trainer was able to help the sites resolve barriers they faced in training implementation.

**Remote Coaching: Bi-weekly Phone Calls with Individual Sites.** The Foundation's national program director scheduled phone calls with the sites as a regular mechanism for program monitoring and trouble-shooting. As with any program intervention, the safe haven-ministation replications faced numerous challenges and barriers to successful implementation. The strong, positive relationships forged between Eisenhower staff and local safe haven-ministation personnel made it more likely that the sites would seek help when they needed it.

Safe haven-ministation staffing was a subject of frequent discussion. Virtually every site found that the local police departments would occasionally reassign police officers away from their safe haven-ministation patrol areas to other parts of the city. Reassignments were a serious threat to replications: they represented a potentially negative impact on the mentoring component (police served as mentors to local youths), and also on crime (police mentors also were responsible for patrolling the areas in the vicinity of the safe haven-ministation). Eisenhower Foundation staff always responded quickly to the reassignment news, advising the sites on how to work with police authorities (and mobilize their communities) to restore the policing resources.

Advisory councils were also a problem for the sites. Replication principles required that sites establish local advisory councils that would include parents, police officers, community leaders, housing authorities, youth, and other important community representatives. Some sites had difficulty attracting representatives from certain constituencies (parents, for example), and needed Eisenhower Foundation advice on recruitment; other sites had fractious councils that needed the assistance of outside mediators.
Remote Coaching: Periodic Group Conference Calls. Eisenhower Foundation staff organized conference calls from time to time to cover issues of relevance to all sites, and covered issues such as the following:

- the format to be used in preparing quarterly reports;
- scheduling of national cluster workshops;
- site recommendations for workshop topics; and
- updates on Eisenhower national fundraising efforts.

Based on initial experiences, Eisenhower Foundation staff realized the need for frequent, regularly-scheduled contact with the sites through group conference calls. We therefore introduced bi-weekly calls.

**Distribution of Resource Material.** Numerous documents and audio-visual materials were distributed to sites, as shown in Figure 13. In an average month, the Foundation sent at least one mailing to the replication groups. Many of these items were discussed during periodic conference calls and at National Cluster Workshops. Distribution of some materials was initiated by the Foundation, while distribution of other materials was initiated by site-specific requests.
As part of the Foundation's Communicating What Works initiative (discussed above under the May, 1998 National Cluster Workshop, 2 first

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Materials</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower Publications and Reports</td>
<td>• The State of Families: Family, Employment and Reconstruction - Police Based on What Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Youth Investment and Police Mentoring: Principle Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Publications and Reports</td>
<td>• Youth Investment and Police Mentoring: Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountability: It All Depends on What You Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample of Newspaper/ Magazine Articles About Participating Safe Haven-ministations</td>
<td>• “U.S. is Importing More Than Cars from Japan,” by Shareese Harold, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 29, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Caimito Program Takes Cue from Japanese ‘Koban’ Idea,” by Karl Ross, The San Juan Star, October 16, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “International Visitors Laud Caimito’s Koban Program,” by Laura Randall, The San Juan Star, September 20, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower Training Curricula (including Videotapes and Audiotapes) and Handbooks</td>
<td>• Youth Development and Police Mentoring Initiative: Replication Manual and Video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Youth Safe Haven/Police Ministration Evaluation Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Argus Community Model - Training Video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal Applications, Funding Notices</td>
<td>• HUD Notice of Funding Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluation

As summarized in the reports, the evaluation of the replications by the Foundation was an important form of technical assistance. Without scientific proof that replications work or at least have promise if refined, there is no justification for expanding them to scale across the nation.

Appendix 2 details the methodology of the evaluation, which has both process and outcome components. Here, we present a summary.

The Process Evaluation. The replications in the 6 cities represented diverse experiments with implementation of the replication principles described at the beginning of Chapter 2. The process evaluation was conducted to document and analyze the implementation of the replication principles -- including key players, roles, funding, activities, institutional capacity, management, technical assistance, training community context, and perception of the program by youth and civilian staff, police, housing authorities and parents. Through the use of a theory of change approach, the process evaluation sought to identify the role that these factors (inputs) played in achieving the desired outcomes -- of positive changes in the lives of youth as well as greater safety in the immediate neighborhood of the safe haven-ministation.

The Outcome Evaluation. The outcome evaluation was conducted to assess if there were measurable improvements that could be attributed to the replications. Two basic hypotheses which underlie the replication principles were tested to determine outcomes.

The first hypothesis was that youth participating at safe haven-ministations would improve on a number of behavior and attitude measures. This hypothesis was tested by interviewing youth, staff, parents and police at each site. They were asked about the benefits to youth, and about any changes youth experienced in behavior, grades, or attitudes. To determine more systematic impacts, some sites were asked to participate in administering questionnaires to the same youth at the safe haven-ministation at two points in time -- at the beginning of their participation and after one year. The goal was to identify changes that occurred over a year of participation. Three sites -- Columbia, Baltimore, and Memphis -- satisfactorily implemented the youth outcome surveys. Washington, DC and Little Rock did not completely implement the surveys, and San Juan
was not included in the youth outcome evaluation. A comparison site, matched demographically with the housing development in which the safe haven-ministation was located, was selected in each city and youth surveys were conducted to test whether youth at the safe haven-ministation did better than youth who did not have a safe haven-ministation. The youth surveys covered the following areas: self-esteem, future outlook, academic achievement, positive behaviors and negative behaviors based on the results of several recent studies in prevention and youth development. In addition, youth were asked what they liked best about the program and how they would improve it. (See Appendix 2 for a full discussion of how the surveys were implemented and analyzed.)

The second outcome evaluation hypothesis was based on crime reported to the police by citizens. "Crime" was defined as in the first generation of replications -- as the total of F.B.I. "Index crime" -- which consists of criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft. Because crimes of theft are more numerous than violent crimes, this aggregate of "Index crime" is relatively a measure of acquisitive than violent crime.

In part, the decision by citizens on whether to report Index crime is based on whether they trust and have confidence in police. Accordingly, this second hypothesis was that Index crime reported by citizens to police initially would increase, based on increased trust and hence reporting by citizens, and that Index crime then would decline, based on less crime as a result of our community equity policing.

There is ample support in practice and in the scientific literature for this increase-and-then-decline hypothesis. For example, in a study, the Community Policing Consortium observes that "calls to report crime may increase considerably during the early phases of community policing implementation, as community confidence in police capability rises and community trust increases. However, the number of 911 calls will likely decrease over time, which will provide a quantitative measure of the strategy's effort."

To test the increase-and-then-decline hypothesis, we compared Index crime over the period of replication in the safe haven-ministation target neighborhood to Index crime in another, similar neighborhood -- as well as to Index crime in the surrounding police precinct and the city as a whole. We compared the average for reported Index crime for years prior to the program with reported Index crime in the program's first year (called the "base" year). Then the first year was compared to the average of the subsequent program years. Averages were used instead of individual years to mitigate the possibility of anomalies in any given year,
to show the effectiveness of the program over the entire program period. (See Appendix 2 for details.)

**Evaluation Team Field Work and Contact With the Sites.** To help carry out this design, evaluation team members made annual visits to each safe haven-ministration. They collected data on changes over time in community conditions, initial resources, local partners, organizational structure, community relations, policing activities, youth development outcomes, and other measures of program implementation and outcomes. The site visits served as an opportunity to assist the sites with evaluation-related issues -- for example, clarifying questions on the youth survey or offering advice on how to increase response rates among comparison group members.

The evaluation team participated in conference calls with the sites, covering technical and practical issues related to data collection. For example, the evaluators reviewed an Evaluation Handbook prepared especially for the sites, and which contained the following information:

- the purpose of the study;
- the Background Form to be used to collect baseline information on youth participants;
- a copy of the Youth Questionnaire;
- the Time-Use Survey to be administered at one of the sites;
- comparison group recruitment strategies;
- police crime data to be submitted;
- teacher ratings that were to be used as a measure of behavioral and academic change among youth participants;
- the weekly attendance sheets and activity forms to be completed by the site;
- payment protocols for program and comparison youths (incentives to increase participation and to encourage submission of report cards), and for local data collectors;
- a copy of the data collection calendar; and
- a list of contacts.

Evaluation conference calls covered other issues as well. For example, sites were advised to work closely with local school districts to gain access to student report cards. Evaluation staff offered regular briefings on the status of data collection, and encouraged site recommendations on completing data collection in a way that was least disruptive to the local programs.

To complement site visits and phone conferencing, the evaluation team led briefings at the national cluster workshops. After reviewing common evaluation terms (such as process measures and outcome measures), the
evaluation team guided the sites through the development of detailed work plans showing:

- all program activities to be offered at the safe haven-ministations (inputs);
- expected program outcomes; and
- the names of those responsible for implementing programs (accountability centers).

**Key Evaluation Questions.** Through the process and outcome evaluations, the evaluation team was interested in answering questions like these:

- Did each replication site establish and implement a safe haven-ministration?
- Could we confirm the two basic outcome hypotheses -- that participating youth would improve on numerous measures and that reported Index crime in the target neighborhood would increase-and-then decline?
- How did the second generation findings compare to the first generation findings?
- Were the lessons of the first round of replications equally valid in the second round of replications?
- How did public housing agencies perform as partners with the Foundation, police and nonprofit youth development organizations?
- On balance, were second generation sites able to achieve roughly similar outcomes as the first generation sites -- in spite of lower levels of national funding?
- How did affiliated nonprofit organizations work out, as the lead replicating agencies compared to unaffiliated organizations?
- Was any light shed on whether faith-based organizations perform better than secular organizations?
- How did the second round replications fare compared to "zero tolerance" policing?
- How can local replicators, national technical assistors and evaluators improve their performance?
- What are the implications for HUD policy and replication to scale of the safe haven-ministration model?
- What directions should the next round of replications take?

**Preparation of a Final Report and Implementation of a Strategic Media Plan to Communicate the Findings**

The last major form of Foundation technical assistance was to communicate the findings summarized in the present report. As part of the
Foundation's permanent Communicating What Works initiative, we already have disseminated preliminary findings through the media. For example, the ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings transcript in Appendix 1 is a story on the HUD site in Columbia, SC. CBS Good Morning America featured coverage of Baltimore and Washington, DC. BBC radio covered the Washington, DC site. Each of the 6 sites was covered on local television features. In terms of print media, there already have been stories in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian (London), The Washington Times, The South Carolina State, The San Juan Star, The Memphis Commercial Appeal, The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, Marketwise, (the Federal Reserve Magazine) and The Housing and Development Reporter.

In 1998, the Center for Visionary Leadership, in A Guide To Best Practices submitted under contract to HUD, wrote up the Washington, DC program as a national model.

The Foundation will enhance this advance media and best practices coverage through new electronic and print media coverage of the printed version of the present report, inclusion of a summary of the report on the Foundation's web site, presentations at HUD sponsored and many other conferences, dissemination of the report to new sites in the Foundation's third generation of safe haven-ministations (presently beginning through funding from the U.S. Department of Justice) and dissemination of the report more widely to policy makers and practitioners at the national, state and local levels.

**Footnotes**


7. Koban, Inc. and the Columbia Police

Summary

The safe haven-ministation opened in September 1995 in Columbia at a public housing development named Gonzales Gardens. The original partners were the Columbia Housing Authority, the Columbia Police Department and the Columbia Urban League. In 1997, the safe haven-ministation became incorporated with support from the Columbia Housing Authority and the Columbia Police Department. The partnership with the Columbia Urban League did not work out. The new entity adopted the Japanese term for police ministation, Koban, Inc.

The safe haven-ministation in Gonzales Gardens received $44,275 in Year 1 (September 1995 to August 1996); $32,000 in Year 2 (September 1996 to August 1997); and $34,000 (September 1997 to August 1998). The local in-kind match was $76,962 for Year 1; $106,667 for Year 2, and $91,814 for Year 3. The safe haven-ministation also received an additional $100,000 in Year 3 from the Columbia Housing Authority to support program directors for additional safe haven-ministations in 2 other public housing developments.

Core activities for youth at the safe haven-ministation were mentoring, after-school tutoring, and recreational activities that provided educational and skill development opportunities. The activities were provided on a daily basis in a structured environment that included a strict schedule and a standard code of behavior that youth were aware of and observed.

Since 1997, the number of partners committed to the Koban, Inc. has increased from 7 to 17 organizations that represent a wide range of sectors. The partners provide a range of services and resources. Seven to 10 volunteers were recruited to tutor youth after school, and 7 parents volunteer to do office work in the safe haven-ministation, including opening the office.

Youth who participated in the program improved significantly more in many key areas compared to youth at a site that did not have a safe haven-ministation based on individual surveys.

Koban youth were:

- Much more likely to get their homework done
- Much less likely to engage in anti-social leadership behavior and other behaviors such as beating someone up, damaging property, carrying weapons, or being disorderly.
Youth participating in the safe haven-ministation program improved more (but not statistically significantly) than the comparison group by:

- Reporting less drug and alcohol use
- Having a better future outlook
- Receiving better grades

Parents, staff, and youth interviewed at the safe haven-ministation also reported that youth improved their manners, behaved more appropriately towards each other and towards adults, and appeared to be more optimistic about their future after having been part of the safe haven-ministation activities for more than a year. Both parents and youth reported that there is less fighting among youth because the activities at the safe haven-ministation taught them to interact better among themselves.

The replication also had a dramatic effect on Index crime reporting, which followed the "increase-and-then-decline" hypothesis expected when the police officers engage, win the trust of the community and increase their activities in an area. The year after the safe haven-ministation opened, Index crime reported to the police was more than double the average number in the previous 3 years. Then starting in 1996, the year after the safe haven-ministation opened, reports steadily decreased, even while increasing at the precinct level. Police, residents and crime reports also agreed that there was a dramatic decrease in drug use. Since 1995, when the safe haven-ministation opened, police report a 61 percent reduction in drug crimes.

The future of the safe haven-ministation program in Columbia is very bright. The formation of Koban, Inc. and the expansion of the program to more sites are 2 factors that helped program staff secure significant resources for the continuation and expansion of the program. The safe haven-ministation program has been replicated in 2 other Columbia public housing developments. Koban, Inc. has plans for further expansion in the future. It hopes to establish a safe haven-ministation in at least one school in every area, which has a safe haven-ministation in the community. Given the recent killings in Colorado and Georgia high schools, and given criticisms of the federal Safe and Drug Free schools program, the expansion of safe haven-ministations to schools may help develop new options for dealing with school violence. Koban, Inc. wants to extend services to rural communities, reach more teens with more supervised activities, remain open until midnight, and add a sports component. The program at Gonzales Gardens served as a model to the other sites.

In terms of sustainability, Koban, Inc. has received $400,000 to date from the Eisenhower Foundation to continue and expand work as part of the Foundation's third generation of replications. The Eisenhower resources
Where Was the Replication Located?

Gonzales Gardens, the third largest public housing development in Columbia, is located near downtown Columbia. It contains 280 units of small townhouses that are 2 stories high. Gonzales Gardens has a population of 689 residents of which 337 (49 percent) are infants, children, and youth. The housing development is spread out across the neighborhood with plenty of space in between the rows of townhouses. There is also a large playground. The grounds and surrounding areas are very well kept.

The safe haven-ministration is located at the end of 1 of the rows. It was located at that particular corner because that corner used to be a drug-infested area. It occupies 2 units of townhouses. The second unit was recently renovated to expand the safe haven-ministration to accommodate its growing number of activities. The first floor of the first unit contains computer workstations, while the offices of the staff are located on the second floor. The second unit provides space for activities geared toward older teens.

How Much Was Spent and What Activities Were Carried out in the Replication?

Funding Levels

In September 1995, the Eisenhower Foundation granted HUD funds to the safe haven-ministration program at Gonzales Gardens. The money provided for the employment of a program director. The local sponsoring nonprofit organization was the Columbia Urban League, Inc., which provided access to office equipment and other support services. The Columbia Housing Authority provided a housing unit within Gonzales Gardens for the safe haven-ministration office. The Columbia Police Department continued to support the 2 existing community police officers in Gonzales Gardens that were responsible for the housing development.

Table 17 summarizes the budget for the program at Gonzales Gardens over 3 years. The program received $44,275 from the Eisenhower Foundation in the first year, $32,000 in the second year, and $34,000 in the third year. In addition, the safe haven-ministration received a local in-kind match of $76,962 for Year 1; $106,667 for Year 2, and $91,814 for Year 3. The safe haven-ministration also received an additional $100,000 in Year 3 from the Columbia Housing Authority to support program...
directors for additional safe haven-ministations in 2 other public housing developments.

**TABLE 17**

**HUD Budget Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HUD Year 1 9/95-8/96</th>
<th>HUD Year 2 9/96-8/97</th>
<th>HUD Year 3 9/97-8/98</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRANTS VIA THE EISENHOWER FOUNDATION</strong></td>
<td>$44,275¹</td>
<td>$32,000²</td>
<td>$34,000³</td>
<td>$110,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL IN-KIND</strong></td>
<td>$76,962⁴</td>
<td>$106,667</td>
<td>$91,814</td>
<td>$275,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CASH MATCH from the COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000⁵</td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$121,237</td>
<td>$138,667</td>
<td>$225,814</td>
<td>$485,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹This figure includes $30,000 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as $14,275 from the Center for Global Partnership.

²This figure represents HUD funding only.

³This figure represents HUD funding only.

⁴The local in-kind figures refer to services from the local police department and other local agencies that include salaries, supplies, awards, field trips, transportation, space, phones, equipment, and utilities.

⁵This dollar amount supplied by the Housing Authority is used for salaries of two additional site directors and expanded program expenses.

**Replication Activities**

**The Program In A Nutshell.** The Gonzales Gardens replication was staffed by a program director, 2 police officers, and a number of parents and college students who volunteered for a variety of tasks, from answering the telephone to proofreading. When Koban, Inc. was established, 2 new safe haven-ministations were set up in 2 additional public housing developments, Saxon Homes and Hendley Homes, and
additional police officers and staff were hired. Both are large public housing developments, known to be crime infested. Volunteers at Gonzalez Gardens have described youth at Saxon and Hendley as unruly and misbehaved. A fourth safe haven-minestation is currently being constructed near Gonzales Gardens. This ministation will be located across the street from an abandoned building where drug activities take place. This new station will become the headquarters for Koban, Inc. and will be the first operation of a ministation outside of public housing.

The program at Gonzales Gardens expanded to occupy the adjacent unit to accommodate its growing number of participants and activities. The number of parent and college volunteers more than doubled. The number of partners also increased, and they provided a range of services and resources to support the program. The safe haven-minestation staff members' knowledge and skills in working with the Gonzales Gardens community has improved. As a result, the staff members have developed strong ties with the residents and other community organizations and public agencies in the city.

The program's core activities were advocacy, mentoring, after-school tutoring, and recreational activities that provided educational and skill development opportunities. The activities were provided on a daily basis in a structured environment that included a strict schedule and a standard code of behavior that youth were aware of and observed. One of the most popular activities was the computer. The computers contained educational software that the children and youth used on a daily basis and that helped them strengthen their reading, spelling, and math skills.

The safe haven-minestation program went from having originally 1 to 2 parents to now having 6 to 7 parent volunteers that assist in answering the telephone, filing, typing, and helping to supervise youth during program hours. Each parent volunteers 2 to 3 times a week. One parent is responsible for opening the safe haven-minestation office. She also remains in the safe haven-minestation office from 2 until 4 p.m. from Monday to Friday to answer the phones and monitor youth, and provide coverage when the safe haven-minestation staff members are at meetings. Both the program staff and parents expressed that the latter's volunteerism has helped the safe haven-minestation engage new parents in its activities. These parents reported that volunteering at the safe haven-minestation helped them understand better what the program was trying to do for their children and also helped them build their trust towards the program staff, especially the police officers during interviews with the evaluation team.

During the inception of the safe haven-minestation, a police officer recruited two students from the Columbia Hall Annual Marathon for Public Service Programs at the University of South Carolina to help tutor
youth. These two student volunteers, in turn, recruited additional
volunteers from the Columbia Hall program and Benedict College.
Another volunteer was recruited from Midland Technical College by a
safe haven-ministration partner representative. Currently, there are 7 to 10
volunteers who tutor youth after school. The initial 2 volunteers have
remained with the safe haven-ministration until now and organized
themselves to split their time between the Gonzales Gardens safe haven-
ministration and Saxon Homes safe haven-ministration. One of these 2
volunteers also assists the safe haven-ministration program director in
answering the phones and proofreading documents. These volunteers were
required to attend a 6-session training course conducted by the safe haven-
ministration program director on mentoring, tutoring, leadership skills,
attitudes, and organizational skills.

Since 1997, the number of partners increased from 7 to 17 organizations
that represent a wide range of sectors. The partners provide a range of
services and resources. For example,

- The Book Buddies Summer Program is directed by a
  representative from the Palmetto Health Alliance (formerly the
  Baptist Medical Center) who recruits and coordinates other
  volunteers to read to youth;
- Cooperative Ministry donated 25 computers, a laser printer,
  educational software, and some office furniture to the safe haven-
  ministration office;
- Richland School District's teachers, social workers, and principals
  collaborate with the safe haven-ministration staff to work with
  youth that get into trouble;
- Carolina Healthcare Plan donated a photocopying machine to the
  safe haven-ministration; and
- Bell South provided administrative supplies for the safe haven-
  ministration.

All the partners have representatives who are members of
Koban, Inc.'s Board of Directors. They maintain regular
contact with the safe haven-ministration staff and play an
active role in the development of Koban, Inc. Some of the
partners have also provided financial resources.

During the summer, the safe haven-ministration participated
in a youth training program sponsored by the Columbia
Police Department. Youth are required to work 3 times a
week for $3 an hour. The program organized 18 youth into
3 teams that are responsible for different chores in the safe
haven-ministration, including taking the trash out, cleaning
the safe haven-ministration at the end of the day, etc. The
youth provide yet another source of support for the program. At the same time, their participation in supporting the safe haven-ministration provides an opportunity for them to learn about responsibility and leadership.

Youth Development. The safe haven-ministration provided a structured environment for youth that included a strict schedule of activities and a standard code of behavior that youth were aware of and observed. The parent volunteers also assisted in enforcing the schedule and code of behavior. The safe haven-ministration executive director developed a training manual for mentors and tutors that requires them to participate in four to six training sessions on tutoring, mentoring, attitudes, leadership skills, and organizational skills.

At present, there are 18 mentors and each mentor is assigned 1 to 9 youth. The mentors include staff members, police officers, and volunteers from the University of South Carolina and other partner organizations. In general, the expectation is for the mentors to spend at least 2 hours a week with the youth. The safe haven-ministration keeps an enrollment roster of the mentors and their assigned youth.

As part of the advocacy and mentoring activities, some of the youth stayed on campus with their college mentors and sat in on their classes. This activity gave the youth a taste of college life and helped them recognize that it is possible for them to go to college also. Five safe haven-ministration youth were involved in the Explorer's Program, which is led by a police officer. This program helps youth build their skills to become responsible adults. Eighteen youth 15 years old and under formed the Gonzales Gardens Basketball Team. In order to stay on the team, the players are required to frequent the safe haven-ministration for a certain number of hours a week to help the younger children. The older youth that graduate from the team can become youth coaches for the team. The team members are required to participate in team building and other skills development sessions before playing. The youths' commitment to the team, their pride, and their self-esteem were elevated when the Palmetto Health Alliance provided funds to buy them basketball jerseys. Twenty-five female youth participated in the Girl Scouts Program that used to be led by an outside volunteer (a relative of one of the police officers) but now is led by a youth leader from Gonzales Gardens. This special program for the girls give them an opportunity to discuss issues specific to females. The group changed its name to the Harmony Group in January, 1998.

Advocates also have developed relationships with the youths' families. Advocates constantly interact with youth and maintain a stable presence in all aspects of the youths' lives, including helping youth with their homework and staying in touch with teachers.
There are currently 7 to 10 volunteers from the University of South Carolina, Benedict College, and Midland Technical College who tutor youth after school for 3 hours. On the average, approximately 40 youth came to the safe haven-ministation everyday for tutoring. The youth who were interviewed reported that they go straight to the safe haven-ministation after school to get help with their homework, get a snack, and then, as a reward for completing their school work, they get to play on the computers. One youth likes the safe haven-ministation because he can get help with his homework. He and the other children are eager to finish their homework so that they can play educational games on the computers there. Aside from regular tutors, older youth also are encouraged to act as near peers -- helping younger children if they have no homework of their own. Some of the volunteer tutors "hang out" in Gonzales Gardens after assisting youth to participate in fun activities (e.g., doing the girls' hair and playing games). This additional interaction shows youth that the tutors really care about them and are not there just to tutor them and then leave.

Youth look forward very much to field trips that expose them to educational opportunities and reinforce positive social behavior, while also allowing them to have fun. So far, youth have made trips to the zoo and Frankie's Fun Park. The Palmetto Health Alliance has contributed to the funds for transportation, food, and entrance fees. Youth also participated in sport activities that promote team building and reinforce discipline (e.g., basketball).

The Book Buddies Program operated during the summers of 1996, 1997, and 1998. An average of 25 to 30 youth ranging from ages 6 to 14 attends the program daily. The program recruits volunteers from the Palmetto Health Alliance, the Columbia Police Department, Greater Columbia Community Relations Council, Lyon Street Elementary School, United Way, Richland School District, Alston Wilkes Society, Carolina Care Health Plan, and Superior Mailing Service to teach youth about music, healthcare, and arts and craft. The youth also participate in math, handwriting, spelling, and reading exercises. The volunteers read to youth as well as facilitate youth reading to each other.

A recent feature article on Koban, Inc. in the Federal Reserve Bank community development magazine, Marketplace, illustrates one way in which youth are rewarded:¹

Each of the Columbia KOBANs boasts a "Wall of Fame" that proudly displays pictures of these key players – the community children who accomplish great things in school or otherwise. Their personal development and achievements speak to the effectiveness of KOBAN, Inc. The "Wall of Fame" reinforces the opportunities for

¹
success that lie beyond their neighborhoods by putting familiar faces to extraordinary feats. The children see their peers on the wall and know that they took using KOBAN as their coach and compass, have the power to choose the direction of their life instead of letting it be chosen for them. This way, they are guaranteed to win.

There were 3 major types of activities that involved community residents – 1) community clean-up days, 2) social gatherings and celebrations (e.g., opening of the clinic and BBQs during the summer) that engaged approximately 250 residents, and 3) the computer program sponsored by the Columbia Housing Authority. The Housing Authority placed 100 computers in homes that needed them -- based on selection criteria developed collaboratively with the police and the schools. The parents had to be employed and were required to attend 6 hours of training; otherwise they would lose the computer. The safe haven-ministation played an integral role in facilitating the placement of the computers and monitoring the progress of the parents. According to the safe haven-ministation staff, some of the youth that had already acquired basic computer skills through the safe haven-ministation were able to teach their parents.

The safe haven-ministation also played a critical role in supporting the adult residents. One resident at Gonzales Gardens came to the safe haven early in its first year of operation. She saw something good about this new program for her community and she wanted to be a part of it. As soon as some funds became available, she was hired on a stipend salary to assist with managing the office. She emerged as a leader in the community, and was voted the Koban Club President. From there, she entered the Climbing to Success program supported by the Columbia Housing Authority. This program contains a full computer lab, GED classes, a "mock" Dollar General Store, and classrooms for life skills classes and certificate programs. She eventually landed a full time job at the General Store and will be moving out of the public housing development into her own home. It was the safe haven-ministation's executive director who encouraged and supported her to develop her skills and make a better life for herself.

**Community Equity Policing.** The police officers maintained the safety of Gonzales Gardens and its immediate surroundings. When on duty, they patrolled the grounds in uniform. When off duty, they participated in a variety of activities. During an interview on ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings on February 18, 1998, one of the police officers said, "Part of the Koban program is being there all the time. They see us as human beings. We take off the uniform sometimes and go out and play a basketball game." One of the police officers was the assistant basketball coach. He also brought his family to assist in coordinating the Girl Scouts
Program. The police officers have played an integral role in making Gonzales Gardens a better place to live. The youth described how they could turn to the police officers whenever they needed help to deal with conflicts, as well as to assist them with their homework. The police officers were aware that the residents' positive perception of them might not extend to other police officers. Therefore, they made it a point to always introduce their fellow officers whenever they could. The police officers reported that the number of calls they received have decreased from back-to-back calls to 1 call every other day. The types of calls changed from homicides, rapes, armed robberies, aggravated assaults, and other serious crimes to helping parents deal with the conflicts with their children.

The police officers reported that their knowledge and skills in community equity policing were enhanced through their experiences in Gonzales Gardens. They found that maintaining a balance between being empathetic as a person and being forceful as a police officer was a challenge, but effective in gaining the trust of the residents. One police officer wanted to make a difference in the community. She knew that there had to be something for the teens in the community. First, she talked with them. Soon she found out that the older children wanted something to do and something to say. Then she came up with the idea of a community Teen's Club for youth 13 to 18 years of age. She got some volunteers to help her recruit youth and they met weekly to discuss issues and planned activities. More than thirty teens attended these meetings, which are held in the community center.

The police officers provided 2 more examples where their attitudes toward working with community residents improved. A group of senior citizens requested 1 of the police officers’ presence during their weekly walks and, at first, she was very apprehensive. However, after accompanying them a few times, she grew to appreciate their anecdotes about the "old days" at Gonzales Gardens and developed a rapport with them. Through them, she learned more about the residents and their activities. In another instance, police officers were asked to recruit mothers to participate in a parenting class by knocking from door to door and describing the class to the mothers. When a particular mother did not show up at the class, the police officers returned the next day and attempted to convince her again to attend. The police officers found that their persistency eventually persuaded the mother to attend class, partly because she was embarrassed by the number of times the officers visited her and partly because she felt that the officers must really care.

All the above events created an interesting turn around for 1 of the police officers. The officer knew that the program had some value, but had some doubts as to her value in the process. After a period of time, she actually
thought about going back to her regular patrol assignment. Once the Eisenhower program director got word of this, he began a line of conversations with the officer to explain what her value was to this program, based on his observation of her at work. The officer said she would give it more time. As it worked out she became a very important link in the Columbia operation. Since then, she has been promoted and remains an important link in the program.

Later, when another safe haven-ministation was established in Hendley Homes, this police officer was transferred there due to her extensive experience with community equity policing and the safe haven-ministation program. Another police officer who had previously been stationed at Saxon Homes replaced her at Gonzales Gardens.

**How Was the Replication Managed and How Were Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?**

**Management**

The structure of the safe haven-ministation program was initially designed by the Columbia Urban League, Inc., Columbia Police Department, and the Columbia Housing Authority, with the assistance of the Eisenhower Foundation. A program director who was considered a staff member of the Columbia Urban League directed the safe haven-ministation program. He was responsible for managing the mentoring, after-school tutoring, and other components of the program; mobilizing and allocating additional resources; and training and supervising staff and volunteers.

According to some interviewees, the initial publicity of the safe haven-ministation and the challenge of managing the safe haven-ministation as an off-site program caused tension between the safe haven-ministation staff and the Columbia Urban League. The Columbia Urban League, which is a strong city-wide organization, had done many positive activities in Columbia. The Columbia Urban League named a program director. However, soon after that, the program director began complaining to the Eisenhower Foundation about the lack of cooperation from the Urban League staff. The complaints ranged from lack of supplies and petty cash for program operations to no support for phone services, postage, or printing. Further, the $10,000 the Urban League pledged for in-kind services never seemed to materialize. It seemed that the safe haven-ministation program director who was an innovator and inspirational leader was not allowed to grow under the umbrella of the Urban League. It also appeared that the Urban League was beginning to perceive the safe haven-ministation as a competitor rather than an asset or partner.
The Eisenhower Foundation's program director went to Columbia on several occasions to address issues that consistently arose with the Columbia Urban League, and got what only seemed to be a quick fix, and on more than one occasion observed little or no involvement in major programming.

Finally after observing the Columbia operation from top to bottom, assessing its potential, holding meetings with all the partners, the Eisenhower Foundation's program director decided that the Urban League would not do its part in making the Columbia Youth Safe Haven a success. The safe haven-ministration program director, a dynamic leader, had become very frustrated, and the program bordered on failure. The Eisenhower Foundation program director called another meeting with the president of the Columbia Urban League, who refused to meet. The Eisenhower director then met with an Urban League staff member and explained the Foundation's position and began termination of the relationships and contract.

In August 1997, the safe haven-ministration program established itself as an independent incorporated organization and became the Koban, Inc. This transition was made possible by strong support from the public housing authority and police, as well as other partners. Koban, Inc. is guided by a 15-member board of directors representing a range of groups - including businesses, social service agencies, health groups, religious institutions, police department, housing authority, colleges, city government, youth, and community leaders. The chief of police and executive director of the Columbia Housing Authority serve as board advisors.

Koban, Inc. conducts weekly meetings with staff from all the safe haven-ministration sites, as well as with security officers for the respective housing developments, resident initiative representatives, community club presidents, and any other interested partners. These meetings allow for ongoing collaboration and communication among safe haven-ministration staff, police officers and mobilizers from the Police Department, and representatives of the Columbia Housing Authority. The Koban, Inc. board of directors meets on a quarterly basis. During those meetings, the Koban, Inc. executive director provides an update on all the safe haven-ministration sites' activities.

The original safe haven-ministration had the same program director for all 3 HUD years. That person then was named executive director for all of Koban, Inc. In addition to his responsibilities as program director for the safe haven-ministration at Gonzales Gardens, he now also is responsible for training and overseeing the staff at the other two safe haven-ministration sites, and the overall development of Koban, Inc. All the
advocates, mentors and volunteers also report to the executive director. He conducts training for advocates and mentors and monitors their progress. The police officers who are part of the safe haven-ministation report to both the executive director and to the chief of police. The close working relationship that the executive director has with the chief of police and the latter's active engagement in Koban, Inc. has enabled the police officers to carry out and report their responsibilities without any conflicts. In terms of management, leadership and vision, the executive director and police chief have been widely praised by other observers.3

The same Federal Reserve Bank article has this to say about the Columbia police chief:4

Columbia Police Chief Charles Austin, a minister and "modern day saint" [according to some] views KOBAN as "more than a crime tool." Austin believes the KOBANs provide community residents "a place to turn for a variety of resources outside traditional law enforcement concerns." This requires that all directors possess the "essentials" according to Austin: a strong value system, a caring spirit, patience, and kindness in dealing with diversity. His belief in the program is evidenced by his embodiment of all these same traits and his extensive personal involvement; he also serves as the co-Chair of the Eisenhower Foundation Trustee Board and as Chair of the KOBAN Committee. The decrease in Columbia's crime rate has been largely attributed to Austin's leadership.

Austin remains "cautiously optimistic" when it comes to statistics, but is "most encouraged by the improvement of the overall quality of life in the KOBAN communities."

It is the "good feeling impact" that Austin says has the power to outweigh the tangible measurements. He modestly describes himself as "a servant, who feels blessed to have been chosen," and feels it is his obligation to do the best he can do.

