Chapter 2
Patterns of Disorder

INTRODUCTION

The President asked the Commission to answer several specific questions about the nature of riots:

- The kinds of communities in which they occurred;
- The characteristics—including age, education, and job history—of those who rioted and those who did not;
- The ways in which groups of lawful citizens can be encouraged to help cool the situation;
- The relative impact of various depressed conditions in the ghetto which stimulated people to riot;
- The impact of Federal and other programs on those conditions;
- The effect on rioting of police-community relationships;
- The parts of the community which suffered the most as a result of the disorders.

The Profiles in the foregoing chapter portray the nature and extent of 10 of the disorders which took place during the summer of 1967. This chapter seeks in these events, and in the others which we surveyed, a set of common elements to aid in understanding what happened and in answering the President’s questions.

This chapter also considers certain popular conceptions about riots. Disorders are often discussed as if there were a single type. The “typical” riot of recent years is sometimes seen as a massive uprising against white people, involving widespread burning, looting, and sniping, either by all ghetto Negroes or by an uneducated, Southern-born Negro underclass of habitual criminals or “riffraff”. An agitator at a protest demonstration, the coverage of events by the news media, or an isolated “triggering” or “precipitating” incident, is often identified as the primary spark of violence. A uniform set of stages is sometimes posited, with a succession of confrontations and withdrawals by two cohesive groups, the police on one side and a riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there was no effort within the Negro community to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is application of the largest possible police or control force, as early as possible.

What we have found does not validate these conceptions. We have been unable to identify constant patterns in all aspects of civil disorders. We have found that they are unusual, irregular, complex, and, in the present state of knowledge, unpredictable social processes. Like many human events, they do not unfold in orderly sequences.

Moreover, we have examined the 1967 disorders within a few months after their occurrence and under pressing time limitations. While we have collected information of considerable immediacy, analysis will undoubtedly improve with the passage and perspective of time and with the further accumulation and refinement of data. To facilitate further analysis we have appended much of our data to this report.

We have categorized the information now available about the 1967 disorders as follows:

- The pattern of violence over the nation: severity, location, timing, and numbers of people involved;
The riot process in a sample of 24 disorders we have surveyed:* prior events, the development of violence, the various control efforts on the part of officials and the community, and the relationship between violence and control efforts;

- The riot participants: a comparison of rioters with those who sought to limit the disorder and with those who remained uninvolved;

- The setting in which the disorders occurred: social and economic conditions, local governmental structure, the scale of Federal programs, and the grievance reservoir in the Negro community;

- The aftermath of disorder: the ways in which communities responded after order was restored in the streets.

Based upon information derived from our surveys, we offer the following generalizations:

1. No civil disorder was “typical” in all respects. Viewed in a national framework, the disorders of 1967 varied greatly in terms of violence and damage: while a relatively small number were major under our criteria and a somewhat larger number were serious, most of the disorders would have received little or no national attention as “riots” had the Nation not been sensitized by the more serious outbreaks.

2. While the civil disorders of 1967 were racial in character, they were not interracial. The 1967 disorders, as well as earlier disorders of the recent period, involved action within Negro neighborhoods against symbols of white American society—authority and property—rather than against white persons.

3. Despite extremist rhetoric, there was no attempt to subvert the social order of the United States. Instead, most of those who attacked white authority and property seemed to be demanding fuller participation in the social order and the material benefits enjoyed by the vast majority of American citizens.

4. Disorder did not typically erupt without pre-existing causes as a result of a single “triggering” or “precipitating” incident. Instead, it developed out of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which typically a series of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked in the minds of many in the Negro community with a shared reservoir of underlying grievances.

5. There was, typically, a complex relationship between the series of incidents and the underlying grievances. For example, grievances about allegedly abusive police practices, unemployment and underemployment, housing, and other conditions in the ghetto, were often aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by incidents involving the police, or the inaction of municipal authorities on Negro complaints about police action, unemployment, inadequate housing or other conditions. When grievance-related incidents recurred and rising tensions were not satisfactorily resolved, a cumulative process took place in which prior incidents were readily recalled and grievances reinforced. At some point in the mounting tension, a further incident—in itself often routine or even trivial—became the breaking point, and the tension spilled over into violence.

6. Many grievances in the Negro community result from the discrimination, prejudice and powerlessness which Negroes often experience. They also result from the severely disadvantaged social and economic conditions of many Negroes as compared with those of whites in the same city and, more particularly, in the predominantly white suburbs.

7. Characteristically, the typical rioter was not a hoodlum, habitual criminal or riffraff; nor was he a recent migrant, a member of an uneducated underclass or a person lacking broad social and political concerns. Instead, he was a teenager or young adult, a lifelong resident of the city in which he rioted, a high school dropout—but somewhat better educated than his Negro neighbor—and almost invariably underemployed or employed in a menial job. He was proud of his race, extremely hostile to both whites and middle-class Negroes and, though informed about politics, highly distrustful of the political system and of political leaders.

8. Numerous Negro counterrioters walked the streets urging rioters to “cool it.” The typical counterrioter resembled in many respects the majority of Negroes, who neither rioted nor took action against the rioters, that is, the noninvolved. But certain differences are crucial: the counterrioter was better educated and had higher income than either the rioter or the noninvolved.

9. Negotiations between Negroes and white officials occurred during virtually all the disorders surveyed. The negotiations often involved young, militant Negroes as well as older, established leaders. Despite a setting of chaos and disorder, negotiations in many

* See the Statement on Methodology in the Appendix for a description of our survey procedures.
cases involved discussion of underlying grievances as well as the handling of the disorder by control authorities.

10. The chain we have identified—discrimination, prejudice, disadvantaged conditions, intense and pervasive grievances, a series of tension-heightening incidents, all culminating in the eruption of disorder at the hands of youthful, politically-aware activists—must be understood as describing the central trend in the disorders, not as an explanation of all aspects of the riots or of all rioters. Some rioters, for example, may have shared neither the conditions nor the grievances of their Negro neighbors; some may have cooly and deliberately exploited the chaos created by others; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Nor do we intend to suggest that the majority of the rioters, who shared the adverse conditions and grievances, necessarily articulated in their own minds the connection between that background and their actions.

11. The background of disorder in the riot cities was typically characterized by severely disadvantaged conditions for Negroes, especially as compared with those for whites; a local government often unresponsive to these conditions; Federal programs which had not yet reached a significantly large proportion of those in need; and the resulting reservoir of pervasive and deep grievance and frustration in the ghetto.

12. In the immediate aftermath of disorder, the status quo of daily life before the disorder generally was quickly restored. Yet, despite some notable public and private efforts, little basic change took place in the conditions underlying the disorder. In some cases, the result was increased distrust between blacks and whites, diminished interracial communication, and growth of Negro and white extremist groups.

I. THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND DAMAGE

LEVELS OF VIOLENCE AND DAMAGE

Because definitions of civil disorder vary widely, between 51 and 217 disorders were recorded by various agencies as having occurred during the first 9 months of 1967. From these sources we have developed a list of 164 disorders which occurred during that period. We have ranked them in three categories of violence and damage, utilizing such criteria as the degree and duration of violence, the number of active participants, and the level of law enforcement response:

Major Disorders

Eight disorders, 5 percent of the total, were major. These were characterized generally by a combination of the following factors: (1) many fires, intensive looting, and reports of sniping; (2) violence lasting more than 2 days; (3) sizeable crowds; and (4) use of National Guard or Federal forces as well as other control forces.

Serious Disorders

Thirty-three disorders, 20 percent of the total, were serious but not major. These were characterized generally by: (1) isolated looting, some fires, and some rock throwing; (2) violence lasting between 1 and 2 days; (3) one sizeable crowd or many small groups and (4) use of state police though generally not National Guard or Federal forces.

Minor Disorders

One hundred and twenty-three disorders, 75 percent of the total, were minor. These would not have been classified as "riots" or received wide press attention without national conditioning to a "riot" climate. They were characterized generally by: (1) a few fires or broken windows; (2) violence lasting generally less than 1 day; (3) participation by only small numbers of people; and (4) use, in most cases, only of local police or police from a neighboring community.

The 164 disorders which we have categorized occurred in 128 cities. Twenty-five (20 percent) of the cities had two or more disturbances. New York had five separate disorders, Chicago had four, six cities had three and 17 cities had two. Two cities which experienced a major disorder—Cincinnati and Tampa—had subsequent disorders; Cincinnati had two more. However, in these two cities the later disorders were less serious than the earlier ones. In only two cities were later disorders more severe.
Three conclusions emerge from the data:

- The significance of the 1967 disorders cannot be minimized. The level of disorder was major or serious, in terms of our criteria, on 41 occasions in 39 cities.
- The level of disorder, however, has been exaggerated. Three-fourths of the disorders were relatively minor and would not have been regarded as nationally-newsworthy "riots" in prior years.
- The fact that a city had experienced disorder earlier in 1967 did not immunize it from further violence.

DISTRIBUTION IN TERMS OF TIME, AREA
AND SIZE OF COMMUNITY

Time
In 1967, disorders occurred with increasing frequency as summer approached and tapered off as it waned. More than 60 percent of the 164 disorders occurred in July alone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month (1967)</th>
<th>Number of major disorders</th>
<th>Number of serious disorders</th>
<th>Number of minor disorders</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area
The violence was not limited to any one section of the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of major disorders</th>
<th>Number of serious disorders</th>
<th>Number of minor disorders</th>
<th>Total (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and border</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When timing and location are considered together, other relationships appear. Ninety-eight disorders can be grouped into 23 clusters, which consist of two or more disturbances occurring within 2 weeks and within a few hundred miles of each other.

"Clustering" was particularly striking for two sets of cities. The first, centered on Newark, consisted of disorders in 14 New Jersey cities. The second, centered on Detroit, consisted of disturbances in seven cities in Michigan and one in Ohio.

