Appendices

Appendix A

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11365, ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, JULY 29, 1967

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Establishment of the Commission. (a) There is hereby established a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

(b) The Commission shall be composed of—

The Honorable Otto Kerner, Chairman
The Honorable John V. Lindsay, Vice Chairman
Senator Fred R. Harris
Senator Edward W. Brooke
Congressman James C. Carman
Congressman William M. McCalloch
I. W. Abel
Charles B. Thornton
Roy Wilkins
The Honorable Katherine Graham Peden
Herbert Jenkins

The President from time to time may appoint additional members to the Commission.

SECTION 2. Functions of the Commission. (a) The Commission shall investigate and make recommendations with respect to:

(1) The origins of the recent major civil disorders in our cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or individuals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence.

(2) The development of methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders, including the improvement of communications between local authorities and community groups, the training of state and local law enforcement and National Guard personnel in dealing with potential or actual riot situations, and the coordination of efforts of the various law enforcement and governmental units which may become involved in such situations;

(3) The appropriate role of the local, state, and Federal authorities in dealing with civil disorders; and

(4) Such other matters as the President may place before the Commission.

SECTION 3. Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies. The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman, from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each department or agency is authorized, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, to furnish information and assistance to the Commission. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in particular, shall provide investigative information and assistance.

SECTION 4. Compensation, Personnel, and Finance. (a) Members of the Commission who are Members of Congress shall receive no additional compensation by virtue of mem-
Appendix B

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT UPON ISSUING AN EXECUTIVE ORDER
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, JULY 29, 1967

This morning I have welcomed the members of the Commission on Civil Disorders to the White House for its first meeting. The Commission is chaired by Governor Kerner of Illinois. The Vice Chairman is Mayor Lindsay of New York. They are both here with me.

I have commended these 11 citizens for what they have agreed to do for this Nation. They are undertaking a responsibility as great as any in our society.

The civil peace has been shattered in a number of cities. The American people are deeply disturbed. They are baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence that has occurred both in small towns and great metropolitan centers. No society can tolerate massive violence, any more than a body can tolerate massive disease. And we in America shall not tolerate it.

But just saying that does not solve the problem. We need to know the answers, I think, to three basic questions about these riots:

--- What happened?
--- Why did it happen?
--- What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?

Beyond these basic questions there are others — the answers to which can help our Governors and our mayors, our chiefs of police and our citizens all over the country to cope with their immediate and their long-range problems of maintaining order:

--- Why did riots occur in some cities and not occur in others?
--- Why one man breaks the law, while another, living in the same circumstances, does not?
--- To what extent, if any, has there been planning and organization in any of the riots?
--- Why did the riots begin before they got out of hand and others have not?
--- How well equipped and trained are the local and State police, and the State guard units, to handle riots?
--- How do police-community relationships affect the likelihood of a riot — or the ability to keep one from spreading once it has started?
--- Who took part in the riots? What about their age, their level of education, their job history, their origins, and their roots in the community?
--- Who suffered most at the hands of the rioters?
--- What can be done to help innocent people and vital institutions escape serious injury?
--- How can groups of law-abiding citizens be encouraged, groups that can help to cool the situations?
--- What is the relative impact of the depressed conditions in the ghetto — joblessness, family instability, poor education, lack of motivation, poor health care — in stimulating people to riot?
--- What Federal, State and local programs have been most helpful in relieving those depressed conditions?
--- What is the proper role of the public in helping cities repair the damage that has been done?
--- What effect do the mass media have on the riots?

What we are really asking for is a profile of the riots — of the riots, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and effects.

We are asking for advice on:
--- short-term measures that can prevent riots,
--- better measures to contain riots once they begin,
--- and long-term measures that will make them only a sordid page in our history.

I know this is a tall order.

One thing should be absolutely clear: this matter is far, far too important for politics. It goes to the health and safety of all American citizens — Republicans and Democrats. It goes to the proper responsibilities of officials in both of our Parties. It goes to the heart of our society in a time of swift change and of great stress. I think the composition of this Commission is proof against any narrowness of partisanship.

You will have all the support and cooperation of the Federal government, as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman lead this Commission in this study.

Sometimes various Administrations have set up commissions that were expected to put the stamp of approval on what the Administration believed.

This is not such a commission. We are looking to you, not to approve our own notions, but to guide us and to guide the country through a thicket of emotion, conflicting evidence and extreme opinion.

So, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, let your search be free. Let it be untrammeled by what has been called the
"conventional wisdom." As best you can, find the truth, the whole truth, and express it in your report.

I hope you will be inspired by a sense of urgency, but also conscious of the danger that lies always in hasty conclusions.

The work that you do ought to help guide us not just this summer, but for many summers to come and for many years to come.

Thank you.

Appendix C

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, JULY 27, 1967

My fellow Americans:

We have endured a week such as no Nation should live through: a time of violence and tragedy.

For a few minutes tonight, I want to talk about that tragedy—and I want to talk about the deeper questions it raises for us all.

I am tonight appointing a special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Governor Otto Kerner, of Illinois, has agreed to serve as Chairman. Mayor John Lindsay, of New York, will serve as Vice Chairman. Fred R. Harris, Senator from Oklahoma; Edward B. Brooke, United States Senator from Massachusetts; James C. Crow, U.S. Representative from California, 22d District, Los Angeles; William M. McCulloch, the U.S. Representative from the State of Ohio, the 4th District; I. W. Abel, the President of the United Steel Workers; Charles B. Thornton, the President, Director and Chairman of the Board of Litton Industries, Inc.; Roy Wilkins, the Executive Director of the NAACP; Katherine Graham Peden, the Commissioner of Commerce of the State of Kentucky; Herbert Jenkins, the Chief of Police, Atlanta, Georgia.

The Commission will investigate the origins of the recent disorders in our cities. It will make recommendations—to me, to the Congress, to the State Governors, and to the Mayors—for measures to prevent or contain such disasters in the future.

In their work, the Commission members will have access to the facts that are gathered by Director Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI will continue to exercise its full authority to investigate these riots, in accordance with my standing instructions, and continue to search for evidence of conspiracy.

But even before the Commission begins its work; and even before all the evidence is in, there are some things that we can tell about the outbreaks of this summer.

First—let there be no mistake about it—the looting, arson, plunder and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights protest. There is no American right to loot stores, or to burn buildings, or to fire rifles from the rooftops. That is crime—and crime must be dealt with forcefully, and swiftly, and certainly—under law.

Ignorant people, Negro and white, have been killed. Damage to property—owned by Negroes and whites—is calamitous. Worst of all, fear and bitterness which have been fomented will take long months to erase.

The criminals who committed these acts of violence against the people deserve to be punished—and they must be punished. Explanations may be offered, but nothing can excuse what they have done.

There will be attempts to interpret the events of the past few days. But when violence strikes, those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job: not to analyze, but to end disorder.

That they must seek to do with every means at their command: through local police, state officials, and—in extraordinary circumstances where local authorities have stated that they cannot maintain order with their own resources—then through Federal power that we have limited authority to use.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense to issue new training standards for riot control procedures immediately to National Guard units across the country. Through the Continental Army Command, this expanded training will begin immediately. The National Guard must have the ability to respond effectively, quickly, and appropriately, in conditions of disorder and violence.

Those charged with the responsibility of law enforcement should, and must, be respected by all of our people. The violence must be stopped: quickly, finally, and permanently.

It would compound the tragedy, however, if we should settle for order that is imposed by the muzzle of a gun.

In America, we seek more than the uneasy calm of martial law. We seek peace based on one man’s respect for another man—and upon mutual respect for law. We seek a public order that is built on steady progress in meeting the needs of all of our people.

Not even the sternest police action, nor the most effective Federal troops, can ever create lasting peace in our cities.

The only genuine, long-range solution for what has happened lies in an attack—mounted at every level—upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know what those conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions—not because we are frightened by conflict, but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America . . .

This is not a time for angry reaction. It is a time for action: starting with legislative action to improve the life in our cities. The strength and promise of the law are the surest remedies for tragedy in the street.

But laws are only one answer. Another answer lies in the way our people will respond to these disturbances.

There is a danger that the worst toll of this tragedy will be counted in the hearts of Americans; in hatred, in insecurity, in fear, in heated words which will not end the conflict, but prolong it.

So let us acknowledge the tragedy; but let us not exaggerate it.

Let us look about tonight. Let us look at ourselves. We will see these things:

Most Americans, Negro and white, are leading decent responsible and productive lives.

Most Americans, Negro and white, seek safety in their neighborhoods and harmony with their neighbors.

Nothing can destroy good will more than a period of needless strife and suspicion between the races.

Let us condemn the violent few. But let us remember that it is law-abiding Negro families who have really suffered most at the hands of the rioters. It is responsible Negro citizens who hope most fervently—and need most urgently—to share in America’s growth and prosperity.
This is not the time to turn away from that goal. To reach it will require more than laws; more than dollars. It will take renewed dedication and understanding in the heart of every citizen.

I know there are millions of men and women tonight who are eager to heal the wounds that we have suffered; who want to get on with the job of teaching and working and building America.

... I call upon every American to search his own heart.

To those who are tempted by violence, I would say this: Think again. Who is really the loser when violence comes? Whose neighborhood is made a shambles? Whose life is threatened most?

If you choose to tear down what other hands have built,
—You will not succeed;
—You will suffer most from your own crimes;
—You will learn that there are no victors in the aftermath of violence.

The apostles of violence, with their ugly drumbeat of hatred, must know that they are now heading for disaster. And every man who really wants progress or justice or equality must stand against them and their miserable virus of hate.

For other Americans, especially those in positions of public trust, I have this message:

Yours is the duty to bring about a peaceful change in America. If your response to these tragic events is only "business as usual"—you invite not only disaster, but dishonor.

My fellow citizens, let us go about our work. Let us clear the streets of rubble and quench the fires that hatred set. Let us feed and care for those who have suffered at the rafter's hands—but let there be no bonus or reward or salaries for those who have inflicted that suffering.

Let us resolve that this violence is going to stop and there will be no bonus to flow from it. We can stop it. We must stop it. We will stop it.

And let us build something much more lasting: faith between man and man, faith between race and race. Faith in each other—and faith in the promise of beautiful America.

Let us pray for the day when "mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." Let us pray—and let us work for better jobs and better housing and better education that so many millions of our own fellow Americans need so much tonight.

Let us then act in the Congress, in the city halls, and in every community, so that this great land of ours may truly be "one Nation under God—with liberty and justice for all."

Appendix D

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIALS ON COMMISSIONERS

OTTO KERNER, CHAIRMAN

Governor of Illinois, 1961—; Springfield, Ill. Born August 15, 1908, Chicago, Ill. A.B., Brown University, 1930; Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1930-31; J.D., Northwestern University, 1934. Attorney, Chicago, 1934-47; U.S. District Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 1947-54; County Judge, Cook County, 1954-61. Illinois National Guard, 1934-41; 1946-54, advancing from Private to Captain, 9th Infantry Division, European Theater of Operations; Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and 32nd Infantry Division, Pacific Theater of Operations, 1941-46, retiring as Major General; Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star, Army Commendation Ribbon, Presidential Unit Citation (34th Field Artillery Battalion).

JOHN V. LINDSAY, VICE CHAIRMAN


J. W. ABEL


EDWARD W. BROOKE

JAMES C. CORMAN
U.S. Representative from California, 22nd District, 1960–; Van Nuyts, Calif. Born October 20, 1929, Galena, Kansas, B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1947; LL.B., University of Southern California, 1948. Attorney, Los Angeles, 1948–50 and 1952–57; Member of the Los Angeles City Council, 1957–60; elected November 6, 1960 to the 87th Congress; reelected to the 88th, 89th, and 90th Congresses. Democrat. U.S. Marine Corps, 3rd Marine Division, at Bougainville, Guadalcanal, and Iwo Jima, 1942–45; subsequent service 1950–52. Member of the Methodist Church, Lions International, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Elk; the American, California, Los Angeles and San Fernando Valley Bar Associations, Los Angeles Community Relations Conference. Awards from the Jewish Federation, Council of Greater Los Angeles, for “outstanding service in fostering good will and understanding among religious and racial groups,” and from the California Congressional Recognition Plan, Claremont College for “exemplary service” on the House Judiciary Committee.

FRED R. HARRIS

HERBERT JENKINS
Chief of Police, Atlanta, Ga., 1947–. Born 1907, Lithonia, Ga. Atlanta public schools and Atlanta Law School. Joined Atlanta Police Department, 1931; elected Chief of Atlanta Police Department, 1947. President, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1963; Member, Attorney General’s Advisory Panel on Grants, 1964; Baptist Church; Past Worshipful Master of Atlanta Masonic Lodge; charter member of Northside Atlanta Kiwanis Club; Board of Directors of the Atlanta Boys Club and other civic organizations. Awards include: 1962 Outstanding Citizen Award by Jewish War Veterans of United States of America, Atlanta Post 112; Atlanta Jaycee Good Government Award, 1962; Alpha Chapter of Delta Kappa Gamma Society award for leadership in maintaining public education, 1962; Silk Hat Award by Northside Atlanta Kiwanis Club, 1962; Boys Club Bronze Keystone for Long and Devoted Service to Boys by the Boys Clubs of America, 1963.

WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH
U.S. Representative from the State of Ohio, 4th District, 1947–; Piquay, Ohio. Born November 24, 1901, Holmes County, Ohio. LL.B. Ohio State University, 1925; Honorary LL.D., Ohio Northern University. Member, Ohio House of Representatives six terms, serving as Republican leader 1936–39, and as Speaker for three terms; Elected to 80th Congress, November 4, 1947, reelected to each succeeding Congress. Republican. Veteran, World War II. Member, American Political Science Association; Recipient, Congressional Distinguished Service Award, APSA, and the Distinguished Alumni Award, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.

KATHERINE GRAHAM PEDEN
Commissioner of Commerce, State of Kentucky, 1963–67; Hopkinsville, Ky. Born January 2, 1926, Hopkinsville, Ky. Traffic Department, Radio Station WHOP, Hopkinsville, 1944–49; Vice President and Director, WHOP, 1949–; Owner-President, Radio Station WVIN, Nicholasville, President, National Federation of Business and Professional Women, 1961–62; Member, the Defense Advisory Committee of Women in the Service (DACOWIT); the National Advisory Council of the Small Business Administration; the Governor’s Commission on the Status of Women, Kentucky; Board of Directors, Kentucky Chamber of Commerce; the American Industrial Development Council; the Southern Industrial Development Council; President, Kentucky Federation of Business and Professional Women, 1953–56; Director, Mental Health Association, and Co-Chairman, Western State Hospital Chapel Fund, 1956–; Trustee, Business and Professional Women's Foundation, 1958–; Member, Kentucky Federation of Business and Professional Women, Kentucky Broadcasters Association, First Christian Church of Hopkinsville, and Hopkinsville Chamber of Commerce, 1951–; Recipient, Woman of the Year Award, Hopkinsville, 1951.

CHARLES B. THORNTON
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Litton Industries, Inc., 1952–; Los Angeles, Calif. Born July 22, 1913, Knox County, Texas, B.C.S., Columbus University, 1937; Honorary D.C.S., The George Washington University, 1964; Honorary Jur.D., Texas Technological College, 1957. Director of Planning, Ford Motor Co., 1946–48; Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, Calif., 1948–53; Vice President, Hughes Tool Co., 1948–55; President, Litton Industries, 1955–61. Colonel, USAF, World War II; Consultant to Commanding General, 1946; Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Commendation Ribbon with two oakleaf clusters. Director and member of the executive committee: United California Bank, Western Bancorporation, Times Mirror Company (1959–67); Director: Union Oil Company of California, Lehman Corporation, General Mills, Inc. (1963–67); Director and Executive Committee Member, Cyprus Mines, Inc.; Director, MCA, Inc.; Director and Finance Committee Member, Trans World Airlines, Inc.; Trustee, University of Southern California; Trustee, Harvey Mudd College of Science and Engineering; Member, California Institute Associates; Member, University of Southern California Associates; Member, The Visiting Committee, Harvard Business School; Board of Governors, Welfare Federation of Los Angeles (1960–63); National Professional and Civic Organizations: Member, The Business Council; Defense Industry Advisory Council to the Department of Defense; Air Force Academy Advisory Council; Director, National Committee for International Development; Trustee, Committee for Economic Development; Trustee, National Security Industrial Association; Member, West Coast Advisory Group of American Management Association; prior affiliation with numerous other local and national civic and governmental bodies.

ROY WILKINS
Executive Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1955–; New York, New York. Born August 30, 1901, St. Louis, Mo., A.B., University of Minnesota, 1923. Managing Editor, Kansas City Call, 1923–31; Assistant Secretary, NAACP, 1931–49; Acting Secretary, NAACP, 1949–50; Administrator, NAACP, 1950–59; Editor, Crisis magazine, 1934–49. Recipient, the Spingarn Medal, NAACP, 1964.
Appendix E

WITNESSES APPEARING AT HEARINGS OF THE COMMISSION,
AUGUST 1-NOVEMBER 7, 1967

ADAHY, CLARENCE G., President, National Association of Food Chains.
ADDONIZIO, HUGH J., Mayor, Newark, N.J.
ATCHISON, LEON, Administrative Assistant to Congressman John Conyers, Jr.
BACHRACH, W. H., Mayor, Cincinnati, Ohio.
BAILEY, SAMUEL, Vice President, Mississippi State Conference of Branches, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Baker, JOHN A., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture; accompanied by Lynn Daft.
BATTLE, MARK, Administrator, Bureau of Works program, Department of Labor.
Bennett, Lerone, historian, Senior Editor, Ebony Magazine.
Berry, Theodore M., Director, Community Action program, Office of Economic Opportunity; accompanied by Ben Zimmerman, William C. Lawrence, Donald K. Hess, and James H. Heller.
Boone, Richard W., Executive Director, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty.
Brett, Paul W., Superintendent of Schools, Cleveland, Ohio.
Bullock, Paul, Associate Research Economist, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California at Los Angeles.
Bussett, Berkeley, President, National Business League; accompanied by Matthew Clark and Henry Miller.
Campbell, R. J., Assistant to the City Manager, City of Cincinnati, Ohio.
Capolovitz, David, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia, University.
Carmichael, Stokely, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.
Cassell, Frank H., Assistant to the Administrative Vice President, Inland Steel Corp.
Cavanagh, Jerome P., Mayor, Detroit, Mich.; accompanied by Robert P. Roselle, Richard Streichartz, Herbert Loehr, John Nichols, Anthony Ripley, Fred J. Romaneff, Ben Hewitt, Conrad Mallett, Assistant to the Mayor; Bernard Wincowski, Richard Marks, Norman Drachler, Superintendent of Schools; Ray Girardin, Police Commissioner; Alvin Harrison, Citizen Representative, Neighborhood Legal Services; Thomas Angott, member, Fire Commission; Rev. Robert Poits, Grace Episcopal Church; and Philip Rutledge, Director, Mayor's Committee on Resources.
Cervantes, Alfonso J., Mayor, St. Louis; accompanied by Rev. Lucius Cervantes, S.J.
Chambers, Ernie W., Negro community leader, Omaha, Neb.
Christensen, Gerald W., Executive Director, President's Council on Youth Opportunity; accompanied by E. Lester Levine, Bruce Terris, and John Stewart.
Christophersen, Warren M., Deputy Attorney General; Vice Chairman of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots.