The 17 partners for Koban, Inc. brought in their networks of concerned citizens, who became volunteers for the safe haven-ministation's activities. The safe haven-ministation's relations with the Columbia Police Department and the Columbia Housing Authority have grown stronger and the affiliation with these two agencies enhanced its visibility and credibility. The safe haven-ministation has received positive media attention and visits to Gonzales Gardens from elected officials. The State has published many articles and editorials about the safe haven-
ministration's accomplishments and activities. The safe haven-ministration was featured on ABC World New Tonight with Peter Jennings on February 18, 1998. The local NBC station also was present when Nations Bank presented a check to the police department for the safe haven-ministration on July 19, 1998 and then proceeded to feature the safe haven-ministration and Gonzales Gardens for the evening news that day.

It is evident through the partnerships and number of volunteers from within Gonzales Gardens that the safe haven-ministration has successfully established relationships with the community. The safe haven-ministration appeared to be the focal point of activities for both youth and parents. The safe haven-ministration staff, including the police officers and volunteers, knew every resident and youth by name. The program director's ability to recruit 7 parents on the spot to be interviewed by the evaluation team was evidence that the safe haven-ministration has immediate access to the adults in the community. The parents were eager to talk about what the safe haven-ministration has done for them, their children, and the Gonzales Gardens community.

**Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training**

Koban, Inc. staff received technical assistance and training from the Eisenhower Foundation through several methods: workshops that covered issues such as program planning, youth development, grant writing, staff development, media planning, and continuation planning; site visits from the evaluation staff that provided opportunities for the Koban, Inc. to get advice on ways to monitor the program and progress of youth; regular telephone calls with the Eisenhower Foundation program director to address issues and trouble-shoot; and assistance in submitting proposals to foundations and government agencies and to leverage local funds.

The value of the Eisenhower Foundation's workshop on media planning was exemplified by Koban, Inc., which immediately applied what was learned at the workshop. First, it developed a media kit that included information on the Koban's history, staff, participants, partners, and supporters; and it developed a newsletter that is published on a quarterly basis. The effectiveness of Koban Inc.'s media strategies that resulted from the Foundation's technical assistance and training workshops is evident in the extensive press coverage that it received. Koban, Inc. also benefitted from the Foundation's training workshop on mentoring. As a result of that workshop, the executive director applied the information and developed a training manual for mentors.

The safe haven-ministration staff felt that the Foundation had the capacity to provide assistance during the start-up period of the program. However, as the safe haven-ministration matured and incorporated into a nonprofit
organization, additional technical assistance was critical to help the organization through its developmental stages. One major area of need was grant writing and fundraising. The Foundation worked with the executive director to identify and respond to federal grant applications in order to sustain the safe haven-ministation program. While this was helpful, it sometimes stretched the limited capacity of the safe haven-ministation, in terms of time and resources. During a site visit to Gonzales Gardens, the evaluation team observed that the executive director was required to balance several tasks simultaneously, including managing the safe haven-ministation in Gonzales Gardens, complying with the reporting requirements of the Foundation, continuing to provide one-on-one attention to youth at Gonzales Gardens, directing the staff at the other safe haven-ministation sites, working with the safe haven-ministation's Board of Directors, and helping the Foundation staff write grant applications for Koban, Inc. The program staff reported that they would require additional technical assistance on grant writing, particularly for the writing and submission of federal grant applications. However, the program director also reported that he learned a great deal about how to write grant applications through his experience in helping the Foundation write a proposal for Koban, Inc. The plan in that proposal to expand safe haven-ministations to middle schools later was implemented by Koban, Inc. via Eisenhower funds raised from the Justice Department as part of the third generation of Foundation replications.

The Eisenhower Foundation evaluation staff worked with the program staff to develop documentation, tracking, and outcome measurement procedures through 2 visits to Gonzales Gardens and ongoing telephone conversations. It became clear that more evaluation technical assistance was needed, because the Columbia program director did not carry out part of the evaluation youth interviewing assigned to him.

The expansion of the Koban, Inc. gives further reason for specific technical assistance and training for the safe haven-ministation program in Columbia.

**What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?**

**Principal Findings**

The safe haven-ministation at Gonzales Gardens had many accomplishments. The process and outcomes confirmed the theory of change or program framework.

All the interviewees (e.g., staff, parents, volunteers, youth, and partners) reported that because of the safe haven-ministation, the participating youth have developed a sense of responsibility for themselves as well as for their
communities; improved their behavior (e.g., they greet adults politely and respectfully, and they stopped fighting in public); developed a sense of trust towards adults, including police officers; improved their school grades and increased their enthusiasm for school; and most important of all, improved their self-esteem and developed a sense of hope for their future, which is evident in some of the youth's success in getting into college.

All the interviewees also described how the community has become safer since the program's inception. According to the people interviewed, there is less fighting among youth, the drug activities that used to occur in the park no longer exist, parents are no longer afraid to walk through the neighborhood to their children's schools, the elderly residents are no longer afraid to take their weekly walks. Police officers stated that the number of calls they receive have decreased.

Surveys of youth conducted at the safe haven-ministation and at a comparison site without a safe haven program showed greater improvement on almost all measures for youth at that safe haven-ministation. They increased grades and other positive behaviors, and were less likely to participate in delinquent behavior.

Analyses of Index crime in the area bear out the feeling of the residents. In the first year of the program, as the police officers engaged the community and won their trust, the number of police reports soared, followed by a steady decline since 1996.

Finally, the safe haven-ministation's presence and efforts have helped the residents in Gonzales Gardens develop a sense of pride for their community. The Gonzales Gardens development has received positive media attention and visits from elected officials. The safe haven-ministation staff reported that they overhear residents refer now to their residence as the "Gonzalez Gardens community" and no longer the "projects."

**Youth Outcomes**

The youth who have participated at the safe haven-ministation have benefitted in many ways. Interviews with parents, youth, and staff as well as on-site observation, corroborate the results of a survey of 50 youth conducted at the safe haven-ministation and a comparison site. Several "success" stories were uncovered and are reported here.

Every interviewee reported that, in general, the youth in Gonzales Gardens exhibit better manners now, behave appropriately towards each other and towards adults, and appear to be more optimistic about their future. This
was due in large part to the program's commitment to working individually with youth. For example, early on in the program, the staff came upon a 17 year old youth who was forced by uncontrollable circumstances to move from his high school to one that is attended by middle to upper class young people. The student was a fairly bright student with extremely good grades and his sights set on becoming a lawyer. After moving to the school his grades declined drastically, and he dropped out of school, losing all focus on his goals. The safe haven staff went after this young man right away. In talking to this young man, the staff found that the students and teachers, because he came from the projects, made him feel as if he didn't belong. His self-esteem was at an all time low. The staff convinced the young man to go back to school and pursue his dream. He graduated from his high school and received a scholarship to college.

Through the Columbia Police Department's summer youth training program, encouragement to high school near peers to assist middle school youth with their homework, encouragement to middle school near peers to help the elementary school children, and community clean up activities, youth have developed a sense of responsibility for themselves as well as for their communities. One youth who was considered a troubled child and resisted outreach efforts of the safe haven-ministration's staff changed his perception of the program after observing the persistence of the staff and their caring attitude. This youth now helps to tutor the younger children because he wants to be a big brother and pass on what the safe haven-ministration staff taught him. A parent commented that in the past, her son would never take the trash out at home, but as a result of his participation in the safe haven ministration's activities, he has now taken on that responsibility.

A volunteer reported that, when she first arrived at the Gonzales Gardens, youth showed no respect for adults. Now, when adults from outside the community arrive, youth greet the adults politely and respectfully. Her statement was consistent with the experience of the evaluation team. According to the volunteer who also coordinates the Book Buddies Program at another public housing development, Hendley Homes, youth at Gonzales Gardens display a tremendous amount of respect and trust towards adults compared to their peers in Hendley Homes.

Four volunteers reported that youth have learned to trust adults, particularly police officers. This was consistent with testimony by several youth that "if anything happens, we can run into the safe haven-ministration and ask the officers for help." Youth also told the story about a fight that had broken out at the basketball court and the police officers immediately came over and took care of it. Both parents and youth
reported that there is less fighting among youth now because the program activities have taught them to interact better among themselves.

Youth trust towards adults has also been strengthened by the safe haven-ministation staff's stable presence in their community over the past 3 years. Some of the older youth apparently were very appreciative of the staff's support and guidance during their last and difficult years in high school, and this is evident in their continuing return to the safe haven-ministation to speak to the staff.

According to all the interviewees (adults and youth alike), youth grades have improved since participating in the program. In December 1995, only one student from Gonzales Gardens made the honor roll; at the end of the school year, 28 students had made the honor roll. The program staff reported that the number of youth suspended from school also decreased. According to the interviewees, this was a major accomplishment because suspension and drop out rates were generally very high in the Richland School District.

Evidence of youth academic achievement and enthusiasm for school included the following:

- One youth obtained a scholarship to college,
- Six youth reported that they feel more confident about completing their math homework correctly,
- One youth improved his grades from all F's to all A's, and
- Some of the youth's reading has improved and they even enjoy reading now.

Parents also described how their children would rush back from school to wave their report cards to the program staff and brag about their grades. The safe haven-ministation's 10 computers also provide youth an opportunity to develop computer skills. Youth played educational games that allowed them to practice their reading and math skills. All the computers were occupied throughout the day.

In addition, the Federal Reserve Bank article on Koban, Inc. reported that student employment rates were up and teen pregnancy rates were down.5

**Results of the youth survey.** More systemic evidence of the positive effect participation at the Gonzales Gardens safe haven-ministation had on youth comes from questionnaires administered to youth in the program and to a sample of comparison youth not in the program in another community. Youth participating in the safe haven-ministation scored significantly better than did counterparts at the comparison site on a number of measures (see Table 18).
The comparison group was matched for gender and was intended to be matched for age. However, some youth surveyed did not meet the age criterion, and, therefore, all the analysis reported here controls for the difference between these groups in age. Overall, the comparison group was about 2 years younger than those at the safe haven-ministation. Since negative behaviors are more likely in the older group, any results finding lower negative behaviors than the younger group at the comparison site can be considered valid, and not caused by age.

Youth who had participated at the safe haven-ministation were better off than their comparison group counterparts on every measure except for future outlook, self-esteem and being fearful traveling to school. This may be explained by the routes taken by the two groups of youth. At Gonzales Gardens, youth have to pass through an area known to be unsafe to go to their school. The route for the comparison youth to their school passes through a nicer more affluent area.

Table 18 shows in what ways the program participants scored better than the comparison group at both survey times. Time 1 is at the beginning of the program and Time 2 is 1 year later. The final column on Table 18 indicates whether youth who participated at the safe haven-ministation showed more improvement compared to the group surveyed earlier than did the comparison group.

Youth at the safe haven-ministation improved significantly more than youth at the comparison site, over the course of 1 year, in:

- getting their homework done on time
- doing volunteer work
- reporting less anti-social leadership
- being less likely to display negative behaviors such as beating someone up, carrying a weapon, damaging property or engaging in disorderly conduct

Youth at the safe haven-ministation also improved somewhat more than the comparison group in grades.
What youth liked best about the safe haven-ministation program. All youth participating at the safe haven-ministation had something good to say about the experience. Table 19 shows what they liked best. Over 90 percent of youth most appreciated having someone to go to for help and advice. Two-thirds liked getting to know the police officers, having a place to feel safe, and getting help with their homework. Almost the same number liked participating in activities that improved their neighborhood. Activities with friends were also often mentioned as some of the best things about the program. Almost two-thirds of the youth liked doing fun things after school, going on trips and having a place to be with their friends.
Youth suggestions for improving the safe haven-ministration program.
Youth made suggestions for improvement to the safe haven-ministration program, which are presented in Table 20. Two-fifths of youth participants wouldn't change the program at all. Half suggest getting more adults, such as their parents, involved in the program. Almost half would like the safe haven-ministration to be open for longer hours and to have more police officers. Two-fifths (or slightly more) recommend having more ways to help the neighborhood, more people to talk to about problems, more help with schoolwork, more chances to do things to feel good about themselves and to be a leader.
Community-Wide Crime and Drug Outcomes

The opening of the safe haven-ministation had a dramatic effect on Gonzales Gardens. In the years after the safe haven-ministation opened in 1995, almost twice as many crimes were reported as before there was an officer present. However, all of 1995, even before the safe haven-ministation opened, was marked by many more crime reports than previous years. We assume that was due to community equity policing that began before the safe haven-ministation officially opened. The Gonzales Gardens safe haven-ministation site differs dramatically from two comparison public housing developments and from its own district in terms of reported crimes (See Table 21 for comparisons of number of index crimes between the target neighborhood of Gonzales Gardens, the

### Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent who selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having more adults, like parents, get involved in the program</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the safe haven-ministation open for longer hours</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have more police officers to make my neighborhood safer</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do more things to help my neighborhood</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more chances to be a leader</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have more people to help me with my schoolwork</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more chances to do things that make me feel good about myself, like helping little kids</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have more people to talk to me about my problems</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going on more educational trips</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would not change the program</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more fun things to do after school</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more chances to learn about college and to listen to adults outside the safe haven-ministation (i.e., college students, mayor)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Community-Wide Crime and Drug Outcomes**

The opening of the safe haven-ministation had a dramatic effect on Gonzales Gardens. In the years after the safe haven-ministation opened in 1995, almost twice as many crimes were reported as before there was an officer present. However, all of 1995, even before the safe haven-ministation opened, was marked by many more crime reports than previous years. We assume that was due to community equity policing that began before the safe haven-ministation officially opened. The Gonzales Gardens safe haven-ministation site differs dramatically from two comparison public housing developments and from its own district in terms of reported crimes (See Table 21 for comparisons of number of index crimes between the target neighborhood of Gonzales Gardens, the
comparison neighborhood, and citywide). The comparison site, Saxon Homes, opened a safe haven-ministation in March 1998.

According to all the residents, police officers, youth, and a Housing Management staff member who were interviewed, the housing development was plagued by all sorts of crime up until 5 years ago (e.g., drug activities in the development's park and shootings). They perceived that since the police officers were assigned to their housing development, the crime activities have decreased. The parents interviewed reported that fights frequently broke out in public among children and youth of all ages. The conditions were so unsafe that the elderly were afraid to leave their homes, parents were afraid to walk to their children's schools to participate in activities, and residents could not sit on their porches without "seeing someone running through the neighborhood to escape a shooting." It was reported in the state newspaper that the police often chased drug dealers through the Gardens and residents feared sitting outside because the dealers would simply throw their stash at the nearest group of people. The police officers reported that they got back-to-back calls about homicides, rapes, armed robberies, aggravated assaults, domestic violence, and other serious crimes in Gonzales Gardens.

All the interviewees reported that Gonzales Gardens has become safer since the inception of the program. Statements that support this opinion include:

- According to 6 youth, there would be more drug activities if not for the safe haven-ministation and the police officers;
- The police officers reported that when they first started their duties, they received back-to-back calls that were related to violent incidents, disorderly conduct, and vandalism, but now there may be days before they receive a call and the callers are suspicious about an activity or individual, or they need assistance from the police officers to handle their children;
- The most serious calls received by police officers now are domestic violence;
- Children can play safely in the park now because the drug activities that used to occur there have been eliminated;
- Parents reported that they are more inclined to participate in school activities because they are no longer afraid to walk through the neighborhood to the schools;
- The elderly started weekly walks that were initially accompanied by a police officer but now continue to do so by themselves;
- Volunteers reported that they and their colleagues are less hesitant and afraid to work in the neighborhood now compared to the first time they volunteered there;
According to the parents, police officers, safe haven-ministation staff, and staff of the housing management office, it is now a common sight for residents to sit outside and chat whereas before, they were afraid of leaving their homes.

In the years following the opening of the safe haven-ministation, Index crime at Gonzales Gardens declined steadily and showed evidence of an effect in contrast to the surrounding district and comparison site. Figure 15 shows a great increase in Index crime reports in the base year, compared to the previous years. Index crime reports in the base year were almost double that of the previous 3-year average. After the base year, Index crime reports declined steadily through 1998. Index crimes declined by over 20 percent after the initial increase in 1995 (see Table 21). These data support our increase-and-then-decline hypothesis (see the Introduction to Part II). Figure 16 shows the difference in Index crime reports for the target neighborhood, its surrounding district and city-wide between the base year and the program years. Figure 17 compares the decrease in crime in Gonzales Gardens with an increase in Index crime at the Saxon Homes comparison neighborhood.

Interviews with police officers at the safe haven-ministation support the hypothesis that the dramatic increase in reported Index crime in the year the safe haven-ministation opened are the result of increased reporting. Officers said that when the safe haven-ministation first opened, they received constant "back-to-back" calls for violent incidents, disorderly conduct and vandalism. Over time, they find that residents come to them when they first note suspicious activity.

Police officers and residents reported that decrease in drug activity was one of the most significant areas of crime reduction, and police reports bear that out. From 1995 to 1998 drug reports declined by 61 percent. Almost all crimes follow the same trend for the safe haven-ministation site in Columbia. They are steady or rise slowly from 1991 to 1994, and then shoot up dramatically in 1995, rise again a little in 1996 and are followed by a decrease the next 2 years.

Overall, residents and youth reported feeling that the neighborhood at Gonzales Gardens was much safer, as evidenced by elderly people walking alone, people sitting outside, and more children in the park. Eighty percent of youth surveyed at the safe haven-ministation who felt their neighborhood was safer, attributed it to the program.
Figure 15


The line graph above illustrates the number of index crimes reported in the target neighborhood, comparison neighborhood, target precinct, and the city of Columbia from 1992 to 1998. The x-axis represents the years (1992 to 1998), while the y-axis shows the number of incident reports ranging from 0 to 250. Different symbols and lines indicate the crime report data for each category, allowing for a visual comparison over the years.
Figure 16


Figure 17

Change in reported index crimes at target and comparison neighborhoods and their surrounding precincts - Programs base year (1995) vs. Program years 2-4 (1996-1998). *Comparison precinct 2 does not include 1996 data.
Other Community-Wide Outcomes

All the interviewees reported that there was an increased sense of pride among the residents. They attributed the increase to program's presence, which helped result in the following:

- Positive media attention.
- Visits from elected officials.
- Opportunities for youth to do community service within their residence.
- Additional services (e.g., the clinic and the youth summer training program).
- A sense of safety due to "their police officers."
According to the interviewees, residents have begun to refer to the housing development as the "Gonzales Gardens community" and not the "projects." The parents also informed the evaluation team that residents no longer exchange profanities in public like they used to but have more self-respect now to limit such exchanges to inside their homes.

**The Most Likely Explanations For These Outcomes**

In general, the interviewees attributed the safe haven-ministration's effectiveness to the following factors:

- The program's committed leadership.
- The program staff members' dedication and ability to reach out to youth and foster a nurturing and caring environment that was also safe.
- The program staff members' sensitivity to the needs and issues of the community.
- The police officers' ability to establish strong relations with the residents and be part of the community by attending activities after they are off-duty, while enforcing the law.
- Strong institutional support from a variety of agencies, particularly the Police Department and Columbia Housing Authority.

Prior to the safe haven-ministration, there already were community police officers placed in all the housing developments in Columbia, and they dealt primarily with the crime activities in those communities. The Gonzales Gardens Housing Management office had a small number of activities for the residents and the Urban League had activities for youth on a citywide level. The 3 groups functioned independently of each another. The safe haven-ministration program linked the different organizations together and provided an opportunity for a more focused and comprehensive approach to youth development and crime prevention in Gonzales Gardens, as well as an infrastructure for collaboration. The Gonzales Gardens housing manager and the executive director of the Columbia Housing Authority stated that the safe haven-ministration enhanced Housing Management's efforts to conduct activities for the residents. The safe haven-ministration enabled the manager to shift his focus to other priorities besides activity planning. The community also became safer and, as a result, encouraged outside resources to invest in the community.

**Lessons Learned**

When the staff, youth, parents, and partners were asked what made the safe haven-ministration program work, their responses reflected the following factors:
• Strong and committed leadership by the safe haven-ministation executive director, which was evident in the amount of time he spends at Gonzales Gardens with youth and his efforts to engage the parents.
• Police officers’ sensitivity to the residents' needs and their commitment to the community, which is evident in their involvement in recreational activities after they were off duty.
• Support and commitment of the Columbia Housing Authority, which is reflected in its agreement to renovate a unit to accommodate the safe haven-ministation's growing number of activities.
• The safe haven-ministation staff's effort to walk around the community to interact with residents.
• Support from outside organizations in terms of volunteers, supplies for the children and youth, and funds.
• Support and commitment from Columbia Police Department, which provided a supportive environment for the safe haven-ministation police officers to practice their community equity policing skills.

The partners also implied that the safe haven-ministation not only created an avenue for convening different groups, but, through its community equity policing activities, created a safe place. As one of the partners reported, the volunteers that she recruited from outside of the community no longer feared coming to Gonzales Gardens. The improved safety of the neighborhood encouraged volunteers from outside the community to assist with the safe haven-ministation.

Based on the interviewees' responses, on-site observations, and other supporting materials, it appeared that the following factors contributed to the safe haven-ministation's effectiveness:

1. Support and buy in from top leadership in the city (e.g., chief of police, executive director of the Columbia Housing Authority, and high level representatives from local colleges, medical centers, corporations, and churches) brought credibility to the safe haven-ministation program and helped mobilize additional resources to support it.
2. An outreach and community organizing process (e.g., door to door introductions, sending birthday cards to each youth in the community during the first year, and needs assessment) during the beginning of the program before implementation to obtain community support.
3. Establishment of an advisory committee made up of leaders that represent key institutions (e.g., schools, surrounding colleges, tenants association, police department, local housing office,
hospital) and ensured accountability to the Gonzales Gardens community.

4. Coordination of activities with Housing Management to reduce duplication of services and competition.

5. Strong relationship with the housing manager so that the police officers were aware of and could assist with evictions, as well as help new families. The police officers checked in on a regular basis with the housing manager to obtain listings of new families.

6. Clear lines of communication in terms of reporting and supervision. The interviewees reported no conflicts between the police officers and the executive director in terms of accountability.

7. An effective schedule of structured activities for youth that were intended to instill a sense of hope (e.g., linking them with role models from the local educational institutions) and help them develop skills to become responsible adults.

8. An internal system to recruit, train, monitor, and retain mentors so that they remained committed to helping youth.

Program staff learned that children are a way to parents. They learned that, when they showed concern for the children, parents gradually began to trust them. This became a strategy for engaging more parents to foster a supportive environment for youth and children at Gonzales Gardens. The parents confirmed the staff's belief that this approach was most effective. According to the parents, when they saw that the staff really cared for their children, they became more willing to cooperate with the staff. In particular, their perception of police officers changed as a result of the program. They began to perceive the police officers as caring adults and not just law enforcers.

The director of the Book Buddies Program provided an example of how the approach worked. She used to distribute announcements to the parents to involve them in the program but that was not sufficient to engage them. So, during the next year, she instructed the program's youth participants to tell their parents about the program and then she herself spoke to the parents and challenged them to come see what the program was about. As a result, the number of parent volunteers for the Book Buddies Program increased from 1 parent in 1997 to 5 parents in 1998.

**How Did the Program Continue?**

In terms of specific post-HUD resources, the Eisenhower Foundation has granted $400,000 in new funds, via the U.S. Justice Department, to include Columbia in the third generation of replications. The Columbia Housing Authority has awarded $100,000 from HUD Drug Elimination
grant funds. Other local funders (NationsBank, the South Carolina Arts Commission and the Cultural Council) have added over $33,000 more.

With these monies, and more anticipated funding, Koban, Inc. will open a safe haven-ministration where police are in residence, open other non-residential safe haven-ministations in low income communities, explore rural settings, add activities that keep safe haven-ministations open to midnight and add more sports components.

Importantly, Koban, Inc. also plans to create a safe haven-ministration in at least 1 school for youth in every community that also has a neighborhood-based safe haven-ministration. As the Federal Reserve Bank magazine article observes:7

Plans are… underway to integrate the KOBAN program into the school system, especially benefiting those students likely to receive probation or suspension who would otherwise spend this disciplinary time away from school destructively. With such extensive community involvement, KOBAN, Inc. is taking the program to new heights with limitless possibilities.

The Eisenhower Foundation is exploring how safe haven-ministations in Columbia middle schools can be integrated with "full service community schools" as articulated by Eisenhower Vice Chair, Joy Dryfoos in her new Carnegie Corporation book, Safe Passage.8

Footnotes

8. The Goodwill Boys and Girls Club and the Memphis Police

Summary

The safe haven-ministation opened at LeMoyne Gardens Public Housing Development in March 1996, within the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club, and with the collaboration of the Memphis Police Department and the Memphis Housing Authority. 100 Black Men of Memphis also promised to provide mentors, but did not follow up on the commitment.

In 1997, demolition of LeMoyne Gardens began, as part of a reconstruction under the HOPE VI program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. In spite of relocation, many children who participated in the safe haven-ministation in 1996 continued to participate through 1998.

Most activities provided to the safe haven-ministation participants were often open to members of the Memphis Boys and Girls Club, and safe haven-ministation participants could also take advantage of the many opportunities offered by the Boys and Girls Club. Activities, facilities, and resources were accessible to youth from both groups because the safe haven-ministation occupied a space within the Boys and Girls Club. Consequently, it was impossible to completely distinguish between safe haven-ministation activities and non-safe haven-ministation activities. However, the director successfully developed unique activities for the safe haven-ministation youth, such as special field trips, sleepovers, movie outings, and cash rewards for good grades.

The safe haven-ministation's primary activities were after-school tutoring at the Club's Learning Center that was managed by a parent; mentoring by the safe haven-ministation director, police officers, and staff of the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club; recreational activities, such as field trips to historical sites, movie outings, and career days; and community equity policing.

Youth participating in the LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministation showed improvement in several areas, particularly:

- improved attention to homework
- better grades
- developing trusting relationships with adults outside their immediate family
- participating in community and volunteer activities.

Effects of participation for youth were also tested through outcome surveys of youth who participated in the safe haven-ministation and
surveys of youth at a comparison site without a safe haven-ministation. Youth at the safe haven-ministation improved significantly between the time of the first survey when they were beginning their participation and one-year later. Youth at the safe haven-ministation showed statistically significant improvement in their future outlook, less drug and alcohol use, helping neighbors more, getting homework done on time, and doing volunteer work.

The comparison site selected to survey youth not participating in a safe haven-ministation participated in another Boys and Girls Club, with some of the same activities as the safe haven-ministation. Youth at the safe haven-ministation received more individual attention and had police on-site, which the comparison Boys and Girls Club did not have. Probably due to the similarity of some activities at the two sites, statistical analysis did not reveal improvements for safe haven-ministation youth that were significantly better than those of the comparison youth. However, youth at the safe haven-ministation did show more relative improvement than youth at the comparison site in future outlook, self-esteem, grades, getting homework done on time, helping neighbors, and cleaning their neighborhood. They also showed more improvement, but not statistically significantly more, in decreasing delinquent behaviors.

The safe haven-ministation appears to have had a dramatic effect on police reported Index crime in the target neighborhood of LeMoyne Gardens. Police reported that Index crime rates in the early 1990's were very high, and showed some decrease at LeMoyne Gardens by 1994. Two Community Action police officers worked out of a mini-precinct at LeMoyne Gardens during this period. In the year during which the safe haven-ministation opened, police reported Index crime decreased by more than 37 percent at LeMoyne Gardens.

Because there was already some form of community equity policing in place at LeMoyne Gardens prior to the start of the safe haven-ministation program, we did not see an initial rise in police reported Index crime in the first program year as the community began engaging with the on-site police. Presumably, that had already occurred at LeMoyne Gardens when residents got to know the two police officers located in the on-site mini-precinct.

When looked at on a monthly basis, the amount of police reported Index crime in 1996, which occurred after the safe haven-ministation opened, indicates even greater reductions. Due to the subsequent demolition of LeMoyne Gardens, local crime rates cannot be meaningfully determined after 1997. Residents were relocated beginning in 1997, and reported, anecdotally, an increase in certain types of crime, such as individual burglaries, as the housing became vacated. In spite of the relocation of
residents and subsequent demolition of LeMoyne Gardens, 85 percent of youth participating in the safe haven-ministration who felt their neighborhood had become safer by October, 1998 attributed the increase in safety to the safe haven-ministration.

The major challenge facing the LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministration is to adapt to the loss of the housing development and the reconstruction of new housing. The safe haven-ministration needs to work on retaining the youth with whom it already works, while recruiting new participants as they move into the community and obtaining the support of the new residents.

After funding ended, the program remained in place with the same director, the same police officers, and the same site. The Memphis Boys and Girls Club has solidly supported the program. However, the end of program funding resulted in a loss of staff, and curtailment of safe haven-ministration programs to one day per week, facilitated by staff from the Boys and Girls Club. The program has been changed to fit into the overall Boys and Girls Club program. If funds are identified and dedicated to the operation of the safe haven-ministration program, the future of the program could be very bright. The director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Hope VI program, which is redeveloping LeMoyne Gardens, has committed space in the new development for the safe haven-ministration program.

Where Was the Replication Located?

LeMoyne Gardens is one of the oldest public housing communities in Memphis. It sits within a geographic area that has been a predominantly African-American area for several generations. Its residents have strong emotional, social, and family ties to the community. Many of the adults who grew up in the area but have since moved out of the area maintain a presence in the community through family and social ties. Some of the parents who were interviewed have moved out of the area for several years, but continued to bring their children to the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club, which has always served the youth from LeMoyne Gardens and its immediate neighborhoods. The safe haven-ministration is located within the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club. It occupies a small office for the safe haven-ministration program director on the second floor. The police officers have their own office in the basement. The first floor of the Club contains pool tables and other recreational equipment. Within the Club also is a large tutoring center that includes a mini-library and computers.

The LeMoyne Gardens area is not home to large industries or manufacturing plants and therefore, most residents work outside of the area. However, the area is home to a few small businesses like
neighborhood stores, small auto repair shops, and human services businesses such as barber shops and beauty parlors. It is also home to a small, historically Black, community college (LeMoyne College), several churches and neighborhood public schools to which the residents express ongoing loyalty.

LeMoyne Gardens has undergone radical transition over the past 2 years as all of the units that once comprised the housing development have been razed and new public housing is being built through the HOPE VI program conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. LeMoyne Gardens was once an 842 unit apartment community located in South Memphis, consisting of 100 two-story buildings which were situated on forty acres of land. During the process of razing the buildings of LeMoyne Gardens and relocating its residents, concerns were expressed about the impact of these changes. For example, it was suggested by a safe haven-ministation participant that, "... the rehabilitation of LeMoyne Gardens will cause the community to become uninhabited. This will adversely affect the community equity policing component because there will be no community to police." However, although all of the buildings have now been torn down and residents relocated, there appears still to be an intact sense of community in the geographic area in which LeMoyne Gardens existed. The safe haven-ministation director, along with other partners and adults, also reported that many former LeMoyne Gardens adult residents return to the neighborhood to work or maintain family and social ties. They also bring their children with them and in some instances, send their children back for social and recreational activities alone. Therefore, the Boys and Girls Club in which the Memphis safe haven-ministation resides is full to capacity with children from the community, and most important to note, with children who were former residents of LeMoyne Gardens. Nonetheless, the move did indeed cause a disruption of contact with most of the LeMoyne Gardens children who were part of the initial cohort of safe haven-ministation participants.

How Much Was Spent and What Activities Were Carried out in the Replication?

Funding Levels

The LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministation opened on March 30, 1996. The program was supported by the Eisenhower Foundation in collaboration with the Memphis Police Department, the Memphis Housing Authority, and the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club of Memphis. 100 Black Men of Memphis was supposed to provide mentors, but did not follow through with the commitment. Early on during a visit to the safe haven-ministation, the Eisenhower Foundation national program director got a
sense of what he deemed a power struggle between 100 Black Men and the Boys and Girls Club. The program director called a meeting between the 2 organizations to clarify how the responsibilities for the safe haven-ministration would be shared, and it was agreed that the Boys and Girls Club would reimburse 100 Black Men for some of the cost of its involvement. The safe haven-ministration activities began, but it wasn't long before the complaints were made concerning the involvement of 100 Black Men. The Boys and Girls Club attempted to contact the president of 100 Black Men, but there was no response. The Eisenhower Foundation program director realized that since the involvement of 100 Black Men's involvement was a major component of the mentoring activities, he instructed the Boys and Girls Club to reallocate the mentoring responsibilities to the staff and police officers.

When the president of 100 Black Men was finally contacted, he cited instances of no transportation and other areas of disagreement with the Boys and Girls Club. It was clear that two major local organizations were vying for a leadership role. The Foundation made it clear that it was the Boys and Girls Club that would have the lead responsibility and the 100 Black Men did not feel any commitment to continue its involvement. The Boys and Girls Club eventually contacted LeMoyne College as an alternative for recruiting mentors.

Funding during each year of the program is detailed in Table 21. The Eisenhower Foundation provided $44,275 in the first year, combining funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Center for Global Partnership. The Eisenhower Foundation continued to channel funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Years 2 and 3, providing $32,000 and $34,000 in each of these years, respectively. The safe haven-ministration also received in-kind contributions from the Memphis Police Department and other local agencies that included salaries, a youth advocate, supplies, awards, field trips, transportation, space, equipment, phones, and utilities. The total value of in-kind contributions was $82,658 in Year 1, $96,658 in Year 2 and $110,658 in Year 3.
**Replication Activities**

**The Program In A Nutshell.** Most activities provided to the safe haven-ministation participants were often open to members of the Memphis Boys and Girls Club, and safe haven-ministation participants could also take advantage of the many opportunities offered by the Boys and Girls Club. This arrangement was mainly the result of the safe haven-ministation's location within the Club. Consequently, it was impossible to completely distinguish between safe haven-ministation activities and non-safe haven-ministation activities. However, the director successfully developed unique activities for the safe haven-ministation youth, such as special field trips, sleepovers, movie outings, and cash rewards for good grades.

The safe haven-ministation's primary activities were after-school tutoring at the Club's Learning Center that was managed by a parent; mentoring by the safe haven-ministation director, police officers, and staff of the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club; recreational activities, such as field trips to historical sites, movie outings, and career days; and community equity policing.

---

**TABLE 21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRANTS VIA THE EISENHOWER FOUNDATION</th>
<th>HUD Year 1 9/95-8/96</th>
<th>HUD Year 2 9/96-8/97</th>
<th>HUD Year 3 9/97-9/98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL IN-KIND</td>
<td>$82,658(^4)</td>
<td>$96,658</td>
<td>$110,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$126,953</td>
<td>$128,658</td>
<td>$144,658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)This figure includes $30,000 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as $14,275 from the Center for Global Partnership.

\(^2\)This figure represents HUD funding only.

\(^3\)This figure represents HUD funding only.