Size of Community
The violence was not limited to large cities. Seven of the eight major disorders occurred in communities with populations of 250,000 or more. But 37 (23 percent) of the disorders reviewed occurred in communities with populations of 50,000 or less; and 67 disorders (41 percent) occurred in communities with populations of 100,000 or less, including nine (about 22 percent) of the 41 serious or major disturbances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City population (in thousands)</th>
<th>Number of major disorders</th>
<th>Number of serious disorders</th>
<th>Number of minor disorders</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-300</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DEATH, INJURY AND DAMAGE

In its study of 75 disturbances in 67 cities, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations reported 83 deaths and 1,897 injuries. Deaths occurred in 12 of these disturbances. More than 60 percent of the deaths and more than half the injuries occurred in Newark and Detroit. In more than 60 percent of the disturbances, no deaths and no more than 10 injuries were reported.

Substantial damage to property also tended to be concentrated in a relatively small number of cities. Of the disorders which the Commission surveyed, significant damage resulted in Detroit ($40-$45 million), Newark ($10.2 million), and Cincinnati (more than $1 million). In each of nine cities, damage was estimated at less than $100,000.

Fire caused extensive damage in Detroit and Cincinnati, two of the three cities which suffered the greatest destruction of property. Newark had relatively little loss from fire but extensive inventory loss from looting and damage to stock.

Damage estimates made at the time of the Newark and Detroit disorders were later greatly reduced. Early estimates in Newark ranged from $15 to $25 million; a month later the estimate was revised to $10.2 million. In Detroit, newspaper damage estimates at first ranged from $200 million to $500 million; the highest recent estimate is $45 million.

What we have said should not obscure three important factors. First, the dollar cost of the disorders should be increased by the extraordinary administrative expenses of municipal, state and Federal Governments. Second, deaths and injuries are not the sole measures of the cost of civil disorders in human terms. For example, the cost of dislocation of people—though clearly not quantifiable in dollars and cents—was a significant factor in Detroit, the one case in which...
many residences were destroyed.\textsuperscript{18} Other human costs—fear, distrust, and alienation—were incurred in every disorder. Third, even a relatively low level of violence and damage in absolute terms may seriously disrupt a small or medium-sized community.

**VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE**

Of the 83 persons who died in the 75 disorders studied by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, about 10 percent were public officials, primarily law officers and firemen. Among the injured, public officials made up 38 percent.\textsuperscript{19} The overwhelming majority of the civilians killed and injured were Negros.

Retail businesses suffered a much larger proportion of the damage during the disorders than public institutions, industrial properties, or private residences. In Newark, 1,029 establishments, affecting some 4,492 employers and employees, suffered damage to buildings or loss of inventory or both. Those which suffered the greatest loss through footing, in descending order of loss, were liquor, clothing, and furniture stores.

White-owned businesses are widely believed to have been damaged much more frequently than those owned by Negros. In at least nine of the cities studied, the damage seems to have been, at least in part, the result of deliberate attacks on white-owned businesses characterized in the Negro community as unfair or disrespectful toward Negros.\textsuperscript{20}

Not all the listed damage was purposeful or was caused by rioters. Some was a by-product of violence. In certain instances police and fire department control efforts caused damage. The New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders has found that in Newark, retributive action was taken against Negro-owned property by control forces.\textsuperscript{21} Some damage was accidental. In Detroit some fire damage, especially to residences, may have been caused primarily by a heavy wind.

Public institutions generally were not targets of serious attacks,\textsuperscript{22} but police and fire equipment was damaged in at least 15 of the 23 cities.\textsuperscript{23}

Of the cities surveyed, significant damage to residences occurred only in Detroit. In at least nine of the 22 other cities there was minor damage to residences, often resulting from fires in adjacent businesses.\textsuperscript{24}

**II. THE RIOT PROCESS**

The Commission has found no "typical" disorder in 1967 in terms of intensity of violence and extensiveness of damage. To determine whether, as is sometimes suggested, there was a typical "riot process," we examined 24 disorders which occurred during 1967 in 20 cities and three university settings.\textsuperscript{25} We have concentrated on four aspects of that process:

- The accumulating reservoir of grievances in the Negro community;
- "Precipitating" incidents and their relationship to the reservoir of grievances;
- The development of violence after its initial outbreak;
- The control effort, including official force, negotiation, and persuasion.

We found a common social process operating in all 24 disorders in certain critical respects. These events developed similarly, over a period of time and out of an accumulation of grievances and increasing tension in the Negro community. Almost invariably, they exploded in ways related to the local community and its particular problems and conflicts. But once violence erupted, there began a complex interaction of many elements—rioters, official control forces, counter-rioters—in which the differences between various disorders were more pronounced than the similarities.
THE RESERVOIR OF GRIEVANCES IN THE NEGRO COMMUNITY

Our examination of the background of the surveyed disorders revealed a typical pattern of deeply held grievances which were widely shared by many members of the Negro community.27 The specific content of the expressed grievances varied somewhat from city to city. But in general, grievances among Negroes in all the cities related to prejudice, discrimination, severely disadvantaged living conditions, and a general sense of frustration about their inability to change those conditions.

Specific events or incidents exemplified and reinforced the shared sense of grievance. News of such incidents spread quickly throughout the community and added to the reservoir. Grievances about police practices, unemployment and underemployment, housing, and other objective conditions in the ghetto were aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by the inaction of municipal authorities.

Out of this reservoir of grievance and frustration, the riot process began in the cities which we surveyed.

PRECIPITATING INCIDENTS

In virtually every case a single “triggering” or “precipitating” incident can be identified as having immediately preceded—within a few hours and in generally the same location—the outbreak of disorder.28 But this incident was usually a relatively minor, even trivial one, by itself substantially disproportionate to the scale of violence that followed. Often it was an incident of a type which had occurred frequently in the same community in the past without provoking violence.

We found that violence was generated by an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which typically not one, but a series of incidents occurred over a period of weeks or months prior to the outbreak of disorder.29 Most cities had three or more such incidents; Houston had 10 over a 5-month period. These earlier or prior incidents were linked in the minds of many Negroes to the preexisting reservoir of underlying grievances. With each such incident, frustration and tension grew until at some point a final incident, often similar to the incidents preceding it, occurred and was followed almost immediately by violence.

As we see it, the prior incidents and the reservoir of underlying grievances contributed to a cumulative process of mounting tension that spilled over into violence when the final incident occurred. In this sense the entire chain—the grievances, the series of prior tension-heightening incidents, and the final incident—was the “precipitant” of disorder.

This chain describes the central trend in the disorders we surveyed and not necessarily all aspects of the riots or of all rioters. For example, incidents have not always increased tension; and tension has not always resulted in violence. We conclude only that both processes did occur in the disorders we examined.

Similarly, we do not suggest that all rioters shared the conditions or the grievances of their Negro neighbors: some may deliberately have exploited the chaos created out of the frustration of others; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Some who shared the adverse conditions and grievances did not riot.

We found that the majority of the rioters did share the adverse conditions and grievances, although they did not necessarily articulate in their own minds the connection between that background and their actions.

Newark and Detroit presented typical sequences of prior incidents, a buildup of tensions, a final incident, and the outbreak of violence:

NEWARK

Prior Incidents
1963: A Newark policeman shot and killed an 18-year-old Negro boy. After the policeman had stated that he had fallen and his gun had discharged accidentally, he later claimed that the youth had assaulted another officer and was shot as he fled. At a hearing it was decided that the patrolman had not used excessive force. The patrolman remained on duty, and his occasional assignment to Negro areas was a continuing source of irritation in the Negro community.

April 1967: Approximately 15 Negroes were arrested while picketing a grocery store which they claimed sold bad meat and used unfair credit practices.

Late May, early June: Negro leaders had for several months voiced strong opposition to a proposed medical-dental center to be built on 150 acres of land in the predominantly Negro central ward. The dispute centered mainly around the lack of relocation provisions for those who would be displaced by the medical center. The issue became extremely volatile in late May when public “blight hearings” were held regarding the land to be condemned. The hearings became a public forum in which many residents spoke against the proposed center. The city did not change its plan.

Late May, June: The mayor recommended appointment of a white city councilman who had no more than a high school education to the position of secretary to the board of education. Reportedly, there was widespread support from both whites and Negroes for a Negro candidate who held a master’s degree and was considered more qualified. The mayor did not change his recommendation. Ultimately, the original secretary retained his position and neither candidate was appointed.

July 8: Several Newark policemen, allegedly including the patrolman involved in the 1965 killing, entered East Orange to assist the East Orange police during an altercation with a group of Negro men.

Final Incident
July 12, approximately 9:30 p.m.: A Negro cab driver was injured during or after a traffic arrest in the heart of the central ward. Word spread quickly, and a crowd gathered in front of the Fourth Precinct stationhouse across the street from a large public housing project.
Initial Violence

Some day, approximately 11:30 p.m.: The crowd continued to grow until it reached 300 to 500 people. One or two Molotov cocktails were thrown at the stationhouse. Shortly after midnight the police dispersed the crowd, and window-breaking and looting began a few minutes later. By about 1 a.m., the peak level of violence for the first night was reached.

Detroit

Prior Incidents

August 1966: A crowd formed during a routine arrest of several Negro youths in the Kercheval section of the city. Tensions were high for several hours, but no serious violence occurred.

June 1967: A Negro prostitute was shot to death on her front steps. Rumors in the Negro community attributed the killing to a vice-squad officer. A police investigation later reportedly unearthed leads to a disgruntled pimp. No arrests were made.

June 26: A young Negro man on a picnic was shot to death while reportedly trying to protect his pregnant wife from assault by seven white youths. The wife witnessed the slaying and miscarried shortly thereafter. Of the white youths, only one was charged. The others were released.

Final Incident

July 23, approximately 3:45 a.m.: Police RAIDED a "blind pig," a type of night club in the Negro area which served drinks after hours. Eighty persons were in the club—more than the police had anticipated—attending a party for several servicemen, two of whom had recently returned from Vietnam. A crowd of about 200 persons gathered as the police escorted the patrons into the police wagons.

Initial Violence

Approximately 5:00 a.m.: As the last police cars drove away from the "blind pig," the crowd began to throw rocks. By 8:00 a.m., looting had become widespread. Violence continued to increase throughout the day, and by evening reached a peak level for the first day.