Clark, Kenneth, psychologist and social scientist; President, Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Inc., New York.
Coleman, Richard G., Director, Better Housing League of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
Coon, Carlton, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.
Danzig, Louis, Housing and Urban Renewal Director, City of New York.
Dawson, R. M., Director, Center for Human Relations and Community Studies, New York University.
Donaldson, Ivanhoe, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.
Drachler, Norman, Superintendent of Schools, Detroit, Mich.
Emery, John C., Jr., Judge, Recorder's Court, Detroit; Legal Aid and Defender Association, Detroit.
Engle, Byron, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development, Department of State.
Everet, Charles, Field Director, Mississippi State Conference of Branches, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Fakhnir, Mario D., Program Officer, Division of Public Education, Ford Foundation.
Fulcher, Dewey C., Director, Economic Development and Employment, Urban League of Greater Cincinnati, Ohio.
Gardner, John W., former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Garrett, Ernest, member, Board of Education, Newark, N.J.
Gelston, George, Adjutant General, Maryland National Guard.
Giacchino, Alpo, Planning Officer, City of Newark, N.J.
Ginsberg, Mitchell I., Commissioner of Social Services, New York City.
Girard, Ray, Police Commissioner, Detroit, Mich.
Goldfarb, Ronald, consultant to the Commission.
Green, Alfred L., Executive Director, New York State Division of Employment.
Gregory, Dick, comedian, lecturer.
Groop, James, Milwaukuee, Wis.; accompanied by Father Patrick Flood, Dwight Benning, and James Pierce.
Guay, Lawrence, Chairman, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.
Hall, William, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.
Hansen, John E., Director, Community Action Commission, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Hardy, David, New York Daily News.
Hatch, Richard, Mayor, Gary, Ind.
Henderson, Vivian, economist; President, Clark College, Atlanta, Ga.
Hill, Norman, Associate Director, A. Philip Randolph Institute.
Hill, Roderic L., (Major General, Ret.), former Adjutant General, State of California.
Hollis, Harris W., Director of Operations, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of Army, Washington, D.C.
Holman, Carl M., Deputy Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

\(^{1}\) Witnesses at special hearings.
HOOVER, J. EDGAR, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
HOVE, HAROLD II, U.S. Commissioner of Education; accompanied by Charles H. Smith.
JACQUES, TRUMAN, Manager, Management Service Center, Watts section of Los Angeles, Calif.
JOHNSON, EARL JR., Director, Legal Services Program, Office of Economic Opportunity.
JORDAN, VERNON, 2 Director, Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, Inc.
KAIN, JOHN F., Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
KARENDRA, RON, 3 Chairman, U.S. King, MARTIN LUTHER, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
LEY, HOWARD R., Police Commissioner, New York.
LEWIS, JOHN, 3 Field Representative, Southern Regional Council, Inc.
LIEBOW, EMMETT, Acting Chief, Special Projects Section, Mental Health Study Center, National Institute of Mental Health.
LONGBORO, WILLIAM M., Chief of Police, Rochester, N.Y.
LUXENBERG, ARTHUR R., Executive Vice President, Chamber of Commerce, Hartford, Conn.
MAIER, HENRY W., Mayor, Milwaukee, Wis.; accompanied by James Neshorn and George Whittle.
MALAFOLIO, DONALD, Administrative Assistant to Mayor Addonizio.
MANGUM, GARTH, Research Professor of Economics, George Washington University.
MARSHALL, KENNETH E., Vice President for Community Affairs, Metropolitan Applied Center, Inc., New York.
MATTHEWS, WILLIAM, Assistant Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Cincinnati, Ohio.
McCANDLES, WILLIAM M., Federal Cochairman, Ozark Regional Commission.
McCLELLAND, H. C., President, Management Council for Merit Employment, Training and Research.
McCUNE, JOHN A., Chairman, Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots.
McFarland, KENNETH, former Superintendent of Schools, Topeka, Kansas.
McKELDRIN, THEODORE B., Mayor, Baltimore, Md.
McKNIGHT, LESLIE, 4 Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.
McKissick, FLOYD, 5 National Director, Congress of Racial Equality.
MELVIN, GEORGE, President, AFL-CIO, accompanied by Nat Goldfinger, Donald Slaiman, Andrew Biemiller, Julius Rotham, and Thomas E. Harris.
MEECHAM, CHARLOTTE, Mrs., National Representative, Police Community Corrections Program, American Friends Service Committee.
MILLER, HERBERT J., Chairman, President's Commission on Crime for the District of Columbia; former Assistant U.S. Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.
MOGGY, JOHN, Professor of Sociology, Boston University.
MURPHY, PATRICK V., Director of Public Safety, District of Columbia.
OOSTDICK, HAROLD, Director, New York Urban League Academy, New York City.
PERSKY, ISRAEL, Harvard University.
POWASS, STEPHEN J., Assistant Attorney General.
PUDG, WILSON E., Director of Public Safety, Dade County, Fla.
QUARLES, BENJAMIN, Professor of History, Morgan State College, Baltimore, Md.

RANKIN, LEE J., former General Counsel, Warren Commission.
REILLY, ALBERT, Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan.
REYNOLDS, C., Acting Director, Cincinnati Human Relations Commission.
RODAM, HYMAN, Merrill-Palmer Institute, Detroit, Mich.
RUTTENBERG, STANLEY H., Assistant Secretary for Manpower, U.S. Department of Labor.
SANDEER, J. STANLEY, Director of Summer Projects, Westminister Neighborhood Association, Watts, Los Angeles, Calif.
SCHRADER, PAUL, Director, Western Region Six, United Auto Workers; member, executive board, United Auto Workers.
SHERIDAN, THOMAS R., Chairman, Committee on Administration of Justice, American Bar Association.
SHERMAN, SARGENT, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity.
SILLS, ARTHUR, Attorney General, State of New Jersey.
SMITH, ROYAL H., former Chief of Police, Syracuse, N.Y.
STEEL, BARRY, Director, Department of Health and Welfare, City of Newark, N.J.
STILL, TIMOTHY, President, United Community Corp., Newark, N.J.
STOKES, CARL B., Mayor, Cleveland, Ohio.
SUMMER, ALEXANDER, former President, National Association of Real Estate Boards; accompanied by Edwin Stoll.
TAMM, QUINN, Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police.
TAYLOR, RALPH H., Assistant Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development.
TAYLOR, WILLIAM L., Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
THOMAS, PETER, author, New York, N.Y.
TITUS, FRANKLIN, Superintendent of Schools, Newark, N.J.
TREACY, JAMES, Human Rights Director, Newark, N.J.
TURKEN, BAILEY, Treasurer, United Community Black Organization, Cincinnati, Ohio.
VANCE, CYRUS R., former Deputy Secretary of Defense on National Guard Matters.
VINSON, FRED J., Assistant Attorney General.
WEAVER, ROBERT C., Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development.
WEST, CALVIN, City Councilman, Newark, N.J.
WHEELAN, THOMAS J., Mayor, Jersey City, N.J.
WIGHT, ROGER W., Director, Community Relations Service, Department of Justice.
WILSON, JAMES Q., Professor of Government, Harvard University; Lecturer, Harvard-MIT Center for Urban Studies.
WILSON, WINSTON P., Major General, Chief, National Guard Bureau.
WINTZ, WILLARD W., Secretary of Labor; accompanied by Stanley H. Rutenberg.
WRIGHT, KENNETH, Vice President and Chief Economist, Life Insurance Association of America.
WRIGHT, MARION, Legal Director, NAACP, Legal Defense and Education Fund, Jackson, Miss.
YULISAKER, PAUL, Director, New Jersey Department of Community Relations, accompanied by Colonel Kelly, Chief of State Police; Oliver Lotton, Director of Legal Services; Stanley Van Ness, Governor’s Counsel; John Spinelli, Press Secretary to Governor; and James Blair, Department of Community Affairs; Timothy Still, President, United Community Corp.; David Sullivan, Assistant Director, Plainfield Human Relations Commission; Charles Miller, Vice Chairman, Plainfield Human Relations Commission; and Don MacDonald, Department of Community Affairs.
YORTY, S. W., Mayor, Los Angeles, Calif.

Appendix F

CONSULTANTS, CONTRACTORS, AND ADVISERS

ADLER, JAMES, Attorney, Los Angeles, Calif.
AILES, STEPHEN, Attorney, former Secretary of the Army.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, New York, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM, ANTHONY G., University of Pennsylvania Law School.
ASTOR, GERALD M., Look magazine
BAGDANIAN, BEN H., Rand Corp.
BAILEY, DOUGLAS, Washington, D.C.
BAIS, JOHN, College of Law, University of Kentucky
BASILE, DAVID T., Attorney, New York, N.Y.
BELLO, GARY, Deputy Director, California Rural Legal Assistance, McFarland, Calif.
BENNETT, LEROYE, Jr., Ebony magazine.
BISHING, LEONARD, Waukegan, Wis.
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Appendix G

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Appendix H

BASIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS

THE INSURANCE PROBLEM

There is a serious lack of property insurance in the core areas of our Nation's cities. For a number of years, many urban residents and businessmen have been unable to purchase the insurance protection they need. Now, riots and the threat of riots are aggravating the problem to an intolerable degree. Immediate steps must be taken to make insurance available to responsible persons in all areas of our cities.

Insurance: A Necessity for Homeowners and Businessmen

Insurance is a basic necessity for a property owner. By paying a premium that represents a relatively small amount compared to the value of his home or business, an owner acquires protection against the possibility that his property may be damaged or destroyed. The opportunity for every responsible individual to obtain security for his savings and investments is vital in a free society. This requires fair access to insurance.

Without insurance, the savings of millions of individual citizens are exposed to the risk of loss from natural and man-made hazards they cannot control. Society cannot erase the suffering of the innocent victims of fire, windstorm, theft, or riot. But it can at least provide the opportunity to obtain insurance to safeguard their capital, and thereby prevent a disastrous occurrence from becoming a permanent tragedy.

Insurance: An Essential Force in Revitalizing Our Cities

Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of credit. Without insurance, banks and other financial institutions will not—and cannot—make loans. New housing cannot be constructed, and existing housing cannot be repaired. New businesses cannot be opened, and existing businesses cannot expand or even survive.

Without insurance, buildings are left to deteriorate; services, goods, and jobs diminish. Efforts to rebuild our Nation's inner cities cannot move forward. Communities without insurance are communities without hope.

The Urban Core Insurance Crisis

Unavailability and High Cost.—A great deal of evidence confirms that there is a serious lack of proper-

1 These basic findings and recommendations are set forth in ch. 1 of the Advisory Panel's report, "Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities." The full report can be obtained through the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

erty insurance in our Nation's inner cities. Residents and businessmen from urban core areas throughout the Nation have stated that they cannot purchase the property insurance they need. Some say they cannot find insurance at all. Others say that they cannot obtain insurance at prices they are able to afford. Some who now have insurance are afraid that their insurance will be cancelled in the near future or not renewed. Many do not make legitimate claims for fear of losing the insurance they have.

In Newark, N.J., when a butcher was asked whether he had any insurance, he answered: "No, sir. Nobody wants to insure us. No insurance—everyone I see. I [would] give my right hand [for it]."

A Detroit, Mich., homeowner told us:

"I was paying $85 previously for three years' coverage, and now they told me it would cost the same amount of money for one year."

The owner of a shoe repair store in Omaha, Neb., was asked whether he had insurance on his merchandise, and responded:

"No sir, not a penny. Ten days after the riot, automatically all insurance was dropped out."

These are not isolated voices. Insurance problems have affected whole communities. At our hearings, the president of a leading savings and loan association in the Watts area of Los Angeles testified:

"Real estate activity is practically at a standstill. Residents in this curfew area, wanting to purchase property outside the area, find it almost impossible because of their inability to sell the property they presently occupy. The sale of these properties is dependent upon financing through reputable financial institutions, which are reluctant to do so because adequate fire insurance coverage is not available."

"The problems now being faced by residents of ghettos in this country are the result of long periods of discrimination, and we should not permit the results of discrimination to be used as an excuse for doing nothing. The problems of the ghetto must be solved, and we submit that a lack of adequate insurance coverage adversely affects the economy of a community."

Adequate insurance is unavailable not only in our major cities but in other areas as well. One insurance company executive said:

"[We emphasize that the problem is not alone that of the core areas of a limited number of metropolitan centers, but also that of hundreds of towns and cities of every size throughout America."

In order to determine the intensity of the problem, we conducted a systematic survey including personal
interviews of approximately 1,500 homeowners and 1,500 businessmen in poverty areas of Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Newark, Oakland, and St. Louis.

The survey disclosed that over 40 percent of businessmen and close to 30 percent of homeowners had serious property insurance problems.

Over 20 percent of the businessmen and 6 percent of the homeowners surveyed did not have basic fire insurance coverage. In Boston, over 35 percent of the businessmen surveyed had no fire insurance, and in Detroit over 12 percent of the homeowners were without it.

Of those who were uninsured, 35 percent of the businessmen and over 50 percent of the homeowners said that insurance was unavailable. Close to 30 percent of the uninsured businessmen and homeowners said that insurance cost too much.

Nearly 50 percent of the businessmen surveyed had no burglary and theft insurance. In Boston the figure was 74 percent.

Of those businessmen without burglary and theft insurance, nearly 30 percent said they wanted it but it cost too much; nearly 25 percent said they wanted it but could not get it at any price.

Impact of the Riot Peril.—Recent riot losses have further constricted the supply of insurance in our inner cities. Regardless of whether the management of the insurance industry anticipates rioting in the future, it feels that it must—in the interest of its policyholders and stockholders—prepare for even the remote possibility of extraordinary losses from civil disorders.

This theme has been repeatedly emphasized by a broad spectrum of insurance company spokesmen. The president of the American Insurance Association, an organization representing 170 companies, testified at our hearings:

"It is not enough merely to hope that riots will not recur and that, if they do, the damage will not be beyond the capacity of insurers to absorb in their normal operations. What served notice on all of us, and still the public and insurers were largely unprepared for what happened in 1967. The lesson is all too clear. I hope that we will profit by this costly experience and not be lulled into complacency and nonaction by wishful thinking that losses cannot reach catastrophic proportions."

The general manager of the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, an organization of 122 companies, told the Panel:

"Some companies are especially concerned over their exposure to the continuing threat of sporadic civil disorders. These companies are being asked to maintain existing insurance in urban areas, and so far they are doing so. But they may not be able to continue doing so, out of concern for their solvency, unless some method can be found to neutralize this excessive riot exposure. * * *"

"We have to recognize the possibility, however remote, that future disorders could develop large enough dimensions to threaten the future ability of insurers to meet their obligations to policyholders."

The president of the National Association of Independent Insurers, an organization representing 350 companies, testified:

"[O]ur industry does not possess either the power to forestall future riots or the ability to predict the scope and severity of any which may occur. We must therefore reckon with the possibility—whether imminent or remote—that more riots may occur, and that they might conceivably produce insurance losses far surpassing the financial capacity of the companies involved to absorb them."

The industry is not the only knowledgeable group that sees in recent riots a formidable threat to the supply of insurance and the solvency of the insurance business. Thus, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners—an organization of the insurance commissioners of the 50 states—on the basis of the studies of a select committee on the insurance problems of civil disorders has recently reported:

"The hazard of loss from riot or civil disorders viewed in the context of recent events poses grave underwriting, rating and capacity problems for the private property and casualty insurance industry. Civil unrest has manifest itself throughout many parts of our nation. Its future course is uncertain. This fact has apparently led major insurer management and underwriters to conclude that they must either be individually relieved, in whole or in part, from exposure to these perils or guard themselves by careful control on writings in areas regarded as vulnerable. These conditions and attitudes constitute not only a deterrent to the development of programs designed to expand the availability of fire and extended coverage insurance in most cities, but threaten to result in even more serious constriction of such markets."

Insured property losses from riots in the summer of 1967 were under $75 million, far less than the $715 million loss caused by Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and less than 3 percent of the total property losses that will be paid for 1967. Nevertheless, the sum approximated 13 percent of the entire underwriting profit of the insurance industry in 1966.

Riot losses have further burdened those lines of insurance already relatively unprofitable and those segments of the industry already the most heavily committed to writing urban core business. Thus, even though the Panel has no doubt that the insurance industry has the financial strength to absorb losses even greater than those sustained in the summer of 1967, we believe that the industry is justifiably concerned about the threat—no matter how unlikely—of future riot losses.

Another aspect of the industry's concern, in view of the civil disorders, is uncertainty about whether it can obtain enough reinsurance—insurance purchased by insurance companies to protect themselves against excessive loss. One of the largest reinsurers in the world has informed the Panel that reinsurance will continue to be available, but at higher rates and on
more restrictive terms. The insurance executive wants security against catastrophic loss just like any other businessman. As one insurance executive described the situation at our hearings:

"Still another threat to the solvency of our companies is the probability that reinsurers in our country and other countries—particularly in England and the Continent—will restrict or withdraw their riot coverage. If this happens, it will mean that primary underwriters will not be able to spread their catastrophic losses for the riot peril. Such an event is in contradiction to our basic operating procedures and would further expose the solvency of the primary insurers."

"It is an inescapable fact, gentlemen, that a direct relationship exists between insurance market inadequacies and the financial capacities of our insurance companies. Our industry just does not have, nor can it be expected to have, the financial structure to cope with widespread civil disorder. It cannot continue to expose its very solvency no matter how remote the recurrence of widespread rioting may be."

Executives of our Nation's most respected insurance companies have stated that without some financial assistance from government to protect them against catastrophic riot losses, they will be unable to continue offering property insurance in the center city. They stress that this is a matter of urgency. As one said at our hearings:

"We believe that the best and only way to induce insurance companies to provide coverage on all otherwise insurable risks is to relieve them of the exposure to catastrophic riot losses. In other words, in the absence of such governmental backup, the Urban Areas Plan could result in risks which are found on inspection to be "insurable" still not finding a market because of the magnitude of the riot exposure alone."

The insurance problems created by riots cannot be allowed to jeopardize the availability of property insurance in center city areas. But the problem of providing adequate and reasonable insurance in the urban core cannot be solved merely by supplying financial assistance to protect insurance companies against catastrophic riot losses. It is clear that adequate insurance was unavailable in the urban core even before the riots. Our survey indicates that property insurance problems are severe in St. Louis—where there were no riots—as well as in Detroit; in Oakland—where riots were minor— as well as in Newark. We are dealing with an inner city insurance problem that is broad in scope and complicated in origin, and riots are only one aspect of it.

Factors Underlying the Crisis.—For a variety of reasons explained in detail in Chapter II, the insurance industry believes that providing insurance to homeowners and businessmen in the urban core is generally unprofitable. As a result, the insurance enterprise does not function well to meet insurance needs in these areas.

The number of insurance agents and brokers selling insurance to residents and businessmen in urban core areas is relatively small. The effort to place the business may be more time consuming and the results less lucrative than with business from other city areas and the suburbs. Agents and brokers who seek business in urban core areas find that their applications for insurance are screened carefully by the insurance companies with which they deal. An agent who submits too many applications that a company considers too risky may have his agency contract terminated.

Many agents simply avoid urban core business. An agent in Kansas City, Mo., told the Panel:

"Probably less than 1 percent of our premium volume comes from the areas which are generally thought to be trouble spots or potential trouble spots. One reason for this truthfully is probably that I know it is hard to place this business and not only do not solicit it but actually discourage it."

An agent in Washington, D.C., said:

"We don't have any trouble with business in blighted areas because we stay away from it. It's bad business."

The basic factor underlying the shortage of insurance in urban core areas is that insurance companies generally regard any business in those areas as relatively unprofitable. Instead of basing their decisions to insure solely on the merits of individual properties, many companies consider the application of an inner-city homeowner or businessman on the basis of the neighborhood where his property is located.

Underwriting materials sent to the Panel in response to requests for information reveal clearly that business in certain geographic territories is restricted. For example, one underwriting guide states:

"An underwriter should be aware of the following situations in his territory:

1. The blighted areas.
2. The redevelopment operations.
3. Peculiar weather conditions which might make for a concentration of windstorm or hail losses.
4. The economic makeup of the area.
5. The nature of the industries in the area, etc.

"This knowledge can be gathered by driving through the area, by talking to and visiting agents, and by following local newspapers as to incidents of crimes and fires. A good way to keep this information available and up to date is by the use of a red line around the questionable areas on territorial maps centrally located in the Underwriting Division for ease of reference by all Underwriting personnel." (Italics added.)

A New York City insurance agent at our hearings put it more pointedly:

"Most companies mark off certain areas to denote a lack of interest in business arising in these areas. In New York these are called K.O. areas—meaning knock-out areas; in Boston they are called redline districts. Same thing—don't write the business."

The companies' motives for restricting the supply of insurance in urban core areas are not hard to find. Every company has a limited capacity to accept risks, and every company legitimately seeks to maximize profits on the insurance it writes. In doing so, company
underwriters are given incentives for choosing the least hazardous risks in relation to the amount of premium charged. Thus, in attempting to select only better risks, they find it easier to block out areas considered to be blighted than to evaluate properties individually.

In considering center city properties to be relatively poor risks, insurance companies may have in mind that buildings in these areas may be older and less fire resistant than new buildings in other areas or the suburbs. They may have defective heating and electrical systems. Narrow and congested streets may hamper firemen. The density of construction and the closeness of properties may invite the spread of individual fires into conflagrations. Damage from heat, smoke, and water may be widespread.

Companies may also feel that environmental hazards generally exist. Property in excellent condition may be exposed to nearby fire risks. It may be vulnerable to unusual crime hazards. Newly arrived residents from rural areas may be unaccustomed to the requirements of urban living. Overcrowding increases tension and antisocial behavior.

The added risk of riots, even though regarded as a remote possibility, has now prompted some companies to state that continued deterioration of the present situation would make them positively unwilling to provide any insurance in urban core areas.

Yet none of these factors may be of significance with respect to any individual property. What could be regarded as generally reasonable procedures may be arbitrary and discriminatory when applied in any particular case. Applications for insurance must be considered on their individual merits if everyone is to have fair access to insurance.