\(^4\)The local in-kind figures refer to in-kind services from the local police department and other local agencies that include salaries, youth advocate, supplies, awards, field trips, transportation, space, equipment, phones, and utilities.
Youth Development. Consistent with the communal philosophy of the neighborhood and Boys and Girls Club, the safe haven-ministation staff and Boys and Girls Club director reported that most activities provided to safe haven-ministation participants were often open to members of the Boys and Girls Club. This was an agreeable arrangement because the safe haven-ministation was located within the Club and enabled safe haven-ministation participants to also take advantage of the many opportunities offered by the Boys and Girls Club. It was impossible to completely distinguish between safe haven-ministation activities and non-safe haven-ministation activities. Yet, the safe haven-ministation director has been successful in developing a few unique activities that are distinguishable from Boys and Girls Club activities and offer an added or more intense experience exclusively for safe haven-ministation youth. Functionally, these unique activities have been equated to privileges and were considered desirable to those youth that were not enrolled in the safe haven-ministation. The 10 youth who were interviewed described how their friends were envious of their safe haven-ministation membership, which provided a sense of belonging and of being special. For example, safe haven-ministation youth were all provided with a special tee-shirt with the Memphis safe haven-ministation logo and their name. They also were invited to participate in weekly rap sessions that discussed topics ranging from general weekly support to specific topics or lectures from outside presenters, such as drug and sex prevention. The safe haven-ministation and Boys and Girls Club staff described how safe haven-ministation youth would drop whatever it was they were doing when they heard the announcement of safe haven-ministation meetings through the intercom. One parent described how her child always came home bragging about what she did that day at the safe haven-ministation.

In addition, safe haven-ministation enrollees were specifically identified and their progress and problems were tracked (e.g., school behavior, grades, club attendance). A chart was displayed on the wall at the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club with all the safe haven-ministation youth's names. Those that obtained outstanding grades were recognized on the chart. When problems were detected, the child and his/her family received extra attention from the safe haven-ministation staff. The safe haven-ministation director and officers also provided extra mentoring, encouragement, and, when necessary, direction and admonishment to safe haven-ministation youth. Specific instances were noted in which school and home visits were made on behalf of safe haven-ministation youth. The parent that was responsible for the after-school tutoring center and library described how she had helped one youth deal with domestic violence and then took the youth back to her home for Thanksgiving.

Over the last year of funding, many other activities of the LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministation evolved or increased. The original
activities remained, but have an additional structure and organization because of the experiences of the safe haven-ministation director and her staff of volunteers and partners accrued from the previous year.

The after-school tutoring program remained one of the major components of the safe haven-ministation. The tutoring was provided in the Boys and Girls Club Learning Center (a study, library, and computer facility) which was open to everyone. The director of this center (an employee of the Boys and Girls Club and a parent of a safe haven-ministation child) was present every day after school. The tutoring was provided in a self-paced framework in which the youth were expected to enter and complete their homework with relative independence. When they needed specific help, or when problems were detected, one-on-one attention was provided. Safe haven-ministation youth were not allowed to participate in Boys and Girls Club activities until they first reported to the Learning Center and completed their homework. The safe haven-ministation director and after-school tutor reported that on the average, approximately 15 safe haven-ministation youth attended after-school tutoring activities. The safe haven-ministation director and officers were available to the students during the tutoring period. Other Boys and Girls Club staff also volunteered their time and effort as they were available or needed. The 10 youth who were interviewed reported that they could always turn to the safe haven-ministation director, after-school tutor, or the police officers for help with their homework. The youth agreed that one of the police officers was especially skilled in mathematics. The Learning Center also had study aids for the Tennessee Comprehensive Achievement Test, which was administered to elementary school students in the state.

Students from the neighboring LeMoyne College were recruited to assist with the after-school program, but their participation was not well documented and seemingly sporadic. Therefore, based on the interviewees' responses, including the youth, it appeared that the safe haven-ministation staff and the parent responsible for the Learning Center were the primary tutors.

Adult interviewees reported specific instances in which a safe haven-ministation child sought one-on-one tutoring and improved school performance as a result. Of the children interviewed, all reported that the after-school tutoring was helpful and five willingly admitted to specific need for one-on-one tutoring (e.g., "I was having trouble with my math and Ms. Terri helped me.")

Counseling, mentoring, advocacy and near-peering were defined by the interviewees (safe haven-ministation and Boys and Girls Club staff and youth), as a broadly defined set of activities which included providing one-on-one assistance, guidance, or encouragement to a youth on one or
many occasions, within a short time-span or over the course of time, or specifically within an agreed upon framework of mentoring for a specific problem or within the casual course of contact with a youth. The definition also included a state of "BEING" in which just "being" present and providing children with a positive image and warm support could have a positive impact on the children.

The safe haven-ministation director indicated that there was no formal or structured mentoring assignment, nor was there special training or guidance provided to mentors. Staff of the safe haven-ministation and the Boys and Girls Club indicated that the mentoring approach that was practiced was an approach taken by the Boys and Girls Club. Given the definition of mentoring used, many of the adults who took the time to work or volunteer at the Boys and Girls Club also, at one time or another, provided mentoring to the safe haven-ministation youth. All of this considered, it was difficult to determine the precise mentor to safe haven-ministation child ratio or the precise amount of time spent "mentoring." However, the staff reported that at least 8 members (safe haven-ministation director, two safe haven-ministation officers, Boys and Girls Club director, and other staff at the club) had regular and substantive contact with the safe haven-ministation children. Along with providing emotional support and life guidance, this group also participated in social activities, community events and assisted students with homework. Two older Boys and Girls Club male staff were especially noted for the "good old fashioned" wisdom they brought to the children along with the needed presence of males that could project positive images.

The recreational activities of the Memphis safe haven-ministation have evolved and expanded. They were perceived as one of the strongest components of the safe haven-ministation by the adults and children. All the interviewees, including the youth, reported that the recreational activities, especially the field trips to historical sites, were the "hook" for the youth. However, it should also be noted that the recreational activities were among those activities in which participation was most fluid. Safe haven-ministation and non-safe haven-ministation children were allowed to interact freely under the general guidelines of the Boys and Girls Club since most of the activities are supported by the club. All reported that the recreation provided a positive outlet for the energy and interests of the children in the community, in addition to serving as an alternative to negative and anti-social behavior, and as a reward. The children participated in the recreational activities in a structured environment where rules and order were enforced by the adults. Children were observed waiting their turn patiently at game tables and relinquishing the games when their turn was complete. It was also reported that the safe haven-ministation officers' involvement with the children in these activities has been one of the most positive evolutions. Through their
interactions with the police officers while playing, the children were noted to become more receptive to the idea of using police officers as confidants and positive role models.

The scope of recreational activities was quite broad. It included activities such as club parties, field trips, movies, organized team sports (e.g., basketball, football), various table games, and the yearly Halloween Haunted House. These activities were open to all the youth in the safe haven-ministation and the Boys and Girls Club. In addition, the safe haven-ministation director also developed recreational activities specifically for the safe haven-ministation children that enabled them to bond and feel special. The director reported that on average, they hosted one safe haven-ministation specific recreational activity per month. They included "sleep-overs," safe haven-ministation parties, safe haven-ministation movie outings, safe haven-ministation field trips.

Other than the 3 initial partners, the safe haven-ministation developed partnerships with the surrounding schools (Cummings Elementary, LaRose Elementary, Cori Middle School, and Booker T. Washington High School). The safe haven-ministation's relationship with the surrounding schools has been a major strength in its ability to monitor the progress of its youth. According to the safe haven-ministation director, the teachers had become familiar with the role of the safe haven-ministation staff in the participating youth's lives. As a result, they contacted the safe haven-ministation whenever they had trouble with one of the youth. In one instance, the safe haven-ministation program director conducted a surprise visit to the schools and discovered that one of the youth had been suspended and in another instance, one of the youth played truant that day. The safe haven-ministation program director was then able to follow up on both cases. Through the schools, the safe haven-ministation staff was also able to review the Tennessee Comprehensive Achievement Proficiency Test requirements and then help the safe haven-ministation youth to prepare for the test as part of the after-school tutoring activities.

The safe haven-ministation program director has also strengthened the safe haven-ministation's relationships with the Memphis Housing Department and the Memphis Police Department. The previous director had complained that the district chief of police and the executive director of the Housing Department were too busy to play an active role in the safe haven-ministation program. The current director found that on the contrary, the 2 individuals were very interested in the safe haven-ministation's progress and willing to provide any assistance necessary to support it. The director reported that she maintained regular contact with the two individuals and provided updates about the safe haven-ministation. The safe haven-ministation director also obtained the District Chief's
cooperation in coordinating a career day with the police department to further enhance the youth's positive perception of police officers.

Community Equity Policing. Prior to the beginning of the safe haven-ministration program, the police officers were already acting in the role of problem-oriented police officers for the LeMoyne Gardens community, through a program called Community Action (COACT) that was part of the city's Weed and Seed program. However, the Community Action program had two disadvantages—there was insufficient space to provide tutoring help to the youth, and the police officers were not responsible for the safety of youth and staff inside the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club. According to a police officer, there were several failed attempts to develop a stronger relationship between the Community Action program and the Boys and Girls Club, primarily due to the lack of a structure and process for the relationship to develop and grow.

In general, the recreational activities at the safe haven-ministration provided a sense of belonging to the youth and exposed them to places, activities, and events outside of their immediate neighborhood. Many thought the police component to be the primary and most critical part of the safe haven-ministration. They reported that the increased safety inside the Boys and Girls Club and in the area was a major accomplishment of the safe haven-ministration. According to the chief of police, the officers spent half of their time patrolling the neighborhood and the other half working with the youth. Any additional hours were considered voluntary. The police officers had an office of their own where they could have privacy to work with a youth one-on-one, if needed. All the youth interviewed reported that they learned a lot about drug prevention from the police officers.

The police officers helped instill a sense of respect and discipline among the safe haven-ministration youth. The parent responsible for the Learning Center said that she always reported rude or troublemaking youth to the police officers. The officers would take the youth aside and talk to him or her, and after that, the youth would never give her trouble again. The police officers also gave the youth lectures about drug use and crime. The youth interviewed claimed that they learned a lot about drugs at the safe haven-ministration. At the request of a pastor, the safe haven-ministration director accompanied two youth to a local church to talk to its at-risk youth members about alcohol prevention, drug abuse, and dealing with peer pressure. Thirteen youth also participated in the Scared Straight Program, which involved a trip to the state penal farm. They were treated exactly as if they were prisoners and met with several prisoners. Three of the prisoners were from the same neighborhood as the youth. The experience affected one youth significantly. This youth had been giving the safe haven-ministration staff a difficult time with his homework and
demonstrated no respect towards the staff. After the trip, he stated that he did not want to be "locked up" and gradually changed his behavior. His grades went from F's to D's in a couple of subjects.

How Was the Replication Managed and How Were the Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?

Management

The LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministration was supported by the Eisenhower Foundation in collaboration with the Memphis Police Department, the Memphis Housing Authority, and the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club of Memphis. It was agreed that the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club would provide an office space and access to administrative support for the safe haven-ministration program; the two Community Action Police Officers who were located in a mini-precinct in LeMoyne Gardens and that were supported by the Memphis Police Department (part of the city's Weed and Seed Program) and Memphis Housing Authority would become part of the safe haven-ministration program's community equity policing activities; and an additional police officer was assigned to the safe haven-ministration. 100 Black Men of Memphis were also part of the initial collaboration, but did not follow through (as discussed previously). As an alternative, the Boys and Girls Club arranged for the LeMoyne College to provide 15 college mentors to help tutor the youth that attended the Boys and Girls Club and the safe haven-ministration program.

The safe haven-ministration initially was managed by the director of the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club until a new director was hired in June 1997. Three police officers were part of the safe haven-ministration until October 1997 when one of the police officers was transferred. At around the same time, the director of the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club resigned and a new director was hired in January 1998. The staff turnover resulted in some confusion about the safe haven-ministration program model, and it was not until the safe haven-ministration director attended a training sponsored by the Eisenhower Foundation in October 1997 that she began to understand the model. The safe haven-ministration director and the new director of the Goodwill Boys and Girls worked closely on an individual level to build the latter's understanding of the safe haven-ministration program. The safe haven-ministration director also worked closely with the Club's staff member who was responsible for the tutoring center.

According to the safe haven-ministration and Boys and Girls Club staff, the structure of the safe haven-ministration within the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club was mutually beneficial to both organizations. The safe haven-ministration had access to a wider range of recreational resources and...
administrative support, while the Boys and Girls Club benefitted from the police officers' presence. However, there was perceived conflict by the safe haven-ministation staff regarding the independence of the safe haven-ministation within the Boys and Girls Club's organizational structure.

The Goodwill Boys and Girls Club's goal was to provide recreational activities for the youth from the community and the surrounding neighborhoods. The interviewees' statements implied that prior to the safe haven-ministation, there were youth that conducted undesirable activities in the Boys and Girls Club. The Boys and Girls Club staff also reported that the Club had some interest in providing drug prevention education and conflict resolution, but did not have the structure or organization to do so.

The safe haven-ministation was required to establish a community advisory board comprised of community members. The initial safe haven-ministation program director (also the Boys and Girls Club director) reported that a community advisory board comprising representatives from the Family Life Center at LeMoyne College, LeMoyne College faculty, Memphis Housing Authority, Resident Association of LeMoyne Gardens, and Goodwill Boys and Girls Club Advisory Board was established in the first year of the program. However, the new and current safe haven-ministation program director was not aware of the requirement nor of the above community advisory board until the beginning of 1998. According to the new director of the Boys and Girls Club, the Club had already established a Government Affairs and Safe Haven-Ministation Advisory Committee in 1996 when the program began but it had been inactive. He intended to revive the Advisory Committee and develop a structure that would make the safe haven-ministation program director directly accountable to the Advisory Committee. On the other hand, the safe haven-ministation program director intended to establish a Community Advisory Board that would consist of several community leaders that she has selected. She felt that this board would enable the safe haven-ministation to become a more autonomous entity and improve its accountability to the community, and not the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club.

**Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training**

The safe haven-ministation staff received technical assistance and training from the Eisenhower Foundation through several methods: workshops that covered issues such as program planning, youth development, grant writing, staff development, media planning, and continuation planning; site visits from the evaluation staff that provided opportunities for the safe haven-ministation to get advice on ways to monitor the program and progress of the youth; regular telephone calls with the Eisenhower
Foundation program director to address issues and trouble-shoot; and assistance in submitting proposals to foundations and government agencies as well as leveraging local funds.

The Eisenhower Foundation also played the key role in leveraging local resources for the safe haven-ministation, including securing a space at the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club. The Foundation's assistance with sustainability issues has helped to ensure that the safe haven-ministation continues to operate even after funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has concluded. The Foundation also helped facilitate the discussions between the Boys and Girls Club and 100 Black Men when the two organizations were struggling over leadership issues related to the safe haven-ministation. The Foundation's program staff had the foresight to instruct the Boys and Girls Club to transfer the mentoring role to the civilian staff and police officers so that the safe haven's mentoring activities could begin without further delay.

The current safe haven-ministation staff attended the training held by the Eisenhower Foundation in October 1997 in Columbia, SC. This training enabled the staff to visit the Columbia safe haven-ministation; meet staff members from the other safe haven-ministation programs; exchange information; and learn additional skills required to direct a safe haven-ministation program. One of the police officers learned for the first time during the training that the safe haven-ministation program actually was "more than just a community equity policing program." The safe haven-ministation program director reported that she learned more about fundraising.

According to the current safe haven-ministation program director, the initial safe haven-ministation program director did not provide adequate guidance when he transitioned the responsibilities of the safe haven-ministation to her. Consequently, the transition caused a slight disruption to the program as she struggled with trying to understand the goals of the initiative and develop a structure that better resembled the model provided by the Eisenhower Foundation. The site visit to the Columbia safe haven-ministation was very valuable in helping her understand the structure of a safe haven-ministation program.

The Foundation's program staff felt that the youth development training workshop appeared to be the most effective technical assistance effort for the safe haven-ministation in Memphis. The safe haven-ministation was able to build strong ties with the youth and their parents, resulting in their continuation to attend the safe haven-ministation activities even after their housing development was razed, and they had moved some distance away.
What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?

Principal Findings

The positive outcomes at LeMoyne Gardens can be seen in improvements for youth in some key areas and a sharp decrease in police crime reports. Youth had significantly better future outlooks, less drug and alcohol use, did more volunteer work, and cleaned their neighborhood more after they had participated in the safe haven-ministation for a year.

When compared to youth at a comparison site that had a Boys and Girls Club but not a safe haven-ministation, the youth who participated in the safe haven-ministation showed more improvement in their future outlook, self-esteem, grades, homework, helping neighbors and cleaning the neighborhood. They also improved more in decreasing delinquent behaviors.

The number of Index crimes reported at LeMoyne Gardens decreased by 38 percent in the first year of the safe haven-ministation program compared to the average of the four years preceding, whereas Index crime reports city-wide were rising. However, Index crime reports had already been decreasing in the previous year, and there was a police mini-station at LeMoyne Gardens before the program began.

Unlike in Columbia, South Carolina where the first year of the program was associated with a substantial increase in crime reports, in Memphis police reported Index crime dropped in the first program year. We believe this is because LeMoyne Gardens already had some form of community equity policing in place, and therefore by the time the program started, the initial effect of the community engaging with the police had already occurred.

Youth Outcomes

Those residents, staff, and youth interviewed at the LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministation reported a number of benefits and outcomes for youth. Some significant achievements were:

- Improved grades—the youth themselves declared their academic improvement after receiving assistance from safe haven-ministation staff;
- Development of life skills -- the youth reported that they learned about money management and drug prevention;
- Improved behavior; and respect and trust for adults at the safe haven-ministation and at home;
- Positive attitudes toward police officers;
- Increased sense of safety among the adults and youth; and
- Improved relations between the safe haven-ministation and the schools.

Four youth interviewed claimed that their grades improved because they can always go to "Ms. Terri," "Ms. Thomas," or "Officer Davis" for help with their homework. One youth said that her composition got better and she kept getting A's; one youth reported that her science grade went from B to A; and another youth said that he received a B in social studies after Ms. Thomas helped him.

The youth participated in field trips to historical sites in Memphis, including the National Civil Rights Museum and an Underground Railroad site. During the interviews with the youth, they claimed that the field trips were one of the best parts about the safe haven-ministation.

The youth also learned about money management. A parent gave a presentation about how to save money. As a result, two youth requested assistance from the safe haven-ministation staff to open saving accounts. The safe haven-ministation staff reported that one particular youth who had once been involved in dubious activities has been saving and tracking the money he earned at a local restaurant. This was also the same youth who had given the safe haven-ministation staff a difficult time with his school work and showed no respect toward the staff initially. The safe haven-ministation staff included this youth on a trip to the State Penal Farm and there he met prisoners from the same neighborhood. This experience affected him significantly and after the trip, he stated that he did not want to be "locked up" and began to change his behavior.

It was apparent that the youth had developed positive relationships with the safe haven-ministation staff, including the police officers. The evaluation team witnessed the youth running up to the safe haven-ministation director and police officers only to greet them enthusiastically and hold their hands. Some of the youth would follow the safe haven-ministation director around as she moved about.

According to the chief of police, the youth greet him respectfully when he comes to the safe haven-ministation. This behavior would never have occurred if not for the safe haven-ministation's community equity policing activities. One of the interviewees told a story of when a female youth that had just started coming to the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club became very wide-eyed with shock and fear when she first saw the police officers enter the Club. Her peers reassured her that the police officers were their friends and they were there to help them.
The safe haven-ministration director reported that the youth's relationships with the adults at the Club and safe haven-ministration also helped strengthen the relationships between the youth and their parents. One parent agreed with this statement, claiming that her child's behavior improved at home after being in the safe haven-ministration. Half the youth that were interviewed stated that the director made regular calls to their parents. The director and police officers stated that nevertheless, parental involvement must be increased to ensure that the nurturing environment established at the safe haven-ministration continued to be fostered at home.

**Results Of The Youth Outcome Survey.** Youth were interviewed at the safe haven-ministration at the beginning of their participation and again one year later. To see if positive youth outcomes could really be attributed to the safe haven-ministration program, youth were also interviewed at a comparison site without a safe haven-ministration covering the same time period as the youth at the safe haven-ministration who participated in the survey.

The comparison site, Dixie Homes, had a Boys and Girls Club program with some activities similar to the safe haven-ministration. Two key program differences between the LeMoyne Gardens safe haven-ministration and the Dixie Homes Boys & Girls Club used as a comparison site were:

- safe haven-ministration youth received more individual attention,
- safe haven-ministration had a police presence.

**Differences between youth tested at the beginning of their program participation and youth tested after one year of participation.** Participation in the safe haven-ministration had a positive effect on youth in some key areas. After one year, youth at the safe haven-ministration reported significantly:

- better future outlooks
- less drug and alcohol use
- more volunteer work
- more cleaning of their neighborhood

Some improvement occurred in:

- self-reported grades
- self-esteem
- decreased disorderly conduct

However, these last 3 differences in outcomes were not statistically significantly different from the baseline survey. Table 22 shows the means
and significance of key factors and questions for the youth at the safe haven-ministation for the pre-test and post-test surveys.

**Differences between youth surveyed at the safe haven-ministation and those surveyed at a comparison site.** Because the comparison site, Dixie Homes, had a Boys and Girls Club program with some activities similar to the safe haven-ministation, youth at that site improved on many measures, as did the safe haven-ministation youth. Safe haven-ministation youth did not improve more than youth at the comparison Boys and Girls Club at a statistically significant level. However, safe haven-ministation youth did improve somewhat more than the comparison youth in several areas, listed on Table 23. For example, although the safe haven-ministation youth had less positive future outlooks when they entered the safe haven-ministation, and continued to have less positive future outlooks than their counterparts at the comparison site, their outlook improved more than it did for the comparison youth.

The effect of the 2 additional activities present at the safe haven-ministation can be seen in the greater relative improvement shown by the safe haven-ministation youth and the dramatic decrease in police reported crime at LeMoyne Gardens, both of which are described in detail below.

Overall, the youth at the safe haven-ministation were reporting lower on the outcome measures than the youth at the comparison site when they entered the safe haven-ministation program in regard to their future outlook, self-esteem, grades, homework, helping neighbors and cleaning the neighborhood. One year later, the safe haven-ministation youth had shown more improvement in all of these areas, except volunteering, than the youth at the comparison site. However, their greater improvement was not statistically significant.

**What youth liked best about the safe haven-ministation program.** Improved relationships with adults and police also resulted from safe haven-ministation participation. When asked what they liked best about the safe haven-ministation, 68 percent of the youth responded that having someone to go to for help and advice was one of the best things, and 63 percent responded that they liked getting to know police officers and getting help with school work. More than half of the youth liked having outside speakers, becoming a leader, feeling better about themselves, having a safe place to go, and doing fun things and going on trips. None of the youth completing the questionnaire were unable to report something that they liked about the safe haven-ministation program. (See Table 24.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Deviation</th>
<th>P &lt; 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future outlook scale</strong></td>
<td>4.5405 Pretest</td>
<td>1.0164</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.297 Post-test</td>
<td>1.4882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antisocial leadership scale</strong></td>
<td>7.8718</td>
<td>1.7797</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8718</td>
<td>1.6730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug and alcohol use scale</strong></td>
<td>6.8485</td>
<td>.6185</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3636</td>
<td>.9624</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-esteem/Self-efficacy scale</strong></td>
<td>42.000</td>
<td>5.099</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.611</td>
<td>4.7608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grades</strong></td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clean your neighborhood</strong></td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Help neighbor</strong></td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Get homework done on time</strong></td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do volunteer work</strong></td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Importance of high school diploma</strong></td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steal</strong></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carry weapon</strong></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Damage property</strong></td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Break into car</strong></td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disorderly conduct</strong></td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cheat</strong></td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beat someone up</strong></td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fearful traveling to and from school</strong></td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Controlling for age and gender.

P values of < .05 are significant
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT MEASURE</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS WERE BETTER OR WORSE THAN THE COMPARISON GROUP AT:</th>
<th>DID THE PARTICIPANTS IMPROVE OR WORSEN COMPARED TO NON-PARTICIPANTS BETWEEN TIME 1 AND TIME 2? ¹ ¹²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future outlook</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem/Self-efficacy</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not engaging in antisocial leadership</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not using drugs and alcohol</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get homework done on time</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean your neighborhood</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help neighbor</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do volunteer work</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not beat someone up</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not carry a weapon</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not steal</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not damage property</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not engage in disorderly conduct</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not break into car</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not cheat on tests</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not be fearful traveling to school</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worsened</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Controlling for age and gender
² None of these differences met the criteria for significance with a p < .05
Youth suggestions for improving the safe haven-ministration program.
Youth also made suggestions on what would make the program better (see Table 25). More than half would like to have more adults, such as their parents get involved, have more police, go on more educational trips, and do more things to feel good about themselves.
Community-wide Crime and Drug Outcomes

All the interviewees agreed that the LeMoyne Gardens has become a safer community. Whether the safety improved after or before the safe haven-ministration is difficult to ascertain because the Community Action program existed prior to the safe haven-ministration, and there was already a police mini-precinct with two officers on site. However, 85 percent of the youth surveyed who felt their neighborhood was safer, felt it was due to the safe haven-ministration.

However, the safe haven-ministration police officers and director believed that the decrease in juvenile criminal activities could be attributed to the safe haven-ministration. The tracking of juvenile criminal activities was monitored by a safe haven-ministration police officer.

**TABLE 25**

**MEMPHIS**

"WHAT WOULD MAKE THE PROGRAM BETTER?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percent who selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Going on more educational trips</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more adults, like parents, get involved in the program</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more chances to do things that make me feel good about myself, like helping little kids</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more police officers to make my neighborhood safer</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having the safe haven-ministration open for longer hours</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more chances to learn about college and to listen to adults outside the safe haven-ministration (i.e., college students, mayor)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more people to help me with my schoolwork</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more people to talk to me about my problems</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing more things to help my neighborhood</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more fun things to do after school</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more chances to be a leader</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not changing the program</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

164
The safe haven-ministation youth and staff reported that they felt safer walking down the neighborhood streets. This is evident in the repeated stories from the staff and youth that even police officers were previously not safe in the community.

When the residents first began vacating LeMoyne Gardens, the police officers and housing manager reported that burglaries increased, mainly because residents were leaving their stuff out in the open or their doors unlocked while they were in the midst of moving out. Apparently, crack houses also increased due to the number of empty houses. There was no way, however, to determine the exact number of these activities because of the transient conditions during the process of tearing down the housing development. As mentioned before, two shootings occurred in the late fall of 1997.

By 1998, the housing development had been torn down entirely.

Official statistics support the interviewees' feeling of increased safety. The number of crimes reported in the target neighborhood declined dramatically between 1994-1995 and 1995-1996, the year during which the safe haven-ministation opened (see Figure 18). They declined even more dramatically between the average of the years preceding the opening of the safe haven-ministation and the first year of the program (see Table 26). Beginning in 1997, LeMoyne Gardens, the housing development adjacent to the safe haven-ministation, began demolition, which was completed in 1998. It is therefore not possible to track decreases in reported crimes for this site after late 1996.

Prior to the opening of the safe haven-ministation, crime was reported by local residents and police to be "rampant." According to an eight year-old youth, "Sometimes there's shooting; sometimes there's fighting. When I hear the shooting, I think somebody just got shot, or maybe they just want to celebrate something. One of the parents described that the children and youth used to "run wild" in the streets and residents were "rowdy."

When the public housing development was finally eliminated, there still remained concerns about outside residents bringing crime to the community. Two incidents were reported. In the late fall of 1997 (Nov/Dec), an uncle of one of the safe haven-ministation girls was shot at a nearby church. During that same period of time, a shooting occurred after the local high school football team played a cross-town rival. In both instances, the children of the safe haven-ministation and the Boys and Girls club were upset and remained fearful and anxious for weeks. The safe haven-ministation officers, safe haven-ministation director, and director of the Boys and Girls club came together to support the children and their families though these incidents. In addition, the safe haven-
ministration officers increased their patrols and presence and provided
escorts to children and adults at the Boys and Girls Club. There was also a
heightened level of concern about the yearly Halloween haunted house
sponsored by the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club and the safe haven-
imistration. Since 1996, this activity was very popular and drew over 300
children, youth, and their families from various communities in Memphis.
The chief of police agreed to place 15 to 20 police officers in the area,
during the event, to ensure safety.

### Table 26

| NUMBER OF REPORTED INDEX CRIMES FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD, THEIR SURROUNDING PRECINCTS AND THE CITY OF MEMPHIS |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **MEMPHIS**                     | **PRE-PROGRAM YEAR AVERAGE** | **PROGRAM YEAR ONE** |
| **NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES**      |                  |                  |
| Target Neighborhood             | 602              | 376              |
| Target Precinct                 | 1389             | 87               |
| Comparison Neighborhood         | 112              | 51               |
| Comparison Precinct             | 1075             | 757              |
| City                           | 62,818           | 70,183           |
| Target Precinct Minus          | 787              | 494              |
| Target Neighborhood Minus      |                  |                  |
| Comparison Precinct Minus      | 963              | 706              |
| Comparison Neighborhood Minus  |                  |                  |
| City Minus Target Precinct     | 61,429           | 69,313           |

#### CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME IN PROGRAM'S FIRST YEAR

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
<td>-54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Precinct Minus</td>
<td>-26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood Minus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>-26.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Memphis Police Department

As Table 26 shows, city-wide Index crime reports in Memphis rose from
the year before the safe haven-ministration opened to the year during which
it opened, but Index crime reports decreased dramatically in the target
neighborhood (LeMoyne Gardens housing development). Index crime
reports at LeMoyne Gardens decreased by 38 percent in the first year of the safe haven-ministation program, by about the same in the precinct, while city-wide Index crime reports were rising over 12 percent. Figure 18 illustrates the trend in number of crime reports for the target neighborhood, the target precinct, and city-wide.

Index crimes reported during 1994-1995, although far more numerous than the following year, were already down from previous years (see Figure 18). A police mini-precinct in LeMoyne Gardens staffed with two police officers may have contributed to the decrease prior to the opening of the safe haven-ministation. So, while the most dramatic results occurred in the year in which the safe haven-ministation opened, changes were already occurring in the prior year when on-site community equity policing was in place.

The actual effect of the safe haven-ministation on police reported Index crime in the immediate neighborhood of LeMoyne Gardens is under-stated when looking at yearly change. The safe haven-ministation opened in the middle of a police reporting year, and decreases that occurred in the second half of the year, due to the opening of the safe haven-ministation, are averaged in with the higher rates that occurred before the safe haven-ministation.

A look at monthly data for the year 1996 provides more detail on the reduction of Index crime reports. For example, the number of aggravated assaults that were reported between October 1995 and September 1996 at LeMoyne Gardens was 73. In March of 1996, the middle of that reporting period, the safe haven-ministation opened. Adding up all months of 1996, January through December, only 39 aggravated assaults took place at LeMoyne Gardens. Therefore, 34 (73-39) of the assaults occurred during the latter months of 1995.
As Table 27 shows, for certain crimes, there were dramatic decreases in the number of reports at LeMoyne Gardens in calendar year 1996 compared to previous years. Larceny and robbery were almost eradicated. Unfortunately, residents began being vacated from LeMoyne Gardens in 1997, and we cannot tell if this dramatic effect was long-lasting.

As Table 26 shows, in the comparison neighborhood of Dixie Homes, crime reports decreased at an even higher rate than at LeMoyne Gardens. Figure 19 shows the percentage decrease in police reported crime for the target neighborhood of LeMoyne Gardens, its precinct, a comparison neighborhood (Dixie Homes) and its precinct.

Reports of particular crimes went down even more dramatically at LeMoyne Gardens between the year before the safe haven-minestation opened and 1996, the year it opened. Residential burglaries decreased by 32 percent, non-residential burglaries decreased by 41 percent, larceny decreased by 35 percent, and individual robbery by 23 percent (see Table 28) Some crimes rose during this period: aggravated assault rose by 18 percent, auto theft by 20 percent, and simple assault rose by over 70 percent. However, a closer look at the data reveals that the vast majority of police reported crimes in all categories were committed in the months before the safe haven-minestation opened in March, 1996.

---

Table 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly average of selected index crimes in years prior to 1996*</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>Percent change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Larceny has 114</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery has 65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide has 4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape has 13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential burglary has 199</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto theft has 73</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated assault has 85</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* averages based on October-September year

---

168
Table 28: Selected crimes Decrease at LeMoyne Gardens from year before to year during safe haven-ministration operation. Non-residential burglary 41 percent, Larceny 35 percent, Residential burglary 32 percent, Individual Robbery 23 percent.

Figure 18

NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES REPORTED IN THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD, TARGET PRECINCT, AND CITY OF MEMPHIS 1991-1996

Figure 19

CHANGES IN REPORTED INDEX CRIMES AT TARGET AND COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD AND THEIR SURROUNDING PRECINCTS - PRE-PROGRAM AVERAGE VS. PROGRAM YEAR
Other Community-Wide Outcomes

It was difficult, if not impossible, for the safe haven-ministration to have larger community impacts because of the transience of the LeMoyne Gardens residents.

The major community outcome that evidently resulted from the safe haven-ministration was the improved relationships between the safe haven-ministration and the schools. The strengthened relationships enabled the safe haven-ministration to better monitor the progress of the youth and intervene before the problems got worse.

The Most Likely Explanations for These Outcomes

One of the key differences between the programs of the Boys and Girls Club and the safe haven-ministration was individual attention and help with homework, and an overall focus on academic achievement. The results of the youth survey show the greatest improvement in getting homework done on time. It is likely that the efforts of the program can be credited with this improvement, as it did not occur to the same extent with the comparison youth at a Boys and Girls Club without a safe haven-ministration.

The decrease in reported Index crimes was already underway because of the two earlier Community Action police officers assigned to the area. There was a more dramatic decrease in Index crime in 1996 after the safe haven-ministration was established. We cannot say for sure that the safe haven-ministration was entirely responsible for the increased rate of decline in Index crime reports. However, we do know that once the safe
haven-ministation opened, the number of reports dropped even more than it had with the Community Action officers. Also, staff and residents reported that the Boys and Girls Club itself was safer, and 85% of the youth at the safe haven-ministation felt that improved neighborhood safety was attributable to the safe haven-ministation.

**Lessons Learned**

**Staff leadership.** A safe haven-ministation director with the commitment, availability, and competence to lead the safe haven-ministation was a critical criteria for the safe haven-ministation program to succeed. Prior to the current director, the previous director, who also served as the executive director of the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club, was not able to distribute his time between the two organizations. Consequently, the initial safe haven-ministation structure did not allow for a clear distinction between safe haven-ministation and non-safe haven-ministation activities. Further, safe haven-ministation membership was fluid. It was not until the national evaluation of the safe haven-ministation program required the sites to conduct a survey of 50 youth that the safe haven-ministation staff was forced to distinguish the 50 youth. It continued to be a challenge for the current director to establish a clear distinction between the two organizations because the safe haven-ministation program was located within the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club's building, the director was also responsible for some of the Club's programming, and the organizational philosophy that the youth from both organizations should not be excluded from each other's activities. Nevertheless, the current director had more time and resources to successfully develop a few unique activities that were distinguishable from Boys and Girls Club activities, and that provided the safe haven-ministation youth with a sense of belonging that the youth claimed as a privilege. The previous director was unable to develop relationships with the Police Department and the Housing Authority representatives. The current director developed the relationships and was able to rely on the representatives for their support and resources.