In the 24 disorders surveyed, the events identified as tension-heightening incidents, whether prior or final, involved issues which generally paralleled the grievances we found in these cities. The incidents identified were of the following types:

Police Actions

Some 40 percent of the prior incidents involved allegedly abusive or discriminatory police actions. Most of the police incidents began routinely and involved a response to, at most, a few persons rather than a large group.

A typical incident occurred in Bridgeton, N.J., 5 days before the disturbance when two police officers went to the home of a young Negro man to investigate a nonsupport complaint. A fight ensued when the officers attempted to take the man to the police station, and the Negro was critically injured and partially

Service station burns amid gutted buildings, Detroit, July 1967
paralyzed. A Negro minister representing the injured man's family asked for suspension of the two officers involved pending investigation. This procedure had been followed previously when three policemen were accused of collusion in the robbery of a white-owned store. The Negro's request was not granted.

Police actions were also identified as the final incident preceding 12 of the 24 disturbances. Again, in all but two cases, the police action which became the final incident began routinely.

The final incident in Grand Rapids occurred when police attempted to apprehend a Negro driving an allegedly stolen car. A crowd of 30 to 40 Negro spectators gathered. The suspect had one arm in a cast, and some of the younger Negroes in the crowd intervened because they thought the police were handling him too roughly.

Protest Activities

Approximately 22 percent of the prior incidents involved Negro demonstrations, rallies, and protest meetings. Only five involved appearances by nationally known Negro militants.

Protest rallies and meetings were also identified as the final incident preceding five disturbances. Nationally known Negro militants spoke at two of these meetings; in the other three only local leaders were involved. A prior incident involving alleged police brutality was the principal subject of each of three rallies. Inaction of municipal authorities was the topic for two other meetings.

White Racist Activities

About 17 percent of the prior incidents involved activities by whites intended to discredit or intimidate Negroes or violence by whites against Negroes. These included some 15 cross-burnings in Bridgeport, the harassment of Negro college students by white teenagers in Jackson, Mississippi, and, in Detroit, the slaying of a Negro by a group of white youths. No final incidents were classifiable as racist activity.

Previous Disorders in the Same City

In this category were approximately 16 percent of the prior incidents, including seven previous disorders, the handling of which had produced a continuing sense of grievance. There were other incidents, usually of minor violence, which occurred prior to seven disorders and were seen by the Negro community as precursors of the subsequent disturbance. Typically, in Plainfield the night before the July disorder, a Negro youth was injured in an altercation between white and Negro teenagers. Tensions rose as a result. No final incidents were identified in this category.

Disorders in Other Cities

Local media coverage and rumors generated by the Newark and Detroit riots were specifically identi-
Typical was a case in Houston a month-and-a-half before the disorder. Three civil rights advocates were arrested for leading a protest and for their participation in organizing a boycott of classes at the predominantly Negro Texas Southern University. Bond was set at $25,000 each. The court refused for several days to reduce bond, even though TSU officials dropped the charges they had originally pressed.

There were no final incidents identified involving the administration of justice.

In a unique case in New Haven, the shooting of a Puerto Rican by a white man was identified as the final incident before violence.67

Finally, we have noted a marked relationship between prior and final incidents within each city. In most of the cities surveyed, the final incident was of the same type as one or more of the prior incidents. For example, police actions were identified as both the final incident and one or more prior incidents preceding seven disturbances.49 Rallies or meetings to protest police actions involved in a prior incident were identified as the final incident preceding three additional disturbances.50 The cumulative reinforcement of grievances and heightening of tensions found in all instances were particularly evident in these cases.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENCE

Once the series of precipitating incidents culminated in violence, the riot process did not follow a uniform pattern in the 24 disorders surveyed.50 However, some similarities emerge.

The final incident before the outbreak of disorder, and the initial violence itself, generally occurred at a time and place in which it was normal for many people to be on the streets. In most of the 24 disorders, groups generally estimated at 50 or more persons were on the street at the time and place of the first outbreak.51

In all 24 disturbances, including the three university-related disorders, the initial disturbance area consisted of streets with relatively high concentrations of pedestrian and automobile traffic at the time. In all but two cases—Detroit and Milwaukee—violence started between 7 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., when the largest numbers of pedestrians could be expected. Ten of the 24 disorders erupted on Friday night, Saturday, or Sunday.52

In most instances, the temperature during the day on which violence first erupted was quite high.53 This contributed to the size of the crowds on the street, particularly in areas of congested housing.

Major violence occurred in all 24 disorders during the evening and night hours, between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., and in most cases between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m.54 In only a few disorders, including Detroit and Newark, did substantial violence occur or continue during the daytime.55 Generally, the night-day cycles continued in daily succession through the early period of the disorder.56

At the beginning of disorder, violence generally flared almost immediately after the final precipitating incident.57 It then escalated quickly to its peak level, in the case of 1-night disorders, and to the first night peak in the case of continuing disorders.58 In Detroit and Newark, the first outbreaks began within two hours and reached severe, although not the highest, levels within 3 hours.

In almost all of the subsequent night-day cycles, the change from relative order to a state of disorder by a number of people typically occurred extremely rapidly—within 1 or 2 hours at the most.59

Nineteen of the surveyed disorders lasted more than 1 night.60 In 10 of these, violence peaked on the first night, and the level of activity on subsequent nights was the same or less.61 In the other nine disorders, however, the peak was reached on a subsequent night.62

Disorder generally began with less serious violence against property, such as rock and bottle-throwing and window-breaking.63 These were usually the materials and the targets closest to hand at the place of the initial outbreak.

Once store windows were broken, looting usually followed.64 Whether fires were set only after looting occurred is unclear. Reported incidents of fire-bombing and Molotov cocktails in the 24 disorders appeared to occur as frequently during one cycle of violence as during another in disorders which continued through more than one cycle.65 However, fires seemed to break out more frequently during the middle cycles of riots lasting several days.66 Gunfire and sniping were also reported more frequently during the middle cycles.67

THE CONTROL EFFORT

What type of community response is most effective once disorder erupts is clearly a critically important question. Chapter 12, "Control of Disorder," and the Supplement on Control of Disorder consider this question at length. We consider in this section the variety of control responses, official and unofficial, utilized in the 24 surveyed disorders, including:

- Use or threatened use of local official force;
- Use or threatened use of supplemental official force from other jurisdictions;
- Negotiations between officials and representatives from the Negro community;
- On-the-street persuasion by "counterrioters."

Disorders are sometimes discussed as if they consisted of a succession of confrontations and withdrawals by two cohesive groups, the police or other control force on one side and a riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there was no effort within the Negro
community to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is mobilization of the largest possible police or control force as early as possible.

None of these views is accurate. We found that:

- A variety of different control forces employed a variety of tactics, often at the same time, and often in a confused situation;
- Substantial non-force control efforts, such as negotiations and on-the-street persuasion by "counterfeiters," were usually underway, often simultaneously with forcible control efforts; counterfeit activity often was carried on by Negro residents of the disturbance area, sometimes with and frequently without official recognition;
- No single tactic appeared to be effective in containing or reducing violence in all situations.

Local official force

In 20 of the 24 disorders, the primary effort to restore order at the beginning of violence was made entirely by local police. In 10 cases no additional outside force was called for after the initial response. In only a few cases was the initial control force faced with crowds too large to control.

The police approach to the initial outbreak of disorder in the surveyed cities was generally cautious. Three types of response were employed. One was dispersal (clearing the area, either by arrests or by scattering crowds), used in 10 cases. Another was reconnaissances (observing and evaluating developments), used in eight cases. In half of these instances, they soon withdrew from the disturbance area, generally because they believed they were unable to cope with the disorder. The third was containment (preventing movement in or out of a cordoned or barricaded area), used in six cases.

No uniform result from utilizing any of the three control approaches is apparent. In at least half of the 24 cases, it can reasonably be said that the approach taken by the police failed to prevent the continuation of violence. To the extent that their effectiveness is measurable, the conclusion appears to hold for subsequent police control responses as well. There is also evidence in some instances of over-response in subsequent cycles of violence.

The various tactical responses we have described are not mutually exclusive, and in many instances combinations were employed. The most common were attempts at dispersal in the disturbance area and a simultaneous cordon or barricade at the routes leading from the disturbance area to the central commercial area of the city, either to contain the disturbance or to prevent persons outside the area from entering it, or both.

In 11 disorders a curfew was imposed at some time, either as the major dispersal technique or in combination with other techniques. In only four disorders was tear gas used at any point as a dispersal technique.

Only Newark and New Haven used a combination of all three means of control—cordons, curfews, and tear gas.

Supplemental Official Force

In nine disturbances—involving a wide variation in the intensity of violence—additional control forces were brought in after there had been serious violence which local police had been unable to handle alone. In every case, further violence occurred, often more than once and often of equal or greater intensity than before.

The result was the same when extra forces were mobilized before serious violence. In four cities where this was done, violence nonetheless occurred, in most cases more than once, and often of equal or greater intensity than in the original outbreak.

In the remaining group of seven cities, no outside control forces were called, because the level and duration of violence were lower. Outbreaks in these cities nevertheless followed the same random pattern as in the cities which used outside forces.

Negotiation

In 21 of the 24 disturbances surveyed, discussion or negotiation occurred during the disturbance. These took the form of relatively formal meetings between government officials and Negroes during which grievances and issues were discussed and means were sought to restore order.

Such meetings were usually held either immediately before or soon after the outbreak of violence. Meetings often continued beyond the first or second day of the disorder and, in a few instances, through the entire period of the disorder.

The Negro participants in these meetings usually were established leaders in the Negro community, such as city councilmen or members of human relations commissions, ministers, or officers of civil rights or other community organizations. However, Negro youths participated in over one-third of these meetings. In a few disorders both youths and adult Negro leaders participated, sometimes without the participation of local officials.

Employees of community action agencies occasionally participated, either as intermediaries or as participants. In some cases they provided the meeting place.