Stop-Gap Measures

In response to the urgency of the center city insurance problem, this Panel, on September 15, 1967, called for state regulators and the insurance industry to prevent mass cancellations and nonrenewals and to halt a further contraction of the market. As a first step toward increasing the availability of insurance in center cities, we also urged the adoption and expansion of “Urban Area Plans.” Under these plans, individual properties are insured unless a physical inspection discloses demonstrable reasons why the property itself cannot be insured.

Encouraging developments are taking place. State insurance commissioners, in consultation with the industry, have taken actions to maintain existing insurance coverage. Thus, in Michigan and New Jersey, for example, commissioners have extended a moratorium against cancellations and nonrenewals and have begun to work with the industry on steps to enlarge the supply of insurance in urban core areas. Some states—for example, Illinois and Kansas—have adopted Urban Area Plans; others, such as New Jersey and Connecticut, are working to develop these and similar methods to overcome the insurance crisis. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has made its concern a matter of record and has encouraged action to meet the problems.

Insurance companies have generally acted responsibly while awaiting the development of a more basic solution to the problem. They have not engaged in mass cancellations or nonrenewals. They have endeavored to maintain existing markets.

Despite these constructive efforts, there is great uncertainty over the future of the inner city insurance market. In some cases, the moratoria on cancellations and nonrenewals imposed by state insurance departments in the wake of the summer’s riots are by their terms limited in time. Clearly, critical problems remain to be solved.

The Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Program

We believe that further steps must be taken immediately. We recommend that a comprehensive and affirmative program be placed into operation at once. The resources and talents of the insurance industry and of local, state and Federal governments must be marshaled to assure property owners everywhere fair access to insurance.

Unless bold and cooperative action is taken without delay, the problems of insurance availability will only become more serious, and solutions will be even more difficult to achieve.

Some representatives of insurance companies have said that if the underlying problems of urban blight were corrected, insurance would be readily available. But if insurance were more readily available for property that is adequately maintained, the underlying problems of urban blight would be more readily corrected.

Owners of well-maintained homes and businesses in urban core areas should not be asked to wait for better days to come. Indeed, they will not wait—those who can will move out at the first opportunity. Those who do not move will have less incentive to keep up their properties. Insurance must be made available now.

Yet any workable program must take other realities into account. Insurance companies are legitimately interested in profits and in maintaining their financial safety and stability. They therefore seek to avoid high risks. The states are already burdened with urgent demands on their resources. The Federal Government’s responsibilities already more than match its tax revenues.

We believe that a successful program can be designed to operate within the context of the existing structure of the insurance industry and the exist-
ing pattern of state regulation and taxation of the insurance industry.

We believe also that Federal measures should support rather than supplant local efforts. Action by the Federal Government should encourage and assist those with front-line responsibilities.

We are convinced that the solution of the insurance problem of the center cities lies in the cooperative efforts of all who are involved. No single interested segment—the insurance industry, local, state, and Federal Governments, or the residents and businessmen of the urban core—can, acting alone, ameliorate the complex and interdependent conditions that cause this problem.

All must accept a measure of responsibility. By doing so, the insurance crisis can be met.

The principal alternative to this approach is for government itself to provide insurance directly. We believe that so marked a departure from the free enterprise insurance system is unjustified at this time. We have confidence in the strength of the insurance industry and the abilities of the state insurance departments. We feel that they can, with limited Federal assistance, meet the challenge posed by the critical insurance needs of our center cities.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

We propose a five-part program of mutually supporting actions to be undertaken immediately by all who have a responsibility for solving the problem:

- We call upon the insurance industry to take the lead in establishing voluntary plans in all states to assure all property owners fair access to property insurance.

- We look to the states to cooperate with the industry in establishing these plans, and to supplement the plans, to whatever extent may be necessary, by organizing insurance pools and taking other steps to facilitate the insuring of urban core properties.

- We urge that the Federal Government enact legislation creating a National Insurance Development Corporation (NIDC) to assist the insurance industry and the states in achieving the important goal of providing adequate insurance for inner cities. Through the NIDC, the state and Federal Governments can provide backup for the remote contingency of very large riot losses.

- We recommend that the Federal Government enact tax deferral measures to increase the capacity of the insurance industry to absorb the financial costs of the program.

- We suggest a series of other necessary steps to meet the special needs of the inner city insurance market—for example, programs to train agents and brokers from the core areas; to assure the absence of discrimination in insurance company employment on racial or other grounds; and to seek out better methods of preventing losses and of marketing insurance in low-income areas.

The fundamental thrust of our program is cooperative action. Thus, only those companies that participate in plans and pools at the local level, and only those states that take action to implement the program, will be eligible to receive the benefits provided by the National Insurance Development Corp. and by the Federal tax-deferral measures. We firmly believe that all concerned must work together to meet the urban insurance crisis. Everyone must contribute; no one should escape responsibility.

Our specific recommendations for a five-part program are:

FAIR Plans

We recommend that the insurance industry, in cooperation with the states, institute in all States plans establishing fair access to insurance requirements (FAIR plans).

A FAIR plan assures every property owner in a State:

- Inspection of his property;

- Written notice of any improvements or loss prevention measures that may be required to make his property insurable; and

- Insurance if the property is adequately maintained according to reasonable insurance standards.

FAIR plans make these assurances applicable to:

- All dwellings and commercial risks, including buildings and contents;

- and for these basic lines of insurance:

- Fire and extended coverage (damages from wind, hail, explosion, riot, civil commotion, aircraft, vehicle, and smoke);

- Vandalism and malicious mischief; and

- Burglary and theft.

FAIR plans envision a substantial expansion of Urban Area Plans that have been in operation on a limited scale since 1960. Urban Area Plans generally cover only residential properties in limited geographical areas, offer only fire and extended coverage insurance, and have procedural inadequacies. Experience with Urban Area Plans demonstrates their promise, but also exposes their limitations. FAIR plans will fulfill that promise.

One of the most notable extensions FAIR plans will make over Urban Area Plans is to provide burglary and theft insurance as well as fire and extended coverage. What is commonly termed "burglary and theft insurance" encompasses a multitude of different coverages, each presenting difficult underwriting problems. This line of insurance has been a very minor part of total industry writings. It has been much more expensive to market, and increasing crime rates are making it even more expensive. The problems of burglary and theft insurance have received relatively little study, and the potential for improvement is great.
While the ultimate answer to the problem lies in the reduction of crime and in loss prevention, FAIR plans can provide the incentive to insurance companies to develop innovations in the burglary and theft line that will make the basic coverages more valuable to the public.

The major differences between Urban Area Plans and FAIR plans have led us to formulate the new name, which has the added merit of conveying to the public the overriding purpose of the plans.

We believe that FAIR plans will:

- End the practice of “red-lining” neighborhoods and eliminate other restrictive activities;
- Secure for all property owners equitable access to all basic lines of property insurance; and
- Encourage property improvement and loss prevention by responsible owners.

FAIR plans will also furnish accurate information to local and state governments on neighborhoods and on the condition of individual properties in poverty areas. We strongly urge forceful action at local levels to remedy the known environmental hazards of these areas. Action should include the development and enforcement of effective building and fire codes, the provision of more adequate police and fire protection, and the improvement of health, safety and related local services.

If the information produced by FAIR plans leads to constructive governmental action, environmental hazards, which generate many of the insurance problems that make the FAIR plans necessary, will be removed. Thus, FAIR plans contain, in themselves, a broader implication. They serve as a stimulus to cure the basic conditions which have created the need for FAIR plans at this time.

We recognize that the successful operation of FAIR plans depends to a large extent on a sincere effort on the part of each insurance company to accept center city insurance risks.

We are confident that the insurance industry will take the steps required to help solve what is not only a complex and troublesome insurance problem, but a profound social problem.

FAIR plans establish minimum standards that are essential to overcome center city insurance problems. Every state will develop and implement a plan in conformance with its own local institutions, and every state may, indeed, establish criteria beyond those suggested by the Panel.

The rates for insuring properties are an important aspect of FAIR plans. Since the regulation of insurance rates is a state function, the States will bear the responsibility for the rates payable for properties insured under FAIR plans.

We urge that, insofar as possible, the level of rates generally applicable in a state also apply to properties insured under FAIR plans. Surcharges, if needed, should be permitted only for demonstrable hazards of the property itself. Wherever possible, there should be no additional rate for environmental hazards.

We recognize the need for flexible and adequate rates. A risk must bear an appropriate rate; if a property is significantly more hazardous than average, it must yield a commensurately higher premium. Nevertheless, we hope that the states will consider placing a maximum limit on surcharges. Excessive or discriminatory rates must not be permitted to undermine the goals of the FAIR plan.

**State Pools or Other Facilities**

We recommend that states, in cooperation with the insurance industry, form pools of insurance companies (or other facilities) to make insurance available for insurable properties that do not receive coverage under the FAIR plans.

State pools will supplement FAIR plans. Some owners of well-maintained property will be unable to obtain insurance even after an inspection under the FAIR plan. Although the property itself is in good condition, it may be adjacent to an extremely high fire risk, exposed to unusual crime hazards, or subject to other environmental hazards which presently make property uninsurable.

Owners of these properties, usually declined by individual insurance companies, must have fair access to insurance. The responsible owner who cares for his property must not be penalized because of his neighborhood. He must not be denied insurance for reasons beyond his control. To do so not only treats him unfairly, but encourages the spread of urban blight.

It is important to recognize the distinction between this property and uninsurable property that itself is in hazardous condition and cannot or will not be repaired by the owner. Uninsurable property of this latter sort should not be insured, but should, instead, be the object of renewal programs designed to revitalize blighted areas.

We recommend that state insurance pools be formed where necessary to insure well-maintained property, regardless of its location. A pool is an association of insurance companies that agree to share income, expenses, and losses according to a predetermined arrangement. A pool may be voluntary if all but an insignificant part of the industry participates. In some states it may have to be mandatory to obtain the broad industry participation that is necessary.

State pools will:

- Guarantee to the property owner insurance if his property meets insurable standards, even when his property is subject to environmental hazards;
- Provide a method of spreading equitably throughout the insurance industry the risks from environmental hazards unacceptable to a single company;
- Create a convenient facility for Government financial assistance if it is needed to provide insurance for these risks.

Some states may well choose a different method to
achieve the same results expected from pools. They may elect some other arrangement more suitable to their own local institutions—for example, a state insurance company to underwrite the properties directly or a state insurance fund to provide reinsurance for those risks. The point is, state pools or some other facility may be needed to achieve the goals of the FAIR plans.

In some states, properties adversely affected by environmental hazards may be insignificant in number. They may be insured without the necessity of organizing a state pool. Diligent effort exercised by property owners and social responsibility exercised by state officials and the insurance industry—for example, by modifying underwriting standards—may succeed in providing adequate insurance through the FAIR plans alone.

States that are uncertain whether a pool is necessary may wish to wait a year or two until they evaluate the data developed under their FAIR plan. In this case, they would have the benefit of the experience of those states that have moved forward more rapidly with pool arrangements.

We recognize that very little is known about insuring core area risks under a pool arrangement. The experience of the Watts Pool is helpful but since that pool is restricted to fire insurance at highly surcharged rates for commercial properties in a limited geographic area, it is not necessarily a model that can be used generally. Pooling, however, is a standard insurance arrangement, and there is every reason to expect that it can function effectively to handle center city insurance problems.

The underwriting standards of the pool should be set by the state insurance department after consulting with the insurance industry. All properties meeting reasonable standards of insurability should be accepted regardless of environmental hazards.

It is recognized that deductibles and other limits on liability may be needed in making insurance available through a pool.

Rates for property insured in the pool will be regulated by the states. Each state will determine its own appropriate pattern of rates. We recognize that flexible rates may be necessary. But we urge that the pool charge no additional rate for environmental hazards, and that, if surcharges are needed, they be subjected to a maximum limit in order to keep the premium costs within the means of the urban core resident.

It may well be that intensive loss prevention and educational campaigns, deductibles and other similar insurance devices, as well as prudent pool management, can make the pool profitable over a reasonable period of time.

We recognize, however, that the rates charged for pool risks and the type of risks undertaken by the pool may make recurring losses inevitable. Handling these losses might be resolved in a number of ways. If rates are adequate throughout a state to permit substantial profits by companies generally, companies might be assessed some portion of their underwriting income on nonpool property. Or, a state might itself provide funds from premium taxes or general revenues and subsidize to a certain extent the risks in the pool. Just as a State provides funds for other programs designed to revitalize core areas, it could consider its insurance pool as a related undertaking.

Another alternative for covering pool losses is for the State pool to apply to the National Insurance Development Corporation for financial backing against losses. In this event, Federal as well as State funds would be available to spread the cost of subsidization.

National Insurance Development Corporation

We recommend that the Federal Government charter a National Insurance Development Corporation (NIDC) to undertake responsibility for a variety of vital but unfulfilled functions in support of the actions of private industry and States in the operations of FAIR plans and State pools.

The National Insurance Development Corporation would have no shareholders, but rather directors appointed by the President and representing all the parties vitally interested in the inner city insurance problem—residents of urban cores, insurance industry representatives, State officials (including State regulators), Federal officials, and members of the public. It would not seek to make a profit but to discharge important functions in making insurance more widely available to the public.

The Corporation would discharge these functions:

- Provide reinsurance against the risk of extraordinary loss from civil disorders, and thereby remove the burden from a single group of persons or segment of the insurance industry;
- Provide a source of reinsurance for State pools;
- Assess the performance of FAIR plans, State pools, and other insurance programs designed to deal with the problems of the inner cities, by gathering information, analyzing data, and preparing studies for the benefit of the public, the industry, and government.

At the present time, standard insurance policies in many lines of insurance include coverage against loss from riots. We strongly believe that the insurance industry should continue to include this riot coverage in all lines of insurance in which it presently exists.

We believe that the riot risk should, however, be neutralized as a factor hampering the underwriting of insurance in center cities and the placement of private reinsurance. Accordingly, the NIDC would issue riot reinsurance to member companies which are participating fully in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools.

Any company desiring this riot reinsurance would
pay a premium to the NIDC. The premiums paid in will provide a fund from which to pay losses should they occur. The companies would retain the primary coverage of riot damage. The NIDC reinsurance would cover only the contingency of very large losses.

Maintaining law and order is primarily a State and local responsibility. Thus, any State desiring reinsurance for riot risks located in that State would be required to accept a State layer of financial backup of some kind in the event that disorders actually take place in that State.

To the extent that losses on reinsured policies exceed the fund accumulated by company premiums and State contributions, the NIDC would have authority to borrow from the Federal Treasury amounts needed to pay for losses in excess of its assets up to whatever limit may be prescribed by Congress. The borrowings would be repaid by subsequent accumulations of premiums or by congressional appropriations.

In addition, we recognize that there is great uncertainty as to how State pools will function, and how their financial aspects will be handled. We feel strongly, however, that pools should be undertaken now where they are required to meet urban core insurance problems. To aid the operation of State pools, the NIDC could receive direct appropriations for the purpose of helping the pools achieve their important objectives.

Finally, we recognize that our proposed program, like all new measures, will not be put into operation without difficulties. The program needs to be monitored to see that it is accomplishing its objectives, and this might best be undertaken by the NIDC.

The monitoring function includes:

- Collecting statistics on the operation of FAIR plans and the State pools.
- Conducting surveys and studies in cooperation with State insurance departments and the insurance industry to assure that the program is achieving its objectives.
- Gathering statistics and preparing studies of reinsurance—especially alien reinsurance—and of direct insurance placed abroad.
- Publishing the results of studies and surveys and providing information and analysis to the public, the insurance industry, and State and Federal Governments.
- Making recommendations for any changes needed in the program to achieve its purposes.

**Tax Deferral Measures**

We recommend Federal legislation authorizing tax deferral measures to permit insurance companies participating in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools, to accumulate, as quickly as possible, more adequate reserves for catastrophic losses.

Federal tax measures would operate as follows:

- The Federal Government would defer tax on any amount placed by insurance companies in special reserves to meet catastrophic losses. Any company desiring tax deferral must participate in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools.
- That portion of the special reserve that would otherwise have been paid in taxes to the Federal Government would instead be invested in interest-free, nontransferable U.S. Treasury securities. Should the companies incur catastrophic losses, these securities could be redeemed for cash, which would then be available to pay the losses.
- Limits would be placed on the amount of funds that could be accumulated in the tax-deferred reserves. Funds set aside in pools and in special reserves which are later returned to the companies for general use would become taxable at the time of the return.

The States would authorize, within these limits, whatever reserves and premiums they determined to be desirable and appropriate. This action would trigger the Federal tax deferral.

The Panel believes that when sufficient reserves are accumulated, the financial backup of government against catastrophe losses may no longer be necessary. Tax deferral measures therefore contain the promise of phasing out governmental support and restoring the entire enterprise to private hands.

**Other Necessary Steps**

We recommend other measures to meet special problems of the urban core insurance market, specifically:

**Manpower Training Programs** to be sponsored by government to train residents of blighted areas as agents and brokers with special competence to handle the insurance needs of center-city areas.

**Recruitment and Training Programs** to be expanded by insurance companies in order to attract residents of center-city areas to fill personnel needs at all levels of the business.

**More Economical Methods of Marketing Insurance** to be studied by the insurance industry; for example, new forms of contracts, as well as new marketing and underwriting techniques designed to improve the insurance market in center cities.

**Better Procedures to Handle Policyholder Complaints** to be developed by State insurance departments in order to have better records of complaints, cancellations, nonrenewals, and other statistics that measure insurance company performance.

**Research Programs** to be established by the insurance industry in cooperation with State pools and government to develop new loss prevention techniques and other methods of improving the insurance market in center-city areas.

**More Refined Statistics** to be compiled by rating bureaus and insurance companies on loss experience in order to facilitate rate regulation and loss prevention.

**Lending Programs** to be accelerated in the urban core with particular attention to providing needed funds to small businessmen and other property owners for removal and control of fire and crime hazards.

**Contractors' Bid and Performance Bonds for Urban Core Businessmen** to be made more readily available to encourage construction work in these areas.
Appendix I

REPORT TO THE COMMISSION BY THE ADVISORY PANEL ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

At the request of the Commission, we have considered the appropriate role of the profit-making free enterprise system in helping to alleviate the causes of civil disorders, which are the subject of the Commission's work. In our meetings and deliberations during the past 2 months we have taken as our starting point the evidence presented to the Commission on the causes of the disorders and the alternative courses of action which might be pursued to deal with these causes. We have also sought the advice of representatives of the business community and others both within and outside of government.

We conclude that maximum utilization of the tremendous capability of the American free enterprise system is a crucial element in any program for improving conditions, in both our urban centers and our rural poverty areas, which have brought us to the present crisis.

The maintenance of public order is primarily the responsibility of the public sector, but the private sector is the main spring of the national economy and consequently of the economic well-being of our citizens. Free enterprise, with its system of incentives and rewards for hard work, ability, ingenuity and creativity, has made this nation strong and produced the highest standard of living the world has ever known. Under the spur of competition, the discipline of business management produces maximum benefit from the funds and other resources available.

More than 65 percent of the current annual gross national product of over $800 billion is attributable to the private business sector. Eighty-four percent of the Nation's 73 million civilian workers are employed by 11.5 million separate private profit-making employers, of which more than 3.3 million are corporations. Even 5 percent of the total number of private employers would represent more than 500,000 enterprises.

The involvement of even that number would constitute a massive, pluralistic and truly national approach to the national problem of civil disorder and the closely related problems of chronic unemployment and underemployment, particularly among Negroes.

For similar reasons the Nation in the past has repeatedly relied upon the private sector to assist in solving complex national problems. In the field of defense, contracts with private companies for material, supplies and services amounted to $34 billion in fiscal year 1966. In the exploration of outer space, contracts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with private companies amounted to more than $4 billion in fiscal year 1966.

The concept that the private sector must also be involved in overcoming the challenge of racial ghettos in urban areas and poverty in rural areas is now widely accepted, both within and outside the government. In his State of the Union Message on January 17, 1968, the President called for "a new partnership between government and private industry to train and to hire the hard-core unemployed persons." The Congress has made similar declarations in a number of acts, including the Economic Opportunity Act, the basic charter of the War on Poverty.

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, the eminent Negro psychologist and educator who testified before the Commission, stated in a recent article in answer to the question: "What role can business play in finding answers to rioting?"

"Business and industry are our last hope. They are the most realistic elements of our society. Other areas in our society—government, education, churches, labor—have defaulted in dealing with Negro problems."

No fewer than 30 of the witnesses who have appeared before the Commission referred to a role for the private sector in meeting those urban problems which contribute to civil disorders.

We believe that these widely shared sentiments about the role of the business community are more than mere rhetoric. The private sector has shown its concern and capacity for making a contribution in the fields relevant to the urban crisis. In many cases it has done so in collaboration with government, and in many cases it has done so entirely independently of government. A partnership of profit-making businesses and local governments, organized labor, and religious groups has recently been organized in the Urban Coalition, and there are numerous examples of involvement by individual companies in useful projects of various types.