**Components of a Comprehensive Approach.** The interviewees believed that all four components -- after-school tutoring, mentoring, community equity policing, and recreation -- were essential to the safe haven-ministation's comprehensive approach to youth development. Despite the fact that some of the components were less developed than others and may not have been as well defined as expected by the Foundation, each component played an essential role in the whole approach. The adult and youth interviewees asserted that the recreation component served as a reward system for the youth and, therefore, was necessary to keep them motivated. The partners felt that the strength of the safe haven-ministation program was the police component because it improved the safety of the Club and attracted more youth from across the city. As a result, the
executive director of the Memphis Housing Authority included a statement in the plan for the new LeMoyne Gardens that required the Boys and Girls Club to continue to support the safe haven-ministration in order for the Club to maintain a facility within the new housing development. The chief of police agreed to continue to commit two police officers to the site.

**Linkages with the larger Institutions that Support Youth.** The safe haven-ministration participants (staff and partners) also learned that building relationships with the schools was essential in order to monitor the youth's progress. The safe haven-ministration provided an effective formal vehicle for doing this. The safe haven-ministration director's ability to monitor each youth's progress closely and take the time to talk to the teachers and visit the schools was a major bonus.

**Accessibility and Availability of Responsible and Helpful Adults.** A recurring theme throughout all the interviews was how the adults like "Ms. Terri," "Ms. Thomas," "Officer Davis" were always there for the youth. They not only served as role models, but also provided a sense of security for the youth.

**Organizational Structure and Credibility in the Community.** All the interviewees agreed that having a police officer who knew the community well brought further credibility to the safe haven-ministration. The police officer grew up in the area and was part of several committees or boards of organizations in the neighborhood. One of the interviewees stated that if the police officer was part of an effort, then he knew that the effort was worth supporting. The safe haven-ministration director attributed the safe haven-ministration's ability to develop stronger relationships with the police department, housing authority, and other community-based organizations to the officer's network.

Other lessons learned included:

- The safe haven-ministration director learned that every activity required a back-up plan,
- The safe haven-ministration staff emphasized that periodic training was necessary to enhance their capacity, and site visits were helpful to see what other safe haven-ministations looked like,
- It was important to develop relationships with individuals or organizations that could provide the needed resources, and
- Parental involvement was essential in order to foster a nurturing environment for the youth at the Club and at home.

**Challenges.** The safe haven-ministration staff and a parent agreed that involving parents would be one of the biggest challenges because most
parents tend to regard the Boys and Girls Club and the safe haven-ministration as "babysitters." The safe haven-ministration also needed to begin thinking about an outreach process that would engage future residents of the new housing development. Some of the residents may be previous residents, but others may be new residents who are not familiar with the safe haven-ministration concept.

Finally, one of the safe haven-ministration police officers emphasized that the safe haven-ministration needed to actively involve more agencies (e.g., other youth organizations, LeMoyne College) in order to strengthen its resources and capacity.

**How Did the Program Continue?**

The safe haven-ministration program at LeMoyne Gardens has both benefitted from and been somewhat restricted by its operation under the umbrella of the Memphis Boys and Girls Club. Because the program operated within the Memphis Boys and Girls Club, a modified version of the program was able to continue after the end of funding in 1998.

The safe haven-ministration staff was ambivalent about the program's future as part of the Memphis Boys and Girls Club because they felt that the current structure was an obstacle to the safe haven-ministration's ability to obtain additional funds and resources and develop new linkages. The safe haven-ministration director and one of the police officers preferred for the safe haven-ministration to become an independent organization. However, the partners (i.e., Memphis Boys and Girls Club, the Memphis Housing Authority, and the Memphis Police Department) expressed their preference for continuing the safe haven-ministration as part of the Memphis Boys and Girls Club because the presence of the police as part of the safe haven-ministration ensures the safety of the Club and the future public housing community. Therefore, the Housing Authority was requiring that the Boys and Girls Club continue to support the safe haven-ministration in order to receive additional HUD resources as part of the Hope VI program. While the safe haven-ministration staff perceived the current structure to be a barrier to the safe haven-ministration's growth, the Goodwill Boys and Girls Club staff reported that the current arrangement worked well and was mutually beneficial to both organizations.

The program has remained in place with the same director, the same police officers, and the same site. The Memphis Boys and Girls Club has solidly supported the program. However, the end of program funding resulted in a loss of staff, and curtailment of safe haven-ministration programs to one day per week, facilitated by staff from the Boys and Girls Club. The program has been changed to fit into the overall Boys and Girls Club program.
According to the safe haven-ministration staff, the major constriction for the safe haven-ministration program as it operates under the Boys and Girls Club umbrella, is that all fundraising must be done through the Boys and Girls Club. The Boys and Girls Club has decided not to fundraise separately for the safe haven-ministration program, and not to allow fundraising efforts for the program that could conflict with funds available for the Boys and Girls Club. The safe haven-ministration program staff have succeeded in obtaining local business support for special events and donations from local representatives.

If funds are identified and dedicated to the operation of the safe haven-ministration program, the future of the program could be very bright. The Director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Hope VI program, which is redeveloping LeMoyne Gardens, has committed space in the new development for the safe haven-ministration program.

There are several major challenges ahead for the safe haven-ministration:

- Its structure, role, and function as it continues to struggle with the issue of autonomy within the larger Boys and Girls Club organization;
- Its ability to continue to retain the same youth and work closely with them despite the current transient nature of the community; and
- The process of integrating into the new housing development and organizing the new residents to get involved with the safe haven-ministration.
9. The Maryland Boys and Girls Club and the Baltimore Police

Summary

The Baltimore safe haven-ministration program began in October 1995 with the commitment of resources from the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the Baltimore Police Department, and the Maryland Boys and Girls Club. The safe haven-ministration is located in a housing unit directly across from the Boys and Girls Club. Two police officers worked at the site, and often also were present at the site when off-duty. The Baltimore Housing Authority contributed the space and a housing police officer, and the Boys and Girls Club provided equipment.

The safe haven-ministration program in Baltimore operated, and continues to operate to some extent, under the umbrella of the Maryland Boys and Girls Club. For the first two years of the program, operating within the Boys & Girls Club created some problems that hampered the program. The main difficulties arose from a lack of clarity about the organizational relationship of the two entities, to confusion about staff roles, and from the lack of a competent program director. In the last year, a new director was found who was able to improve the operation of the program.

The ability of the new director to engage the Tenant’s Council, to attract more volunteers, and to establish mentoring relationships with the majority of the youth appeared to have led to positive outcomes for youth. Youth who were surveyed after one year of participation at the safe haven-ministration showed some increases over the year in most outcomes, including more positive behaviors, fewer negative behaviors, and better self-esteem and hope for the future. However, the improvements, on average, were too small to be statistically significant. It is promising that they were moving in the right direction.

Greater differences were found between the youth at the safe haven-ministration and youth selected for comparison at another site, who were matched by age and gender to the safe haven-ministration youth. The youth at the safe haven-ministration improved significantly more than the comparison youth in getting their homework done and doing volunteer work which is consistent with the programming provided to the youth. They also improved more than the comparison youth by engaging in fewer anti-social behaviors. They reported significantly more decreases in drug and alcohol use, and in disorderly conduct. The youth at the safe haven-ministration improved more than the youth at the comparison site on most other measures as well, but not to a statistically significant extent.
Residents, youth, and police officers also reported that the safe haven-ministration had a positive effect on safety at Flag House Courts due to the assertive activity of the police officers. Loitering and drug activity went from being occurrences on every corner to not being seen by residents. Police reported that as the program progressed, the type of crimes that they responded to changed from violent crime to mostly domestic disputes.

Crime statistics can only tell us part of the story for Flag House Courts. Through 1996, the numbers of reported crimes follows expectations. Crime increased until 1993, when police were first assigned to Flag House Courts. With the presence of the police, crime went down in 1993 and 1994. Then, when the safe haven-ministration opened in late 1995, and the police officers began community equity policing in the full sense, and engaged the community, the residents responded by going to the officers more and more. As a result, crime reports rose dramatically in 1996.

After 1996, statistics show that crime steadily decreased at Flag House Courts. This confirms our increase-and-then-decline hypothesis. However, Flag House Courts was designated to be renovated under the HOPE VI program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and this process began with the relocating of residents in late 1996. Through 1997 and 1998 residents moved out of the development, and by the end of 1999, the development was scheduled to be totally vacated. Therefore, the loss of population concurrent with the decrease in crime makes statistics unreliable in assessing the impact of the safe haven-ministration.

Officers and residents reported that the vacating of apartments has led to a state of disrepair and the future is uncertain for the few remaining tenants, some progress toward renovation seems to be stalled. Residents reported that the safe haven-ministration has helped make the area safer during this period, when vacant units present opportunities for drug activity, vandalism, and other crimes.

The future of the safe haven-ministration program is also uncertain. The program ended in June 1998, but has been kept open by the Maryland Boys and Girls Club with reduced staffing. The Baltimore police officer was recalled to regular duty in December 1998, but the housing officer remained. The director has been reduced to part-time commitment to this project.

The Maryland Boys and Girls Club has applied to new funding sources to keep the program running. The Club has received a twelve-month grant from the national office of the Boys and Girls Club and a grant from the Bureau of Justice Administration to operate a summer program at the safe
haven-ministration Teen Center. At present, staffing and training are underfunded, and the program is not operating at an optimal level.

The Maryland Boys and Girls Club has expressed its commitment to the original vision of the safe haven-ministration, and expanded the program space by combining the existing space with an adjacent vacant two bedroom apartment, resulting in a large eight room safe haven site.

Where Was the Replication Located?

The Flag House Courts is a high-rise public housing development located in East Baltimore near the city's downtown area. Flag House Courts was once a model series of high rise buildings developed initially by the federal government. It was designed as transitional housing for families and individuals prospering from Baltimore's once booming industrial and shipping economy. However, through the last three decades, the physical conditions of the buildings, as well as the social conditions of the local surroundings have deteriorated significantly.

In the early 1990s, the city of Baltimore and the Housing Authority of Baltimore City collaborated with HUD to reinvigorate urban neighborhoods through the HOPE VI program. Old, sprawling, high-rise housing developments were razed and replaced with new modern units. These units would accommodate those who needed subsidized housing and working class families. Since this process has begun, Flag House Courts has undergone radical transition. It used to contain 487 apartments. Over the past two years many of the families have been relocated. As of 1998, approximately 125 families resided in Flag House Courts. As a result, of the loss of residents, many of the vacant housing units have become the locality for gang and drug activities. In addition, the vacant units have been boarded up and left in disrepair, leaving an unsightly picture of the housing development.

The city plans to have Flag House Courts completely torn down by late 1999 or early 2000. New construction was to begin shortly thereafter. However, residents now are unsure of the time line and are suspicious of city's motives for the delay. Several residents and staff of the Maryland Boys and Girls Club that were interviewed expressed their confusion about the future of their home. As a result, the small number of families that remain in Flag House Courts appears to be in limbo. On top of it, they are left with multiple vacancies and units in disrepair that the HABC is unwilling to fix.

The residents have historically taken a lot of pride in their community. The community is predominantly African American. Long time residents talked about the sense of community found among the families and in the
schools and the multiple outlets for pro-social activities and development that characterized Flag House Courts past. As a result of Baltimore’s declining economy in the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the departure of the upwardly mobile working class families, the residents that remained in Flag House Courts were those that relied almost completely on subsidized housing and public assistance. Flag House Courts and the surrounding community developed a reputation for rampant drug activity, prostitution, crime, and violence among both adults and youth. Archival information indicated that test scores of the children in Flag House Courts were consistently well below state and national averages.

**How Much Was Spent and What Activities Were Carried out in the Replication?**

**Funding Levels**

The safe haven-ministration program began in October 1995 with the commitment of resources from the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the Baltimore Police Department, and the Maryland Boys and Girls Club. The safe haven-ministration occupied a housing unit directly across from the Club. The Baltimore Police Department and the Housing Authority provided two police officers that were responsible for the housing development and the immediate surrounding area. The safe haven-ministration had access to the equipment (e.g., computers and recreational supplies), space, and administrative supplies at the Club.

Funding during each year of the program is detailed in Table 29. The Eisenhower Foundation provided $68,275 in the first year, combining funds from HUD and the Center for Global Partnership. This was higher than the funding for Year One at the other sites, and was for expenditures on hardware items, including lighting. The Eisenhower Foundation continued to channel funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Years Two and Three, providing $43,000 and $34,000 in each of these years, respectively.

The safe haven-ministration also received in-kind contributions from the Baltimore Police Department and other local agencies that included salaries, supplies, transportation, space, equipment, phones, and utilities. The total value of in-kind contributions was $103,612 in Year One, $114,334 in Year Two and $108,977 in Year Three.
Replication Activities

The Program In A Nutshell

Based on the interviewees responses, it appeared that the safe haven-ministation struggled during the first two years to establish a structured program. During the first site visit in 1997, the evaluation team found that the most successful aspect of the safe haven-ministation was the community equity policing component. The afterschool tutoring and mentoring components were merged with the Boys and Girls Club’s overall activities. Therefore, there were no activities that were unique to the safe haven-ministation.

However, by 1998, the interviewees (including parents and youth) reported that the current safe haven-ministation director had developed and implemented six new activities. Over ten volunteers, including parents were also recruited by the safe haven-ministation director to assist in conducting several activities for the youth. According to the Tenant Council representative, a parent volunteers on Saturdays to make sure that the safe haven-ministation is open for the book club. All the interviewees attributed the safe haven-ministation’s accomplishments to the director’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRANTS VIA THE</th>
<th>HUD Year 1 (9/95-2/97)</th>
<th>HUD Year 2 (3/97-8/98)</th>
<th>HUD Year 3 (9/98-present)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EISENHOWER FOUNDATION</td>
<td>$68,275&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$43,000&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$34,000&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$145,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL IN-KIND&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$103,612&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$114,334</td>
<td>$108,977</td>
<td>$326,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$171,887</td>
<td>$157,334</td>
<td>$142,977</td>
<td>$471,473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>This figure includes $54,000 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as $14,275 from the Center for Global Partnership.

<sup>2</sup>This figure represents HUD funding only.

<sup>3</sup>This figure represents HUD funding only.

<sup>4</sup>The local in-kind figures refer to in-kind services from the local police department and other local agencies that include salaries, supplies, transportation, space, equipment, phones, and utilities.

TABLE 29

HUD Budget Summary

Replication Activities

The Program In A Nutshell. Based on the interviewees responses, it appeared that the safe haven-ministation struggled during the first two years to establish a structured program. During the first site visit in 1997, the evaluation team found that the most successful aspect of the safe haven-ministation was the community equity policing component. The afterschool tutoring and mentoring components were merged with the Boys and Girls Club’s overall activities. Therefore, there were no activities that were unique to the safe haven-ministation.

However, by 1998, the interviewees (including parents and youth) reported that the current safe haven-ministation director had developed and implemented six new activities. Over ten volunteers, including parents were also recruited by the safe haven-ministation director to assist in conducting several activities for the youth. According to the Tenant Council representative, a parent volunteers on Saturdays to make sure that the safe haven-ministation is open for the book club. All the interviewees attributed the safe haven-ministation’s accomplishments to the director’s
knowledge and skills working with youth and his network of resources from within the community.

**Youth Development.** The safe haven-ministration conducted many of its activities in conjunction with the Boys and Girls Club. Therefore, for practical reasons, activities provided to safe haven-ministration participants were often also open to the Boys and Girls Club members. This was an agreeable arrangement because safe haven-ministration participants also took advantage of the opportunities offered by the Club. Prior reports indicated that aside from a few recreational activities, the activities of the safe haven-ministration were not well defined and were underdeveloped. Afterschool tutoring and mentoring components were merged with the Boys and Girls Club’s overall activities. Therefore, there were no activities that were unique to the safe haven-ministration. The lack of distinction was further supported by the previous safe haven-ministration director’s inability to produce any attendance records or documentation on the safe haven-ministration youth’s participation. The recreational activities comprised of a weight lifting machine and a Sega Genesis game. A bicycle safety and repair program was in its early development.

However, under the leadership of the new safe haven-ministration director, there has been some success with developing unique activities that were distinguishable from the Club’s activities and offered an added or more intense experience exclusively for safe haven-ministration youth. However, these activities were at an early stage of development and records related to the activities were scant or non-existent. Functionally, these unique activities have been equated to privileges and have become desirable to those children and youth that were not enrolled in the safe haven-ministration.

Over ten volunteers, including parents also have been recruited by the safe haven-ministration director to assist in conducting several activities for the youth. According to the Tenant Council representative, a parent volunteers on Saturdays to make sure that the safe haven-ministration is open for the book club. One parent had expressed to the safe haven-ministration staff that she liked working with youth. Soon, she began volunteering at the center and helped chaperone field trips and assisted with programs and membership. She also developed good working relationships with the police officers and ended up volunteering for two years. The Boys and Girls Club staff was so impressed with her that they hired her to assist with youth at the teen center that will be established soon. All the interviewees attributed the safe haven-ministration’s accomplishments to the director’s knowledge and skills working with youth and his network of resources from within the community.
During the safe haven-ministation’s last year, a more organized afterschool tutoring program was developed for safe haven-ministation youth. It was referred to as the Home Work Club. Tutoring took place in the safe haven-ministation unit across from the Club. The tutoring period was usually staffed by the safe haven-ministation director, one of the safe haven-ministation officers, and volunteers from within the community. Occasionally, the Boys and Girls Club’s unit director or a parent would assist. The tutoring was provided using a self-paced framework in which children were expected to enter and complete their homework with relative independence. When children needed specific help, or when problems were detected, one-on-one attention was provided. However, it was unclear that an adult presence was always consistent. According to all the interviewees, there was a policy that safe haven-ministation children and youth were not allowed to participate in Club activities unless they had first reported to the Home Work Club. However, mechanisms did not seem to be in place to assure that this rule was followed. Computer games were used to reward youth for getting their homework done on time.

It also is unclear exactly how many safe haven-ministation participants actually took advantage of the Home Work Club although the safe haven-ministation director indicated that between 20 to 50 children participated. Approximately 20 safe haven-ministation youth participated on a daily basis. Both adult and youth interviewees reported specific instances in which a safe haven-ministation child sought one-on-one tutoring and improved school performance as a result.

A Saturday book club was also developed to stimulate academic development. Adults and children praised this attempt to promote learning. The safe haven-ministation director reported that approximately 25 children participated in this program throughout its life, 15 of whom were reported to be safe haven-ministation children and youth. His statement was supported by the police officers.

Mentoring, as defined by the interviewees at this site, was a broadly defined set of activities which included providing one-on-one assistance, guidance, or encouragement to a youth on one or many occasions, within a short time-span or over the course of time, or specifically within an agreed upon framework of mentoring for a specific problem or within the casual course of contact with a youth. The definition of mentoring also included a state of BEING in which there is an assertion that just being present and providing children with a positive image and warm support could have a positive impact on the children and youth.

Reports on the structure of the mentoring program ranged from reports that mentoring was done in groups (e.g., rap sessions) to reports that adults were assigned from 5 to 7 youth. However, it should be noted that those
who reported individual mentoring had significant difficulty naming the youth they mentored. Given the functional definition of mentoring used by this community, many of the adults who took the time to work or volunteer at the Boys and Girls Club were often considered mentors. There was no mention of special training or guidance provided to mentors. All of this considered, it was difficult to determine the precise mentor to safe haven-ministation child ratio or the precise amount of time spent mentoring. However, seven of the youth interviewed referred to at least six adults (the safe haven-ministation director, the two safe haven-ministation officers, the Boys and Girls Club's unit director; one staff member and one volunteer) that seemed to have regular and substantive contact with the safe haven-ministation youth. A parent stated that the police officers have also helped youth complete job application forms. The safe haven-ministation director was overwhelmingly cited as the most prominent and powerful mentor figure among all of the adults who had contact with the safe haven-ministation.

The recreational activities of the safe haven-ministation also were further developed under the new safe haven-ministation director and were widely praised. However, it also should be noted that the recreational activities are among those activities in which participation was most fluid between safe haven-ministation and non-safe haven-ministation participants. All the adult interviewees reported that the recreation component provided a positive outlet for the energy and interests of the children and youth in the community, in addition to serving as an alternative to negative, anti-social behavior that would be exhibited without the outlet. Many pointed out that children and youth now have a variety of alternative activities that have helped reduce the loitering on street corners and around the housing development.

Combined recreational activities for safe haven-ministation and non-safe haven-ministation participants often took place in the Boys and Girls Club building and around the city of Baltimore. They included board and table games, field trips, movies, neighborhood sport games (e.g., soccer, lacrosse, street hockey), organized team sports (e.g., basketball, football), and access to the weight room located in the Boys and Girls Club.

The safe haven-ministation director was reported to be the principal organizer and coach for the neighborhood sports. He organized sport teams and received much praise for his efforts. The safe haven-ministation officers and community volunteers also provided significant assistance to the director, especially for the neighborhood sports.

In addition, the safe haven-ministation director also developed recreational activities specifically for the safe haven-ministation children and youth. However, non-safe haven-ministation children were never completely
excluded and always participated in the activities, but in lesser numbers than found for the combined activities listed above. The activities included video games in the safe haven-ministation facility (50 children total on a revolving basis almost daily); a bicycle club (30 safe haven-ministation children and youth participated); sewing class and drill activities (12 female safe haven-ministation participants), and safe haven-ministation field trips (30 safe haven-ministation children and youth participated on an as-planned basis).

**Community Equity Policing.** The two police officers assigned to the safe haven-ministation were given different types of responsibilities due to their different personalities and styles. While one officer was viewed as a very strict disciplinarian and did most of the arrests, the other was considered more approachable and a better counselor. It appeared to the evaluation team that the latter police officer maintained a stronger relationship with the safe haven-ministation director and was more involved in safe haven-ministation activities, such as accompanying the youth on field trips. The former was credited with the increased sense of security among residents.

The police officers reported that they have become better at community equity policing through their experiences and participation in the safe haven-ministation program. One police officer indicated that he became better skilled at helping parents resolve disputes with their children and among the children themselves. The strategy to divide the patrolling and youth outreach responsibilities according to each police officer's strengths worked well. One of the two police officers enjoyed working with the youth so much that he started to teach the youth activities that he liked doing, such as trail biking and lacrosse. He also went on to coach basketball and tutor the youth. The officer was so excited about his work that he submitted a request to remain at the safe haven-ministation.

Interviewees praised the dedication, commitment, and skills of the 2 police officers assigned to the safe haven-ministation. Both officers were consistent in arriving at the safe haven-ministation during designated hours and carrying out their responsibilities. They assisted at the safe haven-ministation until it closed for the evening and then they began their regular patrol. Therefore, they were seen as a consistent presence in the community. Adult interviewees stated that the officers' arrival to the safe haven-ministation was always met with much anticipation and excitement by all the children and youth, regardless of whether they were safe haven-ministation participants or not. In addition to being a strong, but compassionate presence, the 2 officers' involvement with the children in recreational activities, afterschool tutoring, and safe haven-ministation specific activities like the discussion groups and individual mentoring was highly lauded. The 2 officers also assisted the safe haven-ministation
director in event planning and chaperoning. While one officer reported that he was involved in the safe haven-ministation activities, the majority of the 7 youth who were interviewed indicated that they did not know that the officer was associated with the safe haven-ministation. They saw him as a law enforcer that kept the neighborhood safe. Their perception may be due to the safe haven-ministation's approach to separate the officers' responsibilities according to their strengths the officer perceived as the law enforcer patrolled the neighborhood and made arrests, while the other officer spent more time tutoring and working with the youth. Both officers were long time residents of the community and one actually grew up in Flag House Courts. Therefore, in addition to their personal commitment, both were excellent informational and contact resources.

Over the course of the Flag House Courts safe haven-ministation project, there have been cases of homicide within the development. In the summer of 1997 a child was found murdered. Such incidents affected the community's sense of safety, particularly among the youth. These incidents may have had some effect on the youth's willingness to initially accept the community police officers into the neighborhood in order to make their community a safer place.

**How Was the Replication Managed and How Were Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?**

**Management**

The safe haven-ministation program began in October 1995 with the commitment of resources from the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the Baltimore Police Department, and the Maryland Boys and Girls Club. The safe haven-ministation occupied a housing unit directly across from the Boys and Girls Club. The Baltimore Police Department and the Housing Authority provided for two police officers who were responsible for the housing development and the immediate surrounding area. The safe haven-ministation had access to the equipment (e.g., computers and recreational supplies), space, and administrative supplies at the Club.

The safe haven-ministation program struggled during the first two years to establish itself as an independent organization separate from the Boys and Girls Club. It encountered several barriers, including:

- Lack of clarity regarding staffing roles and responsibilities for safe haven-ministation and Boys and Girls Club staff;

- Lack of a structured relationship between the safe haven-ministation and the Boys and Girls Club with clear reporting procedures and accountability;
High staff turnover in the safe haven-ministration director position as a consequence of the organizational and management tribulations;

Lack of support from the Tenant Council, which perceived the safe haven-ministration as a competitor; and

Distrust by the residents of previous directors who were not from within the community.

The safe haven-ministration staff included a program director and two police officers. However, the Boys and Girls Club's unit director considered himself the safe haven-ministration program director. He regarded the designated program director as the youth outreach coordinator even though this individual was accepted by the Eisenhower Foundation as the safe haven-ministration director. Consequently, there was no clear staffing responsibilities and based on the interviews, the lack of clarity resulted in poor management, tension, and not letting the current director do what he was supposed to do. The interviewees also attributed the high turnover in the director position (the current director was the third to be hired since the safe haven-ministration started) to the lack of distinct staff roles and the unit director's interference in the safe haven-ministration process.

Due to the turnover, the safe haven-ministration has not been perceived as a stable or central entity in Flag House Courts. Seven youth and 2 parents who were interviewed gave different dates for when the safe haven-ministration started. Most of the youth associated the opening of the safe haven-ministration with the time that the current director was hired. Further, they could barely recall the previous safe haven-ministration directors or the activities that the safe haven-ministration conducted before the current director was hired. They did, however, report that the previous directors did very little for the safe haven-ministration program. Some of the youth even stated that the previous safe haven-ministration director always expressed annoyance when they tried to attend the safe haven-ministration after school -- a direct violation of Eisenhower principles. Two parents admitted that they had no idea what the safe haven-ministration program was until the current director was hired.

According to the safe haven-ministration director and police officers, the Boys and Girls Club further complicated matters by implementing a bureaucracy that requires extensive paperwork, such as monthly reports and a tedious process for accessing petty cash. The bureaucracy was not only complex, but it was inconsistent and ambiguous. Consequently, the safe haven-ministration director had to spend more time than necessary to find out what procedures he had to follow to accomplish the tasks. Some
of the interviewees who were familiar with Boys and Girls Club’s requirements agreed. However, the program staff reported that financial and quarterly reports were always timely and complete.

The safe haven-ministation did not establish its own community advisory board as required by the Eisenhower Foundation. Instead, it considered the Tenant Council as its advisory board. However, the Tenant Council could not fulfill its duties as an advisory board because there was tension between the Council and the Boys and Girls Club unit director. A Tenant Council representative reported that at the beginning of the program, the Council felt that the safe haven-ministation was conducting activities similar to those conducted by the Tenant Council and for the very same youth in Flag House Courts. One safe haven-ministation staff member disagreed with this opinion. Upon further investigation, the evaluation team learned that this contradicting opinion was one of the major barriers to collaboration between the Council and the safe haven-ministation. The other barrier was the Council’s disappointment that each time a new safe haven-ministation director was hired, he or she was not from within the community or was not familiar with the local culture.

When the present safe haven-ministation director was hired, the collaboration between the safe haven-ministation and the Council began to develop. The present director grew up in the area and was familiar with the community and its residents. He also brought with him his network of community resources. His ability to work closely with the Tenant Council improved the coordination of activities and reduced duplication. As a result of better collaboration, the Tenant Council began to assume the responsibilities of a safe haven-ministation advisory committee, and indicated strong interest to work with the director to sustain and continue the safe haven-ministation program. According to the safe haven-ministation director, the support that he got from the Tenant Council far exceeded the support he got from the Boys and Girls Club.

A part-time consultant was hired by the Boys and Girls Club to assist the safe haven-ministation director with some of the administrative tasks, such as writing reports. None of the interviewees discussed the participation of partners that were supposedly involved in 1997 (e.g., with Greater Baltimore Medical Center, Crazy John Community Department Store, Youth Entrepreneurship Program, and a local grocery store). This suggested that the partnerships were most likely not sustained.

During the safe haven-ministation’s last year, several new relationships were developed with community organizations, such as Sister to Sister, which provided 2 volunteers to work with the safe haven-ministation’s female youth participants in developing skills to help them with their transition into womanhood; Mind, Heart and Body, which provided a
health educator; and R.O.O.T. Of, which provided a volunteer to help manage a reading program. According to the safe haven-ministration director, these relationships were established through the Tenant Council and the Boys and Girls Club. According to the Sister to Sister representative, the safe haven-ministration director contacted her for assistance when he realized that there were insufficient activities for girls.

Despite several attempts, the safe haven-ministration did not appear to have strengthened its partnership with the Maryland Boys and Girls Club. According to all the interviewees, it appeared that the Boys and Girls Club claimed ownership of the safe haven-ministration and controlled its growth. When the safe haven-ministration program funds concluded in August 1998, the safe haven-ministration director was not included in any decision-making about the safe haven-ministration’s future. His ambiguity was echoed by other interviewees (Boys and Girls Club staff members and parents) who also had no idea what was going to happen to the safe haven-ministration when the funds ended.

The safe haven-ministration director did not have a direct linkage to the Baltimore Police Department or the Baltimore Housing Authority. Instead, all communication from the two agencies flowed through the Boys and Girls Club, or through the police officers. This structure exacerbated the above ownership issue and reinforced the perception that the safe haven-ministration was a Boys and Girls Club program.

**Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training**

The Eisenhower Foundation was able to raise more resources during the first 2 years for Baltimore than for some of the other sites. As a result the safe haven-ministration was able to repair the housing unit allocated for the safe haven-ministration. (This was supposed to have been financed by the public housing authority.) The safe haven-ministration staff received technical assistance and training from the Eisenhower Foundation through several methods: workshops that covered issues such as program planning, youth development, grant writing, staff development, media planning, and continuation planning; site visits from the evaluation staff that provided opportunities for the safe haven-ministration to get advice on ways to monitor the program and progress of the youth; regular telephone calls with the Eisenhower Foundation program director to address issues and trouble-shoot; and assistance in submitting proposals to foundations and government agencies and to leverage local funds.

One participant stated that the workshop in Washington, DC in 1997 on evaluation was most helpful because it focused on the outcomes and clarified program expectations. Some of the participants emphasized that the Foundation had communicated clearly its programmatic guidelines and
expectations to the Boys and Girls Club, but that the information was not transferred adequately to the rest of the safe haven-ministation staff. One police officer was appreciative of site visits to other safe haven-ministations during some of the workshops, which enabled them to see what a safe haven-ministation was supposed to be like.

One of the interviewees recalled that the Foundation provided technical assistance in resolving the tension between the safe haven-ministation, the Tenant Council, and the Boys and Girls Club. When the Foundation learned of the conflicts that had resulted in the lack of a structured safe haven-ministation, the Foundation national director convened a meeting with all three groups. The meeting helped decrease some of the tension and forced the Boys and Girls Club's unit director to relinquish some of his control. However, when a new safe haven-ministation director was hired, the same conflicts recurred.

**What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?**

**Principal Findings**

As a result of the safe haven-ministation's activities since its inception and particularly during the last year, the following outcomes were described by the interviewees:

- Youths' reading skills and school performance improved;
- Youths' behavior towards adults improved;
- Youths felt that they could turn to the safe haven-ministation director and police officers for any type of assistance ranging from helping them with their homework to resolving family disputes.

A survey of youth who participated at the Flag House Courts safe haven-ministation showed improvement for the youth in many areas, but not to a statistically significant degree. Youth at the safe haven-ministation showed more improvement than youth at a comparison site in their ability to get their homework done on time, and their level of volunteer work. They also showed significantly more improvement than the youth at the comparison site by engaging in fewer anti-social behaviors. They reported significantly more decreases in drug and alcohol use and in engaging in disorderly conduct.

The involvement of the safe haven-ministation police officers had an impact in reducing crime, according to Flag House Courts residents, the officers, and local crime data. Although the dramatic drop in crime at Flag House Courts clearly is the result of the reduced population; there is
evidence that the safe haven-ministation made the neighborhood safer. Police officers began working at Flag House Courts as early as 1993, two years before the safe haven-ministation opened. Crime reports dropped at Flag House Courts in 1993 and 1995, followed by a slight rise in 1995. Then, in 1996, the first year of the safe haven-ministation, which opened at the end of 1995, crime reports increased dramatically and then began to drop again.

**Youth Outcomes**

The new safe haven-ministation director was able to develop six new activities that were consistent and occurred on a frequent basis; develop a collaborative relationship with the Tenant Council; recruit over ten volunteers and parents to assist in various tasks; and establish mentoring relationships with majority of the youth. The adult interviewees attributed his accomplishments to several factors, including his familiarity with the community since he grew up in the neighborhood; his ability to access community resources from within the neighborhood to recruit volunteers from different organizations (e.g., Mind, Heart, and Body; Sister to Sister; and R.O.O.T. Of); and his strong commitment to the youth in Flag House Courts.

The youths' reading skills and school performance improved according to the police officers, volunteers, and parents. According to one of the police officers, the safe haven-ministation staff members visited Lambard Middle School three times a week to talk to teachers about the Flag House Court youth. Their statement was supported by the 10 youth that were interviewed. They claimed that their grades improved as a result of the help they were getting at the safe haven-ministation. They said that otherwise, there was no one to help them at home. One youth stated that his grades went from 4 s and D s to 1 s and A s as a result of the safe haven-ministation s afterschool tutoring program.

On the other hand, the parents interviewed reported that some of the children's improved grades could be due to the change in teachers at the City Springs Elementary School during the last year. The change had a positive effect on the children's abilities. The parents agreed that for the other schools, the youth's improvements could be attributed to the safe haven-ministation. The youth that who interviewed were all in middle or high schools.