Discussions usually included issues generated by the disorder itself, such as the treatment by the police of those arrested. In 12 cases, prior ghetto grievances, such as unemployment and inadequate recreational facilities, were included as subjects. Often both disorder-related and prior grievances were discussed, with the focus generally shifting from the former to the latter as the disorder continued.

How effective these meetings were is, as in the
case of forcible response, impossible to gauge. Again, much depends on who participated, timing, and other responses being made at the same time.

Counterrioters
In all but six of the 24 disorders, Negro private citizens were active on the streets attempting to restore order primarily by means of persuasion. In a Detroit survey of riot area residents over the age of 15, some 14 percent stated that they had been active as counterrioters.

Counterrioters sometimes had some form of official recognition from either the mayor or a human relations council. Police reaction in these cases varied from total opposition to close cooperation. In most cases, some degree of official authorization was given before the activity of the counterrioters began, and in a smaller number of cases, their activity was not explicitly authorized but merely condoned by the authorities.

III. THE RIOT PARTICIPANT

It is sometimes assumed that the rioters were criminal types, overactive social deviants, or riffraff—recent migrants, members of an uneducated underclass, alienated from responsible Negroes, and without broad social or political concerns. It is often implied that there was no effort within the Negro community to attempt to reduce the violence.

We have obtained data on participation from four different sources:
- Eyewitness accounts from more than 1,200 interviews in our staff reconnaissance survey of 20 cities;
- Interview surveys based on probability samples of riot area residents in the two major riot cities—Detroit and Newark—designed to elicit anonymous self-identification of participants as rioters, counterrioters or noninvolved;
- Arrest records from 22 cities; and
- A special study of arrestees in Detroit.

Only partial information is available on the total numbers of participants. In the Detroit survey, approximately 11 percent of the sampled residents over the age of 15 in the two disturbance areas admittedly participated in rioting; another 20 to 25 percent admitted to having been bystanders but claimed that they had not participated; approximately 16 percent claimed they had engaged in counterriot activity; and the largest proportion (48 to 53 percent) claimed they were at home or elsewhere and did not participate. However, a large proportion of the Negro community apparently believed that more was gained than lost through rioting, according to the Newark and Detroit surveys.

Greater precision is possible in describing the characteristics of those who participated. We have combined the data from the four sources to construct a profile of the typical rioter and to compare him with the counterrioter and the noninvolved.

THE PROFILE OF A RIOTER

The typical rioter in the summer of 1967 was a Negro, unmarried male between the ages of 15 and 24. He was in many ways very different from the stereotype. He was not a migrant. He was born in the state and was a lifelong resident of the city in which the riot took place. Economically his position was about the same as his Negro neighbors who did not actively participate in the riot.

Although he had not, usually, graduated from high school, he was somewhat better educated than the average inner-city Negro, having at least attended high school for a time.

Nevertheless, he was more likely to be working in a menial or low status job as an unskilled laborer. If he was employed, he was not working full time and his employment was frequently interrupted by periods of unemployment.

He feels strongly that he deserves a better job and that he is barred from achieving it, not because of lack of training, ability, or ambition, but because of discrimination by employers.

He rejects the white bigot's stereotype of the Negro as ignorant and shiftless. He takes great pride in his race and believes that in some respects Negroes are superior to whites. He is extremely hostile to whites, but his hostility is more apt to be a product of social and economic class than of race; he is almost equally hostile toward middle class Negroes.
survey data. However, the arrest data, which is contemporaneous with the riot, suggest that few outsiders were involved: 90 percent of those arrested resided in the riot city, 7 percent lived in the same state, and only 1 percent were from outside the state. Our interviews in 20 cities corroborate these conclusions.

Income

In the Detroit and Newark survey data, income level alone does not seem to correlate with self-reported riot participation. The figures from the two cities are not directly comparable since respondents were asked for individual income in Detroit and family income in Newark. More Detroit self-reported rioters (38.6 percent) had annual incomes under $5,000 per year than the noninvolved (30.3 percent), but even this small difference disappears when the factor of age is taken into account.

In the Newark data, in which the age distributions of self-reported rioters and the noninvolved are more similar, there is almost no difference between the rioters, 32.6 percent of whom had annual incomes under $5,000, and the noninvolved, 29.4 percent of whom had annual incomes under $5,000.

The similarity in income distribution should not, however, lead to the conclusion that more affluent Negroes are as likely to riot as poor Negroes. Both surveys were conducted in disturbance areas where incomes are considerably lower than in the city as a whole and the surrounding metropolitan area. Nevertheless, the data show that rioters are not necessarily the poorest of the poor.

While income fails to distinguish self-reported rioters from those who were not involved, it does distinguish counterrioters from rioters and the noninvolved. Less than 9 percent of both those who rioted and those not involved earned more than $10,000 annually. Yet almost 20 percent of the counterrioters earned this amount or more. In fact, there were no male self-reported rioters in the Detroit survey who earned less than $5,000 annually. In the Newark sample there were seven respondents who owned their own homes; none of them participated in the riot. While extreme poverty does not necessarily move a man to riot, relative affluence seems at least to inhibit him from attacking the existing social order and may motivate him to take considerable risks to protect it.

Education

Level of schooling is strongly related to participation. Those with some high school education were more likely to riot than those who had only finished grade school. In the Detroit survey, 93 percent of the self-reported rioters had gone beyond grade school, compared with 72.1 percent of the noninvolved. In the Newark survey the comparable figures are 98.1 and 85.7 percent. The majority of self-reported rioters were not, however, high school graduates.

The counterrioters were clearly the best educated of the three groups. Approximately twice as many counterrioters had attended college as had the noninvolved, and half again as many counterrioters had attended college as rioters. Considered with the information on income, the data suggest that counterrioters were probably well on their way into the middle class.

Education and income are the only factors which distinguish the counterrioter from the noninvolved. Apparently, a high level of education and income not only prevents rioting but is more likely to lead to active, responsible opposition to rioting.

Employment

The Detroit and Newark surveys, the arrest records from four cities, and the Detroit arrest study all indicate that there are no substantial differences in unemployment between the rioters and the noninvolved.

Unemployment levels among both groups were extremely high. In the Detroit survey, 29.6 percent of the self-reported rioters were unemployed; in the Newark survey, 29.7 percent; in the four-city arrest data, 33.2 percent; and in the Detroit arrest study, 21.8 percent. The unemployment rates for the noninvolved in the Detroit and Newark surveys were 31.3 and 19.0 percent.

Self-reported rioters were more likely to be only intermittently employed, however, than the noninvolved. Respondents in Newark were asked whether they had been unemployed for as long as a month or more during the last year. Sixty-one percent of the self-reported rioters, but only 43.4 percent of the noninvolved, answered, “yes.”
He is substantially better informed about politics than Negroes who were not involved in the riots. He is more likely to be actively engaged in civil rights efforts, but is extremely distrustful of the political system and of political leaders.

THE PROFILE OF THE COUNTERRIOTER

The typical counterrioter, who risked injury and arrest to walk the streets urging rioters to "cool it," was an active supporter of existing social institutions. He was, for example, far more likely than either the rioter or the noninvolved to feel that this country is worth defending in a major war. His actions and his attitudes reflected his substantially greater stake in the social system; he was considerably better educated and more affluent than either the rioter or the noninvolved. He was somewhat more likely than the rioter, but less likely than the noninvolved, to have been a migrant. In all other respects he was identical to the noninvolved.\(^{113}\)

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS

Race

Of the arrestees 83 percent were Negroes; 15 percent were whites.\(^{114}\) Our interviews in 20 cities indicate that almost all rioters were Negroes.

Age

The survey data from Detroit, the arrest records, and our interviews in 20 cities, all indicate that the rioters were late teenagers or young adults.\(^{115}\) In the Detroit survey, 61.3 percent of the self-reported rioters were between the ages of 15 and 24, and 86.3 percent were between 15 and 35. The arrest data indicate that 52.5 percent of the arrestees were between 15 and 24, and 80.8 percent were between 15 and 35.

Of the noninvolved, by contrast, only 22.6 percent in the Detroit survey were between 15 and 24, and 38.3 percent were between 15 and 35.

Sex

In the Detroit survey, 61.4 percent of the self-reported rioters were male. Arrestees, however, were almost all male—89.3 percent.\(^{116}\) Our interviews in 20 cities indicate that the majority of rioters were male. The large difference in proportion between the Detroit survey data and the arrestee figures probably reflects either selectivity in the arrest process or less dramatic, less provocative riot behavior by women.

Family Structure

Three sources of available information—the Newark survey, the Detroit arrest study, and arrest records from four cities—indicate a tendency for rioters to be single—56.2 percent—more often than the noninvolved—49.6 percent.

The Newark survey also indicates that rioters were more likely to have been divorced or separated—14.2 percent—than the noninvolved—6.4 percent. However, the arrest records from four cities indicate that only a very small percentage of those arrested fall into this category.

In regard to the structure of the family in which he was raised, the self-reported rioter, according to the Newark survey, was not significantly different from many of his Negro neighbors who did not actively participate in the riot. Twenty-five and five-tenths percent of the self-reported rioters and 23 percent of the noninvolved were brought up in homes where no adult male lived.\(^{118}\)

Region of Upbringing

Both survey data and arrest records demonstrate unequivocally that those brought up in the region in which the riot occurred are much more likely to have participated in the riots. The percentage of self-reported rioters brought up in the North is almost identical for the Detroit survey—74.4 percent—and the Newark survey—74 percent. By contrast, of the noninvolved, 36 percent in Detroit and 52.4 percent in Newark were brought up in the region in which the disorder occurred.\(^{119}\)

Data available from five cities on the birthplace of arrestees indicate that 63 percent of the arrestees were born in the North. Although birthplace is not necessarily identical with place of upbringing, the data are sufficiently similar to provide strong support for the conclusion.

Of the self-reported counterrioters, however, 47.5 percent were born in the North, according to the Detroit survey, a figure which places them between self-reported rioters and the noninvolved. Apparently, a significant consequence of growing up in the South is the tendency toward noninvolvement in a riot situation, while involvement in a riot, either in support of or against existing social institutions, was more common among those born in the North.