Some of the areas in which there is evidence that the private sector could make a contribution are:

**Job Training and Employment.**—The on-the-job training program under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 has involved more than 2,000 private employers. The Job Corps has involved more than 20 private companies as managers of urban training centers. Numerous similar undertakings by private companies have been catalogued by the National Association of Manufacturers as part of its STEP (Solutions to Employment Problems) program, a national clearinghouse for such endeavors; and by the National Industrial Conference Board in the proceedings of its conference on "Corporate Urban Programs—An Investment in Economic Progress and Social Order," held on January 10, 1968, in New York City.

**Housing.**—Joint ventures with public housing authorities to reconstruct low-income apartments, housing development corporations to receive industrial and banking investments, and "instant renewal," utilizing prefabricated units, have been pioneered by a number of companies.

**Economic Development.**—A consortium of seven of the largest life insurance companies has been created to extend loans in ghetto areas where investment risks were previously considered too great. Several companies have established plants in various poverty areas to employ and train local residents. "Operation Bootstrap," through tax and other incentives, has drawn some 600 companies into investments in new plants in Puerto Rico since 1912, has resulted in the rapid development of the Puerto Rican economy and a dramatic increase in the standard of living, and now serves as a model for the development of other areas of the Western Hemisphere. As a byproduct, "Operation Bootstrap" has also reversed the net in-migration of Puerto Ricans to the continental United States, which was an in-migration from a rural poverty area to urban centers much like the massive outflow of the rural poor to American cities in recent decades.

**Negro Entrepreneurship.**—In order to support and develop needed managerial capabilities in the Negro community, a number of small business programs have relied upon the private sector. The Small Business Administration made almost 3,500 loans during fiscal year 1967 under its economic opportunity loan program, many in participation with private lending institutions and many as guarantor of private loans. A privately sponsored nonprofit group, the Interacial Council for Business Opportunities, has utilized volunteer executives...
of successful businesses to provide managerial assistance to small businesses. The ICBO has assisted approximately 1,000 businessmen since 1963 and has created a private, bank-guaranteed loan fund. A Department of Commerce program has so far stimulated creation of four trade associations for counseling and other assistance to Negro small businessmen. Some companies have created private community development corporations which provide managerial assistance to Negro entrepreneurs.

Education.—A number of companies have provided basic literacy and mathematical skill training to their own disadvantaged employees and in some cases to those of other companies, under contract. A number of profitmaking Job Corps contractors have pioneered rapid literacy techniques.

Attitudinal Change.—Inclusion of Negroes in national advertising has been spurred by the Advertising Council, and many companies are taking affirmative steps to improve the attitudes of their employees and customers through in-plant literature as well as through advertising policy.

While business and industry are making substantial efforts in these and other fields, we believe that much more can and should be done. Many more companies will undoubtedly enter these fields on a volunteer basis, in some cases because they recognize that the price of inaction may well be continued tension and disorder and the ultimate breakdown of the tranquility which underlies our entire social fabric and economic growth. And this process might, and should, be accelerated by exhortation from government and business leadership.

But we believe that a truly massive number of companies could be induced to participate only if appropriate monetary incentives are provided by the Federal government to defray the unusual costs of participation. We also believe that opportunities for business involvement, on a substantially broader scale than at present, exist primarily in the areas of employment and job training and in economic development, in the sense of the establishment of plants and other facilities in poverty areas, both urban and rural. Housing, Negro entrepreneurship, education, and attitudinal changes are also important areas in which the private sector might well make significantly greater contributions, but in the time available to us we have attempted to deal only with the highest priority areas and urge that further study be given to these additional subjects.

It should be noted that our optimism about potential business involvement, in both jobs for the unemployed and economic development, is grounded upon continuation of essentially the same level of economic growth the Nation has experienced in the past 18 months. Business interest is, obviously, affected by general economic conditions as well as by a specific monetary incentive.

The Commission has received ample testimony that underemployment and unemployment are among the most persistent and serious grievances among many Negroes in the central cities which have experienced disorders in recent years. At the same time, job training and job development are the deep concern of profitmaking enterprises and consequently are areas to which private companies can bring the greatest skill and ingenuity.

It is estimated that some 500,000 unemployed persons may be characterized as hard core in the sense that they lack eighth grade literacy and mathematical skills, have only intermittent work histories at most, and often lack motivation to hold and perform a job. A substantial proportion of this group is Negro, male, and between the ages of approximately 18 and 25. The evidence before the Commission suggests that it is this group of late teenagers and young adults who are often the initial participants in civil disorders. A sham employment study by the Department of Labor in 1966 indicated that, as compared with an overall unemployment rate in the United States of 3.8 percent, the unemployment rate among nonwhite 16- to 19-year-old males was 26.5 percent, and among nonwhite 16- to 24-year-old males was 15.9 percent. Data collected by the Commission in 20 cities which experienced racial disorders in 1967, including the most serious disorders, indicate that Negro males between the ages of 15 and 25 predominated among the rioters, that more than 20 percent of the rioters were unemployed, and that when they were employed, they tended to be underemployed in the sense that their employment was intermittent and in low status, unskilled jobs.

Experience over recent years with various experimental public and private employment techniques demonstrates to us that satisfaction that on-the-job training by private employers offers a highly successful method of insuring ultimate placement of trainees, as compared with vocational school programs. The latter often fail to attract the hard-core unemployed person, who is likely to have been a dropout from public school and is generally poorly motivated toward public educational institutions of any type. Institutional programs also leave unresolved the difficult problem of matching the trainee to the subsequent job. Public employment programs often tend to provide unsatisfying, dead-end jobs.

In our recommendations we propose to deal primarily with the 300,000 hard-core unemployed who have not yet been reached or placed in permanent employment by existing programs. By zeroing-in, we do not intend to ignore the remaining approximately million and a half, which, according to the U.S. Department of Labor estimates also need help with regard to employment. Nor do we intend to ignore the approximately 10 million unemployed, 6.5 million of whom work full time and earn less than $3,000 annually, which is the federally defined poverty level.

Many members of these latter two groups, the unemployed who are not hard core in the sense of extreme disadvantage, and the underemployed, would undoubtedly also benefit from the kind of training which we recommend would encourage for the hard core. We would urge continuation and expansion of existing programs which are designed to reach these other two groups. In addition, we recommend consideration of extension to these two groups of the program we recommend for the hard core, perhaps with modifications.

We do not intend with our program for the hard-core disadvantaged to stimulate the leapfrogging, by the hard-core unemployed, of the other two groups. Certainly the already employed must not lose their jobs in order to make room for the hard-core unemployed. Only a program which both upgrades the already employed and thereby creates openings for the hard core, or which creates new openings for the hard core, can satisfy this need.

The other two groups are often disadvantaged by the interrelated problems of outright racial discrimination against those who are nonwhite, and unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum qualifications for employment or promotion, which often have the effect of discriminating. For these groups, as for the hard core, business must consider whether a criminal record should be a bar to the particular job, whether a high school diploma is an inextricably necessary requirement, or whether a written examination is appropriate. During World War II, industry successfully employed large numbers of the previously unemployed who were disadvantaged, by lowering standards such as these and by restructuring work patterns so that the job fit the level of available skill, not vice versa.

That experience, and many others as well, amply demonstrate that racial and other stereotypes are false. The usual educational and other measures used for the population as a whole, when applied to the disadvantaged often ignore considerable intelligence and skill which are utilized instead in
activity, often illegal, in the complex system of the ghetto streets. The existing Federal, state, and local laws against discrimination in employment should be observed and effectively but reasonably enforced.

We are realistic about the problems involved in motivating and training these hard-core youngsters and young adults. Experience with a number of programs, such as the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and several Manpower Development and Training projects, demonstrates clearly that training and motivating this group is considerably more costly than in the case of either the labor force with which private enterprise normally operates or the trainees whom current federally assisted on-the-job training programs have generally tended to reach. Accordingly, we are convinced that the incentive necessary to induce a broad base of the free enterprise system to hire and train the hard-core unemployed will have to be increased correspondingly.

Almost by definition, the new employee recruited from the hard core will require substantially more basic job training than is provided today for unskilled workers who are not disad

Vantaged. Although this is a function and a source of cost which employers have generally undertaken themselves, under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 the Federal Government has created an incentive for training by defraying a portion of such costs.

Far more serious for the employer are the many supportive services which the hard core require in order to make them amenable to employment and job training and the discipline of the work experience. In many cases the new employee recruited from the hard core will require basic educational training, which employers have rarely been required to provide under normal labor market circumstances. In addition, the new employee will usually require counseling in regard to his willingness to work and in regard to aspects of his work habits which the employer normally takes for granted: for example, in dress, appearance, social relationships, money management, transportation, hygiene and health. These supportive services will therefore constitute a source of special cost to the employer.

Tardiness and absenteeism are major problems for this group, who have previously found little social or economic benefit from conformity with the usual standards of commercial life. A number of experiments, including the substantial experience of the Job Corps training centers, indicates that it is difficult to motivate hard-core youths to remain on the job for more than a few weeks. The productivity of trainees at any level is often minimal, but at this level, and with considerable disruption through tardiness, absenteeism and turnover, the cost to the employer can, again, be especially burdensome.

These special costs, of supportive services and loss of productivity, will have to be adequately reimbursed by government in order to permit and stimulate business and industry of all types and sizes to hire and train members of the hard-core unemployed. Estimates of the total annual cost to the employer per hard-core trainee vary from $3,000 to $5,000, including $3,000 or more in wages at the higher of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage, training costs, and supportive service costs, and assuming that marginal productivity is achieved during the training period in return for the employer’s payment of wages.

It must be recognized that a sure method for motivating the hard-core unemployed has yet to be devised. One basic minimum is already apparent from experimental programs: The job must not appear to the hard-core person to be a dead-end job. Since by definition he would not be eligible for even an entry-level job, he must be given job training. It must be made clear to him from the outset that his satisfactory performance at the entry level will result not only in continued employment after the training period but also in an opportunity for advancement, ideally through a clearly defined job ladder with step increases in both pay and responsibility. The fastest growing area of private sector labor demand is in the service industries, rather than in manufacturing; yet the problem of giving a sense of dignity to entry-level jobs is greatest in the service industries.

We believe that, spurred by an adequate monetary incentive, many private employers can and will utilize sufficient ingenuity to meet these and other difficulties of motivating, training and retaining the hard core in useful and productive jobs. The task is by no means an easy one, but we believe the private sector is capable of devising individual solutions adapted to the individual employee and company. A truly massive attempt has not yet been made to induce business to try this approach to the unemployment problem. We believe that it offers a realistic possibility of success.

Even with an adequate monetary incentive to the employer, it must also be recognized that many of the hard core may never be employable by private enterprise, either because they are not reached by the normal processes of the labor market or even stepped-up recruitment techniques, because once reached they are reluctant to accept employment, because the cost of training them exceeds even the most liberal reimbursement, or because they are unable to achieve an adequate level of productivity. For this most severely disadvantaged group, other alternatives will have to be considered.

Effective administration of a monetary incentive is almost as important in attracting widespread business interest as the amount of the incentive itself. Monetary incentives to business might be provided in a number of ways. The Government could guarantee business against various unusually high risks from investment in ghetto areas or, as has been attempted by the Office of Economic Opportunity in a few experimental cases, against the higher turnover and other loss resulting from employment of the hard core. The most direct technique for compensating business is a contract mechanism, under which reimbursement for costs in the particular case is made by a governmental agency to the private contractor. An indirect incentive can be provided through the tax system, either by way of a credit against net tax or through an additional expense deduction for a particular cost or through accelerated depreciation for particular investments or some combination of these three.

We are convinced that large numbers and many different types of business and industrial companies will participate in hiring and training the hard-core unemployed only if an incentive technique is devised which is as simple and automatic as possible. Experience since 1962 in the on-the-job training program under the Manpower Development and Training Act indicates that the Government contract mechanism, in advance of employment and training, is slow in attracting business interest. In part this is due to the need in a contracting system for a substantial promotional effort to bring the program to the attention of a large number of employers. In part it is due to the reluctance of many employers, once they learn of the program, to engage in protracted negotiations with a many-layered structure of local, state, and Federal authorities, all of whom must approve the contractual arrangements. Employers are also extremely reluctant to assume the burdensome post-job requirements and corresponding additional overhead costs of any Federal contracting procedure. Executives are often apprehensive that a Government contract will necessarily involve some loss of management prerogatives over the productive process, especially because Government may seek to dictate in detail the content of the training to be given to employees. These factors appear to discourage even the largest industrial firms, but their negative impact is, naturally, magnified manifold for medium- and small-sized em-
employees, who might otherwise absorb, in the aggregate, large numbers of the hard-core unemployed. It is possible that a simplified direct compensation technique could be devised which would minimize the negative features of contracting, but it is likely that most businessmen would still avoid this type of involvement with Government.

We believe that the single most powerful inducement for broad involvement of private enterprise in job training and job development lies in the use of a tax incentive. Neither a guarantee technique nor a contracting mechanism offers the same appeal to businessmen in enterprises of all sizes as does a tax incentive. Businessmen are convinced from past experience that tax incentives will be relatively simple, automatic, and as self-enforcing as a Government program can be, even as compared with a simplified direct compensation method.

Accordingly, we recommend the following program of incentives to business and industry:

1. Tax Incentive for Hard-Core Employment

First, the hard-core unemployed should be defined and identified by a Government agency, either the Federal-State Employment Services or other local agencies, such as the community action agencies, whichever may in particular localities develop the capacity to reach out effectively to the hard-core unemployed. We do not believe that business can generally be expected to perform this recruitment function efficiently within the ghetto.

Second, an unemployed person once certified as hard core should be issued a green card or other similar identifying document which he would present to an employer.

Third, for each new employee furnishing a green card added to his payroll, the employer would in turn receive a substantial credit against his corporate income tax for the year in which the employee was employed. The sole limitation upon the employer would be that he not dismiss existing employees in order to hire green card employees.

In order to stimulate efforts by the employer to devise techniques for motivating green card employees to remain on the job, the tax credit would not be allowed to the employer unless the employee were retained for at least 6 months. If he remained for 6 months, the employer would be entitled to a tax credit in the amount of 75 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid to the employee during that period. From the outset, the employer would be required to pay the higher of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage for the occupation in question.

To encourage continued retention of the employee, the employer would be entitled to a credit against tax in the amount of 50 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid to the employee during the second 6 months of employment, and 25 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid during the second year of employment. For example, an employer paying the minimum wage of $1.60 per hour, or $3,398 per year to a full-time employee, and no fringe benefits, would receive for the first 6 months of employment $1,248 in credit against his net corporate income tax. If the employee were retained for the second 6 months, the employer would receive an additional $832 or a total of $2,080 as a credit against tax for the first year. If the employee remained for the entire 2-year period, the employer would receive an additional $832 in credit against his corporate tax for the second year. The employer's total credit for the employee over a 2-year period would thus amount to $2,912. Of course, over the 2-year period the employer will incur the cost of training and other supportive services and the cost of wages and fringe benefits paid and would therefore also receive the usual deduction from gross income for these costs as business expenses.

The premise of the plan is that, given the tax benefit only if the employee is motivated to remain on the job, the employer will attempt to create the conditions necessary to keep the employee motivated, through the provision of training, job ladders, and the supportive services which have been described above as so necessary to motivation and retention of the hard-core unemployed. In order to avoid abuse of the premium which the green card confers upon the job applicant, no green card holder would be entitled to use the card for more than 2 years of cumulative employment and in no event for a series of less-than-6-month periods with different employers. Should an employee leave an employer voluntarily for the second time, the Employment Service or other referring agencies would be required to place him at the bottom of their referral file.

As in the case of the existing 7 percent tax credit for investment in new equipment, the maximum credit allowable against the corporate employer's tax arising from employment of the hard-core unemployed would be limited to $25,000 plus 50 percent of the amount of the company's tax exceeding $25,000. So that no employer would receive a competitive advantage, credit would be allowable only for a limited percentage of the total number of the company's employees, on a sliding scale. An employer of 10 or fewer employees could receive a tax credit for no more than 50 percent of his employees as green card holders; employers of 10 to 100 employees could receive credit for no more than 25 percent; and those employing over 100 no more than 15 percent.

An advantage of the tax credit route is that only companies which are profitable and therefore owe Federal income tax are eligible for the incentive credit. Profitable companies are in the best position to provide meaningful and continuing employment.

Provision should be made for exemption of green card holders from mandatory labor union membership until they have become permanent, full-time employees.

2. Tax Incentives for Investment in Poverty Areas, Both Urban and Rural

We recommend a parallel tax credit, in addition, for the location and renovation of plants and other business facilities in urban and rural poverty areas, as already defined jointly by several Federal departments and agencies. The new investment credit would be available for investments in rural as well as urban poverty areas in order to begin a national effort to improve rural economic conditions and thereby attempt to stem the massive migration from such areas to the urban centers which has been so marked in recent decades.

The existing incentive tax credit for investment in new equipment, first enacted in 1962, applies regardless of the area in which the investment is made. But the existing credit does not apply to investment in real property or in plant. We recommend that, for investment in poverty areas, the existing credit be increased substantially enough to achieve this purpose and extended to investments in real property and plant, whether for acquisition or construction of new property or the renovation of existing property. We also recommend that plant and equipment in such areas be eligible for rapid amortization, within as little as 5 years. These incentives would be designed to attract to the poverty areas the type of industrial and commercial development which would create new jobs and would also stimulate further economic benefit within the disadvantaged community surrounding the enterprise.

The incentives would assist existing businesses in poverty areas, including Negro-owned businesses, as well as new businesses. By stimulating new jobs in urban poverty areas the incentives would also help to overcome the often severe difficulties residents of those areas now experience in obtaining transportation to suburban commercial and industrial plants.

The credit for poverty area investment would not, how-
ever, be dependent upon employment of the hard-core unemployed. An employer eligible for the credit for poverty area investment would also be eligible, if he employed green card holders, for the credit for hard-core employment. The two credits are designed to meet separate needs and different costs to investors and employers and therefore should be cumulative. Like the credit for employment of the hard-core, the investment credit should be limited to $25,000 of tax and 50 percent of the tax exceeding $25,000.

Protections would have to be provided against subsidizing "run-away" plants from urban areas, although large companies should not be discouraged from expanding their operations into rural areas. Protections would also be necessary to avoid abuse of the credit by automated operations which involve few employees.

3. Local Joint Clearinghouse Groups

We recommend that industry, organized labor, and various civic organizations be encouraged to create joint local clearinghouse groups to exchange experience gained with employment of the hard-core unemployed and with investment in poverty areas. A major benefit of utilizing the tax incentive technique is permitting each enterprise to adapt its program to the particular conditions of its business and location and the particular problems and strengths of the labor market in that location. However, there is much to be gained from the cross-fertilization of the many experimental programs now being carried on by business and industry and the many additional experiments which would be stimulated by the tax incentives we have outlined. Mixed local groups would facilitate a useful interchange of experience and know-how. In any event, these local groups would have no authority to approve or disapprove programs for tax credit purposes.

In our deliberations we have considered carefully the arguments which have repeatedly been made in some tax circles against the use of tax incentives for social purposes such as those we recommend. Two such arguments have been made most strenuously and merit thoughtful answers:

1. Backdoor financing.—It is often contended that tax incentives, once enacted as a part of the Internal Revenue Code, become entrenched and immune from the kind of public scrutiny which more direct incentives, through appropriated funds, receive annually in the Congress. The recent history of the existing 7-percent investment credit for new equipment, which is the most direct analogy to the investment credits proposed here, belies this argument. A fixed time limitation may be placed upon a provision of the tax law, just as in the case of authorizing legislation for a direct incentive. Although this was not done in the case of the 7-percent equipment investment credit, the Administration recommended a suspension of the credit for a period of time in 1966 and 1967, because the demonstrated success of the tax credit as a spur to new investment was thought to increase the danger of inflation. The Congress accepted this conclusion, after giving it the same consideration it would have given had the question instead arisen in regard to the extension of an authorized direct incentive or in regard to an appropriation for a program of direct incentive enacted under a multi-year authorization. The public policy which dictates that an incentive be a permanent part of the law is the same whether the law involved is the Internal Revenue Code or some other statute.

The tax incentives we recommend should be limited in time and reappraised every 2 years. If, in addition, some further control on the cost to the Treasury is necessary, the Government would retain authority to regulate the flow of green cards in the case of the credit for hard-core employment.