Seven youth also discussed their special relationship with the current safe haven-ministation director as someone they can talk to and ask for help with their homework. One youth stated that the safe haven-ministation director and sometimes the Boys and Girls Club unit director would calm him down when he got angry and helped him learn how to control his
temper. He described the safe haven-ministration as a place to go. The other youth nodded in agreement. The youth also stated that they felt comfortable going to the police officers when they experienced domestic violence. All the adult interviewees supported the youth's description by stating that one of the safe haven-ministration's major accomplishments was providing a safe place for the youth.

According to the youth, the safe haven-ministration taught them how to speak properly and respectfully to adults when they wanted something. A volunteer agreed that the youth have displayed better manners since the safe haven-ministration began. A parent reported that two of her children were out of hand and the safe haven-ministration director worked closely with them to improve their social skills. Another parent attributed his daughter's improved self-esteem to the safe haven-ministration's efforts. Three interviewees acknowledged that the safe haven-ministration provided positive role models for the children and youth. Two youth who were interviewed said that their perception of police officers improved.

A good example of the importance of the program is a sixteen-year-old youth who caught the attention of the staff at the safe haven-ministration because sometimes he would come to the safe haven and at other times he wouldn't. After a while, this youth just stopped coming altogether. After this youth dropped out of sight, the safe haven-ministration staff wondered about him. Soon thereafter, the youth appeared once again and this time, he was with his mother who was seeking help because her son was not attending school. After talking with the youth and meeting with his teachers, the safe haven-ministration staff found out that the youth had failed for the year. A decision was made that the youth might do well at a military academy. Upon completion, he would receive his GED and driver's license. The youth is now attending Military Youth Corps Freestate Challenge Academy in a 26-week course.

**Results of a youth survey.** Youth were interviewed at the safe haven-ministration at the beginning of their participation and again one year later. To see if positive youth outcomes could really be attributed to the safe haven-ministration program, youth were also interviewed at a comparison site without a safe haven-ministration at the same times as the youth at the safe haven-ministration were interviewed.

Youth who participated at the Flag House Courts safe haven-ministration showed improvement over the course of one year of participation in many areas, and improved more than a comparison group in some ways. Often, however, the improvements were not statistically significant, particularly the before and after measures (referred to in the Tables 30 and 31 as pre and post test) for the safe haven-ministration participants. The type of activities and structure of the program appeared to have an impact on the
type and degree of improvement demonstrated. The focus of the program was on recreational activities, which were intended to attract youth to participate. However, there was no definite strategy on how to get youth participating in recreational activities to participate in other activities.

**Differences between youth tested at the beginning of their program participation and youth tested after one year of participation.** The youth surveyed after one year of participation at the safe haven-ministration did not show statistically significant improvement over the course of the year, although in some areas they did show some improvement (see Table 30 for the significance of key measures). According to youth and parents interviewed during a site visit to Flag House Courts safe haven-ministration, grades were improving for participants. Survey results show that overall, self-reported grades were higher for the participants after one year of participation, but not at a statistically significant level. The same is true for getting homework done. Youth surveyed after a year of participation were more likely to get their homework done on time than they were before they joined the safe haven-ministration, but not statistically more likely.

The lack of measurable improvement in other areas may be a result of the nature of the activities at Flag House Courts safe haven-ministration, and of the transition at Flag House Courts itself, as residents moved out and vacant apartments were left behind. Some behaviors measured may not have been targeted by the safe haven-ministration activities. For example, a key component of change in other cities has been a distinct mentoring program at the safe haven-ministration. At Flag House Courts, most youth reported that the best thing about their safe haven-ministration is having fun. This is consistent with the site visit observation that recreational activities were the focus of the program (e.g., video games and field trips). The site visit also revealed that the mentoring program for safe haven-ministration youth was not really distinct from the overall Maryland Boys and Girls Club program. Most importantly, the mentoring program was not structured for one-on-one relationships, which build trust with adults, but on group activities.

A close look at the surveys revealed that in almost all areas survey scores showed some improvement for the youth after one year of participation, although the improvement in many cases is very minor. This means that for all youth surveyed, on average, behaviors improved. The survey results indicated the summary, or average, effect of the program on youth. Some individual youth may have improved markedly while others less so.

**Differences between youth surveyed at the safe haven-ministration and those surveyed at a comparison site.** The greatest differences occurred between youth who were at the safe haven-ministration for one year, and
youth surveyed at the same times at the comparison site at O Donnell Heights public housing development. The comparison group was matched for gender and age.

The youth who had participated at the safe haven-ministration for one year were better off than their comparison group counterparts on most measures. Table 31 shows in what ways the safe haven-ministration participants scored better than the comparison group at both survey times. Time 1 is at the beginning of the safe haven-ministration program and Time 2 is one year later. The final column on Table 6.3 indicates whether the youth who participated at the safe haven-ministration showed more improvement compared to the group surveyed earlier than did the comparison group.

The youth at the Flag House Courts safe haven-ministration significantly increased in their ability to get their homework done on time and their level of volunteer work compared to their counterparts at O Donnell Heights. The youth participating at the safe haven-ministration also showed more improvement than the youth at the comparison site on a number of anti-social behaviors. They reported significantly more decreases in:

- drug and alcohol use, and
- engaging in disorderly conduct

The safe haven-ministration youth improved more than the comparison youth, but not to a statistically significant level, in the following (see Table 31):

- self-esteem
- grades
- helping neighbors
- cleaning their neighborhood.

They were less likely, but not statistically significantly less likely:

- to engage in anti-social leadership
- carry a weapon
- damage property
- break into cars
One area in which the youth at the safe haven-ministation appear to do significantly worse than their comparison group counterparts is stealing. Because youth participating in the safe haven-ministation said they were unlikely to steal even before they joined the safe haven-ministation, and because they were less likely to steal than the comparison youth to begin with, they actually show statistically less improvement in stealing than the comparison group. This should not be misinterpreted to mean they steal more than the comparison group, or more than they used to. Actually, the safe haven-ministation youth reported very little stealing before they joined the safe haven-ministation, although it was not statistically significant, and they were no more likely to report stealing than the comparison youth. So, the comparison youth improved more than the safe haven-ministation youth, because they were much more likely to report stealing during the first survey (Time 1 on Table 31). The safe haven-ministation participants, overall, reported that they were very unlikely to steal at all.
# TABLE 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>P &lt; 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future outlook scale</td>
<td>Pretest</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisocial leadership scale</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug and alcohol use scale</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem/Self-efficacy scale</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43.33</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean your neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help neighbor</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get homework done on time</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do volunteer work</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of high school diploma</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry weapon</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage property</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break into car</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheat</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beat someone up</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearful traveling to and from school</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Controlling for age and gender
P values of <.05 are significant
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT MEASURE</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS WERE BETTER OR WORSE THAN THE COMPARISON GROUP AT:</th>
<th>DID THE PARTICIPANTS IMPROVE OR WORSEN COMPARED TO NON-PARTICIPANTS BETWEEN TIME 1 AND TIME 2?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TIME 1</td>
<td>TIME 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future outlook</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem/Self-efficacy</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not engaging in antisocial leadership</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not using drugs and alcohol</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get homework done on time</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean your neighborhood</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help neighbor</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do volunteer work</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not beat someone up</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not carry a weapon</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not steal</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not damage property</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not engage in disorderly conduct</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not break into car</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not cheat on tests</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not be fearful traveling to school</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Statistically significant Group 1 minus Group 2 difference, p < .05
What youth liked best about the safe haven-ministation program.
Most of the youth who participated in the safe haven-ministation activities valued a number of opportunities provided by the program (see Table 32). Fewer than 5 percent of the youth had nothing good to say about the program. Approximately two-thirds of the youth rated doing fun things and a place to be with friends highest.

At least half of the youth appreciated having a safe place to go, someone to go to for help and advice, getting help with school work, feeling better about themselves, and having a chance to visit colleges. More than half also liked having a chance to become a leader and help younger kids. A similar number valued the positive effects of the program on their community. Half of the participants liked activities to improve their neighborhood and bring the neighborhood together.

Only about one-third said that getting their parents involved or getting to know the police officers was one of the best things about the program, and that response helps interpret some of the findings from the youth surveys. Although the safe haven-ministation had many positive components, and had attracted new adult volunteers in the last year, forming strong relationships with adults and police mentoring were not strong features of the program.

There were several reasons that strong relationships did not occur to a larger degree. First, the program did not develop a strong relationship with the Tenants Council, which is the link to the residents and adult community. As a result, there were not enough links between the programs and adult residents at Flag House Courts. Secondly, there was a high staff turnover within the program, and a good program director was hired within the last few months. Thirdly, the safe haven-ministation took a deliberate approach to having only one of the two police officers develop relationships with youth, while the other focused on traditional police work.
Youth suggestions for improving the safe haven-minestation program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth suggestions</th>
<th>Percent who selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doing fun things after school</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a place to go to be with my friends</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping me become a leader</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a place where I can go and feel safe</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving me a chance to visit colleges</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to help younger kids</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having someone I can go to for help and advice</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting help with my school work</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping me feel better about myself</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having activities that make my neighborhood better and look nice</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing the people in my neighborhood together</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having other people from outside the safe haven-minestation come to</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going on trips, like concerts, hiking trips, and youth conferences</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having my parents involved in the safe haven-minestation program</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting to know the safe haven-minestation police officers</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is nothing good about the safe haven-minestation program</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the youth surveyed were able to recommend improvements to the safe haven-minestation program (see Table 33). Eighty-eight percent said they would like to see it open for longer hours. However, staffing and organizational issues prevented the safe haven-minestation from staying open more. Almost three-quarters would like to have more fun things to do after school. The recreational component of the program clearly appealed to the youth, who would like to see even more of it. However, many youth commented on the need for other components as well. Over 69 percent would like to go on more educational trips and almost as many (65 percent) would like to have more chances to learn about college and to have more adults come to the safe haven-minestation to speak.

Half said they would like to have more people to talk to about their problems and more people to help them with school work. This is consistent with their desire to have more adults, such as their parents get
involved in the program. More than half of the youth would also like more opportunities to be a leader and to help the neighborhood. While half of the youth said they liked being able to feel better about themselves, two-thirds sought more such opportunities.

These recommendations for improvement seem to be a response to both the strengths and weaknesses of the program. Most youth did report having fun, helping their neighborhood, and chances to become a leader, and to help younger kids. They also reported they would like more of these things. On the other hand, a relatively small percentage of youth reported involvement by parents, getting to really know the police officers, or having outside speakers. They recommend more contact with adults and more educational opportunities.

| TABLE 33 |
|------------------|-----------------|
| BALTIMORE | Percent who selected |
| Have the safe haven-ministation open for longer hours | 88 |
| Having more fun things to do after school | 74.4 |
| Going on more educational trips | 69.3 |
| Having more chances to do things that make me feel good about myself, like helping little kids | 65.1 |
| Having more chances to learn about college and to listen to adults outside the safe-haven-ministation (i.e., college students, mayor) | 65.1 |
| Having more chances to be a leader | 58.1 |
| Having more adults, like parents, get involved in the program | 53.5 |
| Do more things to help my neighborhood | 53.8 |
| Have more people to talk to me bout my problems | 51.2 |
| Have more people to help me with my schoolwork | 48.8 |
| Have more police officers to make my neighborhood safer | 39.5 |
| I would not change the program | 18.6 |
| I don’t know | 11.6 |
Community-wide Crime and Drug Outcomes

All the interviewees reported that the safe haven-ministation provided an avenue for the police officers to participate more intensively in community affairs and to strengthen their relationships with the residents and youth. As a result, the police officers were able to eliminate loitering and drug activities at each corner of Flag House Courts, which was once a common sight. Now, one could actually see children playing at those corners. Parents said that they no longer have to look over their shoulders when they go to the local stores. One of the police officers believed that they have earned the trust and respect of the residents as a result of their community equity policing efforts. He always gave out his pager number readily. The officer works at a local store and sometimes brought clothing or toys for the children. This gesture showed the parents that he really cared about the community. He recalled one incident when residents refused to talk to a detective that was investigating a shooting near Flag House Courts. An eyewitness told the officer to contact her and gave the information to him. The Boys and Girls Club unit director described also how a youth that was being beaten up on the school bus had run to the safe haven-ministation and waited until a police officer came to report the incident.

Three adult interviewees reported that the presence of the police officers at the schools when the children and youth were getting out of school provided a safe passage from the schools to Flag House Courts. The police officers described how they had to break up fights after schools when they first started the chaperoning service. The police officers were contacted directly by the schools because it was the Flag House Courts youth that were causing trouble.

The police officers reported that as time went by, they dealt more and more with family disputes and less with violent crimes (e.g., rapes, homicides, and shootings). Their report was supported by the youth who were interviewed who stated that they go to the police officers whenever they had family problems. One of the officers described how he refused to let a youth participate in a field trip because he disrespected his mother. During the second site visit, the evaluation team observed the police officer facilitate an argument between two mothers complaining about each other's child.

In general, the police officers indicated that the housing development has become a safer place since the safe haven-ministation. There have been decreasing instances of serious assaults and violence against the youth. One police officer stated that a few years ago, he was sure that he would be shot whenever he entered a building.
According to the police officers, the safe haven-ministation's existence enabled the parents to see the police officers as concerned civilians who were part of the safe haven-ministation and not as police officers. This helped strengthen their relationships with the parents. One police officer reported that not conducting police business in the safe haven-ministation and hanging around in the neighborhood when he was in civilian clothes helped downplay the police image and win the residents trust.

The involvement of the safe haven-ministation police officers had an impact in reducing crime, according to Flag House Courts residents, the officers, and local crime data. However, it is necessary to supplement crime statistics with the experiences of the officers and residents because Flag House Courts began to be demolished in 1996, reducing the population and increasing the number of vacant apartments. Table 34 and Figure 21 both show a marked decrease in Index crime in Baltimore after 1996, the first year the safe haven-ministation was open. However, families began to be moved out of Flag House Courts in 1996, and by 1998, fewer than half of the development's units were occupied. By the end of 1999, all residents were scheduled to be relocated, and renovation under the Department of Housing and Urban Development's HOPE VI was to begin by 2000. The process appears to be delayed, leaving remaining residents in a deserted development with a lot of disrepair.

Although the dramatic drop in crime at Flag House Courts clearly is the result of the reduced population; there is evidence that the safe haven-ministation made the neighborhood safer. Police officers began working at Flag House Courts as early as 1993, two years before the safe haven-ministation opened. Figure 21 shows that after a rise in Index crime in 1992, Index crime dropped at Flag House Courts in 1993 and 1994, followed by a slight rise in 1995. Then, in 1996, the first year of the safe haven-ministation, which opened at the end of 1995, crime reports increased dramatically and then began to drop again. Figure 22 shows the decrease in crime at Flag House Courts and the comparison area of O'Donnell Heights after the first year of program operation in 1996. Figure 21 also compares the number of reported crimes at Flag House Courts with the number of reported crimes at the comparison area however, the precipitous drop shown for 1997 and 1998 occurred in the context of the demolition of the housing and the relocation of families.

The increase in Index crime in 1996 follows the theoretical framework presented in the Introduction to Part II, when police officers gain the trust of the community and actively seek community involvement, the increase in engagement of local residents resulted in a rise in the number of crimes they reported. Index crime then dropped sharply. This confirms the increase-and-then-decline hypothesis.
Table 34

NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD, AND THEIR SURROUNDING PRECINCT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>173.5</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
<td>254.75</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrounding Precinct</td>
<td>12,301</td>
<td>12,637</td>
<td>8855*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>82,572</td>
<td>87,546</td>
<td>75,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target and Comparison Neighborhoods</td>
<td>11,872</td>
<td>12,184</td>
<td>8,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>70,271</td>
<td>74,909</td>
<td>66,189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHANGE FROM PRE-PROGRAM YEARS TO BASE YEAR

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
<td>-25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHANGE BETWEEN BASE AND PROGRAM YEARS AVERAGE

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood**</td>
<td>-73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target and Comparison Neighborhoods</td>
<td>-29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>-11.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Precinct data is for 1998 only 1997 unavailable
** Target neighborhood experienced significant loss of housing units in 1997 and 1998

Source: Baltimore Police Department

(Note: no crime data available for the precinct for 1997, therefore lines representing precinct and city minus precinct are interrupted between 1996 and 1998.) (Note: no crime data available for the precinct for 1997, therefore lines representing precinct and city minus precinct are interrupted between 1996 and 1998.)

FIGURE 21

201
Other Community-Wide Outcomes

Based on the information provided by the interviewees, it did not appear that the safe haven-ministation had any other impact on the larger community. Its major effects were on the youth and the safety of the neighborhood, as described above. This was most probably due to the lack of organization during the first two years and the transient nature of Flag House Courts.

The Most Likely Explanations for These Outcomes

The Baltimore Police Department conducts a Police Athletic League program. One of the police officers for the safe haven-ministation participates in the program. According to the Boys and Girls Club’s unit director, while the Police Athletic League program also works with youth, it does not support the more comprehensive youth development approach used by the safe haven-ministation model. This police officer’s participation in the Police Athletic League program enhanced his capacity to serve as a mentor for the youth in Flag House Courts. As a result of his positive relationships with the youth, the youth were more likely to talk to him about their problems and any undesirable activities going on in the neighborhood. In contrast, the second police officer played the role of an enforcer. This strategy that the safe haven-ministation implemented worked well to help decrease crime, while enabling youth to perceive police officers in a more positive way.

The Boys and Girls Club served the needs of all the youth. As a result of the safe haven-ministation’s initial struggles in identifying an appropriate leader who could recruit more volunteers or mentors, the safe haven-ministation itself did not have the capacity to focus intensively on a smaller group of youth. It appears that the specific activities of helping youth with homework and getting more individual attention on school work benefited the youth at the safe haven-ministation, as evidenced in their improved school performance.

The effect of the presence of the police officers followed our Chapter 2 hypothesis of Index crime increase-and-then-decrease. According to the experiences of the residents and staff, many of the decreases are attributable to the efforts of the police, however the demolition of the housing units is largely responsible for the dramatic continued decrease in crime reports.

Lessons Learned

At a very basic level, the Flag House Courts safe haven-ministation did indeed have the core components of an effective safe haven-ministation.
During the last year in comparison to previous years, the safe haven-ministation had a director who was committed to the community and its youth, and, with the trust and support of the Tenant Council, was able to develop activities and establish a structured environment. Volunteers from within the surrounding area were available. Parents also volunteered for various tasks, from tutoring to opening the safe haven-ministation office.

The safe haven-ministation and Boys and Girls Club have different strengths and goals. According to the parents, both organizations are essential to the development of youth, but the safe haven-ministation was a better model for working with older youth. The safe haven-ministation program provided structure and leadership development opportunities. It also had a better capacity for working more intensively with older youth, who required more guidance and discipline.

According to some of the interviewees, the safe haven-ministation enhanced the Boys and Girls Club’s capacity by providing more activities and focused attention on the more troubled youth. In contrast, the Boys and Girls Club provided additional recreational space for the safe haven-ministation. The safe haven-ministation provided an excellent venue for adult and youth residents to get to know the police officers and develop a positive perception of them. The Boys and Girls Club’s unit director felt that the safe haven-ministation’s separate location enabled it to have an identity independent of the Club. Based on the interviewees responses and the evaluation team’s observations, the separation was advantageous in creating an independent image of the safe haven-ministation. However, the inconsistent and ambiguous relationship and staffing responsibilities between the safe haven-ministation and the Boys and Girls Club created barriers for developing and implementing activities. The staff turnover in the director position delayed the safe haven-ministation process.

All the interviewees reported that the safe haven-ministation’s success during the last year can not only be attributed to the safe haven-ministation director’s knowledge and skills in working with youth, but the fact that he was raised in Flag House Courts. As a result, it took less time for the residents to trust him.

There were many territorial issues during the start-up of the safe haven-ministation program among the initial partners due to each partner’s lack of experience in working with one another and across each other’s area of expertise.

The biggest challenge for the safe haven-ministation will be whether it can sustain itself without the support of the Boys and Girls Club. It was apparent during the interviews that the Boys and Girls Club had no plans for maintaining the current safe haven-ministation as it was. The adult
Interviewees and safe haven-ministration staff members were unclear about the future directions for the safe haven-ministration. The Boys and Girls Club unit director intimidated that the Boys and Girls Club intends to maintain the basic safe haven-ministration program model, but it will be integrated into the upcoming Teen Center. Based on the information collected by the evaluation team, it will be questionable whether the Boys and Girls Club or the unit director will be able to discern and cultivate positive agents of change in the Flag House Courts community under the current Maryland Boys and Girls Club administration.

**How Did the Programs Continue?**

All funding provided by HUD via the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation for the replication ended in Flag House Courts in August 1998. However, the other partners - the Baltimore City Police Department, the Baltimore Public Housing Authority, and the Maryland Boys and Girls Club - remained in place to continue programming for youth.

The Maryland Boys and Girls Club assigned the civilian director at the Flag House Courts safe haven-ministration the responsibility for continuing operation of the program, but modified the program slightly. The Maryland Boys and Girls Club changed the name of the program to safe haven-ministration Teen Center, added a program called Goals for Growth and expanded the age group served to nineteen.

The Maryland Boys and Girls Club also expanded the program space by combining the existing space with a vacant two-bedroom apartment, resulting in an eight-room safe haven site. Recognizing the value of the evaluation process, the Maryland Boys and Girls Club instituted the evaluation at all of its sites throughout Baltimore. The main difference to the program was the loss of the police officer, who was recalled to other duties six months after program funding ended. The Housing Authority police officer is still assigned to the safe haven-ministration. Also, the safe haven-ministration director is now only part time.

The Maryland Boys and Girls Club applied for new funding sources to keep the program running, and has received a twelve month grant from the national office of the Boys and Girls Club and a grant from the Bureau of Justice Administration to operate a summer program at the safe haven-ministration Teen Center. The vision for the newly named safe haven-ministration Teen Center remains the same as it was for the safe haven-ministration, and the Maryland Boys and Girls Club continues to seek funding. At present, staffing and training are underfunded, and the program is not yet at an optimal level.
Flag House Courts will be a transient community for at least another year. It is scheduled to be torn down by late 1999 and early 2000, and new construction will occur shortly thereafter. A new and bigger Boys and Girls Club facility will be built in another location. It will serve the needs of youth that will reside in Flag House Courts and the surrounding community.
10. The Tomberlin Community Development Center and the Little Rock Police

Summary

The safe haven-minestation program at Hollinsworth Grove, a public housing development located in east Little Rock, began in 1995 with commitment from the Tomberlin Community Development Center, the Little Rock Housing Authority, and the Little Rock Police Department. The program overcame a very difficult beginning and has changed its perception in the community "from a threat to a resource," according to the program director. In terms of capacity, the program staff increased their knowledge and skills in working with the Hollinsworth Grove community. According to the safe haven-minestation program staff, this allowed for increased volunteer involvement and better community relations, and partners and resources have increased since the beginning of the program.

The program's core activities were community equity policing, mentoring, after-school tutoring, and recreational activities that also provided educational opportunities. Mentoring, after-school tutoring, and activities occurred on a regular schedule, but in a loosely structured form. One of the activities that safe haven-minestation members are most proud of included community service. The youth helped the elderly and improved their relations between the youth and the senior residents of Hollinsworth Grove.

The program succeeded in reducing crime in the neighborhood substantially, but was less successful in building a rapport with the community. The police officers reported that they did not initially have the support of the police department, and there were hostilities early on in the program between residents and safe haven-minestation staff that had long term negative effects on the perception of the community by the police officers.

The safe haven-minestation staff made several improvements to the program over time. The program director and a police officer reported significant improvement in youths' behavior and school achievement. These changes in the youths' behavior and school achievement were verified by ministation staff and the youth participants themselves. The safe haven-minestation staff were not able to administer the questionnaires for the youth outcome surveys and therefore no independent assessment of youth outcomes are available.

The program funding ended in September 1998 and the program became greatly reduced after that. Currently, the site still has an after-school
program, but police presence has been diminished significantly. New resources and a new focus for the program to attract funding are being considered.

**Where Was the Replication Located?**

Hollinsworth Grove is a public housing development located in east Little Rock. It contains 425 one-story units and has a population of 140 families with an average of 3 children per family. Approximately 70 percent of the adult population is single mothers in their late teens or early twenties. According to the residents that were interviewed by the evaluation team during a site visit, the community is isolated from the rest of the city. The residents tend to keep to themselves and were generally reluctant to engage in any community activities. Further, east Little Rock had a reputation of being crime-infested and was considered an unsafe place for youth and adults. One dominant gang was reported to be in the area. There is a curfew for youth under 18 years old. On weekdays, the curfew is from 10 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. and on weekends, the curfew is from 12:00 a.m. until 5:00 a.m.

The safe haven-ministation is located in one of the corner units. The space contains offices for the safe haven-ministation director and an open area for youth activities. A reception desk is located right by the door of the safe haven-ministation.

**How Much Was Spent and What Activities Were Carried out in the Replication?**

**Funding Levels**

The safe haven-ministation program began in September 1995 with the commitment of resources from national and local organizations. The Eisenhower Foundation provided $44,275 in the first year of the program, combining funds from the Center for Global Partnership and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Eisenhower Foundation continued to channel funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Years 2 and 3, providing $32,000 and $34,000 in each of these years, respectively. (Table 34.)

The safe haven-ministation also received in-kind contributions from the Little Rock Police Department and other local agencies that included salaries, youth advocate, supplies, furnishings, computer, copier, air conditioning unit, utilities, and space. The total value of in-kind contributions was $120,653 in Year 1, $120,653 in Year 2 and $120,652 in Year 3.
The program director position was supported by the Eisenhower Foundation. The Little Rock Police Department provided 2 police officers who were responsible for the public housing development. The Housing Authority provided a unit within Hollinsworth Grove for the safe haven-ministration. The local sponsoring community organization was the Tomberlin Community Development Center, which provided additional space at the Center for program activities. The Bethesda Baptist Church, where the program director also was a pastor, provided vans to transport the youth on field trips within the community and between the Community Development Center and Hollinsworth Grove. (The Community Development Center was located about a 5- to 10-minute drive from the safe haven-ministration).

Table 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1 9/95-8/96</th>
<th>Year 2 9/96-8/97</th>
<th>Year 3 9/97-8/98</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRANTS VIA THE EISENHOWER FOUNDATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$44,275$$^{1}$</td>
<td>$32,000$$^{2}$</td>
<td>$34,000$$^{3}$</td>
<td>$110,275$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL IN-KIND</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$120,653$$^{4}$</td>
<td>$120,652$</td>
<td>$120,652$</td>
<td>$361,957$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$164,928$</td>
<td>$152,652$</td>
<td>$154,652$</td>
<td>$472,232$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This figure includes $30,000 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as $14,275 from the Center for Global Partnership.

$^{1}$This figure represents HUD funding only.

$^{2}$This figure represents HUD funding only.

$^{3}$The local in-kind figures refer to in-kind services from the local police department and other local agencies that include salaries, youth advocate, supplies, furnishing, computer, copier, AC unit, utilities, and space.

**Replication Activities**

**The Program In A Nutshell.** The safe haven ministration was established in September 1995 in Hollinsworth Grove. Its initial local partners were the Tomberlin Community Development Center, the Little Rock Housing Authority, and the Little Rock Police Department.

The program overcame a very difficult beginning and has changed its perception in the community "from a threat to a resource," according to the safe haven-ministration program director. Some community residents had perceived the safe haven-ministration to be initially a threat because
they felt that the police officers were being nosy and wanted to know about their personal business, according to interviewees from Hollinsworth Grove. When the evaluation team visited the safe haven-ministration site in 1997, the state of relations between the safe haven-ministration and community was poor. In terms of capacity, the program staff felt that they increased their knowledge and skills in working with the Hollinsworth Grove community. This eventually allowed for increased volunteer involvement, increased number of partners, increased resources, and better relations during the last year of the program.

The program's core activities were community equity policing, mentoring, after-school tutoring, and recreational activities that provided educational opportunities. Mentoring, after-school tutoring, and other activities were provided on a regular schedule. The safe haven-ministration program director reported difficulties in recruiting adult mentors from within the community because he felt that they were not appropriate role models for the youth. Therefore, he felt that the need to reach out beyond the Hollinsworth Grove community to recruit mentors. During a visit to the site in 1997, the evaluation team observed that the mentors available were limited to staff of the Tomberlin Community Development Center. Youth also participated in community service activities, which were geared primarily toward helping the elderly and which helped to improve relations between the youth and the senior residents of Hollinsworth Grove.

**Youth Development.** The safe haven-ministration provided mentoring, after-school tutoring and recreational activities that also provided educational opportunities for the youth. Activities for the youth also occurred at the Tomberlin Community Development Center. These activities at the Center were open to both the youth from Hollinsworth Grove as well as youth from other neighborhoods in Little Rock. On the other hand, activities at the safe haven-ministration were limited only to Hollinsworth Grove youth. The safe haven-ministration office was open all day and sometimes until 8:00 p.m. for afterschool activities.

There were approximately 45 to 60 youth that took advantage of activities at the safe haven-ministration. According to the safe haven-ministration program director, a core of about 25 youth participated in mentoring activities on a consistent basis. The safe haven-ministration did not have a structured mentoring program. There were no specific activities that mentors did with their mentees. Adults that served as mentors (i.e., the director, police officers, and staff members of the Tomberlin Community Development Center) were available for the youth whenever needed.

After-school tutoring activities occurred at the safe haven-ministration. Teachers from the school district as well as members of the program staff
served as tutors to approximately 10 kids who came for about one hour every day.

Other activities for the safe haven-ministration included a computer lab (about 25 children used it on Wednesdays and Fridays); a mobile library which includes computers with internet access as well as books (used by a core group of about 9 kids every Wednesday); basketball and softball teams; field trips to museums, movies, other parts of Little Rock to provide a familiarity with the entire city; and talks regarding alcohol and drug abuse. Youth in the program also participated in community services like cleaning homes and yards, and assisting with picking up medication. The director feels this helped to reduce the fear and improved relations among the youth and the elderly of the community.

The formation of additional partnerships provided the program with additional funds, use of facilities, or human resources for certain activities. The Little Rock Athletic Club provided liberal use of their facilities for program activities. The University of Arkansas provided computer training for the program's youth and offered a pool of college students that could serve as mentors. As mentioned before, the Bethesda Baptist Church provided transportation services. The Family Youth Services Agency provided GED training, counseling, and parent education to the parents in Hollinsworth Grove. They have helped eight parents from the community in the past three years and all had positive results. In addition, the Little Rock Junior League of Women recently made a five-year commitment, which includes a $100,000 grant and 22 volunteers. The Department of Human Services, described as the "backbone" of the program by the director, has contributed $400,000 toward a child care center (located across the street from the Tomberlin Community Center), the hiring of community teenagers to mentor youth, and a food program. Finally, because of the safe haven-ministration's efforts, the Little Rock School District awarded the program a "Partners in Education" plaque.

**Community Equity Policing.** The police officers at the safe haven ministration were previously responsible for staffing the Alert Center in the neighborhood surrounding Hollinsworth Grove. The city of Little Rock funds approximately 8 Alert Centers across the city. Each Center serves as "informational and resource booths" for residents in the surrounding neighborhoods. Consequently, one of the safe haven-ministration police officers was already familiar with the residents of Hollinsworth Grove. They also completed the training provided by the Community Officer Policing Program (COPP).

Despite the officers' previous knowledge, it was a gradual process for them to adapt to the community and their roles, as well. The officer interviewed stated that, at first, he was in what he described as "arrest
mode." Another police officer felt that in order to make the neighborhood a safer place, their first task was to be in that mode to demonstrate to the residents that they would not stand for any unlawful activities.

When the Foundation's evaluation team visited the safe haven-ministation slightly more than a year after its inception, there was a great deal of tension between the community and the safe haven-ministation. The staff felt they were doing the best for the youth of the community and didn't understand why the parents (especially the single mothers) were reluctant to get involved with the safe haven-ministation. Staff reported that some of the parents reprimand their children for speaking to or acting friendly toward the police officers. The staff attributed the hostility to some of the parents' involvement in drug activities and therefore, not wanting their children "snitching." Other interviewees said the residents felt the safe haven-ministation staff was too "nosy." The police officers stated that they were not surprised by the parents' attitudes because Hollinsworth Grove had been a low-income, high-crime community, and that it should be expected that any program affiliated with the police would get a poor reception.

One of the police officers described the gradual change in his attitude and approach. He had initially placed the emphasis on his job as a law enforcer. He learned that, to successfully reach the residents, he had to also focus on communication and talking to people "human to human." In addition, rather than just arresting delinquent youth, he would speak to their parents. These activities, along with the outreach discussed above (e.g. helping with jobs), helped to get the people to see the officer as part of the community and not a threat. He boasts that 75 to 80 families have signed a petition to have him returned to the development after the Little Rock Police Department expanded the police officers' duties to a larger geographic area and the officers reverted to operating out of an Alert Center again.

Another difficulty that had to be overcome for the police officers was their lack of support, initially, from the police department. They said that their peers had viewed them as "babysitters." In the most recent interview, the officer said that he felt that his peers eventually changed their attitudes about the program when they saw that it was effective.

Another police officer who was selected to be a part of the safe haven-ministation found it hard to temper her hard line toward police duties by showing more compassion and working toward trying to establish positive dialogue with the residents. She regularly thought that the problems the community had would take time, resources, and patience. The Eisenhower Foundation program director was concerned that the officer would not work well for the safe haven-ministation and that he would have to go
back to the Chief of Police for another police officer. The Eisenhower Foundation program director reported that as the police officer began to see positive things happen with some of the youth and as she witnessed some of the parents whom she originally felt did not care come and ask for help or volunteer their services, her attitude changed. She even established a number of programs for the young girls and developed relationships with a number of parents, according to the Eisenhower Foundation program director.

**How Was the Replication Managed and How Were Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?**

**Management**

The safe haven-minestation program began in September 1995 with the commitment of resources from national and local organizations. The program director position was supported by the Eisenhower Foundation in partnership with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development department. The Little Rock Police Department provided for 2 police officers who were responsible for the public housing development. The Housing Authority provided a unit within Hollinsworth Grove for the safe haven-minestation. The local sponsoring community organization, the Tomberlin Community Development Center, provided additional space for program activities. The Bethesda Baptist Church, where the program director was a pastor, provided vans to transport the youth.

The structure of the program was developed by the initial partners (i.e., Tomberlin Community Development Center, Little Rock Housing Authority, and Little Rock Police Department) and the Eisenhower Foundation. The program should consist of 4 major components: community equity policing, mentoring, after-school tutoring, and recreational activities. Due to the proximity of the Tomberlin Community Development Center (about a 5- to 10-minute drive between the 2) and the safe haven-minestation and the director's involvement in both programs, there was some confusion about children's participation across the programs. The director reported that both sites were open to all children living in Hollinsworth Grove and that the same children utilize both programs. The police officer interviewed thought that there was almost no overlap, that the kids who used one program did not participate in the other. The director's report was consistent with the findings of the evaluation team during a site visit to the safe haven-minestation.