Residence

Rioters are not only more likely than the noninvolved to have been born in the region in which the riot occurred, but they are also more likely to have been long-term residents of the city in which the disturbance took place.\(^{120}\) The Detroit survey data indicate that 59.4 percent of the self-reported rioters, but only 34.6 percent of the noninvolved, were born in Detroit. The comparable figures in the Newark survey are 53.5 percent and 22.5 percent.

Outsiders who temporarily entered the city during the riot might have left before the surveys were conducted and therefore may be underestimated in the
Despite generally higher levels of education, rioters were more likely than the noninvolved to be employed in unskilled jobs. In the Newark survey, 50 percent of the self-reported rioters, but only 39.6 percent of the noninvolved, had unskilled jobs.

Attitudes About Employment

The Newark survey data indicate that self-reported rioters were more likely to feel dissatisfied with their present jobs than were the noninvolved. Only 29.3 percent of the rioters, compared with 44.4 percent of the noninvolved, thought their present jobs appropriate for them in responsibility and pay. Of the self-reported rioters, 67.6 percent, compared with 56.1 percent of the noninvolved, felt that it was impossible to obtain the kind of job they wanted. Of the self-reported rioters, 69 percent, as compared with 50 percent of the noninvolved, felt that racial discrimination was the major obstacle to finding better employment. Despite this feeling, surprising numbers of rioters (76.9 percent) responded that “getting what you want out of life is a matter of ability, not being in the right place at the right time.”

Racial Attitudes

The Detroit and Newark surveys indicate that rioters have strong feelings of racial pride, if not racial superiority. In the Detroit survey, 48.6 percent of the self-reported rioters said that they felt Negroes were more dependable than whites. Only 22.4 percent of the noninvolved stated this. In Newark, the comparable figures were 45 and 27.8 percent. The Newark survey data indicate that rioters wanted to be called “black” rather than “Negro” or “colored” and were somewhat more likely than the noninvolved to feel that all Negroes should study African history and languages.

To what extent this racial pride antedated the riot or was produced by the riot is impossible to determine from the survey data. Certainly the riot experience seems to have been associated with increased pride in the minds of many participants. This was vividly illustrated by the statement of a Detroit rioter:

Interviewer: You said you were feeling good when you followed the crowds?

Respondent: I was feeling proud, man, at the fact that I was a Negro. I felt like I was a first-class citizen. I didn’t feel ashamed of my race because of what they did.

Similar feelings were expressed by an 18-year-old Detroit girl who reported that she had been a looter:

Interviewer: What is the Negro then if he’s not American?

Respondent: A Negro, he’s considered a slave to the white folks. But half of them know that they’re slaves and feel that they can’t do nothing about it because they’re just going along with it. But most of them they seem to get it in their heads now how the white folks treat them and how they’ve been treating them and how they’ve been slaves for the white folks.

Along with increased racial pride there appears to be intense hostility toward whites. Self-reported rioters in both the Detroit and Newark surveys were more likely to feel that civil rights groups with white and Negro leaders would do better without the whites. In Detroit, 36.1 percent of the self-reported rioters thought that this statement was true, while only 21.1 percent of the noninvolved thought so. In the Newark survey, 51.4 percent of the self-reported rioters agreed; 33.1 percent of the noninvolved shared this opinion.

Self-reported rioters in Newark were also more likely to agree with the statement, “Sometimes I hate white people.” Of the self-reported rioters, 72.4 percent agreed; of the noninvolved, 50 percent agreed.

The intensity of the self-reported rioters’ racial feelings may suggest that the recent riots represented traditional interracial hostilities. Two sources of data suggest that this interpretation is probably incorrect.

First, the Newark survey data indicate that rioters were almost as hostile to middle-class Negroes as they were to whites. Seventy-one and four-tenths percent of the self-reported rioters, but only 59.5 percent of the noninvolved, agreed with the statement, “Negroes who make a lot of money like to think they are better than other Negroes.” Perhaps even more significant, particularly in light of the rioters’ strong feelings of racial pride, is that 50.5 percent of the self-reported rioters agreed that “Negroes who make a lot of money are just as bad as white people.” Only 35.2 percent of the noninvolved shared this opinion.

Second, the arrest data show that the great majority of those arrested during the disorders were generally charged with a crime relating to looting or curfew violations. Only 2.4 percent of the arrests were for assault and 0.1 percent were for homicide, but 31.3 percent of the arrests were for breaking and entering—crimes directed against white property rather than against individual whites.

Political Attitudes and Involvement

Respondents in the Newark survey were asked about relatively simple items of political information, such as the race of prominent local and national political figures. In general, the self-reported rioters were much better informed than the noninvolved. For example, self-reported rioters were more likely to know that one of the 1966 Newark mayoral candidates was a Negro. Of the rioters, 77.1 percent—but only 61.6 percent of the noninvolved—identified him correctly. The overall scores on a series of similar questions also reflect the self-reported rioters’ higher levels of information.

Self-reported rioters were also more likely to be involved in activities associated with Negro rights. At the most basic level of political participation, they were more likely than the noninvolved to talk frequently about Negro rights. In the Newark survey, 53.8 per-
cent of the self-reported rioters, but only 34.9 percent of the noninvolved, said that they talked about Negro rights nearly every day.

The self-reported rioters also were more likely to have attended a meeting or participated in civil rights activity. Of the rioters, 39.3 percent—but only 25.7 percent of the noninvolved—reported that they had engaged in such activity.

In the Newark survey, respondents were asked how much they thought they could trust the local government. Only 4.8 percent of the self-reported rioters, compared with 13.7 percent of the noninvolved, said that they felt they could trust it most of the time; 44.2 percent of the self-reported rioters and 33.9 percent of the noninvolved reported that they could almost never trust the government.

In the Detroit survey, self-reported rioters were much more likely to attribute the riot to anger about politicians and police than were the noninvolved. Of the self-reported rioters, 43.2 percent—but only 19.6 percent of the noninvolved—said anger against politicians had a great deal to do with causing the riot. Of the self-reported rioters, 70.5 percent, compared with 48.8 percent of the noninvolved, believed that anger against the police had a great deal to do with causing the riot.

Perhaps the most revealing and disturbing measure of the rioters’ anger at the social and political system was their response to a question asking whether they thought “the country was worth fighting for in the event of a major world war.” Of the self-reported rioters, 39.4 percent in Detroit and 52.8 percent in Newark shared a negative view. In contrast, 15.5 percent of the noninvolved in Detroit and 27.8 percent of the noninvolved in Newark shared this sentiment. Almost none of the self-reported counterrioters in Detroit—3.3 percent—agreed with the self-reported rioters.

Some comments of interviewees are worthy of note:

Not worth fighting for—if Negroes had an equal chance it would be worth fighting for.

Not worth fighting for—I am not a true citizen so why should I?

Not worth fighting for—because my husband came back from Vietnam and nothing had changed.

IV. THE BACKGROUND OF DISORDER

In response to the President’s questions to the Commission about the riot environment, we have gathered information on the pre-riot conditions in 20 of the cities surveyed. We have sought to analyze the backgrounds of the disorders in terms of four basic groupings of information:

- The social and economic conditions as described in the 1960 census, with particular reference to the area of each city in which the disturbance took place;
- Local governmental structure and its organizational capacity to respond to the needs of the people, particularly those living in the most depressed conditions;
- The extent to which Federal programs assisted in meeting these needs; and
- The nature of the grievances in the ghetto community.

It is sometimes said that conditions for Negroes in the riot cities have improved over the years and are not materially different from conditions for whites; that local government now seeks to accommodate the demands of Negroes and has created many mechanisms for redressing legitimate complaints; that Federal programs now enable most Negroes who so desire, to live comfortably through welfare, housing, employment or antipoverty assistance; and that grievances are harbored only by a few malcontents and agitators.

Our findings show the contrary. In the riot cities we surveyed, we found that Negroes were severely disadvantaged, especially as compared with whites; that local government is often unresponsive to this fact; that Federal programs have not yet reached a significantly large proportion of those in need; and that these facts create a reservoir of unredressed grievances and frustration in the ghetto.

THE PATTERN OF DISADVANTAGE

Social and economic conditions in the riot cities constituted a clear pattern of severe disadvantage for Negroes as compared with whites, whether the Negroes lived in the disturbance area or outside of it. When ghetto conditions are compared with those for whites in the suburbs, the relative disadvantage for Negroes is even greater.

In all the cities surveyed, the Negro population increased between 1950 and 1960 at a median rate of 73 percent. Meanwhile, the white population decreased in more than half the cities—including six which experienced the most severe disturbances in 1967. The increase in nonwhite population in four of these cities was so great that their total population increased despite the decrease in white population. These changes were attributable in large part to heavy in-migration of Negroes from rural poverty areas and movement of whites from the central cities to the suburbs.

In all the cities surveyed:

- The percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area exceeded the percentage of Negro population in the entire city. In some cases it was twice, and in nine instances triple, the city-wide percentage.
- The Negro population was invariably younger than the white population.
Negroes had completed fewer years of education and proportionately fewer had attended high school than whites. A larger percentage of Negroes than whites were in the labor force. Yet they were twice as likely to be unemployed as whites. In cities where they had greater opportunities to work at skilled or semi-skilled jobs, proportionately more Negro men tended to be working, or looking for work, than white men. Conversely, the proportion of men working, or looking for work, tended to be lower among Negroes than whites in cities that offered the least opportunities for skilled or semi-skilled labor. Among the employed, Negroes were more than three times as likely to be in unskilled and service jobs as whites. Negroes earned less than whites in all the surveyed cities, averaging barely 70 percent of white income, and were more than twice as likely to be living in poverty. A smaller proportion of Negro children than white children under 18 were living with both parents. However, family “responsibility” was strongly related to opportunity. In cities where the proportion of Negro men in better-than-menial jobs was higher, median Negro family income was higher, and the proportion of children under 18 living with both parents was also higher. Both family income and family structure showed greater weakness in cities where job opportunities were more restricted to unskilled jobs. Fewer Negroes than whites owned their own homes. Among nonhomeowners, Negroes paid the same rent, but they paid a higher share of their incomes for rent than did whites. Although housing cost Negroes relatively more, their housing was three times as likely to be overcrowded and substandard as dwellings occupied by whites.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

In the riot cities surveyed, we found that:
- All major forms of local government were represented.
- In a substantial minority of instances, a combination of at-large election of legislators and a “weak-mayor” system resulted in fragmentation of political responsibility and accountability.
- The proportion of Negroes in government was substantially smaller than the Negro proportion of population.
- Almost all the cities had some formal grievance machinery, but typically it was regarded by most Negroes interviewed as ineffective and was generally ignored.