2. Foreclosing other, more creative avenues of assistance.—It is contended that tax incentives tend to obscure the search for more effective techniques to achieve common social goals. This may be an effective argument in regard to other uses of tax incentives, but it is inapplicable to the use we recommend. We arrived at the tax approach only after carefully appraising the various other available means of governmental assistance, several of which have been tried. After weighing these alternatives, we have come to the firm conclusion that the tax technique is indeed the most effective for the particular social goal. We have sought a means of motivating the widest possible spectrum of American business in alleviating joblessness in our urban and rural poverty areas, and we find that no other technique is as likely to move the American business community into action for this purpose as is the tax incentive device.

The public policy goal here is the employment and training of hundreds of thousands of persons by, hopefully, thousands of business enterprises. The existing investment tax credit was taken on 1,239,000 corporate tax returns and 6,501,000 individual tax returns during the period of 1962-65, representing new investments in the amount of approximately $7.5 billion and $17.5 billion respectively. It is precisely because of the need for a similarly pluralistic and large-scale answer to the problem of joblessness in the ghetto that we have turned to the most pluralistic technique for channelling governmental assistance: the individual decisions of thousands of businesses to utilize the tax credit in making their daily employment and plant location decisions. Other incentive techniques may be better for the solution of other major social problems, but we are convinced that the tax incentive method is the most appropriate and most hopeful solution to this particular problem.

**Commissioner Charles B. Thornton, Chairman,**

**John Leland Atwood,**

President and Chief Executive Officer,
North American Rockwell Corp.

**Martin R. Gainsbrugh,**

Senior Vice President and Chief Economist,
National Industrial Conference Board.

**Walter E. Hombley,**

Senior Vice President and Chief Economist,
Bank of America.

**Louis F. Polk, Jr.,**

Vice President, Finance,
International and Development,
General Mills, Inc.

**Lawrence M. Stone,**

Professor of Law,
University of California, Berkeley.

January 29, 1967
Appendix J

SPECIAL INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

August 10, 1967.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

On the basis of the testimony to date, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recommends that the following actions be taken immediately:

1. Increase substantially the recruitment of Negroes into the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. As of December 31, 1966, the Army National Guard totaled 404,996 officers and enlisted personnel in units in the United States. Of this total, only 4,638 were Negro—1.15 percent. As of the same date, the Air National Guard totaled 80,622 officers and airmen. Of this total, only 475 were Negro—0.6 percent.

The Commission believes strongly that this deficiency must be corrected as soon as possible. To do so will require the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, State officials, and the Negro community.

2. Improve and expand riot control training of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. We have been informed that the steps are under way to do this. We wish to underscore the importance of moving forward as rapidly as possible. We recommend that special emphasis be given to such training during the next several weeks.

3. Review by Federal and state officials of the qualifications and performance of all officers in the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. The Department of Defense should also review Federal recognition standards and procedures to insure that they are adequate to preclude the appointment and promotion of substandard officers.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER,
Chairman,
Hon. Ramsay Clark, Attorney General,
Washington, D.C.

(Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,
Vice Chairman.

February 7, 1968.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

More effective means of communication among police officers in a disorder area and between police in the area and officers at control headquarters are essential. Difficulties in communication impair day-to-day enforcement efforts, but become particularly acute during a disorder when there is urgent need for departments to act as coordinated units.

One important way to alleviate this problem is to provide miniaturized two-way radio equipment for all officers on patrol. Accordingly, the Commission's Report will include the following paragraph strongly endorsing the recommendation of the President's Crime Commission:

Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the Federal Government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police.

The Commission believes that the Department of Justice should move forward now to develop such a program. We urge immediate action and we would appreciate learning of steps being taken in this direction.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER,
Chairman.

(Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,
Vice Chairman.

October 7, 1967.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, on the basis of testimony thus far received, recommends that you direct the Department of Justice to conduct a series of intensive training conferences this winter for governmental and police officials. The series would focus on effective measures for the maintenance of law and order and on programs to improve police-community relations.

We emphasize that knowledge and programs in these areas are not substitutes for solutions to the problems of racial discrimination, alienation and poverty, as reflected in such areas as employment, education and housing. But there is need for cities, as soon as possible, to share the knowledge that has been gained in methods for maintenance of law and order.

Some 75 witnesses, including mayors, chiefs of police, other state and local officials, representatives of Federal departments and agencies, and residents of disorder areas have now testified before the Commission. Many others will be heard.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER,
Chairman.

(Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,
Vice Chairman.
February 7, 1968.

Hon. Rosel H. Hyde,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has examined the critical control problems that our cities have encountered in the recent disorders. Among the most perplexing has been to provide sufficient radio frequencies to assure communication among control officers on a daily basis and especially during a disorder. Police officers in the disorder area have frequently found it difficult or impossible to reach other officers or other agencies of local or state government. State and local police are sometimes unable to use the same frequency.

The following paragraph, which will be included in the Commission's report, sets forth the Commission's strong recommendation on the basis of its study:

We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use.

We understand that this matter is under consideration by the Commission now. We urge immediate action and would appreciate learning of steps being taken in this direction.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Otto Kerner,
Chairman,
(Signed) John V. Lindsay,
Vice Chairman.

Appendix K

A STATEMENT ON METHODOLOGY

Two prime factors shaped the character and direction of the Commission’s work. The first was time; the second, the scope of the task.

The Commission was established by the President on July 29, 1967. Under the terms of the Executive order, it was directed to make an interim report not later than March 1, 1968, and a final report not later than July 29, 1968.

From the start, a sense of urgency dominated the Commission’s work. This grew from month to month until, in December, the decision was made to issue both the interim and final reports as a single document before March 1, 1968. Basic to this decision was the conviction that to present our major conclusions and recommendations in midsummer would be to forfeit whatever opportunity might exist for the report “to affect this year the dangerous climate of tension and apprehension that pervades our cities.”

At the same time, the Commission was faced with the task of analyzing a series of essentially local events, reporting “what happened” and “why it happened” in terms that would provide a national perspective. It also had responsibility to formulate a series of recommendations to answer the question: “What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?”

The Work of the Commissioners

To accomplish these tasks within the stringent time limits indicated above, the Commissioners divided their work into two basic phases.

During the first phase, closed hearings were held in Washington, D.C., in order to bring before the Commission a full spectrum of witnesses whose testimony would aid the Commission in considering the issues raised by the President's charge.

In the initial hearings, the Commission sought information to determine as accurately as possible what happened during several major disorders. The Commission heard testimony from mayors and their top assistants, from police and fire department officials, from officers and workers of human relations commissions, and from a variety of other local officials who either played a role in controlling the disorders or had knowledge of the events that took place. For some major disorders, the Commission also heard testimony from Federal officials, from governors, from other state officials, and from state law enforcement officers.

This testimony was not confined solely to what happened. In prepared statements and during questioning by the Commission, these officials also explained their understanding of the basic causes of the disorders and their recommendations for future action.

In attempting to gain an understanding of the forces that gave rise to the disorders, the Commission heard testimony from ghetto residents, from civil rights leaders, from noted authors, from reporters, from sociologists, historians, psychologists, economists, and from a wide range of Federal, state, and local officials involved in the problems of our cities, our poor, and our minority groups.

Because of the extreme importance of measures relating to the prevention and control of disorders, the Commission heard testimony from officials of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from army officers with responsibility for riot control operations, from National Guard officers who commanded control forces, and from a wide variety of police officials and academic experts in police-community relations.

The Commission heard extensive testimony to provide the background for its program recommendations. In these various fields—employment, education, housing, welfare, youth programs, urban problems—the Commission heard testimony from Cabinet officials, from other Federal officials, from business and labor leaders, from ghetto residents, from state and local officials, from civil rights leaders, and from university experts.

In total, during 20 days of hearings from August to November, over 150 persons appeared as witnesses before the Commission. The transcript of these hearings—which totaled over 3,900 pages—was digested and fully indexed so that it could serve as a continuing source of information for the Commission, staff, consultants, and advisers.

A list of the witnesses appearing before the Commission is found in Appendix E.

In addition to the hearings, the Commissioners themselves visited some eight cities that had suffered serious disorders. During these visits the Commissioners met with and interviewed ghetto residents and black militants, as well as public officials. Tours were conducted of areas that had experienced disorders.

The second phase of the Commission’s work consisted of
a series of meetings held from December through February of 1968 for the purpose of discussing the results of the field surveys and other investigations, reviewing preliminary drafts of sections of the report, and discussing and formulating proposed recommendations.

In addition to these general meetings attended by the Commission and key staff members, individual Commissioners participated in preparation of the report by exchanging information with the staff, by furnishing data on particular subjects under review, and by generally furnishing advice and guidance to the staff effort.

In sum, during the period from July 29, 1967, to March 1, 1968, the Commission met for a total of 44 days, not including the trips taken to the riot cities.

The Staff
The pressures of time and the need to study a representative sample of the riot cities led the Commission to recruit rapidly a staff of over 90 professionals, including qualified personnel, both professional and clerical, detailed to the Commission by Federal agencies.

As the Commission's work shifted into its second phase, and as the investigative and analytical work neared completion, the staff was reduced in number to approximately 45 professionals.

Shortly after the appointment of the Commission, the President appointed David Ginsburg, a Washington attorney, as Executive Director, to direct the staff effort. He was assisted by the Deputy Executive Director, Victor H. Palmieri, a Los Angeles attorney and businessman.

Merle M. McCurdy, on leave of absence as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, served as the General Counsel for the Commission. He and his staff furnished legal advice to the Commission, arranged for and conducted the Commission hearings, and conducted depositions as part of the investigative efforts.

Stephen Kurzman, a Washington attorney, supervised the field surveys conducted by the Commission, and the analysis of the data collected by these surveys.

Staff efforts in the various substantive and analytical areas of the Commission's work were directed by a number of experts. Dr. Robert Shellow, a social psychologist with the National Institute of Mental Health, directed portions of the analytical effort conducted by the staff. The staff work concerning police and public safety was the responsibility of Arnold Sagofy, former Director of the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination for the Treasury Department, on leave of absence as Advisor on Public Safety for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Robert Conot, author and journalist, directed the work of the staff in preparing the riot profiles. Milan C. Mislowsky, on leave as Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Treasury, served as Director of Investigations. Staff work in the development of social and economic program recommendations was directed by Dr. Richard Nathan, an economist and associate of the Brookings Institution, and Dr. Anthony Downs, economist.

The Commission also relied heavily on the talents of the consultants and advisers named in appendix F. They included experts on all facets of the problems studied by the Commission including leading scholars, police and other law enforcement officials, a variety of experts from local, state, and Federal Government agencies, and specialists from private research firms. Some of these experts prepared drafts of chapters of the report, submitted papers, or conducted studies especially for the Commission.

Commission Investigative Efforts
The Commission undertook three major field research programs.

The primary investigative effort consisted of field surveys conducted in 23 cities. After consultation with staff researchers, the Commission concluded that within the short time period available, a national perspective could best be obtained by an intensive study of a representative group of cities that experienced some sort of disorder in 1967. Disturbances that took place in over 150 cities were initially ranked on the basis of the degree of violence and damage, the duration of the violent action, the number of active participants, and the level of law enforcement response. From this list, Commission researchers selected for field investigation:

- Nine cities experiencing serious destruction.
- Three cities where the disorders occurred in university settings.
- A chain of six New Jersey cities surrounding Newark.
- Five cities which experienced lesser degrees of violence.

For each of the 23 cities, the staff collected and reviewed existing written material on the disorders—FBI and Department of Justice reports, reports prepared by other Government agencies, and newspaper accounts. This review was supplemented by oral briefings from those with special knowledge of one or more of the 23 cities.

Over a period of several months, investigative teams of six staff members were dispatched to 20 of the 23 cities. (Investigation of the three university disturbances was contracted to a nonprofit corporation.) In each city, subteams of two staff members interviewed persons from the official sector (mayors, city officials, policemen and police officials, judges, and others), the disorder area (residents, leaders of community groups), and the private sector (businessmen, labor, and community leaders). In order to increase uniformity of the investigative effort, each six-man team was dispatched to a number of cities.

During the city visits, team members interviewed over 1,200 persons. All interviews followed, to the fullest extent possible, questionnaires developed by staff members working in the various substantive areas studied by the Commission.

After completion of interviews in a city, team members returned to Washington to dictate reports of their interviews. Team members were also fully debriefed by oral questioning by staff members.

A draft report was prepared synthesizing the team interviews for each city. Followup visits to a number of cities were conducted to obtain additional information.

The field investigative effort thus produced information in two areas: first, chronology of each disorder, beginning with the events leading to the outbreak, through the development in its various stages, to the resolution and aftermath; second, the factors responsible for the tension leading to disorder, including grievances in the Negro community, and the responses of officials. A national perspective, as well as evidence of specific events, was obtained.

The second major investigative effort went into the development of the riot profiles, a detailed study of 10 disorders. This study focused on an identification and classification of the key actors and critical points in the disorders. It took advantage of all the material developed by the field surveys, but also conducted independent investigations.

To insure absolute accuracy each riot profile was thoroughly reviewed by the General Counsel and his staff. All statements that were not substantiated by sworn testimony, or by well-known facts, were isolated, and potential verifying witnesses identified.

Attorneys from the General Counsel's staff subpoenaed three witnesses for depositions and, in a series of city visits, obtained nearly 1,500 pages of sworn testimony from 90 witnesses to validate all material assertions in the Riot Profiles.

The third major investigative effort sought to determine to
what extent, if any, there was planning or organization in the riots. The methodology of this investigation is set out in the chapter on organized activity. Depositions and interviews conducted in connection with the General Counsel's office augmented this investigation.

A number of other specialized studies were conducted during preparation of the Report or have been contracted to outside consultants for later completion. These studies include, for example, an analysis of three disorders that took place in university settings, a comprehensive study of riot arrests in over 20 disturbances occurring over the past 3 years, and a computer examination of the effectiveness of police-community relations programs.

In addition, the Commission has undertaken two major surveys of Negro and white attitudes with the aid of the Ford Foundation. The first, a survey of white and Negro attitudes in 15 major cities and four suburban areas, is being conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The second, under the direction of Prof. Peter Rossi and Prof. James Coleman, Johns Hopkins University, is a continuation of the Commission's field effort—a special survey of attitudes of community leaders, elected officials, administrators, policemen on the beat, and teachers. The Commission is deeply indebted to the Ford Foundation for its assistance and support.

**Analytical Studies**

To describe and explain the disorders and to identify operative factors during the period of the disorders, the data collected and compiled by field investigators were analyzed by staff social scientists and consultants. The analysis concentrated on subjective behavior, leadership structures, the bargaining process operating in the disorders, and the causative factors of the disorders. Detailed analyses of selected cities, and a comprehensive analysis of all disorders studies, were prepared.

The data obtained from the field investigations was further analyzed by the staff and consultants in preparing the chapter on organized disorder. Results obtained from a special survey based on probability samples of residents in Detroit and Newark augmented this analysis. A methodology for this survey is set out in the chapter.

In cooperation with the Bureau of the Census, the staff developed socioeconomic profiles for each of the 23 cities studied by the Commission. Primarily based upon 1960 census information, these profiles included statistics on total population, age distribution, education, size of households, income, employment, type of employment, and housing. Separate information on white and nonwhite population was developed for the city studied, the standard metropolitan statistical area containing the city, and the census tracts within the city where the disturbance took place. Whenever possible, census data was updated by more recent information.

**Program Studies**

The remaining staff and consultant efforts focused on the major substantive problem areas delineated in the President's charge to the Commission.

The chapter on the police and the community was the product of a joint effort of the staff and a large number of consultants and advisers. Initially, a number of academic experts, including many who had served as staff members, consultants or advisers to the Crime Commission, submitted original papers analyzing a variety of problems in police-community relations.

The chapter on control of disorder contains a distillation of some of the extensive material in the control supplement, but with special emphasis on the means by which police—and public officials—can control incidents or disorders in their early stages. A summary of the methodology is contained in a footnote to the chapter.

For the control chapter and supplement, the basic data on police departments was obtained from a survey of 28 city and two state police departments conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The survey information, which was obtained from interviews conducted by experienced police personnel, was analyzed by the IACP staff and a report prepared assessing the state of preparedness and control capabilities of these police departments. The survey and report also covered police-community relations programs and training, information on policy guidelines, and data on Negro personnel in police departments.

A 2-day conference attended by police officials from several leading departments was held for the purpose of reviewing the lessons learned by police as a result of recent disorders. A National Guard commander also participated in discussions relating to police-Guard coordination and operations. A transcript of the conference was prepared to permit full review of the proceedings.

The basic sources of data on the National Guard were: After action reports from a number of cities where Guard troops aided in control of disorders; the report on Detroit prepared by Cyril R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense during the 1967 disorder, extensive information on the National Guard furnished by the National Guard Bureau and the Department of the Army; information from Commission investigations, analysts, riot profiles, and hearings; and information furnished by consultants and advisers.

In August 1967, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives established a special subcommittee to inquire into the capability of the National Guard to cope with civil disturbances. The report and hearings of this subcommittee served as a valuable source of information on the Guard.

An experienced Guard commander, who also served as a police commissioner, was retained as a consultant on National Guard matters. He, assisted by the staff, reviewed the information from the above sources, and submitted a report based upon this information and his own experience.

Information about the Army was primarily supplied by the Department of Defense. Additional information was obtained from the Vance report on Detroit, and from Commission hearings.

Information concerning fire department problems, and suggested recommendations, were primarily obtained from reports prepared by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and by the Chief of the New York Fire Department. Additional information was obtained from reports prepared by fire department observers at several disorders.

Reports were prepared for the Commission by the Public Administration Service (PAS) of Chicago, Illinois (an organization that also developed information on coordination of police services for the Commission) on intracity and interjurisdictional coordinated planning at a horizontal level. In preparing these reports, PAS used information from the IACP survey of police departments as well as from its own resources. The Department of Justice furnished information concerning Federal-state planning.

Information on youth groups was obtained from the Comm. **321**
mission field investigations, and from a study prepared for the Commission by the administration of justice unit of the University Research Corp.

Basic information for the section on legal needs was obtained from the IACP survey, from a report prepared for the Commission by the National League of Cities, Washington, D.C., and from the Department of Justice studies. Information from Commission investigations and hearings was also relied upon.

Staff members prepared the initial drafts of the public safety sections using the above information. All or selected parts of these drafts were then submitted to a number of advisers for critical comment in order to ensure not only accuracy, but also full coverage of the subjects under investigation.

The methodology for the media chapter, including the special study of television broadcasting and newspaper stories of the riots, is described in the chapter itself.

Preparation of the remaining portions of parts II and III of the Report drew on the resources of the Commission, the staff, consultants, and advisers. Preliminary drafts were generally prepared based on outlines approved by the Commission and on readily available information. As the drafts progressed through the many revisions leading to a final product, data from the field investigations, hearings and special studies were gradually incorporated. Drafts were circulated among Commission members, other staff members, and consultants for comment. Advisers submitted new ideas and information, and critical commentary. Also at this stage new data received from a variety of outside studies concerning the disorders were fed into the drafts. Finally, after thorough review and reworking by the members of the Commission, who spent 24 days in full Commission meetings reviewing, discussing and revising the drafts, the final versions were completed.

In addition to the foregoing, two special advisory panels were formed by the Commission. On August 10, 1967, the President, after consulting with the Commission, appointed a separate and expert group, the National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, to deal with the insurance problems of urban core residents and businessmen.


A second panel, the Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise, was formed under the chairmanship of Commissioner Thornton. The primary purpose of the Panel was "to assist the Commission and staff in formulating recommendations for increasing employment opportunities." The members of the Panel included leading businessmen and academic experts. The full text of the Panel's report is attached as Appendix H.

Acknowledgments

Members of our investigative and research staff received cooperation from numerous persons who gave freely of their time and advice. Individuals are too numerous to mention, but we would like to thank generally the city officials, both elected and appointed, in the cities we visited. State and county officials throughout the country also cooperated with us, as did people throughout the Federal Government.

Remington Arms Company, Inc. and the Winchester-Western Division of Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation also arranged for an independent study by Stanford Research Institute on the role of firearms in disorders, to be released by May 1, 1968.
Footnotes: Chapter Two

Note: In many of these footnotes where a series of disorders is mentioned we have indicated the number of disturbances which have been classified as "major," "serious" or "minor" in the section on "Levels of Violence and Damage" in chapter 2-1, supra.

1. Five sources for our compilation were: Department of Justice, Criminal Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University; and Congressional Quarterly, September 8, 1967.