The safe haven-minestation staff included the program director and two community police officers. The safe haven-minestation director also served as the executive director of the Tomberlin Community Development Center. As a result, he utilized the Community Center's staff
to assist in organizing and coordinating activities for the safe haven-ministation youth. He was responsible for managing the daily activities, mobilizing and allocating additional resources, and supervising staff. The two police officers were primarily responsible for maintaining the safety of Hollinsworth Grove and other community equity policing activities. The director played a very visible role and all the staff members and police officers reported directly to him.

The Tomberlin Community Development Center's Board of Directors also served as the advisory board for the safe haven-ministation program. The program director described a youth advisory council of approximately 20 youth in their middle to late teens from Hollinsworth Grove and other neighborhoods in Little Rock that supported the safe haven-ministation activities. The evaluation team was unable to confirm the existence of the council with the youth that were interviewed during a site visit, nor was the team able to obtain any archival documents that supported its existence.

The program director reported that the process of building the safe haven-ministation's capacity by mobilizing funds and seeking support from organizations, particularly public agencies, taught him a great deal about the city's political structure. The weak support from the city forced him to reach out further to acquire additional resources from private organizations, and as a result increased its capacity to work collaboratively with other groups that included the Little Rock Junior League of Women, the Little Rock Athletic Club, the University of Arkansas Little Rock, the Little Rock School District, Bethesda Baptist Church, AmeriCorp, Johnson Companies, Family Youth Services Agency and the Department of Human Services. These partners provide funds, facilities for recreational activities and speakers. The director noted that due to the uniqueness of the police officers' being part of the program and the backing of a national foundation such as the Eisenhower Foundation, he was able to leverage resources he would not have been able to otherwise.

**Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training**

The safe haven-ministation staff received technical assistance and training from the Eisenhower Foundation through several methods: workshops that covered issues such as program planning, youth development, grant writing, staff development, media planning and continuation planning; site visits from the evaluation staff that provided opportunities for the safe haven-ministation to get advice on ways to monitor the program and progress of the youth; regular telephone calls with the Eisenhower Foundation program director to address issues and trouble-shoot; and assistance in submitting proposals to foundations and government agencies and to leverage local funds. The safe haven-ministation hosted
one of the Foundation's workshops in Little Rock. As a result, participants from other safe haven-ministations had the opportunity to visit the safe haven and observe how it is operated.

The Eisenhower Foundation program staff felt that the Foundation played an essential role in assisting the safe haven-ministation during its planning of the grand opening event for the safe haven. The mayor, the police chief and the president of the Foundation all spoke, were interviewed by electronic and print media, toured the development and demonstrated public and private unity. Little Rock was the only site where both the mayor and the police chief came to the grand opening. The Foundation helped the safe haven director plan the media for this event which mobilized very large numbers of youth, public housing residents, government officials, police department staff, and others.

Through its technical assistance and workshops the Foundation also helped the safe haven-ministation develop a detailed plan for garnering media coverage, which resulted in several newspaper articles and television stories about the grand opening event and the safe haven-ministation. According to the Foundation's program staff, the safe haven-ministation benefited from the technical assistance that helped them identify and train police officers appropriate for the safe haven-ministation. As described previously, the Foundation's evaluation team learned that while the technical assistance was helpful, the police officers continued to struggle with gaining the community's trust.

The site selection process in Little Rock proved to be complicated. A local government agency in Little Rock sought to be the lead organization for the replication. This conflicted with the Foundation's requirement that a non-profit youth or community development organization fill that role. Still eager to be part of the initiative, the Little Rock government and police identified what they saw as a suitable nonprofit organization. The Foundation accepted this choice. However, throughout the program, there were tensions between the city agency that wanted to be the lead agency and the nonprofit selected to fill a void.

In addition to the above technical assistance, the Foundation's program and evaluation staff suggested strategies that would help the safe haven-ministation build a sense of community in Hollinsworth Grove and develop stronger relations with residents. The safe haven-ministation director found the suggestions helpful, but there was no evidence that the strategies were implemented.

The program director also failed to comply with the requirements of the youth survey (below). In retrospect, the Foundation evaluation technical
assistance staff probably needed to provide more help and consider taking over the data collection.

What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?

Principal Findings

Staff interviewed at the safe haven-ministration reported many positive changes for the youth. They particularly felt that problems with school improved and that good relationships were formed with adults. It appeared that some youth with serious problems benefited from their participation at the safe haven-ministration. However, there is not a great deal of evidence, beyond the process information collected from staff interviews, on which to base solid conclusions about the effectiveness of this program. The safe haven-ministration staff were unable to properly implement the youth surveys even with the assistance of the Foundation's evaluation and program staff. Initially, the director adequately administered questionnaires and returned them to the Foundation. The Foundation received from the staff of the safe haven-ministration staff surveys that did not meet the evaluation guidelines during the post test survey of youth. The director eventually did not respond to the Foundation's attempts to correct the surveys or collect the agreed upon additional information. See Appendix 2 for a description of data collection and analysis issues.

Interviews with staff and other informants revealed that the community originally had little trust in the program and, often, strongly discouraged their children from participating in it. It was a long process and took great persistence on the part of the staff. According to the safe haven-ministration director, their efforts eventually paid off and they earned the trust of the community.

According to all the interviewees, Hollinsworth Grove prior to the safe haven-ministration experienced very little sense of community, high crime, and was characterized by fear for the adults of the community. Official crime reports confirmed the opinions of those interviewed -- the Hollinsworth Grove safe haven-ministration definitely contributed to a decrease in crime in the neighborhood. Crime in the safe haven-ministration neighborhood was 27 percent lower in 1995, when the safe haven-ministration opened, than it was in 1993 and 1994, and remained at approximately the same level through 1998.

Youth Outcomes

As mentioned before, any outcomes that are described here were based on information provided by informants during interviews with the evaluation team. Participants in the interviews reported that the safe haven-
ministration had positive impacts on the youth in terms of their educational attainment, behavior, and relationships with adults beyond their immediate families.

The director said that 9 children in the program had been expelled from school at the start of the program, but 7 of them have returned since. Of the children who regularly participated in the tutoring and computer lab programs, the director reported that their grade point averages increased from a pre-program average of 1.85 to about 2.9 now.

Both the director and the police officer described the youth at Hollinsworth Grove as being out of control at the beginning of the program. They were doing "anything and everything." The behavior of the youth has changed since the program began for several reasons. Among the strategies that created positive changes was a zero tolerance curfew during school hours. School-age children were not allowed to be outside their home if they were not in school. This policy was strictly enforced. The program and especially the police presence made it clear that certain behaviors would not be tolerated in the neighborhood and they feel largely successful in reducing those behaviors.

At first, only the younger children were forming positive relationships with the police officers. Staff reported that eventually, the program broke through to the older youth and they feel that positive relationships were formed on this level, as well. Primary factors in this transformation were gaining the trust of the parents who had been discouraging their children from socializing with the police and the successful recruitment of a former gang leader into the program.

The positive outcomes were not easily achieved. The community originally had little trust in the program and, often, strongly discouraged their children from participating in it. It was a long process that required great persistence on the part of the staff.

Community-Wide Crime and Drug Outcomes

The community has become safer according to those interviewed. While the community had been dominated by crime before, it is now a place where seniors can sit outside and young children can play in much greater comfort and less fear.

According to all the interviewees, Hollinsworth Grove prior to the safe haven-ministration experienced very little sense of community, high crime, and was characterized by fear in the adults of the community. Truant children were engaged in delinquent activities around the development.
Loud music was constantly being played and adults did not feel comfortable outside their apartments.

Much of this has changed, according to those interviewed. Residents feel more safe and welcome to be out of their homes and walk through the community. The interviewees reported a great increase in sense of community now.

The staff also spoke of the residents gradually seeing the positive results of the presence of the program such as the reduced crime and the police officers helping in other areas. These include taking kids to school when they missed the bus, helping parents find jobs, etc. They stressed the importance of persistence, which eventually wins the approval of the community. The police officer said that crime has increased since he was removed last September, even though there is no crime data that confirms his statement. He is upset by his relocation and feels that crime would fall back down if he were reassigned to the safe haven-ministration.

Official Index crime reports confirm the reports of those interviewed that Hollinsworth Grove safe haven-ministration definitely contributed to a decrease in crime in the neighborhood. Index crime in the safe haven-ministration neighborhood was 27.6 percent lower in 1995, when the safe haven-ministration opened, than it was in 1993 and 1994, and remained at approximately the same level through 1998 (see Table 35). This was a slightly larger decrease than that which occurred in the comparison neighborhood, and slightly greater than citywide changes.

As can be seen in Figure 24, crime was on the rise in the Hollinsworth Grove community between 1993 and 1994, and dropped dramatically during the first year of the safe haven-ministration in 1995. Residents interviewed at Hollinsworth Grove said that certain criminal activities had declined dramatically. Adults, especially senior residents, reported feeling safer in the neighborhood. Loitering, loud music playing, and other delinquent behavior, which dominated Hollinsworth Grove prior to the program, were reported almost eliminated. Youth truancy and delinquency during school hours were dramatically reduced according to those interviewed.

The immediate decrease in crime when the safe haven-ministration opened does not follow the hypothesis in Chapter 2 of an initial increase in crime reports at the start of the program, followed by decreases in subsequent years. Figure 25 shows that crime reports did not go down significantly from the base year (program start) of 1995 to the next years.

This can be explained by looking at the safe haven-ministration program at Hollinsworth Grove more closely. At this site, the police did not really
practice "community equity policing" until, at least, a year into the program. They reported that they did finally change their ways and switched from "zero tolerance" "arrest mode" to a communicator and helper role that also included law enforcement. Therefore, the basis for an initial increase in crime reports, which is the engagement and trust of the community, did not occur at this site at the start of the program, and only developed gradually, if at all.

After the police officers left the safe haven-ministration in September 1998, crime began to rise again, and as Figure 24 shows, 1998 is the first year since the safe haven-ministration opened to begin to show crime increasing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>171.5</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>27,571.5</td>
<td>21,525</td>
<td>20,588.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE FROM PRE-PROGRAM YEARS TO BASE YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE BETWEEN BASE YEAR AND PROGRAM YEARS AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Precinct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Little Rock Police Department
## TABLE 24

**MEMPHIS**

"**WHAT ARE SOME OF THE BEST THINGS ABOUT THE PROGRAM?**"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Percent who selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having someone I can go to for help and advice</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going on trips, like concerts, hiking trips, and youth conferences</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting to know the safe haven-ministration police officers</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting help with my school work</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping me become a leader</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having other people from outside the safe haven-ministration come to speak</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a place where I can go and feel safe</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing fun things after school</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping me feel better about myself</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a place to go to be with my friends</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to help younger kids</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving me a chance to visit colleges</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having activities that make my neighborhood better and look nicer</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing the people in my neighborhood together</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having my parents involved in the safe haven-ministration program</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is nothing good about the safe haven-ministration program</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other Community-Wide Outcomes

Besides reduced crime and youth development improvements, the interviewees felt the program had additional impacts on the community. The director stated he feels the community has come together as a whole. The police officer was proud that adults benefited by increased success in finding jobs, acquiring GEDs, and anger management skills as a result of outreach efforts by program staff. The director feels the program was able to reverse a trend that had the Hollinsworth Grove community headed toward utter despair. While such outcomes were perceived by the safe haven-ministration director, there has been no documented evidence that supports his opinion.

The Eisenhower Foundation program director reported one particular success story about a young lady that came to the safe haven-ministration with one of her friends. The young lady was a teen mother and a school
dropout. She had no intentions of "wasting her time" on the youth safe haven programs, but insisted that she had to get a job to support herself and her baby. The young lady continued to come to the safe haven-ministration, and the assistant to the director of the safe haven would not give up on getting her to come into the program. Finally, one day, the assistant convinced the young lady of the value of a GED education in her desire to get a job and to take the GED. This young lady also enrolled in an early childhood training program.

**The Most Likely Explanations for These Outcomes**

The presence of police at Hollinsworth Grove appears to be the most likely explanation for a large drop in crime reports the first year they were there. Because the police presence was combined with a program that had a reputation for "no-nonsense" and "bad behavior was not tolerated", according to an interviewee, crime began to decrease immediately.

The police officers' strict enforcement had a price, which was the length of time it then took for the officers to develop relationships with community residents. Those interviewed indicated that the trust of the community was not forthcoming initially, and was hard won over time. Therefore, the first year of the program was not characterized by an increase in community engagement with the police, and therefore an increase in crime reports. At Hollinsworth Grove, the combination of the features of the program, despite the lack of trust by the community, and the lack of community equity policing appear to have brought about a decrease in crime without a concomitant increase in community participation.

**Lessons Learned**

The safe haven-ministration staff cited the following factors as contributing to the program's effectiveness:

1. The uniqueness of the program in that it involved police officers, which helped the director secure many more outside resources than he might have otherwise;

2. The additional resources, in terms of funding, facilities, and human resources, that were obtained through collaboration with other groups;

3. Changing police role from strictly law enforcement to being a part of the community;

4. Motivation received from Eisenhower Foundation during difficult times.
The process appears to be a gradual interactive one. Police officers began operations. Residents started feeling safer. They were more free to be outside and interact with each other as well as the safe haven-ministration staff, which led to an increased sense of community and greater communication. This led to greater opportunities for the safe haven-ministration staff, particularly the police officers, to provide other assistance beyond law enforcement. These activities helped to begin a gradual trust-building process between the safe haven-ministration staff and police officers and community residents. Parents slowly began supporting the program and youth benefited by increased access to the program. As youth participated in the program as opposed to deviant behavior, community again grew stronger. This whole process supports the idea of persistent, well informed, efforts gradually eroding barriers to the success and the process gaining a momentum of its own.

The staff reported that they learned that when a program like the safe haven-ministration comes to a high-crime community such as Hollinsworth Grove was at the beginning, that patience is a must. Establishing relationships with the members of the community took continued effort and time for the staff to gain the trust of the residents. They report three main strategies that were effective: finding staff who are sensitive to the population being served, keeping a consistent effort to gradually win the trust of the community, and the importance of true "community equity policing."

Safe haven-ministration staff attributed their success primarily to the following factors:

1. The persistence of the staff
2. The increased capacity to reach out and communicate with the community through technical assistance and training provided by the Eisenhower Foundation
3. A switch from "arrest mode" to community equity policing by the officers
4. Strong institutional support from a variety of agencies, particularly the Department of Human Services

Nonetheless, the safe haven-ministration in Hollinsworth Grove was unable to meet its full potential due to several reasons. The safe haven-ministration did not appear to have implemented the replication fully, despite the programatic technical assistance and training that were provided by the Eisenhower Foundation, particularly regarding ways to engage the community further. Based on the evaluation team's observations, the safe haven-ministration program director did not provide competent leadership in delegating responsibilities to his staff, following up with his staff, and reaching out to the community. The program director also did not comply
with the evaluation guidelines and failed to submit complete information
to substantially support the staff's opinions about the program's impacts.
The initial mutual distrust between the safe haven-ministation staff and the
community hindered the potential of the safe haven-ministation program
right from the beginning.

How Did the Program Continue?

The program director of the safe haven-ministation program at Hollinsworth Grove in Little Rock has applied for funding from the local
and federal governments and from local foundations. Since program
funding ended in 1998, there has not been enough money to keep staff,
and programmatic adjustments included curtailing the program and
focusing on afterschool hours only. The police officers are there at a
diminished level and mentoring had to be terminated.

However, the program space is still operational, and the director, program
administrator and mentor, Linda Washington, continue to provide services
in-kind. A 5-year grant for $75,000 was obtained to conduct a Women's
Mentoring Program with 20 women volunteers to assist women in the
transition from welfare-to-work. That program is scheduled to begin in
June 1999. In the past, the program was awarded $20,000 for the youth
summer jobs program for two years.

Some other funding opportunities were pursued but not successful.
Approval for a three year AmeriCorps contract was contingent on the
police remaining at the site. When the police were returned to regular
duty, the AmeriCorps contract was terminated. Overall, lack of funding
and the loss of the police officers have severely hampered the program.
The Little Rock Police Department did not become a strong supporter of
the program, although the officers were given outstanding awards before
the City Council.

The program has developed a safe haven-ministation Board which has
raised $10,000 and is seeking new resources. Two proposals for Family
Preservation to the Arkansas Division of Early Childhood Education are
pending. The new Board believes that working with the Welfare Reform
Personal Responsibility Act of 1998 in the form of child care provided by
the safe haven-ministation for mothers seeking employment and training,
will provide funding that will allow the program to become self-sufficient.
11. The Telesis Corporation and the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police

Summary

The safe haven-ministation at the Paradise at Parkside private, low income housing development in the Anacostia neighborhood of Washington, DC began in 1995 with commitments from the Metropolitan Police Department; the Telesis Corporation, a national, for-profit housing and economic development company; and the Home Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of Telesis. Initially, three police officers staffed the safe haven-ministation.

Within Paradise at Parkside, there were several other services in addition to the safe haven-ministation, including a community center and a learning center. The community center conducted tutoring and recreational activities. The learning center conducted computer activities. Security officers were employed through CT Management, the housing management company hired by the Telesis Corporation. These services were provided as match by the Telesis Corporation. Each service had its own manager, with overall coordination by the housing management office.

The safe haven-ministation's core activities were mentoring, after-school tutoring, recreation, and community equity policing. A few of the safe haven-ministation activities were unique and open only to safe haven-ministation youth participants. However, by work plan design, the safe haven-ministation conducted many of its activities in conjunction with the community center located a few doors down. As a result, youth who participated regularly in safe haven-ministation activities were given priority, but participation was open to any youth interested.

Positive youth outcomes were reported by parents and youth -- especially better relationships with adults, improved behavior, and higher self-esteem. Most observers had praise for the safe haven-ministation activities and its impact on the youth. A few observers gave examples of how activities such as the mentoring and recreational activities had improved youth self-esteem and increased pro-social behavior.

Index crime at the safe haven-ministation followed the hypothesis of increase-and-then-decline. (See the Introduction to Part II.) In 1995, the year the safe haven-ministation opened, Index crime reports increased by almost 10 percent, then decreased by over 14 percent in 1996 and 1997. Later, police began being removed from the program, and crime started to increase again.
The initial police chief was sensitive and supportive. He visited the San Juan model. But then he resigned. An acting chief headed the police department for a number of months. Then a new chief was appointed, but soon he resigned under pressure. Neither the acting chief nor the new chief had been to Japan. Neither supported the program. Without their leadership, the local commander began to pull the 3 assigned police off their safe haven-minestation assignments during Year 2. By Year 3, only 1 full time officer and 1 half time officer were left. Even these officers often were pulled out for other work. By the end of the program all officers had been pulled out.

Unsurprisingly, the turmoil within the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department made it difficult for civilian staff to coordinate and manage. After HUD funding ended, the safe haven-minestation closed. However, a new Mayor and new Police Chief were supportive, and new funds were being sought at the time of this report.

**Where Was the Replication Located?**

Paradise at Parkside is a large privately rehabilitated housing development located in the Anacostia neighborhood of northeast Washington, D.C. It contains 590 apartment units and has an estimated population of approximately 1,800. Of the 1,800, about 11 percent are youth ranging from ages 1 to 18 years. The housing development is owned by the for-profit, Telesis Corporation, and managed by C T Management, Inc. Within the grounds of Paradise at Parkside are the C T Management, Inc., office, a community center, a learning center, and a security office. There are cameras installed in each complex for security purposes. The grounds are well kept and within a fenced in area. There is a playground in the middle of the complex.

One of the most attractive features of the $20M Paradise at Parkside rehabilitation effort was the creative way in which Telesis brought financing partners together. One funding source, the AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust, invested $10M in return for a guarantee that all construction workers would be union members. Other financing included $6M from Consumers United, $3M from the Washington, DC, Department of Housing and Community Development, $4.5M from HUD, and $500,000 from the federal Department of Health and Human Services. The Federal and National Mortgage Association provided financial services.

Paradise renovation costs averaged approximately $30,500 per apartment - an amount in sharp contrast to the $130,000 per-unit cost to the federal government and the District of Columbia government to renovate the nearby Kenilworth-Parkside public housing complex, which was held up
by HUD from 1988 to 1992 as perhaps the best federal example of tenant management and ownership. A group called the Paradise Cooperative hopes eventually to convert the complex to cooperative ownership by residents.

The founder of Telesis is a savvy, nontraditional developer. Telesis has been able to integrate social development with physical development to create solutions to multiple problems. Employment training and classes on life skills, such as budgeting and home ownership, are conducted by the greater Washington Mutual Housing Association. A day-care center and after-school tutoring for children are available to residents. Some Paradise residents work at construction and property-management jobs at the development.

In its 1998 report to HUD on best practices, the Center for Visionary Leadership had these observations on the success of Telesis and Paradise at Parkside: 1

Telesis set up the Home Corporation, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit community development organization. After meeting with residents about their fears, needs, and aspirations, Home Corporation rehabilitated hundreds of vacant public housing units, landscaped the common areas, planted trees, and installed recreational facilities. Soon, the Chauncy Spruell Community Center and Paradise Day Care Center, which opened next door to Paradise, became host to a wide variety of community-based events and support groups for the residents.

The combined effect of housing rehabilitation, resident home ownership, socio-economic changes, and improved safety and security has given the housing development a new name: Paradise at Parkside. Today, more than 70% of the residents living in the converted development's 600 housing units are paying market-rate rent, while the remaining 30% are either in assisted or subsidized housing. Because the three types of units are mixed together, however, none of the residents know the financial status of any of their neighbors.
Formerly, Paradise housed one of the District's largest outdoor drug markets. Afraid to leave their homes, residents locked themselves in, and children were scarcely seen outdoors. A youth remembers that, when he was 8 years old, the area was controlled by thugs "going around beating up people", and he never dared to ride his bike around the courtyard. However, concentrated efforts by Telesis and Paradise residents moved drug dealers out. All of this occurred before we began the safe haven-ministration replication.

How Much Was Spent and What Activities Were Carried out in the Replication?

Funding Levels

Funding during each year of the program is detailed in Table 36. The Eisenhower Foundation provided $32,775 in the first year, combining funds from the Kellogg Foundation and the Center for Global Partnership. The Eisenhower Foundation continued to channel funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Years 2 and 3, providing $35,450 and $34,000 in each of these years, respectively.

The safe haven-ministration also received in-kind contributions from the Washington D.C. Police Department and other local agencies that included salaries, telephone, fax, space, police radios, supplies, printing, copying, postage/delivery, fringe benefits, utilities, and youth advocates. The Telesis Corporation also matched in-kind services. The total value of in-kind contributions was $175,932 in Year 1, $152,666 in Year 2 and $82,800 in Year 3.

Table 36
HUD Budget Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HUD Year 1 9/95-8/96</th>
<th>HUD Year 2 9/96-8/97</th>
<th>HUD Year 3 9/97-8/98</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants via the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>$32,775(^1)</td>
<td>$35,450(^2)</td>
<td>$34,000(^3)</td>
<td>$102,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local in-kind</td>
<td>$175,932(^4)</td>
<td>$152,666</td>
<td>$ 82,800</td>
<td>$411,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$208,707</td>
<td>$188,116</td>
<td>$116,800</td>
<td>$513,623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This figure includes $18,450 from the Kellogg Foundation as well as $14,325 from the Center for Global Partnership.
Replication Activities

The Program in a Nutshell. The program was designed to integrate the existing functions of the learning center and the community center with complementary advocacy, near-peering, counseling and community equity policing from the new safe haven-ministation close by.

Youth Development. The safe haven-ministation was located in an attractive new row house. Upon entering a common hall/staircase, police and youth walked into a 2-floor unit. Civilians were trained as advocates (following the San Juan model), mentors, near-peers and counselors. Police were trained as mentors. The unit was a few doors down from the large community center, with a playground in front of it, as well as a few doors down from the learning center, housed in another unit. Youth were recruited for involvement in the safe haven-ministation program. As part of the program, they had access to the community center and learning center.

After-school tutoring and computer learning activities were conducted primarily by the safe haven-ministation's administrative assistant in the learning center from approximately 3:30 to 6:00 p.m. Volunteers helped with the tutoring (including 1 community center staff member and 2 parents). In the summer, 4 additional aids helped youth and adults with computer skills. Attendance at the tutoring sessions was good; however, safe haven-ministation staff did not keep records to indicate the number of safe haven-ministation youth participating in this activity.

Mentoring and advocacy were a broadly defined set of activities. They included 1-on-1 assistance, guidance, encouragement to youth, and outreach with parents. Such work was done over a short time-span or within an agreed-upon timeframe to address a specific problem. Advocacy and mentoring were carried out individually or in groups. Two advocacy and mentoring groups -- the Male Outreach group and the Girls Leadership group -- were led by a male police officer and a female police officer, respectively.
The safe haven-ministration advocates and mentors included the safe haven-ministration program director, safe haven-ministration administrative assistant, safe haven-ministration officer(s), 2 male volunteers and 2 female volunteers. Boys received group mentoring from the safe haven-ministration's Male Outreach program and girls received group mentoring from the Women R Us group and the Girls Leadership group. However, specific attention to girls suffered because the female police officer assigned to the safe haven-ministration was reassigned and could no longer lead the groups. (See below.) Each mentor or advocate met with each group weekly and with each child assigned to him/her at least once a month (including Saturday or Sunday, if needed).

Safe haven-ministration youth participated in a range of education, pre-employment training and recreational activities. Activities included field trips to museums, camping and hiking trips, dance troupes, photography classes, and video games. Safe haven-ministration youth were able to take advantage of recreational activities and organized sports offered by the housing development's recreation center.

The safe haven-ministration staff members had collaborative relationships with several organizations in the area -- including the Circle of Hope, Marshall Heights Neighborhood Association and Boys and Girls Club of Greater Washington. The safe haven-ministration helped co-sponsor several events outside of Paradise at Parkside with some of these organizations. However, the relationships appeared to be sporadic and did not extend beyond co-sponsorship of events.

During the second year of the program, the safe haven-ministration staff members and other organizations such as Women R Us and Circle of Hope provided instruction for photography and began African dance classes.

**Community Equity Policing.** Initially, the safe haven-ministration had 3 police officers who patrolled the neighborhood and participated in mentoring activities. The police officers worked in shifts to ensure coverage at all times. Because of the police officers' stable presence in the community, residents began to look for the safe haven-ministration police officers first when there was a problem before calling the police department. Persons interviewed as part of the Eisenhower Foundation evaluation consistently mentioned the police officers as mentors frequently observed working with the youth.

All observers (including safe haven-ministration staff, youth, parents, and service providers) consistently praised the community equity policing component of the safe haven-ministration. A member of the community for 25 years reported that, prior to the safe haven-ministration, someone was
killed every summer. The safe haven-minestation brought police presence, which reduced the number of drug activities and vandalism. The police officers also helped settle conflicts between parents and youth. Because of greater trust by youth in the safe haven-minestation police officers, youth were less hesitant to inform the police officers of inappropriate behaviors or activities at Paradise. As a result, the police officers were able to intervene proactively, before such activities led to adverse consequences.

All observers reported that the police officers were knowledgeable in ways to deal with the youth at Paradise. Police officers were able to gain the respect of the youth, while simultaneously enforcing the law.

Telesis held a grand opening buffet luncheon for the ministation safe haven. This event, in the community center, brought together the police chief, president of the Eisenhower Foundation, president of Telesis, police officers, residents and civic leaders. A considerable amount of media attention ensued -- including an interview with the president of the Eisenhower Foundation on the CBS early morning program that showed footage of the safe haven-minestation, as well as articles in the *Washington Post* and *Washington Times*. According to the *Washington Times*, for example, here is how police initially interacted with civilian staff and youth:

> The staff at the Parkside koban say they have become role models, surrogate parents and even friends with the children and residents in the complex.

> "Since I've been here, I've seen lots of children," says Officer Mona Lynch, one of the three resident officers at the koban.

> "The basic problem with children is that they don't see the other side of policing. The only thing they see of police is when [officers] are swinging a stick or coming to lock them away," she says. "The thing is to let children know they have a friend."

> Another koban officer, William Jackson, grew up in Parkside and came back after earning his badge to keep an eye on his old stomping grounds. Today, he tutors kids, organizes basketball games and chaperones trips to Baltimore as a way of giving
something to the community that was not there before.

"Lots of children here want to do well, but their parents don't have the skills," Officer Jackson says. "That's had an impact. Growing up here, I didn't have anyone to tutor me."

Indeed, Wilbert Hines, 13, could hardly be stopped as he hurried to a tutoring session on his bike recently, with a folder stuffed with science and English homework under his arm.

"The tutors help us out with our homework," he says. "I like math best. It's fun. And the problems they give you are hard, and that's fun, too."

"They look at us as they grow up and think of us as role models," says Officer Richard Saunders, the third koban staffer. "We want to keep that concept as the next generation comes to replace us."

"I remember saying to myself, 'I could never live here or raise a family here,' says Officer Saunders. "You never saw people just hanging out. Now I do live here. It seems like a happier place to be."

Besides organizing activities, like summer camps and Sega video game tournaments, the officers and the counselors at the koban help both the children and their parents with resumes. The koban sponsors computer training seminars and helps people of all ages apply for jobs.

"We want these kids to be able to compete in today's society and come out as taxpayers," says Alonzo Patterson, an advocate coordinator who promotes self-esteem programs and helps with job training. "We're people who have come out
of here and done something productive with our lives."

At Parkside, kids know better than to utter a four-letter word on the basketball court. The neighborhood may be the only one in the city where cursing is a crime.

"We holler at them out the window," says Officer Lynch. "They know us very well."

After this good start in Year 1, and at a time when the 3 officers were still learning counseling and mentoring skills from Eisenhower Foundation trainers, high level police support started to diminish. The initial chief of the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police was sensitive and supportive. He visited the San Juan safe haven-minestation model, assigned the original 3 police and encouraged their ongoing training. However, the police chief then resigned. An acting chief headed the police department for a number of months, but refused to meet with the Foundation on the replication. A new chief was appointed. He initially showed support for the program in writing, but soon seemed to lose interest -- apparently because of personal problems that eventually forced him to resign.

During what, therefore, became a leadership void during Year 2 and Year 3 of the replication, district commanders took more power. During Year 2, the commander for the district where Paradise was located reassigned all 3 officers out of Paradise. The Foundation's national program director fought the action, and the officers were reinstated at Paradise. However, they still frequently were pulled off for temporary assignments. During Year 3, the district commander again reassigned the officers, and the Eisenhower Foundation national program director again fought to reverse the decision. This time, only 1 full time officer and 1 half time officer returned to Paradise -- and they again often were pulled out for temporary duties. By the closing month of HUD funding, no officers remained at Paradise.

How Was the Replication Managed and How Were Staff Trained and Technically Assisted?

Management

The turmoil within the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department made it difficult for civilian staff to coordinate and manage the program. The original civilian program director departed, and the second program director did the best he could under difficult circumstances.
The program director was responsible for managing the advocacy, counseling, mentoring, afterschool tutoring, and recreational components of the program; mobilizing and allocating additional resources; and supervising the staff. The safe haven-ministration's administrative assistant was responsible for the daily administrative duties and for managing the afterschool tutoring and computer learning activities.

The safe haven-ministration office was open to the residents from 9 a.m. until 9 p.m. The safe haven-ministration staff worked in shifts to provide office coverage. During the first year of operation, there were 2 additional individuals who assisted in the daily administrative tasks. These 2 individuals lived in the community, and they received a small stipend for their services. Office coverage appeared to decline when police officers were pulled out by their commanders.

The safe haven-ministration was requested by CT Management to coordinate its activities with the management office, the community center and the learning center. The CT Management site manager held regular meetings with the safe haven-ministration program director and the community center's director. The site manager expected the safe haven-ministration program director to report directly to her, particularly with regard to program expenses and to keep her informed of events.

**Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance and Training**

The safe haven-ministration staff received technical assistance and training from the Eisenhower Foundation through several methods: workshops that covered issues such as program planning, youth development, grant writing, staff development, media planning, and continuation planning; site visits from the evaluation staff that provided opportunities for the safe haven-ministration to get advice on ways to monitor the program and progress of the youth; regular telephone calls with the Eisenhower Foundation program director to address issues and trouble-shoot; and assistance in submitting proposals to foundations and government agencies and to leverage local funds. When new staff came on board in midstream, the Foundation arranged for them to visit the model San Juan site. In Years 2 and 3, a great deal of time was spent in negotiations with the district commander to reinstate officers who had been pulled out.

The Eisenhower Foundation helped to leverage local resources from the Telesis Corporation to provide space for the safe haven-ministration. Paradise at Parkside also was 1 of only 2 sites that was able to provide officers with subsidized housing so that they could live and work in the neighborhood they patrolled.
The safe haven-ministation program director, the administrative assistant, and at least 1 police officer attended all training workshops. Some of the technical assistance and training provided by the Eisenhower Foundation seemed to be helpful. But more follow up back home probably was necessary. For instance, the administration of the youth survey was difficult and problematic for the staff, even thought the survey looked straightforward enough during a workshop. In retrospect, more evaluation technical assistance was needed for the youth surveys.

The safe haven-ministation's second program director reported that, while he had the knowledge to implement program activities and to develop collaborative linkages with organizations outside and within Paradise, he was less informed on ways to monitor and document the progress of the safe haven-ministation and its participating youth. He therefore was pleased that the Eisenhower Foundation included Paradise as a site funded by the Dewitt Wallace Readers' Digest Fund, as part of Eisenhower work to improve training for youth workers. He had opportunities to attend Eisenhower youth worker training. This helped him become a more effective manager.

What Did the Outcome Evaluation Show?

Principal Findings

Index crime first increased and then decreased, confirming the hypothesis of increase-and-then-decline. (See the Introduction to Part II.) However, as police support lessened, Index crime began to move back up in 1997. Police did not cooperate with the Foundation's requests for data during the last year, so we do not know what happened to Index crime in the target neighborhood in 1998.

Youth Outcomes

Most observers had praise for the safe haven-ministation activities and its impact on the youth. A few observers gave examples of how advocacy, mentoring and recreational activities had improved a few youth's self-esteem and increased pro-social behavior. One parent cited the improvement she saw in her son's behavior and attributed the improvement to the mentoring relationship her son had developed with the safe haven-ministation administrative assistant. Another observer noted an improvement in the attitudes and behaviors of girls associated with the mentoring group, and, subsequently, noted a return to disrespectful and unruly behavior once the mentoring group was discontinued. A youth observer described how his relationship with his mentor provided opportunities to participate in field trips and to discuss a variety of life issues, such as drugs.
The safe haven-ministation provided 1 youth with the opportunity to help develop a presentation and conduct a workshop. That youth went to college and returned during his summer vacation in 1997 -- to assist the safe haven-ministation program director and teach art as a near-peer. This particular youth was already doing very well in school and, according to him, the safe haven-ministation gave him an opportunity to enhance his leadership skills.