All major forms of municipal government were represented in the 20 cities examined. Fourteen had a mayor-city council form of government, five had a council-city manager, and one had a commission. The division of power between the legislative and executive branches varied widely from city to city. Of the mayor-council cities, eight could be characterized as “strong mayor/weak city council” systems in the sense that the mayor had broad appointive and veto powers. Five could be characterized as “weak mayor/strong council” forms, where the city council had broad appointive and veto powers. In one city, Milwaukee, such powers appeared to be evenly balanced.

In 17 of the 20 cities, mayors were elected directly. Mayors were part-time in eight cities. Almost all the cities had a principal executive, either a mayor or a city manager, who earned a substantial annual salary. Terms of office for mayors ranged from 2 to 4 years.

In eight cities, all legislators were elected at large and therefore represented no particular legislative ward or district. Six of these cities also had either a city manager or a “weak-mayor” form of government. In these cities, there was heavy reliance upon the city council as the principal elected policymaking authority. This combination of factors appeared to produce even less identification by citizens with any particular elected official than in the 12 cities which elected all legislators from wards or districts or used a combination of election by districts and at large.

The proportion of Negroes in the governments of the 20 cities was substantially smaller than the median proportion of Negro population—16 percent. Ten percent of the legislators in the surveyed cities were Negroes. Only in New Brunswick and Phoenix was the proportion of legislators who were Negroes as great as the percentage of the total population that was nonwhite. Six cities had no Negro legislators. Only three cities had more than one Negro legislator: Newark and Plainfield had two, and New Haven had five. None of the 20 cities had or had ever had a Negro mayor or city manager. In only four cities did Negroes hold other important policymaking positions or serve as heads of other municipal departments.

In seven cities Negro representatives had been elected to the State legislature.

In 17 of the cities, however, Negroes were serving on boards of education. In all 17 cities which had human relations councils or similar organizations, Negroes were represented on the boards of such organizations.

One of the most surprising findings is that in 17 of the 20 surveyed riot cities, some formal grievance machinery existed before the 1967 disorders—a municipal human relations council or similar organization authorized to receive citizen complaints about racial or other discrimination by public and private agencies. Existence of these formal channels, however, did not necessarily achieve their tension-relieving purpose. They were seldom regarded as effective by Negroes who were interviewed. The councils generally consisted of prominent citizens, including one or more Negroes, serving part time and with little or no salary.

With only one exception, the councils were wholly advisory and mediating, with power to conciliate and make recommendations but not to subpoena witnesses or enforce compliance. While most of the councils had full-time paid staff, they were generally organized only as loosely affiliated departments of the city government. The number of complaints filed with the
councils was low considering both the size of the Negro populations and the levels of grievance manifested by the disorders. Only five councils received more than 100 complaints a year. In almost all cases, complaints against private parties were mediated informally by these councils. But complaints against governmental agencies usually were referred for investigation to the agencies against whom the complaints were directed. For example, complaints of police misconduct were accepted by most councils and then referred directly to the police for investigation.

In only two cities did human relations councils attempt to investigate complaints against the police. In neither case did they succeed in completing the investigation.

Where special channels for complaints against the police existed, the result appears to have been similar. In several of the cities, police-community relations units had been established within the police department, in most instances within two years before the disorder. However, complaints about police misconduct generally were forwarded to the police investigative unit, complaint bureau or police chief for investigation.

In all the cities which had a police-community relations unit, during the year preceding the disorder, complaints against policemen had been filed with or forwarded to the police department. In at least two of these cities the police department stated that the complaints had been investigated and that disciplinary action had been taken in several cases. Whether or not these departments in fact did take action on the complaints, the results were never disclosed to the public or to complainants. The grievances on which the complaints were based often appeared to remain alive.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS

What was the pattern of governmental effort to relieve ghetto conditions and to respond to needs in the cities which experienced disorders in 1967?

We have attempted no comprehensive answer to this large and complex question. Instead, we have surveyed only the key Federal antipoverty programs in Detroit, Newark, and New Haven—cities which received substantial Federal funds and also suffered severe disorders.

Among the large number of Federal programs to aid cities, we have concentrated on five types, which relate to the most serious conditions and which involve sizable amounts of Federal assistance. We have sought to evaluate those amounts against the proportion of persons reached.

We conclude that:

- While these three cities received substantial amounts of Federal funds in 1967 for manpower, education, housing, welfare and community action programs, the number of persons assisted by those programs in almost all cases constituted only a fraction of those in need.
- In at least 11 of the 15 programs examined (five programs in each of the three cities), the number of people assisted in 1967 was less than half of those in need.
- In one of the 15 programs, the percentage rose as high as 72 percent.
- The median was 33 percent.

Manpower

Our study included all major manpower and employment programs including basic and remedial education, skill training, on-the-job training, job counseling, and placement.

A 1966 Department of Labor study of 10 slum areas, as well as our own survey of 20 disorder areas, indicates that underemployment may be an even more serious problem for ghetto residents that unemployment. However, our measurement of need for manpower programs is based on unemployment figures alone because underemployment data are not available for the three cities surveyed. The Department of Labor estimates that underemployment rates in major central-city ghettos are a multiple of the unemployment rate.

In Detroit, during the first three quarters of 1967, Federal funds, obligated in the amount of $19.6 million, provided job training opportunities for less than one-half of the unemployed.

During the first 9 months of 1967, the labor force in Detroit totaled 650,000 persons, of whom 200,000 were Negroes. The average unemployment rate for that period was 2.7 percent for whites and 9.6 percent for Negroes. The total average number unemployed during that period was 31,350, of whom 19,200 (61 percent) were Negroes.

During the same period, there were 22 manpower programs (excluding MDTA institutional programs) in various stages of operation in Detroit. Twenty of the programs provided for 15,979 trainees.

In Newark, in the first half of 1967, $2.6 million of Federal funds provided job training opportunities for less than 20 percent of the unemployed. And in New Haven, during the first three quarters of 1967, Federal funds in the amount of $2.1 million provided job training opportunities for less than one-third of the unemployed.

Education

For purposes of comparing funding to needs, we have limited our examination to two major Federal education programs for the disadvantaged: The Title I program under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and the Adult Basic Education Program. Title I provides assistance to schools having concentrations of educationally disadvantaged children, defined as children from families having annual incomes of less than $3,000 or supported by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
(AFDC). Title I supports remedial reading, career guidance for potential dropouts, reduced pupil-teacher ratios, special teacher training, educational television and other teaching equipment, and specialized staff for social work, guidance and counseling, psychiatry and medicine. The Adult Basic Education program is designed to teach functionally illiterate adults to read.

In order to measure the total Federal contributions to state and local educational expenditures, we have also included such other Federal programs as Head Start, for disadvantaged preschool children; the larger institutional Manpower Development and Training Programs; the Teacher Corps; library material and supplementary education projects under Titles II and III of ESEA; and vocational education programs.

In Detroit, during the 1967-68 school year, $11.2 million of ESEA Title I funds assist only 31 percent of the eligible students. Adult Basic Education reaches slightly more than 2 percent of the eligible beneficiaries. Federal contributions to the Detroit public school system add about 10 percent to state and local expenditures.191

In Newark, during the 1967-68 school year, $4 million of ESEA Title I funds assist about 72 percent of the eligible students. The number of persons reached by the Adult Basic Education program is only approximately 6 percent of the number of functionally illiterate adults. Federal contributions to the Newark public school system add about 11 percent to state and local expenditures.192

In New Haven, during the 1967-68 school year, ESEA Title I funds in the amount of $992,000 assist only 40 percent of the eligible students in the middle and senior high schools. Although all eligible beneficiaries in 14 target elementary schools are aided, none of the eligible beneficiaries in 19 non-target elementary schools is reached. Adult Basic Education reaches less than 4 percent of eligible beneficiaries. Federal contributions to the New Haven public school system add about 7 percent to state and local expenditures.193

Housing

The major Federal programs we have examined which are, at least in part, designed to affect the supply of low-income housing, include urban renewal, low rent public housing, housing for the elderly and handicapped, rental supplements, and FHA below market interest rate mortgage insurance (BMIR).

To measure the extent of need for low-income housing, we have used the number of substandard and overcrowded units.194 In measuring the size of housing programs, we have included expenditures for years before 1967 because they affected the low-income housing supply available in 1967.

In Detroit, a maximum of 758 low-income housing units have been assisted through these programs since 1956. This amounts to 2 percent of the substandard units and 1.7 percent of the overcrowded units.195 Yet, since 1960, approximately 8,000 low-income units have been demolished for urban renewal.

Similarly, in Newark, since 1959, a maximum of 3,760 low-income housing units have been assisted through the programs considered. This amounts to 16 percent of the substandard units and 23 percent of the overcrowded units.196 During the same period, more than 12,000 families, mostly low-income, have been displaced by such public uses as urban renewal, public housing and highways.

In New Haven, since 1952, a maximum of 951 low-income housing units have been assisted through the programs considered. This amounts to 14 percent of the substandard units and 20 percent of the overcrowded units.197 Yet since 1956, approximately 6,500 housing units, mostly low-income, have been demolished for highway construction and urban renewal.