2. The following listed:
   Buffalo, N.Y.
   Cincinnati, Ohio (June)
   Detroit, Mich.
   Milwaukee, Wis.
   Minneapolis, Minn.
   Newark, N.J.
   Plainfield, N.J.
   Tampa, Fla. (June)

3. The following listed:
   Albany, N.Y.
   Atlanta, Ga. (June)
   Birmingham, Ala.
   Boston, Mass.
   Cairo, Ill.
   Cambridge, Md. (July)
   Cincinnati, Ohio (July 3–5)
   Dayton, Ohio (June)
   Flint, Mich.
   Fresno, Calif.
   Grand Rapids, Mich.
   Houston, Texas (May)
   Jackson, Miss.
   Montclair, N.J.
   Nashville, Tenn.
   New Haven, Conn.
   New York, N.Y. (Bronx and East Harlem)
   Omaha, Nebr.
   Paterson, N.J.
   Phoenix, Ariz.
   Pontiac, Mich.
   Portland, Ore.
   Riviera Beach, Fla.
   Rochester, N.Y. (July)
   Saginaw, Mich.
   San Francisco, Calif.
   (May 14–15, July)
   Syracuse, N.Y.
   Toledo, Ohio
   Waterloo, Iowa.
   Wichita, Kan. (August)
   Wilmington, Del.
   4. The following listed:
   Alton, Ill.
   Abingdon, N.C.
   Atlanta, Ga. (July)
   Aurora, Ill.
   Benton Harbor, Mich.
   Bridgeport, Conn.
   Bridgeton, N.J.
   Cambridge, Md. (June)
   Chicago, Ill. (4 disorders)
   Cincinnati, Ohio (July 27)
   Clearwater, Fla.
   Cleveland, Ohio (2 disorders)
   Columbus, Ohio
   Dayton, Ohio (September)
   Deerfield Beach, Fla. (2 disorders)
   Denver, Colo. (2 disorders)
   Des Moines, Iowa (2 disorders)
   Durham, N.C.
   East Orange, N.J. (2 disorders)
   East Palo Alto, Calif.
   East St. Louis, Ill. (2 disorders)
   Elgin, Ill. (2 disorders)
   Elizabeth, N.J.
   Englewood, N.J.
   Erie, Pa. (2 disorders)
   Greenburg, N.C.
   Hamilton, Ohio
   Hammond, Ind.
   Hartford, Conn. (3 disorders)
   Houston, Texas (July, August)
   Irvington, N.J.
   Jackson, Mich.
   Jarvesburg, N.J.
   Jersey City, N.J.
   Kansas City, Mo.
   Lackawanna, N.Y.
   Lakeland, Fla.
   Lansing, Mich.
   Lima, Ohio
   Long Beach, Calif.
   Lorain, Ohio
   Los Angeles, Calif.
   Louisville, Ky.
   Marin City, Calif.
   Massillon, Ohio
   Maywood, Ill. (2 disorders)
   Middleburg, Ohio
   Mt. Clemens, Mich.
   Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
   Muskegon, Mich.
   New Britain, Conn.
   New Brunswick, N.J.
   Newburgh, N.Y.
   New Castle, Pa.
   New Haven, Conn.
   New Rochelle, N.Y.
   New York, N.Y. (Fifth Avenue and 2 Brookline disorders)
   Niagara Falls, N.Y.
   Nyack, N.Y. (2 disorders)
   Oakland, Calif.
   Orange, N.J.
   Pasadena, Calif.
   Passaic, N.J.
   Peabody, N.Y.
   Peoria, Ill.
   Philadelphia, Pa. (3 disorders)
   Pittsburgh, Pa.
   Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
   Prattville, Ala.
Providence, R.I.
Rochester, N.Y. (May 31–June 1)
Rockford, Ill. (2 disorders)
Sacramento, Calif.
St. Louis, Mo.
St. Paul, Minn.
St. Petersburg, Fla.
San Bernardino, Calif.
San Diego, Calif.
Sandusky, Ohio
San Francisco, Calif. (May 21)
Seabrook, Del.
Seattle, Wash.
South Bend, Ind.
Springfield, Ohio
Spring Valley, N.Y.
Tampa, Fla. (July)
Torrington, Ark.
Tucson, Ariz.
Vallejo, Calif. (2 disorders)
Wadesboro, N.C.
Washington, D.C.
Waterbury, Conn.
Waukegan, Ill.
West Palm Beach, Fla.
Wichita, Kans. (May and July)
Wyandanch, N.Y.
Youngstown, Ohio
Ypsilanti, Mich.
4. Two: Atlanta, Cambridge, Cleveland, Dayton, Deerfield Beach, Denver, Des Moines, East Orange, East St. Louis, Elgin, Erie, Maywood, Nyack, Rochester, Rockford, Tampa, and Vallejo.
6. Cleveland and Rochester.
7. Disorders were counted in the month in which they began. Thus the Omaha disorder, for example, which began on March 31 and ended on April 2, was counted in the March total.
January: Chicago.
March: Omaha.
April: Cleveland, Louisville, Massillon, and Nashville.
June: Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Clearwater, Dayton, Lansing, Los Angeles, Maywood, Middletown, Niagara Falls, Philadelphia, Prattville, St. Petersburg, and Tampa.
September: Aurora, Columbus, Dayton, Deerfield Beach, East St. Louis, Hartford (2), New London, New York, Nyack, and Texarkana.
Midwest: Alton, Aurora, Benton Harbor, Cairo, Chicago (4), Cleveland (2), Cincinnati (3), Columbus, Dayton (2), Des Moines (2), Detroit, East St. Louis (2), Elgin (2), Flint, Grand Rapids, Hamilton, Jackson (Mich.), Kalamazoo, Kansas City, Lansing, Lima, Lorain, Massillon, Maywood (2), Middletown, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Mt. Clemens, Muskegon, Omaha, Peoria, Pontiac, Rockford (2), Saginaw, St. Louis, St. Paul, Sandusky, South Bend, Springfield, Toledo, Waterford, Waterbury, Wicklita (3), Youngstown, and Ypsilanti.
South and border States: Atlanta (2), Birmingham, Cambridge (2), Clearwater, Deerfield Beach (2), Durham, Greensboro, Hammond, Houston (3), Jackson (Miss.), Lake Park, Louisville, Nashville, Prattville, Riviera Beach, St. Petersburg, Tampa (2), Texarkana, Wadesboro, West Palm Beach, and Washington.
Detroit: Kalamazoo, Pontiac, Toledo, Flint, Grand Rapids, Muskegon, Saginaw, and Mt. Clemens.
The causal relationship between the Detroit and Newark riots and the disorders in their respective clusters is considered under Precipitating Incidents in part II of this chapter.
The other 21 clusters, arranged by the month in which each cluster began, were:
April: Cleveland, Massillon.
Nashville, Louisville.
May: San Francisco, Vallejo.
June: Cincinnati, Dayton, Middletown.
Buffalo, Niagara Falls.
Clearwater, Tampa, St. Petersburg.
July: Tampa, Deerfield Beach, Lakeland, Riviera Beach, West Palm Beach.
Greensboro, Durham, Wadesboro.
Brooklyn, East Harlem, New York, 5th Avenue, Mt. Vernon, Brooklyn, Peckskill, Lackawanna, Newburgh, Passaic, Poughkeepsie, New Rochelle, New Britain, Bridgeport, Waterbury.
Rochester, Albany.
Philadelphia, Wilmington.
Des Moines, Waterloo, Des Moines.
Minneapolis, St. Paul.
Youngstown, Lima, Cleveland.
Lorain, Springfield, Cincinnati, Hamilton, Sandusky.
Waukegan, Chicago, South Bend, Elgin, Rockford, Peoria.
Tucson, Phoenix.
Sacramento, San Francisco, Oakland.
East Palo Alto, Long Beach, San Bernardino, Pasadena.
September: Dayton, Columbus.
10. This table is based upon the estimated 1967 population of the 128 cities except for New York and Hartford, for which 1966 estimates were used, and 15 cities for which 1960 census figures were used (Deerfield Beach, East Orange, Englewood, Irvington, Lackawanna, Maywood, Montclair, Orange, Pravtville, Rahway, Riviera Beach, Seaford, Spring Valley, Wadesboro, and Waterlow).
11. Figures are unavailable for four communities (East Palo Alto, Jamesburg, Marin City, and Wyandanch).
More recent data indicate that there were 23 riot-related deaths in Newark rather than 25 as reported by the subcommittee. There are similar variations for some cities with regard to the number injured. In addition, Atlanta, in which there was one death and at least nine injuries, was not included in the subcommittee's figures. Finally, two of the disturbances included in the subcommittee's figures are not in our list of 164 disorders (Hattiesburg, Miss.—no deaths, five injuries; Montgomery, Ala.—no deaths, no injuries.)
13. In 12 (16 percent) of the disturbances studied the Permanent Subcommittee there were deaths. Sixty-eight (12 percent) of the deaths and 1,049 (55 percent) of the injuries occurred in two (15 percent) of the disturbances.
According to figures of the Permanent Subcommittee, Detroit experienced 43 deaths and 324 injuries; Newark experienced 25 deaths and 725 injuries.
In six (8 percent) of the disturbances, there were one to four deaths and 11 to 65 injuries reported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Rapids</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York (July 24 to Aug. 3)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York (July 29-30)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco (May 18-19)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco (July 26-31)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeling</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 31 (41 percent) of the disturbances, there were no deaths and from 1 to 10 injuries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati (July 24-28)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland (July 27-28)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erie (July 24-25)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erie (July 24-30)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenough</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattiesburg</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalamazoo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Vernon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passaic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoria</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poughkeepsie</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockford</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bend</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syracuse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Palm Beach</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This figure represents only injuries to "law officers." No figure was reported for injuries to civilians.

In 17 (23 percent) of the disturbances, there were no injuries and no deaths reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>Montgomery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Mt. Clemens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton (6/14-15)</td>
<td>Omaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgin</td>
<td>Paterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flint</td>
<td>Pecksill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston (8/13-17)</td>
<td>Riviera Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>Wyandach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>Paterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgerton</td>
<td>Phoenix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth</td>
<td>Rockford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey City</td>
<td>Tucson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. The Detroit Fire Department has listed 682 riot-connected building fires. Of these, 412 buildings were completely demolished. The Cincinnati Fire Department has estimated over $1 million in damage from riot-connected fires during the June disturbance.
16. Of 250 fires during a 6-day period, only 13 were considered serious by Newark authorities. In no case did a fire spread from its original source to other areas.
More than $6 million of the loss in Newark was attributed to loss of inventory due to looting and damage to stock. Of the 889 business establishments damaged, 25 (3 percent) were demolished and 136 (15 percent) were heavily damaged. Damage to glass, fixtures, and buildings was estimated at $1,976,140.

17. On Aug. 15, 1967, it was reported that the state insurance commission estimated the property loss at $144 million and that the Detroit Fire Department's estimate was closer to $200 million, only $84 million of which was insured. A December 1967 estimate by the State insurance commission was between $40 million and $15 million. The insurance commission indicated that almost $33 million will be covered by insurance.

18. The City of Detroit incurred over $5 million in extraordinary expenses, more than $3 million of which was for personnel costs. In Cincinnati, a disorder of 1 week cost three city departments more than $300,000 in extraordinary expenditures, principally for overtime for police and firemen.

19. In Detroit at least 274 families were displaced by the destruction of their homes.

20. Seventy-four (89 percent) of the persons reported killed were civilians. The person killed in Atlanta was also a civilian. Of the 1,897 persons reported injured, 1,185 (62 percent) were civilians and 712 (38 percent) were public officials. There is evidence that many additional injuries to civilians were not reported to officials.

21. Cincinnati
   New Haven
   Dayton
   Paterson
   Englewood
   Plainfield
   Newark
   Tampa
   New Brunswick

22. The New Jersey Commission said:

   “The damage caused within a few hours early Sunday morning, July 16, to a large number of stores marked with "Soul" signs to depict nonwhite ownership and located in a limited area reflects a pattern of police action for which there is no possible justification. Testimony strongly suggests that state police elements were mainly responsible with some participation by National Guardsmen.”


23. In at least three of the cities (Detroit, Newark, and Plainfield) there was damage to police and/or fire stations. In Cambridge, a public elementary school building was burned. In two of the university settings, school buildings were damaged. There was extensive damage to two dormitories at Texas Southern University in Houston. The bulk of this damage was allegedly caused by police gunfire and subsequent searches of the buildings. At privately owned Fisk University in Nashville, a plate glass door was broken. It is unclear whether this was done by police or students.

Other types of property damage included private cars, buses, and delivery trucks in at least 11 of the 25 cities studied.

Cambridge
   Newark

Cincinnati
   Phoenix

Dayton
   Plainfield

Grand Rapids
   Tampa

Jersey City
   Tucson

Nashville

26. The 20 cities were Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cambridge, Cincinnati (the June disorder), Dayton (the June and September disorders), Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson.

The three university settings were Houston, Tex. (Texas Southern University), Jackson, Miss. (Jackson State College), and Nashville, Tenn. (Fisk University and Tennessee A. & I. State College).

See Statement on Methodology, appendix, for a description of our survey procedures.

27. See part IV, The Background of Disorder, infra; and pt. III, The Riot Participant, infra.

28. A final incident was identifiable preceding all 24 surveyed disorders except Rockford. See sec. II, “The Development of Violence,” infra, for the time and place of each final incident and the outbreak of violence.

29. In our surveys at least 88 prior incidents were identified by Negro interviewees as having been widely known and remembered at the time of the outbreak of violence, as having been a source or exemplification of grievances, and as having contributed to the disorders. The number of such prior precipitating incidents in a given city cannot be stated with certainty. Different sources recalled different events or stressed different aspects of the single event. However, we have been able to identify multiple incidents in most of the cities surveyed. Such incidents were reported in all except two cities (Elizabeth and Tucson; both minor).

At least 10 prior incidents were identified in Houston (serious): seven in Bridgeport (minor); six in Atlanta, Milwaukee and Nashville (one major, two serious); five in Cincinnati, Newark, and Plainfield (all major); four in Cambridge and Bridgeport and the June and September Dayton disorders (two serious, one minor); three in Detroit, Jersey City, New Haven, and Phoenix (one major, two serious, and one minor); two in Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, New Brunswick, Paterson, Rockford, and Tampa (one major, three serious, and three minor).

Twenty-eight prior incidents occurred within a week preceding violence, nine occurred 1 month to 1 week prior, 36 occurred 6 month to 1 month prior, 11 occurred 1 year to 6 months prior to the violence. One year was used as an arbitrary time limit for counting incidents except when the incident was identified as particularly significant to the disorder in that city. Four such incidents were identified: In Newark (the 1965 shooting of a Negro by police), in Jersey City (a disturbance in 1964), in Englewood (a 1962 disturbance), and in Cambridge (racial tensions necessitating the presence of National Guardsmen from 1963 to 1965).

30. See the section on “Grievances” in part IV, infra.

31. Such actions were identified as prior incidents in 35 cases preceding 18 disturbances (Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, the June and September Dayton disturbances, Detroit, Englewood, Houston, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; six major, six serious, and six minor).
32. Thirty-two incidents preceding all 18 disorders fit this pattern. Responses to a larger group constituted four incidents, all involving groups of demonstrators (Cincinnati, Nashville, and twice in Houston; one major and two serious).

33. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Nashville, Newark, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (four major, six serious, and two minor).

34. The two exceptions were Cambridge and Houston (both serious). The incident in Cambridge occurred when police fired at a group of Negroes leaving a protest meeting, and in Houston when they arrested a Negro trying to address a group of demonstrators.

35. This was the case in 13 instances preceding nine disorders (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, Houston, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, and Phoenix; two major, six serious, and one minor).

36. This occurred in five cases preceding four disorders (Cambridge, the June Dayton disturbance, Houston, and Nashville; all serious).

37. Atlanta and the June Dayton disturbance (both serious) featured nationally known militants. Cincinnati, the September Daynton disturbance, and Plainfield (two major and one minor) involved only local leaders.

38. Atlanta, Cincinnati, and the September Dayton disturbance (one major, one serious, and one minor).

39. The June Dayton and Plainfield disturbances (both serious).

40. This occurred in 15 cases preceding nine disturbances (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, the June Dayton disorder, Detroit, Jackson, Milwaukee, Nashville, and Tampa; three major, five serious, and one minor).

41. Atlanta, the June and September Dayton disturbances, Detroit, Englewood, Jersey City, and Paterson (one major, three serious, and three minor). The previous disorder counted in Detroit was the "Kercheval incident" in August of 1966 mentioned in the text of this section, and not the 1943 Detroit riot. In Dayton, the June 1967 disorder was counted as a prior incident in relation to the September disorder.

42. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jersey City, Milwaukee, and Plainfield (three major, three serious, and one minor).

43. The Newark disorder was specifically identified as a prior incident in Bridgeton and Plainfield (one major and one minor). The Detroit riot was so identified in Grand Rapids and Phoenix (both serious).

44. Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, and Paterson (one serious and four minor).

See part I of this Chapter for a discussion of the patterns of the disorders in terms of timing and geographic distribution. The impact of communications media on the propagation of disorders is discussed in Chapter 16.

45. This was the case in nine or more instances preceding six disturbances (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, and Plainfield; four major, one serious, and one minor). The initial refusal to fund or the cancellation of funding by officials responsible for federally financed antipoverty programs was included in this category. There were three cases preceding three disturbances (the June Dayton disorder, New Haven, and Phoenix; all serious).

46. This was the case in eight instances preceding eight disorders (Cambridge, Cincinnati, the September Dayton disorder, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, and Paterson; three major, three serious, and two minor).

47. This incident was not included in the category of racist activities, since the shooting apparently was not motivated entirely by the victim's ethnic origin.

48. Bridgeton, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, Nashville, Newark, and Tampa (four major, two serious, and one minor).

49. Atlanta, Cincinnati, and the September Dayton disturbance (one major and two serious).

Meetings to protest actions involved in prior incidents on the part of city officials other than the police were identified as the final incident preceding two disorders (the June Dayton disturbance and Plainfield; one major and one serious).

50. This is clearly apparent from the charts annexed to these footnotes at page 359. The charts portray graphically the varying levels of violence during the period of each of the 24 surveyed disorders.

51. All except Bridgeton, Cambridge, Elizabeth, Jersey City, New Brunswick, and New Haven (two serious and four minor disturbances). In eight of the 18 cases the estimated size of the groups ranged from 50 to 100 (the September Dayton disorder, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Paterson, Phoenix, and Plainfield; two major, five serious, and one minor); in six cases from 100 to 200 (Cincinnati, the June Dayton disorder, Englewood, Nashville, Rockford, and Tucson; one major, two serious, and three minor); and in six cases from 200 to 1,000 (Atlanta, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, and Tampa; three major and three serious).

52. Detroit, Englewood, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson (four major, three serious, and three minor). Seven disorders began on Monday (Atlanta, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, and New Brunswick; one major, three serious, and three minor). Three began on Tuesday (the September Dayton disturbance, Houston, and Phoenix; two serious and one minor), three on Wednesday (the June Dayton disturbance, Jackson, and Newark; one major and two serious), and one Thursday (Bridgeton; minor).

53. Eighteen disorders for which temperature information was available occurred at the end of a day in which the temperature had reached a high of at least 79 degrees. In nine cases the temperature had reached 90 degrees or more during the day (Atlanta, Cambridge, Cincinnati, the June Dayton disturbance, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson; three major, five serious, and one minor). In eight cases the temperature had been in the 80's (Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven, and Rockford; one major, two serious, and five minor), and in one city the high temperature was 79 degrees (Milwaukee; a major disturbance).

54. See the annexed charts of levels of violence.

55. Ibid. Of New Haven's six cycles of violence, one occurred during early daylight hours and one began and reached its peak during the afternoon. In Plainfield (major) substantial violence began during one afternoon and continued, through a midnight peak, into the following day and evening. In Grand Rapids (serious) two cycles of violence occurred within one 24-hour period, one continuing into daylight hours and the other beginning in the afternoon.

56. In three disorders this was the pattern (Atlanta, Cambridge, and Englewood; two serious and one minor). In a few cases these cycles were separated by one or more 24-hour periods in which little or no violence occurred, even during the first days of the disorder. Also see the charts annexed to this chapter.

57. Violence erupted within less than 30 minutes after the occurrence of the final incident in 11 disorders (Atlanta, Cincinnati, the June and September Dayton disturbances,
Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, five serious, and two minor.

In seven other disorders the violence erupted less than 2 hours after the occurrence of a final incident (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Detroit, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, and Phoenix; two major, four serious, and one minor).

The time span between the final incident and the beginning of violence is not easily established for the disturbances in the five New Jersey cities in which the final incidents were reports of disorders in neighboring cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, New Brunswick, Jersey City, and Paterson; one serious and four minor).

58. Violence in 11 disorders reached a peak for the first night, and in some cases an overall peak, in less than 1 hour after the initial outbreak (Atlanta, Bridgeport, the June and September Dayton disorders, Englewood, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, and Rockford; three major, five serious, and three minor). In four other disorders violence reached a first night peak in less than 2 hours (Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson, and Tann; one major, one serious, and two minor), and in eight disorders violence reached a first night peak in less than 3 hours (Cambridge, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, five serious, and two minor). In one disturbance (Detroit; major), violence continued to escalate over a period of 12 to 15 hours after the initial outbreak.