Index crime reports in the Paradise at Parkside neighborhood where the safe haven-ministation was located followed the pattern hypothesized in Chapter 2 of increased reports during the first year of the safe haven-ministation (1995), and decreases thereafter. Index crime began to rise slightly again in 1997, as the district commander pulled out the officers. Table 37 shows that crime increased by 9.5 percent in 1995, from the previous 3-year average, and then fell by over 14 percent over the next two years. (See also Figure 26).

During the years when the safe haven-ministation was in full operation (1996 and 1997), and following the first year when crime reports increased, Index crime was 6 percent lower than it had been before the safe haven-ministation opened. (See Table 37). This was a slightly greater decrease in crime than was seen for the comparison area and its precinct. (See Figures 27 and 28). Crime reports decreased about the same in the safe haven-ministation neighborhood as in the larger precinct, but less than citywide in 1996 and 1997. However, crime reports decreased more in the target neighborhood than in the precinct or the city between the first year of the program and the subsequent two years of 1996 and 1997. (See Figures 27 and 28). Police did not cooperate with the Foundation's requests for data during the last year, so we do not know what happened to Index crime in the target neighborhood in 1998.

**Other Community Outcomes**

This safe haven-ministation emphasized its commitment to the whole community; including parents, extended families, and especially young adult men. It provided an annual Easter parade, outdoor concerts, outdoor cookouts, and community clean-ups consistent with this emphasis. Observers lauded these activities and reported good attendance by not only residents of Paradise at Parkside, but also residents of the surrounding neighborhoods and developments. Observers differed in their opinion about the safe haven-ministation's value to the Paradise community. Some observers felt that the safe haven-ministation benefited the community. Others reported that residents often complained that the safe haven-ministation staff members were never around when they needed them.
According to one observer, the safe haven-ministation helped foster a sense of community at Paradise at Parkside. She described a weekly rap session that was led by one of the police officers that allowed residents (predominantly women) to talk freely about their community and children. Up to 11 mothers attended the weekly sessions.

### Table 37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON, D.C.</td>
<td>TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>144.3</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TARGET PRECINCT</td>
<td>5,460.7</td>
<td>5,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPARISON PRECINCT</td>
<td>7,971.7</td>
<td>7,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CITY</td>
<td>66,294.7</td>
<td>67,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TARGET PRECINCT MINUS TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>5,346.3</td>
<td>5,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPARISON PRECINCT MINUS COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>7,841.3</td>
<td>7,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CITY MINUS PRECINCTS</td>
<td>52,832</td>
<td>54,518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE FROM PRE-PROGRAM YEARS TO BASE YEAR</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>+ 9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>+11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGET PRECINCT MINUS TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>+ 2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARISON PRECINCT MINUS COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>- 2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY MINUS PRECINCTS</td>
<td>+ 3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE BETWEEN BASE YEAR AND PROGRAM YEARS AVERAGE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>-14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGET PRECINCT MINUS TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>- 5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARISON PRECINCT MINUS COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td>+ 4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY MINUS PRECINCTS</td>
<td>-13.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Comparison Neighborhood and Precinct data based on 1996 only, 1997 unavailable
Source: Washington, D.C. Police Department
The Most Likely Explanations for These Outcomes
And Lessons Learned

The presence of the 3 police officers was considered important by everyone interviewed, and they attributed greater safety and positive relationships the youth formed with them to their dedication. After the police presence was reduced, Index crime reports began to rise again, for the first time since the program started. Hence, interviews and official statistics support the view that the role of the police at Paradise at Parkside was instrumental in creating a safer neighborhood.

The police presence which created a safe place for youth and residents alike encouraged organizations and individuals from outside Paradise at Parkside to visit and help conduct activities. As a result, there were more youth development opportunities for youth. The limited number of staff and the resulting limited capacity of the safe haven-ministration was a barrier in enabling the program to reach out to all the youth and provide more individualized attention. More funding by the Eisenhower Foundation for more civilian staff would have helped. Information provided by parents and youth suggested that, for those youth who spent a large amount of time working closely with the safe haven-ministration staff, behavior and attitudes improved.

One of the components that contributed to the safe haven-ministration's initial success was the subsidized housing available to the police officers in order to secure their vested interest in the community. Their presence made the community feel safe, which in turn made the property owners feel secure and helped leverage outside resources.

How Did the Program Continue?
After HUD funding ended and the police pulled out, most, but not all of the program was discontinued. However, the Eisenhower Foundation is seeking meetings with the new mayor and the new police chief are supportive, and so new funding was being sought at the time of this report.

Footnotes

12. Lessons from the Second Generation

As we reflected on our experiences in San Juan, Columbia, Memphis, Baltimore, Little Rock and Washington, DC, we concluded that the lessons learned in the first generation of replications with Justice Department, private sector and local match funds (Part I) held up in the second generation of replications with HUD, private sector and local match funds.

Chapter 12 integrates together the conclusions we reached during the second generation with the lessons we learned and their comparability with the first generation.

Our conclusions and lessons were:

1. Community equity policing proved it could out perform "zero tolerance" policing.
2. All second generation replications were able to demonstrate success, to varying degrees.
3. All second generation replications were successful in implementing safe haven-ministations.
4. All second generation replications were able to implement youth development by paid civilian staff and community equity policing by paid police staff.
5. The degree of implementation was related to the degree of positive outcome.
6. Good staff, screening and leadership counted.
7. The role of paid staff remained far more important than the role of volunteers.
8. The role of police remained crucial.
9. It again proved possible to create successful partnerships in which nonprofit youth development organizations took the lead and police officers were supplied as local match.
10. Public housing authorities proved to be good partners.
11. The need for sufficient funding to nonprofit organizations appeared to be borne out.
12. Technical assistance remained imperative.
13. Technical assistance to enhance local social cohesion took time.
14. "Self sufficiency" remained a simplistic buzzword that risked being abused.
15. Indigenous, unaffiliated nonprofit organizations continued to have advantages over affiliates of national nonprofit organizations.
16. Strong organizational capacity was key to nonprofit organization success -- whether a group was secular or "faith based."
17. HUD was a good partner.
Consider each conclusion and lesson:

1. **All second generation HUD replications were able to demonstrate success, to varying degrees.** The degree of success was not uniform, but we could point to at least some good outcomes in every site, and to many good outcomes in sites like Columbia.

   We analyzed Index crime reports to police at all 6 second generation sites. We hypothesized that Index crime reported to police would first increase during the replications (due to more trust in police and hence more reporting) and then decline (due to the effectiveness of community equity policing). This increase-and-then-decline hypothesis (see the Introduction to Part II) held for 4 of the 6 sites (San Juan, Columbia, Baltimore, and Washington, DC). For the other 2 sites (Memphis and Little Rock) there were no initial increases, but rather immediate Index crime declines - in ways that were logically explicable based on local circumstances. Hence, one way or another, Index crime reports declined in all 6 target neighborhoods during HUD funding.

   Among the 6 cities, 3 completed youth surveys in a form that allowed analysis for statistical significance: Columbia, Memphis, and Baltimore. For these sites, target youth had significantly better outcomes than comparison youth in the following areas:

   In Columbia, target youth improved statistically significantly more than comparison youth in getting their homework done on time and doing volunteer work. They were significantly less likely to engage in anti-social activity, beat someone up, carry a weapon, damage property, or engage in disorderly conduct.

   In Baltimore, target youth improved statistically significantly more than comparison youth in getting their homework done on time and doing volunteer work. They were significantly less likely to use drugs or alcohol or engage in disorderly conduct.

   In Memphis, the target youth showed no statistically significant difference from the comparison youth, although they improved somewhat more in many areas. The comparison site had a Boys and Girls Club, so the comparison youth had access to some similar program components as the target youth. When the target youth surveys were analyzed to compare the youth at the time they entered the safe haven-ministation program to 1 year later, statistical significance was found. The target youth improved significantly in their future outlook, getting their homework done, and doing volunteer work. They decreased their use of drugs and alcohol significantly.
2. **All the second generation HUD replications were successful in implementing safe haven-ministrations.** The most basic component of the model that evolved from the first generation was the presence of a physical facility to house a safe haven-ministration. All 6 sites established a safe haven-ministration - while in the first generation only 2 of 5 sites were able to do so completely.

3. **All second generation HUD replications were able to implement youth development by paid civilian staff and community equity policing by paid police staff.** There were differences in the success associated with paid staff members across all sites. But paid civilian staff members were able to engage in variations on advocacy, mentoring, coaching, and counseling, as part of youth development. One-on-one work with youth seemed more successful than group work. Paid police were able to undertake variations on mentoring of youth, patrols, problem-oriented solutions and coaching of athletic teams.

4. **The degree of implementation was related to the strength of the positive outcome.** We found that 4 of the 6 programs evaluated (San Juan, Columbia, Memphis and Baltimore) demonstrated good levels of implementation (although not without some conflicts around autonomy and staffing), produced measurable positive benefits to youth, and had a significant impact on Index crime. Two programs, in Little Rock and Washington, DC, had more problems in implementation and were unable to conduct youth surveys to measure outcomes. Therefore, we have less evidence that their programs really worked for youth. However, in both cases, staff and residents interviewed gave numerous anecdotes of the positive impact the program had on some youth. In addition, both Little Rock and Washington, DC demonstrated success in reducing Index crime.

Tables 38 and 39 document more systematically key programmatic, process, training, technical assistance and management components that were implemented (or not) at each second generation site. For the most part, these tables use the same component categories as the tables for the first generation of replications in Part I.

### Table 38
**Some Key Program Components In the Replication Cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Columbia</th>
<th>Memphis</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
<th>Little Rock</th>
<th>Washington DC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups by paid civilian staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Description</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring one-on-one by paid civilian staff</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups or one-on-one by paid police staff</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups or one-one-one by volunteers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy by paid staff who mediate among youth, community and police - like intercessors and near-peers.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe haven extended family sanctuary off-the-street</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstructured program settings</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-school links, help with homework, remedial education, rites of passage through high school and to college</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment training and job placement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth leadership training and entrepreneurial training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth media enterprise, newspapers, and dramatic productions with a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

243
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message</th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Columbia</th>
<th>Memphis</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
<th>Little Rock</th>
<th>Washington DC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and sports</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police kobans/ministations/drop in centers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented patrols by police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented patrols by police with citizens</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police home visits</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = Presence of component.

**Table 39**

**Some Key Process, Training, Technical Assistance and Management Components in the Replication Cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Columbia</th>
<th>Memphis</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
<th>Little Rock</th>
<th>Washington DC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had a prior working relationship with the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had a commitment to multiple solutions to multiple problems.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had acceptable management and financial</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had competent paid staff to work with youth and police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization received group technical assistance by the Eisenhower Foundation.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization received one-on-one technical assistance by the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was overseen by a local advisory/planning council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police went to Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and community leaders &quot;bonded&quot; in Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police attended Eisenhower Foundation workshops, especially in San Juan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police chief approved the</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was overseen day-to-day by competent commander-level police supervisors</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police officers who worked with the community day-to-day were competent and open to learning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police received follow-up Eisenhower Foundation mentoring training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization provided informal on-the-job training to police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program succeeded in part because of local coalition building among grassroots organizations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program screened, trained and retained qualified volunteers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = Presence of component or process.
5. **Good staff, screening and leadership counted.** Broadly speaking, where staff and volunteers were well screened, programs appeared to be more effective.

Good leadership of the program proved critical in many ways. At some times, the programs suffered from changes in the director, or from a director splitting duties between the safe haven-ministation and another program, or from the wrong person in the job. At those times, it was harder to attract and keep youth participants, the community was less involved, and programmatic activities suffered. In each program, when a good director was in place, the programs got on track.

The role of paid staff remained far more important than the role of volunteers. Volunteers were extensively used in Columbia, and used one way or another in all other sites. But, as in the first generation of replications, we concluded in the second generation that degree of success could be related not to volunteers but much more to the skills of paid civilian and police staff. Funding for paid civilian staff - including salaries, benefits and indirect costs - also helped to build the overall institutional capacity of the host nonprofit 501(c)(3) youth development organization, especially when such funding was accompanied by capacity building technical assistance by Eisenhower Foundation staff and consultants. With enhanced capacity, a nonprofit organization is more capable of undertaking more and better replications in the future. By contrast, funding that concentrates on volunteers is less likely to cover enhancements in nonprofit institutional capacity -- like improved management, financial management, paid staff skills and board member skills.

7. **The role of police remained crucial.** The conclusions we reached in the first generation were reinforced in the second generation. Police chiefs originally committed to match 2 or 3 officers. However, when the commitment was enthusiastic and was enhanced over time, as was the case with Columbia, the outcomes were more positive than when the commitment wavered and declined over time, as was the case with Washington, DC.

The relationships the police established in the community appeared linked to the degree of Index crime change. In all cases, the presence of police led to a drop in reported Index crime. However, in those safe haven-ministations where the police also took the time to engage the community and build trust (such as by working at the site when off-duty in civilian clothes) or where police helped families and youth with non-police problems, the drop was preceded by an initial substantial increase in Index crimes. This is a common phenomenon in community equity policing, where community engagement leads to people coming to the police more
often to report crimes, problems, and to assist in youth development and crime prevention.

Refined over time, our definition of community equity policing integrated a number of components. While it was not implemented completely in all of our second generation sites, our definition of community equity policing for future replications is as follows: Officers move from their cruisers and into foot beats or bicycle beats. Policing is problem-oriented - - police and citizens identify the source of a problem and jointly create a solution. The process is proactive, not reactive. Civilians from the nonprofit youth development organizations join police on foot patrols and jointly strive to build community trust. Police are screened by citizens and then trained in how to counsel, coach and mentor neighborhood youth. Whenever possible, police who grew up in the neighborhood are selected, and they work hard on creating trust with youth -- who typically see police as their enemies. If police are not presently living in the neighborhood, they are encouraged to do so. Police officers and nonprofit youth development organizations carefully maintain the roles of equal partners. The nonprofit youth development organization has the overall organizational lead and is the entity with fiduciary responsibility for administering national funding from the Eisenhower Foundation. Police officers report to their police supervisor and coordinate closely with the civilian director of the replication. A careful balance must be maintained. The supervisor is in weekly contact with the civilian program director - to insure that program coordination is maintained and that any managerial or accountability problems that emerge are quickly resolved. If any problems cannot be resolved at this level, they are jointly resolved by the police chief, the overall civilian director of the nonprofit youth development organization and the Eisenhower Foundation. Most funding from the Foundation is for operation of the nonprofit youth development organization. Police may receive some funding, including funding to cover costs of evaluation data collection based on police records. The police chief assigns 2 or 3 officers as local in-kind match. The police chief requires that both these officers and their commanders receive training in mentoring and the principles of the program.

8. **It again proved possible to create successful partnerships in which nonprofit youth development organizations took the lead and police officers were supplied as match.** Conventionally, in such partnerships police have control and civilians assist. Police are well funded (including substantial federal support). Most nonprofit youth development organizations are chronically underfunded, at federal, state and local levels. In the 2 generations of replications reported here, most national funding, from federal agencies and private foundations, was channeled by the Eisenhower Foundation to the nonprofit youth organizations, which had the organizational lead -- while police agreed to assign officers as
local match. Based on the positive Index crime reduction and youth development outcomes from such institutional and financial relationships, we believe that replication of our concepts across the nation to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problems is one cost-effective venue for better funding and developing the institutional capacity of nonprofit organizations -- while at the same time crediting police with success. *Wise replication policy can create win-win outcomes, when it comes to youth development nonprofits and police.*

9. **Community equity policing proved it could out perform zero-tolerance policing.** For all first and second generation sites, Index crime was reduced while race and community relations improved via our community equity policing. In Memphis, community equity policing succeeded where Weed and Seed community policing did not. By contrast, get tough "zero tolerance" policing, which is fashionable but unevaluated for the most part, often has reduced crime *at the expense of* good race and community relations - as is the case in New York City.

10. **Public housing authorities proved to be good partners.** All the public housing agencies (and, in the case of Washington, DC, the private Telesis Corporation) fulfilled their commitments. All provided good physical space for the safe haven-ministations (except in Memphis, where it was agreed that the space would be in the Boys and Girls Club). Most provided additional resources, with the Columbia Public Housing Authority being the standout. All were able to work well with the nonprofit groups that had the organizational lead.

12. **Technical assistance remained imperative.** As in the first generation, we concluded that technical assistance by Foundation staff and consultants was a sine qua non for success. This, of course, is a self-serving conclusion. Yet take the obvious example. The most important form of Foundation technical assistance was fundraising. Without the national HUD and private foundation funding raised by the Eisenhower Foundation, and without the Foundation's ability to use it to leverage local matches - primarily the salaries and benefits of police officers -- the replications would not have been possible. About $1.00 in local matches was raised for every $1.00 in national funds committed.

On balance, we believe Foundation technical assistance improved from the first generation to the second -- building on the lessons we learned. For example, even though we reduced the amount of national funding per year, per site to the nonprofit organizations in the second generation (on purpose, to further test the connection between funding and outcome), we were able to secure 2 or 3 police officers per site as match -- as in the first generation. We held more national cluster workshops (5 in the second generation compared to 3 in the first). Based on the evaluations we
received from participants, the quality was at least as good, if not better. We also seemed to improve the balance between imparting what we thought important and what sites thought they needed. The Foundation added more training on capacity building, and added an entirely new component on media - which the most effective sites, like Columbia, used to publicize themselves and draw in more funding. We improved and better systemized training of civilian and police staff in coaching, mentoring, advocacy and near-peering.

At the same time, we concluded that the Foundation can do better. We need more civilian funding per site (above). We need to replace, in a more timely way, local staff who do not meet our standards. The Foundation needs more follow-up on-site to implement what was learned in national cluster workshops. We need to further improve training of civilians and police in advocacy, coaching, mentoring, advocacy and near-peering -- and set up a national academy for such training. In terms of evaluation technical assistance, the Foundation no longer should ask sites to collect data -- that is asking too much of them, given, for example, that not all HUD-funded sites were unable to complete youth surveys in the manner requested. We need our evaluators to provide more assistance in how local sites can set up sound record keeping. The Foundation needs to improve our measurement instruments -- drawing, for example, on excellent work by the Search Institute in Minneapolis. When necessary, we need to fund police to collect index crime data. In future replications, Foundation evaluations need to make much more progress in defining and comparing advocacy vs coaching vs counseling vs near-peering -- in both one-on-one and group contexts, by civilians and police, paid staff and volunteers. We need systematic data on the cost-benefits of paid versus volunteer staff. The second generation evaluation was unable to make progress on these fronts.

13. **Technical assistance to enhance local social cohesion took time.** In smaller areas which already have a strong sense of community, and relative strong trust of the local police, a safe haven-ministation has a head start. However, in areas where social cohesion is not strong, and where there may be an active distrust of police, we found that Foundation technical assistors and safe haven-ministation staff needed to actively work on outreach to develop the trust of the local residents, and ultimately their involvement.

Programs that were successful, like the program in Columbia, sought ways to get to know the community and promote themselves as caring members in the community. In Columbia, the safe haven-ministation staff made a point of knowing the birthday of every resident and sending a card. They knocked on doors and introduced themselves. The police officers assigned
to the safe haven-ministation stayed on-site when they were off-duty to serve as mentors and talk to community residents.

One of the key components to community involvement proved to be parent involvement. The more programs engaged parents and other family members, the more they found improvements in young people and greater resources to expand the program. Community involvement, in terms of tenant and other neighborhood organizations, can greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the programs. In Baltimore, for example, the tenant council's involvement toward the end of the safe haven-ministation program greatly enhanced its ability to engage more youth and recruit parent volunteers.

Working to establish trust doesn't only need to happen at the start of the program, we concluded, but needs to be explicitly incorporated into ongoing program design, national technical assistance and local program implementation.

14. In practice, at the street level, "self sufficiency" remained a simplistic buzzword that risked being abused. In the first generation of replications, we warned against the naïve or politicized use of "self sufficiency." We found that resource needs are too great in inner cities and public housing to fund for a few years and then to assume that a nonprofit organization can make it on its own. The same held in the second generation. The Columbia site was most successful at "self sufficiency" because the Eisenhower Foundation raised $400,000 in new grants from the Justice Department. In spite of 10 years of solid success in San Juan, Centro appreciated and needed the Eisenhower Foundation's role in publicizing success in Puerto Rico through the crime prevention Congress we keynoted -- and appreciated and needed the Foundation's commitment to searching for new grants. Without Eisenhower support, the Baltimore and Memphis replications continued on, but the original replication goals were changed, and perhaps diluted, by the Boys and Girls Clubs that are hosting them. The Little Rock site struggled to continue without the Foundation. Though still holding promise, the Washington, DC replication closed down because the police pulled out. The safe haven-ministation will require Eisenhower Foundation intervention with the new mayor and new police chief to re-establish itself in Washington, DC.

15. Indigenous, unaffiliated nonprofit organizations continued to have advantages over affiliates of national nonprofit organizations. In the first generation, we warned against a national inner-city strategy that focuses too much on implementing through national nonprofit organizations and their subsidiaries. Funds are scarce in the nonprofit world, and they disproportionately are granted to national organizations -- which have more access to power, information and funds than local,
indigenous, unaffiliated nonprofit organizations. This warning held up in the second generation. The 2 replications that had the most success were the indigenous, unaffiliated groups in Columbia and San Juan. The Baltimore and Memphis replications also performed well, with both hosted by Boys and Girls Clubs, yet these host organizations began to dilute the original replication goals.

Our experience also was that affiliates of national nonprofits could impede replications. In Columbia, the replication first operated out of the Columbia Urban League, which restricted the executive director. After the new unaffiliated nonprofit Koban, Inc. was created, the replication was much more creative and successful. In Memphis, 100 Black Men of Memphis originally committed mentors. Later, 100 Black Men reneged on its commitment.

16. **Strong institutional capacity was key to nonprofit organization success -- whether a group was secular or "faith-based."** Over our first and second generations, we have funded 10 local nonprofit organizations. All demonstrated outcome-based success, to varying degrees. Seven nonprofit organizations (2 in Baltimore and 1 each in Boston, Chicago, Memphis, Philadelphia and Washington, DC) are secular. Among the 3 remaining groups, the highly successful Columbia organization is secular, but part of its vision, energy, and creativity comes from the values of the chief of police, who is an ordained minister. Still, success in Columbia is based more fundamentally on sound management and the hard work of secular civilians and police. In Little Rock, the organization also is secular, but the executive director is an ordained minister. Nonetheless, Little Rock was much less successful than Columbia, in part because management and relations with the community were not as sound. In San Juan, the highly successful Centro is faith based -- though the nun who ran it for most of the time also is a very effective manager and received the cooperation of the police. There also was an eleventh site, Newark, which dropped out. The executive director is an ordained member of the clergy. The site dropped out, not because of any "faith based" status, but because a new police chief would not necessarily agree to assign officers as local match. This all is anecdotal information -- not information based on a scientific evaluation. But it suggests that the key to success is not whether a nonprofit group is secular or "faith-based." The key is whether it has sound institutional capacity -- in terms of leadership, management, staff, board members and good relationships with the community, especially the police.

17. **HUD was a good partner.** In our experience, sometimes federal funding agencies can be the major impediments to success. This was not the case with HUD. At all levels, HUD staff understood the program, were supportive of the inevitable midcourse corrections that were needed, and
facilitated ways (like the 1998 best practices report by the Center for Visionary Leadership), in which the model could become better known. The model also was included by HUD as eligible in its major ("SuperNOFA") announcement of fund availability to public housing authorities.

18. **New Replications.** Based on our preliminary demonstration of success, we recommend that HUD finance a more ambitious round of national replications of safe haven-ministations with civilian advocates, youth development and community equity policing. We propose that HUD funds be channeled through the Foundation, to provide technical assistance, training, evaluation, media and direct grants to sites. In our view, most site level funds should continue to be targeted on civilian nonprofit operations. From the Foundation's perspective, local police should continue to match 2-3 officers per site.

We recommend that a substantial number of new replications be undertaken -- in order to create sample sizes that allow for a more ambitious outcome evaluation. For example, the evaluation should assess the relative merits of:

- Sites with safe haven-ministations in *both* the public housing community *and* the school that serves it *vs* sites with safe haven-ministations only in the public housing community.
- Safe haven-ministations in public housing *vs* safe haven-ministations in HOPE VI housing *vs* safe haven-ministations in other subsidized housing.
- Safe haven-ministations in Empowerment/Enterprise Zones *vs* safe haven-ministations that are not.
- Safe haven-ministations with housing police *vs* safe haven ministations with city police.
- Safe haven-ministations where civilian staff primarily are advocates *vs* safe haven-ministations where civilian staff are more conventional mentors, counselors or coaches.

Such a more ambitious round of replications should try to identify cities where initial success with a single safe haven-ministration can be leveraged into a city-wide program, as is the case with the Columbia model. It is easier, for example, to start with small and medium size cities.

Nor should we fail to consider replications of and variations on enhanced safe haven-ministations in other places that have been left behind in America -- like the Mississippi Delta, Native American reservations, Appalachia and the Colonias.
A new round of replications should explore how the basic physical facility, in which space is shared by the youth safe haven and the police ministation, can become a magnet to attract more and more complementary ventures. Can these secured locations become full service, 1 stop centers for programs that work -- including job training, placement and retention as part of welfare reform? The centers can be located in public housing, nonprofit organizations, schools or other locations in low income neighborhoods. Our vision is to create human capital neighborhoods, where multiple solutions are comprehensive, interdependent and responsive to local needs.

Inspired by the success of Centro in San Juan in training over 500 cadets at the Puerto Rico Police Academy and building on the Foundation's present 10 unit training curriculum, we believe that a new generation of replications should establish a national academy for training city police officers and public housing police officers in community equity policing.

Based by what has been learned in the first and second generation of replications, as reported in the present volume, the Eisenhower Foundation has revised its replication operating principles, as follows:

A. The outcomes of the program are to keep youth aged approximately 6 to 18 in school or alternative school, keep their grades up, develop youth for responsible adulthood, keep youth out of the criminal justice system, prevent crime and drug abuse by youth, improve the quality of life in the neighborhood and reduce crime in the neighborhood. Program staff need to develop work plans that impact these outcomes, which will be measured by the evaluators.

B. The program is framed as a youth investment and youth, housing and community development venture, not as a criminal justice system initiative.

C. The Eisenhower Foundation provides federal start up and continuation funding. Sites receive between $80,000 and $100,000 per year, for 4 years. Funding is to a qualified 501(c)(3) youth development, community development or similar organization, devoted to human betterment and to carrying out multiple solutions to multiple problems. The organization has legal, fiduciary responsibility for the program and hires a civilian director. Civilian staff report to the civilian director. The civilian director reports to the Eisenhower Foundation and to an advisory board that consists of board members from the 501(c)(3) organization, police officials, school officials, public housing officials, tenant organization officials and other community officials who are deemed important locally (like, perhaps, persons from local colleges, hospitals and businesses).
D. The civilian program director, local advisory board and other local partners leverage local match funding through the course of the program and, when federal funding ends, finance the continuation of the program, if the evaluation shows it to be successful.

E. The chief of police in each city assigns 2 or 3 full time officers as local match. The officers report to their police supervisor, and coordinate closely with the civilian program director. The civilian program director and police supervisor meet weekly, to make sure civilian staff and police are carrying out the approved work plan. Any management issues that cannot be resolved at this weekly meeting are brought to the police chief, the Eisenhower Foundation and the local advisory board on a weekly basis.

F. The public housing authority provides as local match for the safe haven-minestation a physical facility and furniture in good repair. The public housing authority also seeks additional grants, based on good performance. The public housing authority must agree in writing that the housing in the target neighborhood will not be razed during the course of the replication's evaluation.

G. In addition to granting funds, the Eisenhower Foundation helps in planning, requires work plan approval before allowing drawdowns, provides technical assistance, monitors progress, requires refinements and midcourse corrections as needed, helps the local advisory board and public housing agency secure funding after federal support ends, helps communicate the program's success (if merited by the evaluation), and writes a final report that receives national attention among practitioners, citizens, policy makers and the media.

H. The Eisenhower Foundation requires that the principles in this statement be followed. But the Foundation is flexible on the exact details of how the principles are carried out. The Foundation recognizes that variations on the exact details at any one place are of critical importance. Such flexibility allows the program to fit itself to local circumstances and to encourage local ownership.

I. An initial grant will be made to allow for community outreach needs assessments, planning, work plan development, staff hiring, training and initial implementation. This should take about 3 months. Needs assessments can be taken informally -- for example, door-to-door and through town meetings. The goal is to obtain community support and ideas that may be included in the work plan. Continuation grants will not be made until and unless a work plan, budget and contract are approved by the Eisenhower Foundation; the program has able civilian staff and police in place; the program begins implementation as planned; the program
gives evidence of solid board, organizational, time, staff and financial management; and there is evidence that an able police supervisor is in place who works well with the civilian program director and is sensitive to the community.

J. As part of work plan approval, the police chief, 501(c)(3) organization executive director, school superintendent or principal, public housing authority executive director, tenant council president and any other key officials must state in writing their support for the program over the period of federal funding.

K. Priority is on paid staff, not volunteers. The paid staff include 2 or 3 civilians and 2 or 3 police officers. Paid civilian and police staff are carefully screened, selected, trained and supervised. All staff are approved by the Eisenhower Foundation. The civilian program director and local advisory board approve the 2 or 3 police officers who are proposed for the program. The selected police are sensitive to youth and to the community, and are open to learning. The priority for paid staff is on people who originally came from the neighborhood. The priority is on officers who now will live in the neighborhood.

L. Priority for full and part-time paid civilian staff is on persons who act as advocates, as developed in San Juan and Columbia. Advocates not only counsel youth but also work with a youth's family, coordinate with teachers on a youth's academic progress, and undertake other community outreach. Civilian mentors, near-peers and coaches also may be hired -- as long as the budget first adequately covers advocates.

Civilian advocates and police coaches and mentors who work one-on-one with youth see their role as full time, not just during "counseling activities." Advocates and mentors must make a continuous effort to interact with youth. The advocate or mentor's responsibility is not limited to the youth, but also to the youth's family and teachers. Advocates, coaches, counselors and mentors must be prepared to maintain a steady or dependable presence in a youth's life. The presence is all the more necessary during crisis (for example, going to juvenile court or spending extra time tutoring if the youth is on the edge of failing). Advocates or mentors who fail to meet these standards will be dismissed by the Eisenhower Foundation.

M. Civilians and police officers take a 10 unit Eisenhower Foundation course at the beginning of the program on how to advocate for, counsel, near peer and mentor youth -- and how to train others to do so. Civilian and police later receive other training. Police receive training from civilians in the program, above and beyond training in the local police academy. Much of this is informal, on-the-job training. A good guide is
the training of police by civilians at Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in Puerto Rico. The police chief also requires the commander of the officers to receive training in mentoring and the principles of the replication.

N. Volunteers are allowed, but only if carefully screened, selected, trained and supervised. The priority for volunteer staff is on people who come from the neighborhood, not outside.

O. The most basic feature of the program is a safe haven for youth that is run by civilian advocates, combined with a police ministation that shares the same space. The safe haven-ministation is most active from about 3:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., weekdays. It also is open on weekends. The safe haven-ministations is used as a magnet to attract other programs (like day care and employment training) at or near the same location.

P. Staff at the safe haven-ministation can be residential, nonresidential or both.

Q. Staff at the safe haven-ministation give first priority to advocating for, near-peering counseling and mentoring 50 high-risk youth. Staff work with these youth throughout the program. The evaluation follows these youth. Second priority is given to other youth and to neighborhood-wide development, as resources allow. "Neighborhood" is defined in terms of a specific geographic area.

R. Within the day-to-day functioning of the safe haven-ministation, the highest priority is given to helping youth with their homework, tutoring, learning through computers, providing social support and discipline to youth in their school activities and personal lives, providing positive role models, solving problems at home by sitting down with both parents and youth, developing youth at school through weekly liaison with teachers and other school staff, providing recreational opportunities, undertaking pre-employment and employment training, locating summer job opportunities, and teaching life skills (like how to save money and start a bank account or how to peacefully resolve conflicts with others). The goal is to develop youth, keep youth in school, improve their grades, keep them out of trouble, and make it possible to go on to college, if youth so choose.

S. Other program initiatives -- like youth leadership training and youth media enterprise (following the Dorchester Youth Collaborative model) -- should be seriously considered, and are summarized in Eisenhower Foundation program guidebooks. All staff, advisory board members and other local partners are required to read Foundation guidebooks -- yet also are encouraged to innovate their own initiatives that proceed creatively in new directions.
T. Police spend about half their time counseling and mentoring youth and about half their time undertaking community equity policing on foot or on bicycle, using the safe haven-minestation as home base. Civilian staff participate in community policing patrols. Patrol activity includes safe passage of youth to and from school. The goal is to develop youth, reduce serious crime in the neighborhood and improve the quality of life in the neighborhood.

U. A high priority is placed on youth and parents learning to trust police, and vice versa. Good examples of how this has occurred in safe haven-ministration programs are the experience of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in San Juan and Koban, Inc. in Columbia.

V. The Eisenhower Foundation will conduct a process and outcome evaluation that refines past evaluations -- based in part on studies by the Search Institute in Minneapolis. All local data collection will be undertaken by the Foundation -- not by staff of the local sites. Police will be paid for their work in preparing Index crime data, broken down by appropriate geographic areas.

Footnotes


Appendix 1

Methodology for Evaluating the First Generation Replications

The police in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago provided the Eisenhower Foundation with Part I Index crime data covering the years the programs operated. Part I Index crime as defined by the FBI consists of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, auto theft and larceny. There are more property crimes than violent crimes, so any composite like the Index summation of all 7 of these crimes is weighted in favor of property crimes. We here will refer to these Part I offenses simply as "Index crime."

In each city, Index crime data were provided by the police for (1) the neighborhood served by the program, (2) the whole city, and (3) the police precinct surrounding the target neighborhood.1,2 We determined whether the program had an impact on Index crime by comparing Index crime in the target neighborhood served by the program to Index crime in the city and then to Index crime in the surrounding police precinct. An effective program will produce greater declines in Index crime in its target neighborhood than declines in Index crime in either of these other areas.

The Index crime data were not uniform. Different cities gave us different levels of detail. To simplify the analytic problems this presents, we only analyzed the most serious crime -- Index crime. Presumably, measures of Index crime are comparable across cities. But we make no claim that the Index crime data are perfectly comparable across the four sites -- except to the extent that each city followed the procedures defining Index crime. However, some inconsistencies in the measurement of Index crime across the 4 cities can be an advantage in the analysis. If we can demonstrate impacts, our confidence in the results increases if the Index crime data are somewhat different from place to place -- because the effect of the program presumably is strong enough to overcome any effects the non-comparability of the data might have.