Welfare

We have considered four Federally assisted programs which provide monetary benefits to low-income persons: Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).198

In Detroit, the number of persons reached with $48.2 million of Federal funds through the four welfare programs during fiscal year 1967 was approximately 19 percent of the number of poor persons.199 In Newark, the number of persons reached with $15 million was approximately 54 percent.200 In New Haven, the number reached with $3.9 million was approximately 40 percent.201

Community Action Programs

We have considered such community action programs as neighborhood service centers, consumer education, family counseling, low-cost credit services, small business development, legal services, programs for the aged, summer programs, home economics counseling, and cultural programs.202

In Detroit, the number of persons reached by $12.6 million of community action funds in 1967 was only about 30 percent of the number of poor persons. Federal funding of these programs averaged approximately $35 for each poor person.203 In Newark, the number of persons reached by $1.9 million was about 44 percent. Federal funding of these programs averaged approximately $21 for each poor person.204 In New Haven, the number reached by $2.3 million was approximately 42 percent. Federal funding averaged approximately $72 for each poor person.205

GRIEVANCES

To measure the present attitudes of people in the riot cities as precisely as possible, we are sponsoring two attitude surveys among Negroes and whites in
15 cities and four suburban areas, including four of the 20 cities studied for this chapter. These surveys are to be reported later.

In the interim we have attempted to draw some tentative conclusions based upon our own investigations and the more than 1200 interviews we conducted relatively soon after the disorders.

In almost all the cities surveyed, we found the same major grievance topics among Negro communities—although they varied in importance from city to city. The deepest grievances can be ranked into the following three levels of relative intensity:

First Level of Intensity
1. Police practices
2. Unemployment and underemployment
3. Inadequate housing

Second Level of Intensity
4. Inadequate education
5. Poor recreation facilities and programs
6. Ineffectiveness of the political structure and grievance mechanisms

Third Level of Intensity
7. Disrespectful white attitudes
8. Discriminatory administration of justice
9. Inadequacy of Federal programs
10. Inadequacy of municipal services
11. Discriminatory consumer and civil practices
12. Inadequate welfare programs

Our conclusions for the 20 cities have been generally confirmed by a special interview survey in Detroit sponsored by the Detroit Urban League.

Police practices were, in some form, a significant grievance in virtually all cities and were often one of the most serious complaints. Included in this category were complaints about physical or verbal abuse of Negro citizens by police officers, the lack of adequate channels for complaints against police, discriminatory police employment and promotion practices, a general lack of respect for Negroes by police officers, and the failure of police departments to provide adequate protection to Negroes.

Unemployment and underemployment were found to be grievances in all 20 cities and also frequently appeared to be one of the most serious complaints. These were expressed in terms of joblessness or inadequate jobs and discriminatory practices by labor unions, local and state governments, state employment services and private employment agencies.

Housing grievances were found in almost all of the cities studied and appeared to be among the most serious complaints in a majority of them. These included inadequate enforcement of building and safety codes, discrimination in sales and rentals, and overcrowding.

The educational system was a source of grievance in almost all the 20 cities and appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in half of them. These centered on the prevalence of de facto segregation, the poor quality of instruction and facilities, deficiencies in the curriculum in the public schools (particularly because no Negro history was taught), inadequate representation of Negroes on school boards, and the absence or inadequacy of vocational training.

Grievances concerning municipal recreation programs were found in a large majority of the 20 cities and appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in almost half. Inadequate recreational facilities in the ghetto and the lack of organized programs were common complaints.

The political structure was a source of grievance in almost all of the cities and was among the most serious complaints in several. There were significant grievances concerning the lack of adequate representation of Negroes in the political structure, the failure of local political structures to respond to legitimate complaints and the absence or obscurity of official grievance channels.

Hostile or racist attitudes of whites toward Negroes appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in several cities.

In three-fourths of the cities there were significant grievances growing out of beliefs that the courts ad-
minister justice on a double, discriminatory standard, and that a presumption of guilt attaches whenever a policeman testifies against a Negro.279

Significant grievances concerning Federal programs were expressed in a large majority of the 20 cities, but appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in only one.280 Criticism of the Federal antipoverty programs focused on insufficient participation by the poor, lack of continuity, and inadequate funding. Other significant grievances involved urban renewal, insufficient community participation in planning and decisionmaking, and inadequate employment programs.

Services provided by municipal governments—sanitation and garbage removal, health and hospital facilities, and paving and lighting of streets—were sources of complaint in approximately half of the cities, but appeared to be among the most serious grievances in only one.281

Grievances concerning unfair commercial practices affecting Negro consumers were found in approximately half of the cities, but appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in only two.282 Beliefs were expressed that Negroes are sold inferior quality goods (particularly meats and produce) at higher prices and are subjected to excessive interest rates and fraudulent commercial practices.

Grievances relating to the welfare system were expressed in more than half of the 20 cities, but were not among the most serious complaints in any of the cities. There were complaints related to the inadequacy of welfare payments, "unfair regulations," such as the "man in the house" rule, which governs welfare eligibility, and the sometimes hostile and contemptuous attitude of welfare workers. The Commission's recommendations for reform of the welfare system are based on the necessity of attacking the cycle of poverty and dependency in the ghettos.

Chart I.—Pervasiveness of Grievances

Grievances Found and Number of Cities Where Mentioned As Significant

1. Employment and underemployment (found in at least one of the following forms in 20 cities):
   - Unemployment and underemployment (General lack of full-time jobs) 19
   - Unemployment and underemployment (General lack of full-time jobs) 19
   - Union discrimination 13
   - Discrimination in hiring by local and state government 9
   - Discrimination in placement by state employment service 6
   - Discrimination in placement by private employment agencies 3

2. Police practices (found in at least one of the following forms in 19 cities):
   - Physical abuse 15
   - Verbal abuse 15
   - Nonexistent or inadequate channels for the redress of grievances against police 13

3. Inadequate housing (found in at least one of the following forms in 18 cities):
   - Poor housing code enforcement 13
   - Discrimination in sales and rentals 12
   - Overcrowding 12

4. Inadequate education (found in at least one of the following forms in 17 cities):
   - De facto segregation 15
   - Poor quality of instruction and facilities 12
   - Inadequacy of curriculum (e.g., no Negro history) 10
   - Inadequate Negro representation on school board 10
   - Poor vocational education or none at all 9

5. Political structure and grievance mechanism (found in at least one of the following forms in 16 cities):
   - Lack of adequate Negro representation 15
   - Lack of response to legitimate grievances of Negroes 13
   - Grievance mechanism nonexistent or inadequately publicized 11

6. Inadequate programs (found in at least one of the following forms in 16 cities):
   - Poverty programs (OEO) (e.g., insufficient participation of the poor in project planning; lack of continuity in programs; inadequate funding; and unfulfilled promises) 12
   - Urban renewal (HUD) (e.g., too little community participation in planning and decisionmaking; programs are not urban renewal but "Negro removal") 9
   - Employment training (Labor-HEW) (e.g., persons are trained for jobs that are not available in the community) 7

7. Discriminatory administration of justice (found in at least one of the following forms in 15 cities):
   - Discriminatory treatment in the courts 15
   - Lower courts act as arm of police department rather than as an objective arbiter in truly adversary proceedings 10
   - Presumption of guilt when policeman testifies against Negro 8

8. Poor recreation facilities and programs (found in at least one of the following forms in 15 cities):
   - Inadequate facilities (parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums, and pools) 15
   - Lack of organized programs 10

9. Racism and other disrespectful white attitudes (found in at least one of the following forms in 15 cities):
   - Racism and lack of respect for dignity of Negroes 15
   - General animosity toward Negroes 10

10. Inadequate and poorly administered welfare programs (found in at least one of the following forms in 14 cities):
    - Unfair qualification regulations (e.g., "man in the house" rule) 6
    - Attitude of welfare workers toward recipients (e.g., manifestations of hostility and contempt for persons on welfare) 6
11. Inadequate municipal services (found in at least one of the following forms in 11 cities):
   Inadequate sanitation and garbage removal ........................................... 9
   Inadequate health and hospital facilities ............................................. 6
   Inadequate street paving and lighting .................................................. 6

12. Discriminatory consumer and credit practices (found in at least one of the following forms in 11 cities):
   Inferior quality goods (especially meats and produce) .......................... 11
   Overpricing (especially on days welfare checks issued) ......................... 8
   Exorbitant interest rates (particularly in connection with furniture and appliance sales) ......................................................... 7
   Fraudulent practices ............................................................................. 6

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CHART II.—WEIGHTED COMPARISON OF GRIEVANCE CATEGORIES:

(Part 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st place (4 points)</th>
<th>2nd place (3 points)</th>
<th>3rd place (2 points)</th>
<th>4th place (1 point)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Cities</td>
<td>Points</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>Points</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The total of points for each category is the product of the number of cities times the number of points indicated at the top of each double column, except where two grievances were judged equally serious. In these cases the total points for the two rankings involved were divided equally (e.g., in case two were judged equally suitable for the 1st priority, the total points for 1st and 2nd were divided, and each received 3 1/2 points).

(Part 2—Results of Weighted Comparison in Part 1)

- Police Practices
- Unemployment
- Housing
- Education
- Recreation
- Political Structure
- White Attitudes
- Admin. of Justice
- Federal Programs
- Municipal Services
- Commercial Practices
- Welfare

* See right hand column of Chart II (Part 1).
V. THE AFTERMATH OF DISORDER

"We will all do our best for a peaceful future together."
"Next time we'll really get the so and so's."

"It won't happen again."
"Nothing much changed here—one way or the other."

We have sought to determine whether any of these expressions accurately characterizes events in the immediate aftermath of the 20 surveyed disorders. We are conducting continuing studies of the postdisorder climate in a number of cities. But we have tried to make a preliminary judgment at this point. To do so, we considered:

- Changes in Negro and white organizations;
- Official and civic responses to the social and economic conditions and grievances underlying the disorders;
- Police efforts to increase capacity to control future outbreaks;
- Efforts to repair physical damage.

We conclude that:

- The most common reaction was characterized by the last of the quoted expressions: "Nothing much changed";
- The status quo of daily life before the disorder was quickly restored;
- Despite some notable public and private efforts, particularly regarding employment opportunities, little basic change took place in the conditions underlying the disorder;
- In some cities disorder recurred within the same summer;
- In several cities, the principal official response was to train and equip the police and auxiliary law enforcement agencies with more sophisticated weapons;
- In several cities, Negro communities sought to develop greater unity to negotiate with the larger community and to initiate self-help efforts in the ghetto;
- In several cities, there has been increased distrust between blacks and whites, less interracial communication, and growth of white segregationist or black separatist groups.