59. See the annexed charts of levels of violence.

60. Ibid. All except the June and September Dayton disturbances, Elizabeth, Houston, and New Brunswick (two serious and three minor).

61. Bridgeport, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, Tampa, and Tucson (two major, five serious, and three minor).

62. Atlanta, Detroit, Jackson, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, and Rockford (three major, five serious, and one minor). See the section on "Control Effort," infra, for further discussion of violence levels.

63. Of 34 reported occasions of rock and bottle-throwing, 26 occurred in the first two cycles of violence. Of 51 reported occasions of window-breaking, 24 occurred in the first two cycles. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

64. Of 30 reported occasions of looting, 20 occurred in the first two cycles and 28 in the first three cycles. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

65. Of 24 reported occasions of fire bombs and Molotov cocktails, 12 occurred in the first two cycles and 12 in the second two. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

66. Of 26 reported occasions of fires, 18 occurred in the second and third cycles and eight in the first and last.

67. Of 18 reported occasions of explosions, 13 occurred in the second and third cycles. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

68. In only four instances did local police request and receive assistance in the initial response from an outside force (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Englewood, and New Brunswick; one serious, and three minor). In the case of Cambridge, the outside forces consisted of National Guardsmen, state police, and the county sheriff and constable. In the other three cases, they consisted of the police of neighboring towns or county or both. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

69. In 10 of the 24 disorders, this was the case (Atlanta, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Houston, Jersey City, Nashville, Paterson, Phoenix, and Tucson; six serious and four minor).

70. In a majority of cases for which we have such information, in 12 out of 22, the initial control force was either larger than the crowd on the street or no fewer than a ratio of one policeman to every five persons on the street (Bridge-}

71. In at least one case, the police rushed at the crowd with nightsticks (Newark; major). In only one case was a shot fired by the police during the initial response, and in that case it was a single shot (Cambridge; serious).

72. Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Rockford, and Tucson (two major, three serious, and five minor).

73. Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, Detroit, Elizabeth, Houston, Phoenix, and Tampa (three major, three serious, and two minor).

74. Detroit, Houston, Phoenix, and Tampa; two major and two serious.

75. Cambridge, both Dayton disturbances, Jackson, Nashville, and Plainfield (one major, four serious, and one minor).

76. See annexed charts of levels of violence. In at least 15 instances the initial control response appeared to fail, in this sense. The three control approaches, dispersal, reconnaissance, and containment, were almost equally represented in this group: six of these were cases of dispersal (Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, and Tucson; two major, two serious, and two minor); four cases of containment (Cambridge, both Dayton disorders and Jackson; three serious and one minor); and three cases of reconnaissance (Detroit, Houston, and Tampa; two major and one serious).

77. If violence continued, or resumed after a pause, the second control response by local police (and, in the instances we have noted, by the outside forces to which by then had arrived) again was one of the three categories of dispersal, reconnaissance, and containment. However, at this stage, dispersal was used in a slightly larger number of cases than at the stage of the initial response: 12 cases, two more than in the initial response (Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, and Rockford; four major, four serious, and four minor). Containment was also new used in a slightly larger number of cases than at the earlier stage: nine cases, one more than before (both Dayton disturbances, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Nashville, Phoenix, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; two major, five serious, and two minor).

Reconnaissance, the most passive tactic and therefore understandably less tenable in the face of continued violence, was abandoned by half the forces which had used it initially but surprisingly was still employed by half: three forces (Cincinnati and Detroit, which turned to dispersal, and Tampa, which turned to containment; three major) abandoned reconnaissance for one of the other tactics, but reconnaissance was still used by three (Cambridge, Elizabeth, and Houston; two serious and one minor).

78. See footnote 22 to the section on "Levels of Violence and Damage" in part I of this chapter. See also the Profiles on Newark and Detroit in chapter I.
79. This combination occurred in at least seven cases, two during the initial response (Englewood and Plainfield; one major and one minor) and five during a subsequent response (Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Nashville, and New Haven; two major and three serious).

80. Atlanta, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Phoenix, and Plainfield (four major, five serious, and two minor).

81. Cambridge, Nashville, Newark, and New Haven (one major and three serious).

82. One major and one serious.

83. Cincinnati, Detroit, Jackson, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Phoenix, Rockford, and Tampa (five major, three serious, and one minor). In four of these nine disturbances (Detroit, Jackson, and, arguably, Phoenix and Rockford: one major, two serious and one minor) the entry of extra forces occurred after the first outbreak of violence. In four cities (Cincinnati, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; all major) extra forces were brought in after two outbreaks of violence. In one city (New Haven; serious) extra forces were brought in after three outbreaks of violence. See the annexed charts of levels of violence, and type and duration of law enforcement mobilization.

84. In all but two of these cities (Plainfield and, arguably, Rockford; one major and one minor) violence continued thereafter on two occasions. In three cases (Cincinnati, Tampa and Phoenix: two major and one serious) the subsequent violence was at lower levels than before the extra forces' arrival. But in the majority of cases (Detroit, Jackson, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield and Rockford; three major, two serious, and one minor) the intensity of violence recurring after the arrival of extra forces was equal to or greater than that of the earlier violence.

85. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Englewood and New Brunswick (one serious and three minor).

86. In one city (Englewood: minor) four outbreaks followed; in four cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Grand Rapids, and Jersey City; two serious and two minor) two outbreaks followed; and in one city (New Brunswick: minor) a single outbreak followed.

87. In three of the six cities (Bridgeton, Englewood, and Grand Rapids; one serious and two minor) the level of violence in one or more successive outbreaks was the same as or higher than that in the first outbreak of disorder. In three of these cities (Cambridge, Jersey City, and New Brunswick; one serious and two minor) the latter outbreak or outbreaks was of lower intensity than the first or there was no further outbreak of violence.

88. Atlanta, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Houston, Nashville, Paterson, and Tucson (five serious and three minor).

89. Two of these cities (Paterson and Tucson; one serious and one minor) had four outbreaks; one (Atlanta, serious) had three outbreaks; two (Elizabeth and Nashville: one serious and one minor) had two outbreaks; and three (both Dayton disorders and Houston; two serious and three minor) had one outbreak. Of the four cities which had multiple outbreaks, three (Atlanta, Paterson and Tucson; two serious and one minor) had subsequent outbreaks of violence at the same or a higher level of violence than the first outbreak.

90. There is evidence of a total of at least 68 such meetings in 21 of the 24 disturbances studied: only in three disorders (Cambridge, Milwaukee, and Rockford: one major, one serious, and one minor) is there no evidence of such meetings. The annexed charts include, on a horizontal line near the top, a depiction of such meetings through the period of disorder in the 21 cases.

91. In 17 of the 21 disturbances (excepting only Atlanta, Jackson, Jersey City and Paterson; three serious and one minor) the first meetings occurred either immediately before the disorder erupted or during the first or second day of disorders.

92. Of the 16 disorders which had a duration of more than 2 days, the meetings also continued beyond that point in nine cases (Cincinnati, the Dayton September disturbance and New Brunswick; one major and two minor) did such meetings occur before the outbreak of violence.

93. Of the 16 disorders which had a duration of more than 2 days, the meetings continued beyond that point in nine cases (Cincinnati, the Dayton September disturbance and New Brunswick; one major and two minor) did such meetings occur before the outbreak of violence.

94. Of the 16 disorders which had a duration of more than 2 days, the meetings also continued beyond that point in nine cases (Cincinnati, the Dayton September disturbance and New Brunswick; one major and two minor) did such meetings occur before the outbreak of violence.

95. Cincinnati, Nashville, New Brunswick, Plainfield, and Tampa (three major, one serious, and one minor). Of these five cases, the two elements of the Negro community attended meetings together in two disorders (Cincinnati and Plainfield; one major and one serious) and in the remaining three disorders they attended such meetings separately.

96. This occurred in five disorders (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Houston, Plainfield, and Phoenix: two major and three serious). In one of the five disorders (Phoenix: serious) the only meeting in which established Negro leadership participated was one with Negro youths. In the remaining four cases, established Negro leadership also met with government officials. In three of the five disorders, Negro youths also met with government officials (all except Atlanta and Houston: both serious).

97. This occurred in nine of the 21 disturbances in which such meetings took place (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, the Dayton June disturbance, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Newark, New Brunswick, and New Haven; one major, five serious, and three minor). Also involved were representatives of local human relations commissions (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, both Dayton disturbances, Elizabeth, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; four major, three serious, and four minor); state community relations agencies (Jersey City, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; three major and one minor); and Federal agencies. In four cities (Cincinnati, Detroit, Jersey City, and Newark; three major and one minor) officials of the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice were participants in meetings.

98. Meetings during 19 of the 21 disorders followed this pattern (all except Houston and Tucson; one serious and one minor). In 13 cases the grievance related to the handling of the precipitating incident by the police (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, Nashville, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, and Phoenix; three major, six serious, and four minor).

99. Meetings during 12 of the 21 disorders followed this pattern (all except Atlanta, Bridgeton, the Dayton September disturbance, Detroit, Elizabeth, Nashville, Newark, New Haven, and Paterson: two major, four serious, and three minor).

100. In seven cases the preexisting grievances related to unemployment and underemployment (Cincinnati, the Dayton...
June disturbance, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, two serious, and four minor. In six cases they related to inadequate recreation facilities (the Dayton June disturbance, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; two major, one serious, and three minor).

100. This was the case in 10 of the 21 disorders in which meetings were held. In most of these cases (8 of 10), the earlier meetings or early stages of meetings focused on disorder-related grievances and the later meetings, or stages of meetings, focused on preexisting grievances (Cincinnati, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jacksonville, Jersey City, Phoenix, and Tampa; two major, four serious, and two minor). In only two cases (New Brunswick and Plainfield; one major and one minor), was the order of subjects reversed.

101. The only disorders in which counterrioters were not active were Bridgeport, Cambrige, the Dayton September disorder, Englewood, Milwaukee, and Rockford (one major, one serious, and four minor).

102. For a discussion of this study and the characteristics of those who did identify themselves, as compared with rioters, see Part III, The Riot Participant, infra.

103. Cincinnati, the Dayton June disorder, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Houston, Nashville, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (five major, seven serious, and three minor).

104. For example, in Cincinnati the police opposed official recognition of counterrioters, whereas in Detroit and Dayton there was close cooperation between police and counterrioters.

105. Nine of fifteen (Cincinnati, the Dayton June disorder, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Newark, Phoenix, and Tampa; four major, three serious, and two minor).

106. Houston, Nashville, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, and Tucson (one major, four serious, and one minor).

107. In Elizabeth and Newark the counterrioters were armed (one major and one minor).

108. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Jacksonville, Jersey City, and New York (three major, two serious, and one minor).

109. Examples are: employees of city agencies (Detroit and Cincinnati; two major); ministers (Atlanta, Phoenix, and Tampa; one major and two serious); college students (Grand Rapids, Newark, Jackson, and Nashville; one major and three serious); civil rights leaders (Atlanta and Cincinnati; one major and one serious); young Negro militants (Phoenix, Jersey City, and New Haven; two serious and one minor); poverty workers (Atlanta, Phoenix, and Cincinnati; one major and two serious); and admitted former riot participants (Tampa; major).

110. Newark (major). In Paterson (serious) they held a block dance; in Phoenix (serious) they promised to make attempts to find jobs for rioters; in Jackson (serious) they kept nonstudents out of college dormitories; and in Atlanta (serious) they attempted to organize a youth corps patrol, similar to Dayton's "White Hats." Counterrioters used physical force to restrain rioters in two cities (Tampa and Nashville, one major and two serious). In neither case was the use of force officially authorized.

111. All four sources are subject to limitations, and we have, therefore, used each as a reliability check on the others. Eyewitness accounts are subject to retrospective distortion. Data on arrestees also involve built-in biases. The fact of arrest alone, without subsequent trial and conviction does not constitute evidence of the crime charged, and there has been sufficient time for many of the 1967 riot arrestees to be brought to trial. Many of the most active rioters may have escaped arrest, while many of the uninvolved, or even counterrioters, may have been arrested in the confusion. Finally, questions about riot activity in interview surveys may elicit overstatements of participation by some interviewees and understatements by others.

We are conducting a continuing study of arrest records in a number of cities which experienced disorders in 1967 and in some earlier years as well. So far we have studied the records of 13,788 persons arrested during disturbances in 22 cities in 1967. The recently published study of arrestees in Detroit, which was sponsored by the Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, involved interviews with 496 arrestees.

The Detroit and Newark surveys furnish the most comprehensive information on mass participation.

The Detroit survey data are based on a survey of 253 interviews with Negroes aged 15 and over. The Newark data are based on 233 interviews with Negro males between the ages of 15 and 35. In both surveys, the sampling area was determined by identifying the 1960 census tracts in which violence and damage occurred. Newspaper accounts were used to identify the location of riot damage, fires, and looting. In Detroit, the sample was drawn from two riot areas, the West Side and the East Side, including the following census tracts: 9-22, 26-28, 36-43, 115-123 and 152-188 (West Side); 759-776 and 789-793 (East Side). The Newark sample was drawn from an inner city area consisting of census tracts 12, 29-33, 38-40, 58-67 and 81-82.

A probability sample was drawn for both cities so that the probability of inclusion for any household in Detroit was approximately one-fiftieth and in Newark one Forty-fourth. Blocks were selected at random from within the specified census tracts and constituted the primary sampling unit for each study. In Detroit, lists of all dwellings in the selected blocks were prepared from a city directory. Every 15th address was identified and assigned to an interviewer. In Newark, segments of approximately 10 dwelling units were constructed by first enumeration of blocks selected at random and assigned to interviewers. Both studies used techniques described by Leslie Kish in Survey Sampling, New York: Wiley, 1965, ch. 9.

Each interviewer in Detroit was instructed to conduct interviews only at those dwelling units on his assignment sheet. Within households only Negroes were to be interviewed, and the interviewer was instructed to list all members of the household 15 years of age and older and then select every other one for interviewing. The interviewer was required to return twice if there was no answer to the initial call or if the respondent to be interviewed was not at home. This procedure yielded 437 interviews for 50 blocks, or 8.7 interviews per block.

In order to enlarge the sample of those who were likely to identify themselves as rioters, interviewers in Newark were told to interview only Negro males between the ages 15 and 35. They were instructed to interview all eligible respondents in each household. They were also required to return three times if there was no answer or if an eligible respondent was not at home. A total of 233 interviews were completed in 24 blocks, or 9.7 interviews per block.

In Detroit, 67.0 percent of all eligible respondents were interviewed; in Newark, 66.0 percent. While these response rates do not compare favorably with the usual 80-85 percent response rate in white, middle-class samples, they are comparable to the rates in other ghetto area studies. A Negro response rate of 71.0 percent was reported in another study.

In both surveys, questions were designed to permit comparisons of the characteristics and attitudes of those who (a) admitted active participation in rioting, referred to as "self-reported rioters;" (b) those who said they had sought to stop the rioting, the "counterrioters;" and (c) those who claimed not to have been involved, the "noninvolved." These classifications were based on the answers to two questions, one direct and one indirect. The indirect question asked how active the respondent had been during the riot, without specifying in particular what he had been doing. The second question, which appeared later in the questionnaire, asked whether the respondent had participated in various activities, such as trying to stop the riot, calling the fire department, or picking up goods and taking them home. Respondents were classified as "rioters" if they answered either that they were "active" or admitted one or more specific antisocial activities. They were classified as "counterrioters" if they said that they were engaged in some prosocial activity, whether or not they said they were "active." If they said that they had stayed home and also claimed not to have been "active," they were classified as "noninvolved." In the Detroit survey the analysis is based only on the answers of those 393 respondents who were willing to answer at least one of these classificatory questions. In the Newark survey the entire sample of 233 was used, and those who refused to answer either of the classificatory questions were included in the "noninvolved."

112. In Detroit, 11.2 percent (44) of the 393 respondents identified themselves as rioters, 15.8 percent (62) as counterrioters, and the majority, 73 percent (287), as noninvolved. Bystanders included approximately 5 percent who admitted to having gone into the riot area but claimed not to have participated; and another 15 to 20 percent who claimed to have watched from the front steps or sidewalks in front of their homes. For purposes of analysis all of the 393 respondents other than the self-reported rioters and counterrioters were treated as the "noninvolved." In the Newark survey, where the sample was restricted to Negro males between the ages of 15 and 35, 45.4 percent identified themselves as rioters, and 54.6 percent as noninvolved. About 5 percent of the respondents identified themselves as counterrioters, but were included as noninvolved because the number of persons was so small. The proportion of respondents who admitted active participation does not necessarily indicate the levels of support for rioting among inner city Negroes. In Detroit, 23.5 percent of those interviewed felt that more was to be gained than lost through rioting. In Newark, 47.0 percent agreed that more was to be gained and 77.1 percent said that they were generally sympathetic to the rioters.

113. In the more detailed discussion which follows, only those characteristics of the counterrioters which differed from those of the noninvolved are highlighted.

114. Of 13,012 arrestees in 22 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; six major, nine serious, and seven minor) 10,792 (82.9 percent) were Negroes; 1,907 (15.1 percent) were whites, 78 (0.6 percent) were Puerto Ricans, and 37 (0.3 percent) were of other races. The ethnic origin of 138 arrestees (1.1 percent) was unknown.

A study of 348 arrestees in Grand Rapids (serious) divided the disorder in that city into two time segments of 4 hours and 36 hours. During the first 4 hours of the disorder, 35 percent of the arrestees were Negroes. The proportion of Negro arrestees declined to 65 percent during the remaining 48 hours of the disorder. See "Anatomy of a Riot," United Community Services, Research Department, Grand Rapids and Kent County, Mich., 1967.

115. Age distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Arrest records</th>
<th>71 cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (64)***</td>
<td>N (287)***</td>
<td>A (11,771)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 35</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 50</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.001***

The Grand Rapids data indicate that during the first 4 hours of the disorder 82 percent of the arrestees were under 25 years of age. During the remaining 48 hours, the proportion of arrestees over 25 years of age declined to 58 percent. See "Anatomy of a Riot," p. 28.

116. Sex distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Arrest records</th>
<th>71 cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (64)</td>
<td>N (287)</td>
<td>A (11,771)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.005

The Grand Rapids data indicate that during the first 4 hours of the disorder, 45 of the 46 persons arrested (98 percent) were males. During the remaining 48 hours, the proportion of female arrestees increased, comprising 15 percent of a total of 274 adults.

117. Marital status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
<th>Detroit arrest</th>
<th>Arrest records, 4 cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (105)</td>
<td>N (125)</td>
<td>A (986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced separated</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.01

* Atlanta, Cincinnati, New Brunswick, and Tucson (5 major, 1 serious, and 2 minor).
118. Family structure in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adults present in family of upbringing:</th>
<th>R (136)</th>
<th>N (136)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.05

119. Region of upbringing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R (28)</td>
<td>NI (127)</td>
<td>CR (61)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R (104)</td>
<td>NI (114)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CR - Counter-rioters.

**In the Detroit survey respondents were asked directly if they were brought up in the North or South. In Newark, South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

**In the Newark survey respondents were asked directly if they were brought up in the North or South. In Newark, South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

**In the Newark survey respondents were asked directly if they were brought up in the North or South. In Newark, South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

120. Of 266 arrestees in five cities (Atlanta, New Brunswick, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; two major, one serious, and two minor), 106 (40 percent) were born in the state in which the disorder occurred; 98 (37 percent) were born in the South (but not in the state in which the disorder occurred in the cases of Atlanta and Tampa; one major and one serious); and 30 (8 percent) were born elsewhere. The state of birth of 59 persons (15 percent) was undetermined. For purposes of the sample, the South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

121. The discrepancy between the percentages of the non-involved brought up in the North in Newark and Detroit (two major) is not significant since the Detroit sample includes more older people than the Newark sample. This difference does not affect the validity of the figures for youthful rioters.

122. Place of birth:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth:</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R (43)</td>
<td>NI (285)</td>
<td>R (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI (106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.001

123. Of 3,395 arrestees in 15 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Dayton, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson; three major, seven serious, and five minor), 3,054 (90 percent) resided in the city in which the disorder occurred, 228 (7 percent) resided in the State in which the disorder occurred, and 48 (1 percent) resided elsewhere. The residence of 65 persons (2 percent) was undetermined.

124. Income level:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income*</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R (144)</td>
<td>NI (103)</td>
<td>CR (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R (104)</td>
<td>NI (112)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Annual income for Detroit based on individual income, for Newark on family income.

**All self-reported counter-rioters with incomes under 15,000 were female.

See the section on "The Pattern of Disadvantage" in pt. IV of this chapter.