Police crime statistics are well-known as inaccurate measures of the extent of crime because they are affected by both the willingness of the public to report crime and by police practices in recording reports from the public. As long as they are constant over time within each city, these errors do not affect our analysis of change over time. It is reasonable to assume the errors in police Index crime data are constant over the short period covered by our data.3,4

Method
We looked at the percentage changes in Index crime reported over the 3 years that the programs operated. We compared the change in the program target neighborhood to the change for the city and for the police precinct within which the program was located, after removing the target neighborhood crime counts from the precinct data and after removing the precinct (and target neighborhood) crime counts from the city total. We took the number of crimes in the first year the program operated as the base number of crimes. We used this base crime count to compute the change in subsequent years as a percentage of the base year. For example, if there were 100 crimes in a city in the base year and 88 crimes the next year, crime in the second year was 88 percent of the base year number of crimes, or a decline of 12 percent in the number of crimes (100% - 88% = 12%). If there were 86 crimes in the third year, the third year rate would be 86 percent of the base year number of crimes. If the crime count went up to 112 in the second year, it would be 112 percent of the base. If there were no change in the number of crimes from year to year, our measure of change would be 0.

We used the first year in which the program operated at each site as the baseline year primarily because one site didn't provide any Index crime data for the years before the program began operation. The programs had only modest operations during the first parts of their first years. Consequently, first year crime data were a mix of the experience under both the program condition and under the condition of very little program, as often is the case with youth development and police initiatives. The only consequence of using the first program year as the baseline as compared to using the year before as the baseline is to produce a more conservative test of the impact of the program. This is because an effective program might be expected to reduce crime somewhat even in its first year (although not as much as in immediately subsequent years because it takes programs awhile to gear up to maximum effectiveness).

For the analysis of the impact of the Justice Department budget cut in Year 3 of the program, we compared the percentage that Index crime declined between the first and second program years, when funding levels were greater, to the percentage change in Index crime between the second and third program year, when budgets were cut by the Justice Department.

**Program Impact**

We analyzed the total number of Index crimes and did not disaggregate the total into its component crimes -- because the number of serious crimes in the target neighborhood was small. Disaggregating would have reduced the stability (reliability) of the data as an estimate of Index crime.
Two statistical analyses were done for each of 3 comparisons to determine the effect of the program. We compared the change in crime over 3 years for:

- The target neighborhood vs. the city
- The target neighborhood vs. the precinct
- The precinct vs. the city

These data were analyzed with two statistical tests, Student's t and the nonparametric Wilcoxin Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test.\(^5\)

The third year budget cut let us look at the effect of funding level on Index crime reduction.\(^6\) We compared the change in Index crime between the years of greater funding to the change in Index crime between Year 2 and the final year, of reduced funding.

**San Juan: Two Problems**

In terms of analyses, there were 2 problems encountered in San Juan that were not present at the other locations. First, there was a question of which year to use as the start of the Centro program. Centro began full operations a year before the Justice Department grant and a year before the other 3 sites started full program operations. Consequently, we did 2 analyses using different years for the start of Centro. One analysis took as the first year the first year of the program's operation. The other analysis took as the first year the first year of the Justice grant.

For the purposes of assessing the effects of the Justice Department grant, we limited the analysis to the period covered by that grant, which started in Centro's second year. For purposes of assessing the impact of the koban/community-based youth program, we used the first year of each project, which, in the case of Centro, was one year earlier than at the other locations.

The second issue in San Juan was defining the program target area. In contrast to San Juan, the police at the other 3 locations provided data that more closely matched their program's geographic target area. Chicago, for example, sent block level crime reports for the streets within the programs target area.

Centro is located within the Caimito precinct, more or less in the center of police reporting sector 813, which implies the target area was sector 813.
However, the patrol area covered by the koban officers was about equally
divided between reporting sectors 813 and 814, and covered less than half
of either sector. The patrol area implies that both sectors should be used to
define the target area. Consequently, we did the analysis twice, once for
the target area defined as sector 813 and then for the target area defined as
both sectors 813 and 814.

Everything considered, and especially in light of the geography of
Caimito, we are inclined to think that the best definition of the target area
is 813 and 814 combined.

These issues in San Juan produced 4 data analyses, as seen in Table 1.

Table 1
Alternative Geographic Areas and Start Dates, San Juan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What was the target area?</th>
<th>What was the first year?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>813 and 814</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>813</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impacts on Index Crime

From the start of the programs (4 years for San Juan, 3 years for the other
sites) through the end of the 3 year Justice Department grant, crime
deailed, on average, about 24 percent in the program target
neighborhoods, 10 percent in the cities, and 10 percent in the police
precinct surrounding the program target neighborhoods. Over the 3 years
the Justice-funded program operated, crime declined, on average, 19
percent in the target neighborhoods, 14 percent in the precincts, and 8
percent for the cities.

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the statistical analyses for the
aggregated target area data from the 4 cities, the aggregated precinct data
from the 4 cities and the aggregated city level data from the 4 cities.
Tables 2 and 3 show the results under all the options in Table 1. That is,
the aggregated 4 city results are shown under the assumptions of smaller
versus larger target neighborhoods for San Juan and under the assumptions
of 4 years of data versus 3 years of data for San Juan.

Tables 2 and 3 show that different ways of defining the target
neighborhood in San Juan and the year taken in San Juan as the first year
of the analysis do not affect the results. There was a statistically
significant difference in the percentage decline in Index crime between the program neighborhood and the comparison areas of both the cities and the surrounding police precincts.\textsuperscript{7,8}

Also, there was a statistically significant greater drop in Index crime in the precincts than in the cities.

These results indicate the program was effective in reducing Index crime - because Index crime dropped more in the target neighborhood than in either the precincts or in the cities.

To explain the meaning of Tables 2 and 3 in more detail, we note that there are 2 types of statistical analyses that differ in the assumptions that have to be made about the nature of the data being analyzed for the statistical test to work correctly. One of these, called parametric statistics, requires more conditions be met. However, if these conditions are met, parametric statistical tests are more powerful than the alternative. (Powerful in this case means the statistical test is able to detect a real difference for a given number of cases.)

The other type of statistics -- non-parametric statistical tests -- have almost no prior conditions for them to work. But they are less powerful.

\textbf{Table 2}

\textbf{Effects of the Program}

\textbf{Results of Parametric Statistical Analyses}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target v. City*</th>
<th>Target v. Precinct*</th>
<th>Precinct v. City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( t )</td>
<td>( P &lt; )</td>
<td>( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Years of San Juan data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 1 sector</td>
<td>6.075</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 2 sectors</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four years of San Juan data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 1 sector</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>4.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 2 sectors</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>.000000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* = one-tailed \( t \)-test

\textbf{Table 3}

\textbf{Effects of the Program}

\textbf{Results of Nonparametric Statistical Analyses}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target vs. City*</th>
<th>Target vs. Precinct*</th>
<th>Precinct vs. City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( P &lt; )</td>
<td>( P &lt; )</td>
<td>( P &lt; )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

263
Three years of San Juan data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 1 sector</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 2 sectors</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four years of San Juan data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 1 sector</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.0085</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 2 sectors</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = one-tailed test

We believe the best procedure is to use both. Then, when drawing conclusions, we don't have to worry about making errors that could result from either a failure to satisfy the conditions required by parametric statistics or from missing a true effect when using the less powerful non-parametric tests.

To see if it made any difference whether the koban target neighborhood in San Juan was defined by one or two police reporting areas, we compared the results of doing it both ways. We compared the target neighborhood to either the rest of the city or to the rest of its police precinct for the change in crime from each year to the next over the 3 or 4 years for which we had data.

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the analysis. In Table 2, the column "t" gives the value of the statistical test. The column "P<" shows whether the result was significant. (Chances were less than 5 out of 100 that the value of t was an accidental event.)

The first 2 rows of Table 2 tell us that when we use 3 years of San Juan data, we get the same result whether the target neighborhood is defined as 1 or 2 police sectors. In both cases, there was more improvement in Index crime for the target neighborhood than for either the rest of the city or for the rest of the Caimito police precinct. (All values of t were significant.)

The same pattern -- all t values are significant -- also occurs if we use 4 years of data instead of 3 years.

Table 3 shows the same pattern of results when a non-parametric test rather than the parametric t-test is used.

We then can gain confidence in the conclusion that the koban program had the desired effect on Index crime in the target neighborhood. This is because the target neighborhood had a statistically significant decline in Index crime when compared to either the rest of the city or to the rest of the police precinct where the target neighborhood was located, but which was not serviced by the koban. Moreover, these results were not affected
by either the way the target neighborhood was defined or by the number of years taken as the time the program operated.

**Impact of Different Budget Levels**

The Justice Department cut budgets during the last year of the program. The year before the budget cuts, Index crime in the target areas declined an average 18 percent. The year after the budget cuts, Index crime declined only 3 percent. The budget cuts allowed us to demonstrate the relationship between funding levels and Index crime.

We compared the change in Index crime between the first and second program years, when there was greater funding per year, to the change in Index crime between the second and third years. The Justice Department cut the budgets in the third year. There was a statistically significant difference in the percentage of the base year that Index crime went down in the year before the budget cut compared to the percentage base year Index crime declined during the program year affected by the budget -- with the chances being about 9 out of 10 that the budget cuts seriously impeded crime reduction. The statistical test results are in Table 4. The budget cuts resulted in a loss of program impact. Striking reductions in crime were greatly reduced (but not totally eliminated).

Eventually, we would expect the impact of the program to lessen. No program can cut Index crime by 20 percent a year forever. Therefore, was the drop in crime encountered in the third year only the expected decline in program impact rather than the effect of a budget cut? We think not, for two reasons. First, the change was too abrupt. The natural decline in effectiveness, what economists call diminishing marginal returns, is almost always smooth and gradual. Second, the change came too soon in the program's history. Much of the first year of a program's life is spent in organizing and implementing the program. Most programs don't really become operational until the second or even third year. We would expect at least a few years of strong program effects before diminishing returns set in. However, these programs were reduced after their second year of full operation. It appears that the budget cut adversely affected crime in these locations.

**Could Something Else Cause the Differences in Index Crime That We Found?**

Before we can conclude that the programs in the 4 cities were effective, we have to be as sure as we can that only the program intervention could have caused the pattern of changes we found in the Index crime data. Using 2 comparison conditions and 4 different sites around the country rules out many of the threats to validity. Of any remaining threats to
validity, the major concern is the "regression artifact" -- because a regression artifact could produce exactly the pattern we found of an initial large decline followed by no difference.

Table 4

Effects of the BJA Budget Cut: Statistical Analysis of Comparison of Full Funding to the Year After the Budget Cut.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t-test*</th>
<th>Wilcoxin test*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>P &lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three years of San Juan data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 1 sector</td>
<td>3.387</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 2 sectors</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four years of San Juan data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 1 sector</td>
<td>1.738</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro is 2 sectors</td>
<td>4.409</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* one-tailed

The regression artifact works something like this. Data can be divided into 2 parts, a true pattern and a distortion of the truth for a host of reasons that constitute random error in the data. Figure 1 shows 3 lines. One line is a set of random numbers, irrelevant error in the data. The second line shows a true pattern, a value that increases by one at every point on the x-axis. Because we never can directly measure the true patterns, the third line shows what happens when the random pattern and the real pattern are combined. The third line consists of "real data" from which we want to deduce the true pattern.

Suppose the true pattern is increasing crime and we want to find the effects of a crime prevention program. If we start our program at A in Figure 1 and measure the change in crime between A and B, we would conclude that crime declined and the program was effective. This is the wrong conclusion. The truth is that, in these data, crime always increases. Hence, the program failed.

How do we know this hypothetical pattern is not what we encountered in this study? How do we know the programs didn't take advantage of the quirks in the pattern of crime produced by random events?

First, skipping over some boring statistics and oversimplifying a little, the accidental pattern showing program improvement requires only that we
pick as our starting point a measure that is inflated by random error. It is necessary that the pre-test data are selected in some way that is tantamount to selecting data inflated by random errors. Given that, it doesn't matter when

Figure 1

Hypothetical Illustration of the Regression Artifact and Selection Bias

Figure 1

Hypothetical Illustration of the Regression Artifact and Selection Bias

A = Pre-test at selection point
B = Post-test

we do the post-test for the comparison. Therefore, the question is, did the programs start in a year when crime was unusually high because of the
random fluctuation in crime? If they did, then we would expect, for reasons unrelated to the program, that crime would drop.

There are several reasons for concluding that the decline in Index crime found for the Justice Department programs was real and not a statistical quirk. For example, our process evaluation looked at the reasons why the programs began, and none of the programs started in response to an unusual short term increase in Index crime. Index crime in the target areas in Chicago and Philadelphia had been steady for several years. Both the Chicago and Philadelphia programs began in response to growing citizen complaints over an inaccurately perceived fear that Index crime was increasing when in fact it was not.

In addition, the Boston youth program had been in operation for many years before the community police program began, and there were no unusual changes in Index crime, according to the police. In Philadelphia, the police started a community policing program the year before the involvement with the youth program by the police began. If there were regression effects or selection effects, they would have happened the year before the experimental program started.

San Juan is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. Index crime was increasing in Caimito because of police activity in central San Juan. Caimito is the most remote part of San Juan, more than 20 miles from downtown San Juan. Caimito is in the foothills of the mountain chain that forms the central spine of Puerto Rico, and it is an area of steep rugged hills and narrow twisting valleys. When the police cracked down on drug dealers in central San Juan, it appears that the crooks literally took to the hills. They fled to Caimito, where it is easier to hide. Index crime shot up in Caimito. It dropped dramatically in the program target area, but Index crime continued to climb in the rest of Caimito. If our data were biased by a regression artifact or by the police responding to pockets of exploding Index crime, Index crime would have dropped in all of Caimito, not just in the target area.

The way the target areas were selected also argues against regression or selection effects biasing the data. Sites were selected (1) having a community-based youth development program and (2) police and youth program willingness to work together. Index crime rates were not directly part of the selection process. Indirectly, Index crime affected the site locations in that youth programs are likely to be located in high Index crime areas because that is where high-risk youth live. But these areas are defined by long term high Index crime rates, not by the sudden short term jump that raises the possibility of regression or selection bias.
Further, the youth development programs pre-dated the project. With the exception of Chicago and Boston, community policing in the target area predated the project. Therefore, it is virtually impossible for the selection procedure to create a regression or selection bias in Index crime data.

Regression artifacts or selection biases do not happen out of the blue. Consciously or unconsciously, a decision has to be made to start collecting data at the point marked A in Figure 1. The histories of these programs shows that no such decision was made. Moreover, for all 4 sites, we would have had to experience a large random fluctuation in Index crime in the same year, except in San Juan, where it had to happen a year earlier. The probability that this happened is extremely remote.

**Other Possibilities**

Sometimes crime statistics collected by the police are affected, either intentionally or unintentionally, by police department policy or by the attitudes of the police. Could changes in police policy or attitudes have produced the results we found? We don't think it very likely. In most sites, the officers assigned to the project were not involved in recording Index crime reports. In 3 of the 4 sites, they worked outside the precinct police station where crimes were reported. (Crimes could be reported through the Philadelphia mini-station. In San Juan, it was police policy that crimes not be reported through the koban. The settings where the police worked in Boston and Chicago were organized to handle crime reports.) In all sites, the program was a small part of precinct operations and almost invisible at the city level. There was no opportunity for the program to bias the collection of Index crime reports.

Inspection of the data suggests that Index crime first dropped and then began to level out. Why should this happen? In addition to the effect of the budget cut, there are other possibilities. First, it could be a temporary glitch in the pattern, so the decline could resume in later years. In other words, there might not really have been a decline in the rate at which crime was declining in the program neighborhoods. But this was very unlikely -- because the leveling out was statistically significant.

Next, it could be that the effects of such programs are not linear. That is, when the programs were first introduced, they made a (relatively) big initial impact but further gains were incrementally smaller. This is a common pattern -- big initial impacts followed by smaller improvements - - found in everything from learning (the well known learning curve) to the economists' law of diminishing marginal returns. However, we would not expect a decline in effectiveness in the third year for several reasons. First, we would expect further improvement, not decline, in effectiveness in later years as the developmental effects of the program come into play.
Second, it is well established in the experience of the full range of prevention and youth development programs that it takes a year or more -- usually more -- to get a program up and running. The Justice Department cut the program's budget at a point in time when the program could be expected to have settled down from its initial growing pains and could be ready to have shown full effectiveness. Ordinarily, we would expect increasing effectiveness from any program through 3 or more years of operation, not the sudden stop to progress such as we found. As discussed earlier, the budget cut seems by far the most likely explanation of the Index crime data pattern, especially because the same leveling out was found at every site immediately following the budget cut.

Central Tendencies

Customarily, evaluation reports give statistical analyses of central tendencies -- i.e. the overall patterns in the data. We did that here. In addition, we also report the data for each separate case because the effects we identified in the statistical analysis are so consistent across the individual program locations that they can be seen in each individual case as well as in the statistical aggregate. It is unusual for social science data to reveal such consistent patterns that they can be clearly seen in every individual case as well as in the aggregate.

In looking at the results for the individual sites, readers should remember not to make too big a point over the few discrepancies where one site deviates from the overall pattern. For example, unlike the other 3 locations, Chicago shows a greater Index crime drop for the part of the police precinct that surrounds the target neighborhood than for the target neighborhood. That is of little consequence -- because the program's effect, as determined by statistical analysis, was statistically significant. It is well known and well established that there are variations from case to case in social science data, just as it is correct to say that, on the average, NBA players are taller than the average person even though some NBA players are not.

The big picture is what is important; trivial variations in the overall pattern can safely be ignored.

On the other hand, it is also valuable to look at each individual case rather than only looking at the average to be sure we are not misled by the problem of interpretation illustrated by the old joke about the man laying with his head on a block of ice and his feet in the oven who said, "On average, I'm quite comfortable."

Summary
Two lines of evidence create a compelling case that the program was effective. First, for the 4 Justice Department sites aggregated, Index crime in the neighborhood served by the programs declined much more than Index crime declined in either the city as a whole or in the police precinct surrounding the target neighborhood. Even with a very small number of cases, there was a significantly greater decline statistically in Index crime in the neighborhoods where the program operated than in either the city or in the surrounding police precinct. Second, we found that the positive impact of the program was related to the level of funding. When the Justice Department cut the program's budget in the last of the 3 program years, Index crime was reduced much less than it was during the earlier, higher level of funding.

Notes

1. Some sites gave us data on the entire precinct within which the program operated so we subtracted the crime counts for the target area from these data to get the figures for the surrounding precinct. Some sites gave us data with this subtraction already done.

2. The San Juan project was located in the middle of police sector 813, but the koban officers assigned to the project patrolled about equally in sectors 813 and 814. Therefore, we combined these two sectors to create the target area. The officers' patrol areas covered about 1/3 of each sector, but there is no way to refine the crime data to any geographical area that more closely matches the program target area.

Chicago crime data are available by blocks, so the police were able to create an accurate match between crime data and the program target area.

3. If there is bias, then the reported or observed crime rate is the sum of two parts, the true rate of crime and the bias. Let the observed rate of crime = c,

the true rate of crime = C
and bias in crime statistics = b, a constant,

The change in crime between two points in time is (since measurement error is a constant, it cancels out in the change measure, so, for simplicity, it is omitted in these equations):

\[ c_2 - c_1 = (C_2 + b) = \]
C2-C1+b-b = C2-C1
or
c2-c1 = C2-C1, the change in the observed crime rate is the same as the change in the true crime rate, so bias disappears.

The change in the crime rate is an unbiased measure as long as the bias is constant. The bias does not affect the measure of change. Strangely, we may not know accurately what the number of crimes is, but we can get an accurate measure of the change in crime from flawed data.

4. Moreover, even if there were a change in police practice in one or more of the 4 cities, it would not bias the analysis since it would affect both the treatment and control groups.

5. The nonparametric test makes fewer restrictive assumptions about the nature of the data.

6. The budget cut let us test the effect of funding levels as an experimental variable, which is preferable to a correlational analysis of different funding levels.

7. We might note that it takes an exceptionally powerful program effect to produce statistically significant differences with such a small number of cases.

8. Roughly speaking, the chances were only 1 of a 1,000 that the crime data differences resulted from chance. Since this probability of an accidental finding is so small (social science research usually considers 1 chance out 20 (= 5 out 100 = 50 out of 1,000) to be significant), we can conclude that the program was effective in reducing crime. Put another way, chances are 999 out of 1,000 that the program was effective. There is only 1 chance in 1,000 that the program was not effective.

This is a Bayesian interpretation of the analysis, assuming the prior probabilities equal zero. There are a number of advantages to using Bayesian analysis in program evaluations. See Baker (1993).
Appendix 2

Second Generation Methodology

Introduction

The evaluation comprised a process evaluation and an outcome evaluation. The process evaluation was conducted to document and analyze the implementation of the program, including key players, roles, resources, activities, capacity, community context, and perception of the program by youth, parents, staff, volunteers, partners, and police.

The outcome evaluation was conducted to assess if there were measurable improvements that could be attributed to the program. Two basic hypotheses which underlie the program principles were tested to determine outcomes. The first hypothesis was that youth participating at safe haven-ministations would improve on numerous behavior and attitude measures. This hypothesis was tested through administration and comparison of surveys to youth who attended a safe haven-ministation and to youth who did not, both at the start of the program and one year later. The second hypothesis was that crime would first increase and then decrease in the safe haven-ministation neighborhood. This hypothesis was tested by analysis of Index crime police reports for the safe haven-ministation area, an area selected for comparison, the district within which the safe haven-ministation operates, the district surrounding the comparison site, and city-wide.

Analysis was conducted separately for each city because implementation of the program was different at each site. Index crime data were also analyzed separately. Again, this was due to differences in program implementation at each site, and to differences in crime reporting by police departments.

While analysis is presented city by city, the same research design was employed throughout. With some exceptions, discussed below, the data collection and analytical techniques were identical for all cities.

Youth surveys were based on widely-recognized and reliable measures and concepts to test whether youth improved in ways expected after participating at the safe haven-ministation. We tested for improvement in self-efficacy and self-esteem, future hope and expectation, pro-social behavior, and academic performance. We tested for decreases in anti-social behaviors, such as drug and alcohol use, and violence.

Data Collection
Youth Surveys. Youth surveys were administered in each city by a locally hired staff person. Local data collectors were trained by the evaluation team and given written instructions. Letters of informed consent were distributed and collected from parents and guardians before the survey could be administered. Each survey was assigned an identification number that was coded to denote the city, the site, and an individual code for each respondent.

After completion of these steps, the local data collector would assemble the youth in a quiet and comfortable location and read them the survey questions. The youth circled their answers on an answer sheet that did not have their name on it, and they were informed that their answers were confidential. However, names and contact information were collected for each youth, so that they could be surveyed again one year later. It was explained to the youth that this list was on a separate sheet of paper from their answers and would be locked up and used only to find them for the next survey.

Pre-test surveys were administered to youth at the beginning of their participation at the safe haven-ministation, and to a group of youth selected as comparisons. The comparison sites were selected for similarity in the demographics and density to the safe haven-ministation area and youth at the comparison site were matched by age and gender to their safe haven-ministation counterparts. Post-test surveys were administered twelve to fifteen months later. The differences in when post-tests were administered arose due to the difficulty of finding the comparison youth, some of whom had moved, and to compliance of the local programs in conducting surveys. In Washington, D.C. and Baltimore the programs had already closed, and access to youth was more difficult.

After surveys were completed and mailed back to the Eisenhower Foundation, they were logged in and checked for completeness. Survey data were entered into an Access database and transferred to a statistical analysis program (SPSS) when complete. Accuracy of data entry was verified by a senior staff member by checking between ten and twenty percent of the records entered in their entirety, and by checking selected fields for all records.

The research design was intended to capture the same youth after one year. However, there were difficulties at some sites with finding the youth a year later, even after all contact information had been tried. Therefore, in Columbia, South Carolina, while we had surveys to compare youth before participation with youth who have been participating at the safe haven-ministation for one year, they were not the same youth. In Washington, D.C. surveys were conducted too late to be useful, because youth were
surveyed several months after the program closed. In Little Rock, Arkansas, no post-test surveys were submitted.

The city by city description below provides details of how the survey was actually administered at each location.

**Crime Data.** Local police departments were asked to provide the number of Part I Index Crimes and Part II crimes for the reporting area immediately around the safe haven-ministration, for the larger police district within which the safe haven-ministration operated, for an area comparable to the safe haven-ministration, but without a safe haven-ministration, and for the district within which the comparison site is located. They were also asked to provide city-wide crime statistics. Crime data for each year from 1991 through 1998 was requested.

Acquisition of the data from the local police departments was problematic in several ways. Police departments were not provided with any additional resources to provide such data, and the amount of data requested was fairly extensive. Often, police departments did not routinely aggregate data to the geographic areas needed for evaluation of the program, and this aggregation caused a burden to them and a delay in getting data in the best of circumstances. In some cases, police departments were unable to completely fulfill the requests.

**Report Cards.** Students were asked to submit report cards to the local data collector who would forward them to the evaluation team for analysis. However, submission of report cards was inconsistent, and in some cases students' report cards were withheld until fees owed for books or any other school charges were paid. Too few report cards were submitted for analysis to be meaningful.

**Site Visits.** Two annual site visits were conducted at Columbia, Memphis, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. One site visit was conducted at Little Rock. The purpose of the site visit was to obtain information on the replication, implementation, and outcomes of the Youth Initiatives and Police Mentoring program at each safe haven-ministration. At each site visit, the program was observed and individual interviews were held with program staff, youth participants, parents, volunteers, safe haven-ministration partners, and local police. Protocols for these interviews were developed in advance. Document review on site was conducted of program materials, such as attendance records, agenda, and event logs.

**Analysis**

**Youth Surveys.** Analysis was conducted primarily through General Linear Models Repeated Measures, controlling for any differences in the
age and gender of the groups being compared. Where possible, individual questions which were theoretically similar were grouped together into factors to increase reliability. Factors are conceptually related groups of questions, such as "what do you think are the chances you will graduate from high school," "what do you think are the chances you will get the job you really want," and "what do you think are the chances you will graduate from college." All of these questions make up a factor we called "future outlook". Similarly, we grouped questions about leadership in delinquent activities, self-esteem and self-efficacy, and drinking and doing drugs together. Internal consistency was determined for these groups of questions to make sure it was valid to consider them conceptually related. The future outlook scale had a Cronbach's alpha of .6793; antisocial leadership .7701; alcohol and drugs .7128; self-esteem/self-efficacy .7239. Individual questions were also analyzed.

In addition to comparing program versus comparison outcome scores, frequency of responses were obtained for several questions which dealt with program participants' assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the programs.

**Crime Data.** The primary form of analysis was to compute rates of change over time for Part I Index crimes, starting in the years before the safe haven-ministration opened, and continuing through 1998. A base year was identified which corresponded to the first year of safe haven-ministration operation, and change was computed between the average of the years before the base year, and the average of the years after the base year. Rates were calculated for the immediate safe haven-ministration area, a comparison area, and their surrounding police precincts, as well as city-wide. Juvenile crime rates were also examined where available, but the number of crimes for a small area, such as the safe haven-ministration neighborhood, was too small to reveal patterns of change.

### Site-specific Factors Affecting Methodology

**Columbia**

Youth were pre-tested in Columbia in October 1997. Contact information were obtained for all youth. However, the program director and local data collector were not able to locate the youth who were pre-tested. Therefore, post-tests conducted in October 1998 were conducted with different youth. Furthermore, the youth who were surveyed in October 1998 (post-tests) differed significantly in age between the safe haven-ministration site and the comparison site.

**Number of youth surveyed -Columbia**

276
Because the pre and post-test youth were not the same, we determined that change scores would not be meaningful, and did not report on differences experienced by the program youth over the year. However, the data are valid as a cross-sectional sample of youth surveyed before participating and youth surveyed after participating. We therefore restricted our use of the pre and post-test data to analyzing the differences between the program youth and the comparison youth.

Crime data were collected yearly from 1991 through mid-November 1998. Estimates were calculated to provide data for the remainder of 1998 (mid-November through December).

**Memphis**

Youth were pre-tested in October 1997 at the safe haven-ministration and a comparison site, and post-tested in October 1998. In most cases, the youth who were pre-tested were located and participated in the post-test. Some youth could not be located, and therefore the total number of surveys was slightly lower for the post-test group, as shown in the chart below.

### Number of youth surveyed - Memphis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>safe haven-ministration</th>
<th>comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-test</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-test</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crime data from the year before the safe haven-ministration opened were compared to the year after its opening. However, the housing development, LeMoyne Gardens, near which the safe haven-ministration was located was demolished beginning in 1996, and crime data were not collected for that development after that date.

**Baltimore**

Youth surveys were conducted in Baltimore in October 1997 and post-tests were conducted one year later. Due to difficulty in locating comparison youth after one year, there are fewer comparison youth in the post-test, who are the same as the youth pre-tested. Additional youth were located for at the comparison site for post-testing, but preliminary analysis revealed that the two comparison groups were not similar and should not
be combined. Therefore, analysis was conducted only on those youth who had participated in both the pre and post-tests.

**Number of youth surveyed - Baltimore**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>safe haven-ministration</th>
<th>comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-test</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-test</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50 (26 of same youth as pre-test)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Baltimore, the comparison neighborhood and the target neighborhood were located in the same precinct, so there is no separate analysis for the comparison precinct as in other cities.

**Washington, D.C.**

There is no youth survey analysis for Washington, D.C. Program staff did not return post-test surveys until several months after the safe haven-ministration program ended, making the data unreliable. They were also unable to locate many of the youth who were pre-tested.

The Washington, D.C. police department was not able to provide 1998 crime data, as they do not complete year-end analysis until May of the following year, which was after the writing of this report.

**Little Rock**

Little Rock did not return any youth surveys, although they were contacted for several months and were offered assistance in conducting the surveys. Therefore, there is no youth survey analysis for Little Rock.

Only one site visit was conducted to Little Rock. Follow-up information was obtained through phone interviews with the program director and police officer.

This table provides the statistical basis for Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 - Columbia, with the mean rating on each factor, and the computed F score at three levels: all youth in the program at both times (group), all youth pre-tested, regardless of program or comparison group (time), and the difference between means controlling for both the group and the survey time (group x time). The statistical significance of interest, and reported in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, is of group x time, which represents the difference between safe haven-ministration and comparison youth, after accounting for any pre-existing differences between them as evidenced in the pre-test.

**Table 1 - Columbia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE ON IMPACT VARIABLES FOR PROGRAM AND COMPARISON GROUPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

278
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>TIME 1</th>
<th>TIME 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FUTURE OUTLOOK - TIME 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>10.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FUTURE OUTLOOK - TIME 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>9.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistical Tests**

- \( F(\text{Time}) = 5.67, 1, 53 \text{ D.F., } P<.02 \)
- \( F(\text{Group}) = 21.33, 1, 53 \text{ D.F., } P<.000 \)
- \( F(\text{Group} \times \text{Time}) = \text{NSD} \)

| **ANTISOCIAL LEADERSHIP - TIME 1** |                 |                 |
| Avg Rating | 8.68            | 10.12           |
| Std Dev    | 0.00            | 3.40            |

**Statistical Tests**

- \( F(\text{Time}) = \text{NSD} \)
- \( F(\text{Group}) = 16.48, 1, 55 \text{ D.F., } P<.00 \)
- \( F(\text{Group} \times \text{Time}) = 4.88, 1, 55 \text{ D.F., } P<.03 \)

| **DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE - TIME 1** |                 |                 |
| Avg Rating | 4.88            | 4.89            |
| Std Dev    | 0.00            | 2.135           |

**Statistical Tests**

- \( F(\text{Time}) = \text{NSD} \)
- \( F(\text{Group}) = \text{NSD} \)
- \( F(\text{Group} \times \text{Time}) = \text{NSD} \)

| **SELF-ESTEEM / SELF-EFFICACY - TIME 1** |                 |                 |
| Avg Rating | 38.31           | 42.19           |
| Std Dev    | 0.00            | 2.96            |

**Statistical Tests**

- \( F(\text{Time}) = \text{NSD} \)
- \( F(\text{Group}) = \text{NSD} \)
- \( F(\text{Group} \times \text{Time}) = \text{NSD} \)

This table provides the statistical basis for Table 5.3 in Chapter 5 - Memphis, with the mean rating on each factor, and the computed F score at three levels: all youth in the program at both times (group), all youth pre-tested, regardless of program or comparison group (time), and the difference between means controlling for both the group and the survey time (group x time). The statistical significance of interest, and reported in Table 5.3 in Chapter 5, is of group x time, which represents the difference between safe haven-ministration and comparison youth, after accounting for any pre-existing differences between them as evidenced in the pre-test.
This table provides the statistical basis for Table 6.3 in Chapter 6 - Baltimore, with the mean rating on each factor, and the computed F score at three levels: all youth in the program at both times (group), all youth pre-tested, regardless of program or comparison group (time), and the difference between means controlling for both the group and the survey time (group x time). The statistical significance of interest, and reported in Table 6.3 in Chapter 6, is of group x time, which represents the difference between safe haven-
ministration and comparison youth, after accounting for any pre-existing differences between them as evidenced in the pre-test.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 - Baltimore</th>
<th>CHANGE ON IMPACT VARIABLES FOR PROGRAM AND COMPARISON GROUPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPARISON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURE OUTLOOK - TIME 1</td>
<td>9.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURE OUTLOOK - TIME 2</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = 8.21, 1, 55 D.F., P&lt;.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTISOCIAL LEADERSHIP - TIME 1</td>
<td>8.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTISOCIAL LEADERSHIP - TIME 2</td>
<td>7.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE - TIME 1</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE - TIME 2</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-ESTEEM / SELF-EFFICACY - TIME 1</td>
<td>39.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-ESTEEM / SELF-EFFICACY - TIME 2</td>
<td>39.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Rating</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (Group x Time) = NSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


_________. ATwenty-Five Years after the Kerner Commission. Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Washington, DC: Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, April, 1993(b).


DeMott, Benjamin. *ASeduced By Civility.* *Nation,* December 9, 1996, p. 11.


Gross, Jane. *A Remnant of the War on Poverty, the Job Corps is a Quiet Success.* @New York Times, February 17, 1993.


Harris, Irving B. *What Can We Do to Prevent the Cycle of Poverty?*. New Haven, CT: Child Study Center, Yale University, October 25, 1990.


Nation. A Dialing For Dollars. @March 24, 1997, p. 3.


Powell, Kenneth and Darnell F. Hawkins, Editors. AYouth Violence Prevention: Descriptions and Baseline Data from 13 Evaluation Projects.@ American Journal of Preventive Medicine, Supplement to Volume 12, Number 5, September/October 1996.


Rantin, Bertram. APolice Station Offers Safe Haven, City Service.@ South Carolina State, May 11, 1996, p. 3.


Royko, Mike. ACrime Dog Puts Bite on Taxpayers.@ Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1993, p. 3.


Sandel, Michael J. AMaking Nice is Not the Same as Doing Good.@ New York Times, December 29, 1996.


Sklar, Morton B. AProposed JTPA Reforms Miss the Mark.@ Youth Policy, September-October 1989, p. 36.


USA Today. APrevention Pays for Kids.@ USA Today, September 23, 1992, p. 10A.


__________. AWelfare=s Next Challenge: Sustained Employment.@ Washington Post,