Often several of these developments occurred simultaneously within a city.

Detroit provides a notable example of the complexity of postdisorder events. Shortly after the riot, many efforts to ameliorate the grievances of ghetto residents and to improve interracial communication were announced and begun by public and private organizations. The success of these efforts and their reception by the Negro community were mixed. More recently, militant separatist organizations of both races appear to be growing in influence.

Some of the most significant of the postriot developments were:

OFFICIAL AND OTHER COMMUNITY ACTIONS

The New Detroit Committee (NDC), organized under the cosponsorship of the Mayor of Detroit and the Governor of Michigan, originally had a membership ranging from top industrialists to leading black militant spokesmen. NDC was envisioned as the central planning body for Detroit's rejuvenation.

However, it had an early setback last fall when the state legislature rejected its proposals for a statewide fair housing ordinance and for more state aid for Detroit's schools.

In January 1968, NDC's broad interracial base was seriously weakened when black militant members resigned in a dispute over the conditions set for a proposed NDC-supported grant of $100,000 to a black militant organization.

To deal with the employment problem, the Ford Motor Co. and other major employers in Detroit promised several thousand additional jobs to Detroit's hard-core unemployed. At least 35,000 persons were hired by some 17 firms. Ford, for example, established two employment offices in the ghetto. Reports vary on the results of these programs.

Steps taken to improve education after the riot include the appointment of Negroes to seven out of 18 supervisory positions in the Detroit school system. Before the summer of 1967 none of these positions was held by a Negro. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. announced that it would "adopt" one of

Black Brother Black Soul

Detroit, July 1967
Detroit's public high schools and initiate special programs in it. Detroit's school board failed to obtain increased aid from the state legislature and announced plans to bring a novel suit against the state to force higher per capita aid to ghetto schools.

There are signs of increased hostility toward Negroes in the white community. One white extremist organization reportedly proposes that whites arm themselves for the holocaust it prophesies. A movement to recall the mayor has gained strength since the riot, and its leader has also pressed to have the fair housing ordinance, passed by the Detroit Common Council, put to a referendum.

The police and other law enforcement agencies in Detroit are making extensive plans to cope with any future disorder. The mayor has promised to the Common Council the purchase of some $2 million worth of police riot equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and Stoner rifles (a weapon which fires a particularly destructive type of bullet).

NEGRO COMMUNITY ACTION

A broadly based Negro organization, the City-Wide Citizens Action Committee (CGAC), was formed after the riot by a leading local militant and originally included both militant and moderate members. It stresses self-determination for the black community. For example, it is developing plans for Negro-owned cooperatives and reportedly has demanded Negro participation in planning new construction in the ghetto. CGAC has lost some of its moderate members because it has taken increasingly militant positions, and a rival, more moderate Negro organization, the Detroit Council of Organizations, has been formed.

POSTRIOT INCIDENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

There appears to be a growing division between the black and white communities as well as within the black community itself. Some pawnshops and gun stores have been robbed of firearms, and gun sales reportedly have tripled since the riot. In late 1967 a rent strike took place, some fire bombings were reported, and a new junior high school was seriously damaged by its predominantly Negro student body.

Many Negroes interviewed rejected the theory that the 1967 riot immunized Detroit against further disorders. Some believed that a new disturbance may well be highly organized and therefore much more serious.

CHANGES IN NEGRO AND WHITE ORGANIZATIONS

In half the cities surveyed, new organizations concerned with race relations were established or old ones revitalized. No clear trend is apparent.

In a few cities, the only apparent changes have been the increased influence of Negro militant separatist or white segregationist groups.

In a few cities the organizations identified tended to follow more moderate and integrationist policies. A youthful Negro who emerged as a leader during the riot in Plainfield started a new organization which, though militant, is cooperating with and influencing the established, more moderate Negro leadership in the city.

And in a few cities, organizations of white segregationists, Negro militants, and moderate integrationists all emerged following the disturbances. In Newark, as in Detroit, both black and white extremist organizations have been active, as well as a prominent integrationist postriot organization, the Committee of Concern. The Committee was formed immediately after the riot and includes leading white businessmen, educators, and Negro leaders. At the same time, leading black militants reportedly gained support among Negro moderates. And a white extremist group achieved prominence—but not success—in attempting to persuade the city council to authorize the purchase of police dogs.

OFFICIAL AND CIVIC RESPONSE

Actions to ameliorate Negro grievances in the 20 cities surveyed were limited and sporadic. With few exceptions, these actions cannot be said to have contributed significantly to reducing the level of tension.

Police-Community Relations

In eight of the cities surveyed municipal administrations took some action to strengthen police-community relations. In Atlanta, immediately after the riot, residents of the disturbance area requested that all regular police patrols be withdrawn because of hostility caused during the riot, when a resident was killed, allegedly by policemen. The request was granted, and for a time the only officers in the area were police-community relations personnel. In Cincinnati, however, a proposal to increase the size of the police-community relations unit and to station the new officers in precinct stations has received little support.

Employment

Public and private organizations, often including business and industry, made efforts to improve employment opportunities in nine of the cities.

In Tucson, a joint effort by public agencies and private industry produced 125 private and 75 city jobs. Since most of the city jobs ended with the summer, several companies sought to provide permanent employment for some of those who had been hired by the city.

Housing

In nine cities surveyed, municipal administrations increased their housing programs. In Cambridge, the community relations commission supported the application of a local church to obtain Federal funds for low and moderate income housing. The commission also tried to interest local and national builders in constructing additional low-cost housing.

The Dayton city government initiated a program of concentrated housing code enforcement in the ghetto. The housing authority also adopted a policy of dispersing public housing sites and, at the request of Negroes, declared a moratorium on any new public housing in the predominantly Negro West Dayton area.
But in Newark, municipal and state authorities continued to pursue a medical center project designed to occupy up to 150 acres in the almost all-Negro Central Ward. The project, bitterly opposed by Negroes before the riot, would have required massive relocation of Negroes and was a source of great tension in the Negro community. However, with the persistent efforts of Federal officials (HUD and HEW), an accommodation appears to have been reached on the issue recently, with reduction of the site to approximately 58 acres.

Private organizations attempted to improve the quality of ghetto housing in at least three of the cities surveyed. A Catholic charity in New Jersey announced a plan to build or rehabilitate 100 homes in each of five cities, including three of the cities surveyed (Elizabeth, Jersey City and Newark) and to sell the homes to low-income residents. The plan received substantial business backing.

Education

In five of the cities surveyed, local governments have taken positive steps to alleviate grievances relating to education. In Rockford, residents approved a bond referendum to increase teacher salaries, build schools and meet other educational needs. A portion of this money will be used, with matching state and Federal funds, to construct a vocational and technical center for secondary schools in the Rockford area.

In two cities, private companies made substantial contributions to local school systems. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey donated to the Elizabeth school board a building valued at $500,000 for an administrative center and additional classrooms.

In four of the cities surveyed, grievances concerning education increased. In Cincinnati, recent elections resulted in the seating of two new board of education members who belonged to a taxpayers' group which had twice in 1966 successfully opposed a school bond referendum. Also, racial incidents in the Cincinnati schools increased dramatically in number and severity during the school year.

Recreation

In four cities, programs have been initiated to increase recreational facilities in ghetto communities. A month and a half after the New Brunswick disturbance, local businessmen donated five portable swimming pools to the city. A boat which the city will use as a recreation center was also donated and towed to the city by private companies.

Negro Representation

The elections of Negro mayors in Cleveland—which experienced the Hough riot in 1966—and Gary have been widely interpreted as significant gains in Negro representation and participation in municipal political structures. In five of the six surveyed cities which have had municipal elections since the 1967 disturbances, however, there has been no change in Negro representation in city hall or in the municipal governing body. In New Haven, the one city where there was change, the result was decreased Negro representation on the board of aldermen from five out of 35 to three out of 30.

Changes toward greater Negro representation occurred in three other cities in which Negroes were selected as president of the city council and as members of a local civil service commission, a housing authority and a board of adjustment.

Grievance Machinery

There was a positive change in governmental grievance channels or procedures in two cities. But in one case, an effort to continue use of counterrioters as a communications channel was abandoned.

Federal Programs

There are at least 10 examples, in eight cities, of Federal programs being improved or new Federal programs being instituted. In two cities disputes have arisen in connection with federally assisted programs.

Municipal Services

Four cities have tried to improve municipal services in disturbance areas. In Dayton, the city began a
program of additional garbage collection and alley cleaning in the disturbance area. In Atlanta, on the
day after the disturbance ended, the city began re-
placing street lights, repaving streets, and collecting
garbage frequently in the disturbance area. However,
the improved services were reportedly discontinued
after a month and a half.

Other Programs
In one city, a consumer education program was be-
gun. In none of the 20 cities surveyed were steps
taken to improve welfare programs. In two of the sur-
veyed cities, plans were developed to establish new
business in disturbance areas.

CAPACITY TO CONTROL FUTURE
DISORDERS
Five of the surveyed cities planned to improve police
control capability in the event of disorder. Four
cities developed plans for using counterrioters, but
in one case the plans were later abandoned. In
Detroit, plans were made to improve the administra-
tion of justice in the event of future disorders by
identifying usable detention facilities and assigning ex-
perienced clerks to process arrestees.

REPAIR OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE
Significant numbers of businesses in the riot areas
have reopened in several cities where damage was
substantial. In Detroit, none of the businesses totally
destroyed in the riot has been rebuilt, but many which
suffered only minor damage have reopened. In Newark,
83 percent of the damaged businesses have reopened,
according to official estimates. In Detroit, the only
city surveyed which suffered substantial damage to
residences, there has been no significant residential
rebuilding.

In two cities, Negro organizations insisted on an
active role in decisions about rehabilitation of the dis-
turbance area.