125. See the section on "The Pattern of Disadvantage" in pt. IV of this chapter.

126. Educational level:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R (43)</td>
<td>NI (285)</td>
<td>CR (61)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI (106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

127. Employment status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status*</th>
<th>Detroit survey**</th>
<th>Newark survey**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R (27)</td>
<td>NI (127)</td>
<td>R (84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI (105)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Males only.

**Excludes students.

***Atlanta, Cincinnati, New Brunswick, and Tampa (two major, one serious, and one minor).
### Underemployment in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R (64)</th>
<th>H (124)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you been unemployed as long as a month during the last year?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05

### Occupational level in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>R (25)</th>
<th>H (26)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled or better</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05

### Job aspiration in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you feel your job is appropriate considering the education you have?</th>
<th>R (82)</th>
<th>H (49)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present job is about right</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should have job with more income and responsibility</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05

### Perceived job opportunity in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived opportunity</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>H (128)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is possible to obtain desired job.</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is not possible to obtain desired job.</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05

### Perceived obstacles to employment in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>R (68)</th>
<th>H (68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training.</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience.</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination.</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.025

### Ability and success in Detroit survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R (29)</th>
<th>H (24)</th>
<th>CR (44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Getting what you want out of life or being in the right place?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High place</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* R-H p < 0.001
* CR-H p < 0.05
* R-CR p < 0.025

### Racial consciousness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R (37) H (247)</td>
<td>R (101) H (108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial consciousness</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who do you think are more dependable?</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.001
* p < 0.05

### Black consciousness in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-description</th>
<th>R (195)</th>
<th>H (129)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.025

### All Negroes should study African history and language:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic</th>
<th>R (21)</th>
<th>H (21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.06
135. Anti-white attitudes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detroit study</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (30)</td>
<td>N1 (245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (105)</td>
<td>N1 (125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which have white and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro bodies would</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do better without</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whites:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (105)</td>
<td>N1 (125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I hate white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

136. Hostility toward middle-class Negroes in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>N1 (126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes who make a lot of money and think they are better than other Negroes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>N1 (122)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes who make a lot of money are just as bad as whites:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

137. Half the arrestees were charged with one or more of three offenses: breaking and entering, trespassing, or curfew violation.

Of 13,112 offenses charged against 12,457 persons in 19 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tuscon; six major, six serious, and seven minor), 4,105 (31 percent) were charges of breaking and entering or trespassing and 2,556 (19 percent) were charges of curfew violation. The breakdown of charges by categories was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charges</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breaking and entering or</td>
<td>4,105</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trespassing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew violation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary, larceny, robbery,</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theft, and all similar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly conduct, disturb</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ing the peace or failing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting arrest, drunk or</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traffic violations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons charges</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagrancy, labour, unlawful</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entry, or suspicious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[These arrest statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should be interpreted with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caution. Felony,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>misdemeanors and ordinance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violation charges are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined. After dispositions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any change this distribution.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

138. Political information in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification of political figures—Kenneth Gibson:</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>N1 (125)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification of political figures—Kenneth Gibson:</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>N1 (127)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political involvement in Newark survey:</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>N1 (126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Negro right discussions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearly every time</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendance at city meetings of civil rights group:</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>N1 (113)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; 0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

334
141. Trust of the Government in Newark survey:

| How much do you think you can trust the Newark government to do what is right? |
|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                             R(105) | N(127)           |
| Just about always           | 2.9              | 1.6              |
| Most of the time            | 4.8              | 13.7             |
| Some of the time            | 48.1             | 50.8             |
| Almost never                | 44.2             | 33.9             |
| Total                       | 100.0            | 100.0            |

p < 0.10

142. Political grievances in Detroit survey:

| How much did anger with politicians have to do with causing riot? |
|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                             R(44) | N(287)           |
| Great deal                  | 43.2             | 19.6             |
| Something                   | 31.8             | 39.1             |
| Nothing                     | 18.2             | 24.5             |
| Don't know                  | 6.8              | 16.8             |
| Total                       | 100.0            | 100.0            |

p < 0.05

143. Perception of country as not worth fighting for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
<th>R(39)</th>
<th>N(264)</th>
<th>CR(36)</th>
<th>R(105)</th>
<th>H(120)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country worth fighting for in major world war:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[in percent]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worth fighting</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not worth fighting</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.005
R-CHI p < 0.001

144. For purposes of this section the three university-related riots, in Houston, Jackson, and Nashville, have not been included.

145. See the discussion of grievances in relation to the riot process in pt. II of this chapter.

146. Our discussion relies heavily upon 1960 census data, which are always the most complete and usually the most recent data available. Nevertheless, 1960 statistics are outdated for American urban life in 1967 and consequently, we used more recent data wherever possible. For detailed 1960 census data on each of the 20 cities surveyed, see the tables annexed to these footnotes, pp. 348–358.

We have examined, for most purposes in this section, 20 of the 23 surveyed riot cities. Three cities (Houston, Jackson, and Nashville; three serious) were excluded because their disturbances were more directly campus-related than city-related.

In each of 17 cities, we have compared conditions in the riot area with conditions elsewhere in (1) the city as a whole, and (2) the metropolitan area of which the city is a part, including the suburban areas. In addition, we have sought to determine whether racial differences affect these comparisons. To do this, we have identified census tracts in which violence and damage occurred. This study of census tracts is limited to 17 cities because identification of the disturbance area for purposes of analysis was not possible for three cities (Bridgeport, Cambridge, and New Brunswick; one serious and one minor). They are not divided into census tracts.

We recognize that participants in the disorders did not necessarily live in the area of disorder. However, we have attempted to learn whether the disturbance areas have characteristics which set them apart from the cities and metropolitan areas in which the disturbance areas are situated.

The disturbance areas were primarily commercial areas in a part of the city having a high concentration of Negro residents. These were usually characterized by a number of retail or wholesale shops, often with residences above the shops and with residential areas immediately adjacent to the commercial streets. In two cities (Atlanta and Tucson; one serious and one minor) the disturbance area was primarily residential.

147. After studying 100 cities, the Department of Labor reached the same conclusion: "... Negroes living in non-poverty areas were not much better off than those in poverty areas; among whites, the differences were very sharp." (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Special Labor Force Report No. 73, "Poverty Areas of Our Major Cities," October 1966, p. 1105.)

148. The Bureau of the Census categorizes citizens as white and nonwhite. Since 92 percent of the nonwhites in the United States are Negroes, we have used the terms "Negro" and nonwhite interchangeably throughout this section. The numbers compared in the section are medians for the 17 cities.

149. In eight cities, white population also increased in that period, however, it did so at a much lower rate. Only Englewood (minor) showed no change in white population during that period.

150. In 13 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tucson, Rockford, and Tampa; five major, five serious, and three minor), including seven of the cities which experienced the most severe violence, the percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area was more than twice the percentage of Negro population in the entire city; in nine of the cities, the percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area was more than triple the citywide percentage.

151. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro population 24 years of age or younger in all 17 cities exceeded the percentage of whites in that age group. The percentage of Negro population 65 years of age or older, in all 17 cities except two (Phoenix and Tucson; one serious and one minor), was less than one-half the percentage of whites in that age group.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro population 24 years of age or younger living in the disturbance area in approximately half the cities (Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, and Tucson; three major, two serious, and three minor) exceeded the citywide percentage. The percentages were equal only in Tampa (major).

The differences we have seen are even greater when the age distribution among Negroes in the disturbance areas is com-
pared with the age distribution among whites in the standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA’s).

### MEDIAN AGE DISTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>SMSA’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.</td>
<td>N.W.</td>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, under 25</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 64</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, under 25</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 64</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The number of median years of school completed by Negroes was less than the median number for whites in all 21 cities. In 13 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, five serious, and four minor) there was a difference of at least 1 year.

The percentage of Negro population over 25 years of age having 8 years or less of education in all 17 cities was greater than the percentage of white population in this age-education bracket.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The median years of school completed by Negroes in the disturbance area in more than half of the 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tucson; two major, three serious, and four minor) was lower than the median rate of education for Negroes in the entire city. In three of the 17 cities (Jersey City, Milwaukee, and Tampa; two major and one minor), the median years completed by Negroes in the disturbance area and by Negroes in the city were equal. In the remaining five cities the median rate was slightly higher (less than a year’s difference) for Negroes in the disturbance area. The difference between the median number of years completed was one-tenth of a year for the 17 cities. The percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area over 25 years of age having 8 years or less education was slightly greater than the citywide percentage in 11 of the 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, three serious, and four minor).

The differences we have seen are even greater when comparing the level of education of Negroes in the disturbance areas with that of whites in the SMSA’s:

### MEDIAN EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>SMSA’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>N.W.</td>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median years of school completed</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 8 years of schooling (percent)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

153. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro males in the labor force in nine of 17 cities (Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Englewood, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Rockford, and Tampa; three major, two serious, and four minor) exceeded the percentage of white males. The proportion of Negro and white males employed or seeking employment was equal in Grand Rapids (serious).

The percentage of Negro females exceeded the percentage of white females in the labor force in all 17 cities.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro males in the disturbance area in the labor force, in all except seven cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Plainfield, and Tucson; two major, two serious, and three minor), exceeded the percentage of Negro males in the entire city in the labor force.

The percentage of Negro females in the labor force in the disturbance area, in all except 10 cities (Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Paterson, Phoenix, and Plainfield; two major, five serious, and three minor), was larger than the percentage of Negro females in the entire city in the labor force.

The differences in the percentages of Negroes and whites in the labor force again can be seen to be small by comparing Negroes in the disturbance area with whites in the SMSA:

### MEDIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>SMSA’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>N.W.</td>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

154. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unemployment in all 20 cities was lower than the unemployment rate for white males. In 13 of 20 cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford; four major, five serious, and four minor), the rate of unemployment for Negroes was more than twice the rate for whites.

The unemployment rate for Negro females was more than the rate for white females in all of 20 cities except Plainfield (major).

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The unemployment rate for Negro males in the disturbance area was slightly more than the Negro city-wide rate in 11 of 17 cities and slightly less in the remaining six (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, New Haven, and Paterson; two major, three serious, and one minor).

The disturbance area unemployment rate for Negro females equaled or exceeded the city-wide rate in seven of 17 cities (Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, two serious, and one minor).

The differences are even greater when the unemployment rate among Negroes in the disturbance areas is compared with the unemployment rate among whites in the SMSA’s:

### MEDIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>SMSA’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>N.W.</td>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More recent and complete data indicate that unemployment and underemployment of Negroes are even more serious than the 1960 census revealed.

The Bureau of the Census estimates that one out of every six Negro males between ages 20 and 39 was not counted in the 1960 census. Unemployment is likely to be common among the uncounted men.

The Department of Labor, in November 1966, surveyed 10 slum areas in eight cities and obtained slightly earlier unem-
ployment data for slums in four other cities. "A Sharper Look at Unemployment in U.S. Cities and Slums," a summary report submitted to the President by the Secretary of Labor. Two of these cities, Detroit and Phoenix (one major and one serious) were among the cities we surveyed.

The Department found, in the slum areas surveyed, that:

The unemployment rate was approximately three times the nationwide rate of 5.7 percent.
Six and nine-tenths percent of those listed as employed were working only part time although they were trying to find full-time work; the comparable figure for the Nation as a whole was 2.3 percent.
Twenty-one percent of those working full time were earning less than $60 a week; the comparable figure for the Nation as a whole was 15.4 percent.
One-third of the labor force was subemployed.

The Department of Labor included in its definition of subemployment (i) those unemployed in the sense that they are actively looking for work and unable to find it; (ii) those working only part time when they are trying to get full-time work; (iii) those heads of households under 65 who earn less than $60 per week working full time and whose individual heads under 65 who are not heads of households and earn less than $56 per week in a full-time job; (iv) half the number of "nonparticipants" (not in the labor force) in the male 20-64 age group; and (v) a conservative and carefully considered estimate of the male underclass group.

155. Labor force participation increases as better job opportunities appear:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1963 labor force participation rate (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cities with least, moderate, and most opportunities for other than menial jobs.

156. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unskilled and service workers in 10 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; three major, four serious, and three minor) was at least three times the rate of white men.

The percentage of Negro female unskilled and service workers in all but three of 17 cities (Englewood, Jersey City, and Milwaukee; one major and two minor) was at least three times the percentage of white females.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unskilled and service workers in the disturbance areas in 11 of 17 cities (Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tucson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; three major, four serious, and four minor) slightly exceeded the percentage in the cities as a whole. The difference between the median of percentages in the disturbance areas and the median of percentages in the cities was 4.5 percent.

The percentage of Negro female unskilled and service workers in the disturbance areas in eight of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, New Haven, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, two serious, and two minor) was slightly smaller than the percentage of Negro female unskilled and service workers in the cities. The difference in 17 city medians was 3.6 percent.

The differences are even greater when comparing the percentage of Negro unskilled and service workers in the disturbance areas with whites in the SMSA's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIAN WORKERS IN UNSKILLED AND SERVICE JOBS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

157. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The median income of Negroes in 17 cities was 69.3 percent of the median income of whites. The 1966 nationwide median income earned by Negroes was 38 percent of the median income earned by whites. ("Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States," Joint Report by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census, October 1967, p. 15.

The percentage of Negro families in poverty (having an annual income under $3,000) in 14 of 17 cities was twice the percentage of white families in poverty. In the other three cities (Englewood, Newark, and Paterson, one major, one serious, and one minor) the percentage was at least one and one-half the percentage of white families.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of the families below the poverty line was slightly higher in the disturbance areas in almost two-thirds of 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, four serious, and three minor).

The differences are even greater when the income levels of Negroes in the disturbance areas are compared with the income levels of whites in the SMSA's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIAN INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income... $5,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families with annual income less than $3,000(%)...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

158. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro children under 18 living with both parents in all 17 cities was less than the percentage of white children that age similarly situated.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro children under 18 living with both parents in the disturbance area was greater than the city-wide percentage in seven of 17 cities (Atlanta, Dayton, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Rockford, and Tucson; two major, three serious, and two minor).

The differences are even greater when comparing the family status of Negroes in the disturbance areas and of whites in the SMSA's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY STATUS (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 living with both parents...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
159. Family stability improves as family income rises:

| Cities with lowest to highest median nonwhite family incomes. |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 60---------------| 65---------------| 67---------------|

160. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro owner-occupied units in all 17 cities was lower than that of whites. In 10 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, and Tampa; four major, three serious and two minor) the proportion of white homeownership was at least one and one-half that of Negroes. In five of the 10 cities (Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, and Paterson; three major and two serious) the percentage of white homeownership was twice that of Negroes.

Although Negroes paid the same or slightly lower rents than did whites among nonhomeowners in 15 of 17 cities (all except New Haven and Paterson; two serious), they paid a higher proportion of income for rent than whites. Median rent as a proportion of median income in 11 of 13 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, and Tampa; six major, four serious, and one minor) was higher for Negroes than for whites. Negroes paid the same proportion as whites in Phoenix (serious) and a smaller proportion than whites in Englewood (minor).

The percentage of overcrowded Negro-occupied homes (homes with more than 1.01 persons per room) in all of the 17 cities except Tucson (minor) was twice the percentage of overcrowded white-occupied homes. In nine of those cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; three major, three serious, and three minor) the percentage of overcrowded Negro-occupied homes was three times the percentage of white homes.

The percentage of homes occupied by whites which were sound and had adequate plumbing facilities was 1 1/2 times the proportion of Negro-occupied homes which met those criteria, in 10 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, and Tucson; three major, four serious, and three minor).

Comparing Negro housing in the disturbance area and in the entire city: The percentage of Negro owner-occupied units in the disturbance area exceeded the Negro citywide percentage in only six of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Jersey City, New Haven, Paterson, and Tucson; one major, three serious, and two minor). The citywide median for 17 cities was 3.8 percent points higher than the median for the disturbance area.

Negroes in the disturbance area paid more for rent than Negroes paid citywide in eight of 13 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Paterson, and Plainfield; three major, four serious, and one minor). In Milwaukee (minor) they paid the same. In four cities they paid less (Englewood, Newark, Phoenix, and Tampa; two major, one serious, and one minor).

The proportion of income paid for rent by Negroes living in the disturbance area slightly exceeded the citywide proportion paid by Negroes in eight of 13 cities (Cincinnati, Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; four major, one serious, and three minor). The proportions were equal in Detroit (major). The difference in medians was 3/10 of 1 percent.

The percentage of overcrowded homes in which Negroes lived in the disturbance area was slightly greater than the percentage of overcrowded homes in which Negroes lived citywide in eight of 17 cities (Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Plainfield, Newark, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, one serious, and three minor). This median 17-city difference was 1.1 percent points.

The percentage of sound homes in the entire city was slightly greater than in the disturbance area in 10 of 17 cities (Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; four major, three serious, and three minor). The difference in medians was 1/10 of 1 percent point. The differences are even greater when comparing the housing conditions of Negroes in the disturbance areas and of those whites in the SMSA's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENT</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>SMSA's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>N.W.</td>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$74</td>
<td>$74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent as a proportion of median income (percent)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data for 13 cities only*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIAN HOUSING OWNERSHIP</th>
<th>In percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>SMSA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>N.W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied units</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIAN HOUSING OVERCROWDING AND CONDITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 1.01 persons per room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound with all plumbing facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

161. For purposes of this section we have not included the three university communities.


163. Detroit, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Rockford, and Tampa (three major, two serious, and three minor). In the case of Paterson, virtually no powers were left to the aldermen.

164. Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cambridge, Englewood, and Plainfield (one major, two serious, and three minor).

165. In the five cities having a council-city manager system, the city manager was appointed by the council, and the mayor's powers were limited (Cincinnati, Dayton, Grand Rapids, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, three serious, and one minor).

In the one city having a commission form of government (New Brunswick; minor), the mayor was selected by the commission from its own membership and traditionally was the commissioner who received the largest popular vote. The mayor shared executive power with the other commissioners.

166. In three they were elected by the legislative bodies from their own membership (Cincinnati, Dayton, and New Brunswick; one major, one serious, and one minor).

167. Bridgeport, Cambridge, Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Plainfield, and Tucson (one major, three serious, and four minor). The part-time mayors had a variety of other occupations: in Bridgeport, the mayor was a clothing store clerk; in Cambridge, a plumbing contractor; in
Dayton, a real estate investor; in Englewood, a businessman who worked in New York; in Grand Rapids, a part-owner of a restaurant supply business; in New Brunswick, a housewife; in Plainfield, a lawyer; and in Tucson, a pharmacist.

165. In 15 of the 20 cities, the principal executive, either the mayor or the city manager, earned an annual salary ranging from $15,000 to $35,000 (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; five major, six serious, and four minor). The other five cities studied had no city manager and a part-time mayor whose annual salary was less than $2,000 in four cases and $3,500 in one case (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Englewood, New Brunswick, and Plainfield; one major, one serious, and three minor). In all five cities having a council-city manager system, the appointed city manager's salary was significantly higher than the salary of the elected mayor (Cincinnati, Dayton, Grand Rapids, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, three serious, and one minor).

166. Three mayors had terms of 4 years (Atlanta, Cambridge, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, Phoenix, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, four serious, and five minor). Two held terms of 3 years (Bridgeport and Paterson; one serious, and one minor), and five held terms of 2 years (Cincinnati, Englewood, New Haven, Phoenix, and Plainfield; two major, two serious, and one minor).

There appeared to be no pattern as to the length of time a mayor had been in office prior to the disturbance.

In four of the 20 cities the mayor had been in office for less than 2 years (Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Paterson, and Tampa; one major, two serious, and one minor). In three cities the mayor had been in office for 7 years or more (Milwaukee, New Haven, and Rockford; one major, one serious, and one minor). In the remaining cities, the mayor's tenure had ranged from 2 to 7 years.

In two cities (Paterson and New Brunswick; one serious and one minor), the mayors had been in office for 6 months and 2 months, respectively. In both cases the mayor appealed to people in the disturbance area to give the new administration a chance to solve the city's problems, and these appeals appeared to have had an effect in dampening the disorder.

170. Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, New Brunswick, Phoenix, and Tampa (three major, three serious, and two minor).

171. Cambridge, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Paterson, Rockford, and Tucson (one major, four serious, and two minor).

172. Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Newark, and Plainfield (two major and three minor).

173. Of a total of 207 legislators in the 20 cities, 20 (or 10 percent) were Negroes.

174. Bridgeport, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson (one major, one serious, and four minor).

175. In Newark the budget director and the director of health and welfare were Negroes; in Cincinnati, the city solicitor was a Negro; in Jersey City, the director of health and welfare was a Negro; and in Detroit, an aide to the mayor was a Negro.

176. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Englewood, Newark, and Phoenix (three major, three serious, and one minor).

177. All except Milwaukee, Tampa, and Tucson (two major and one minor). Of the 205 board of education members in those cities, 24 (or 11 percent) were Negroes.

178. Excepting Englewood, New Brunswick, and Paterson (one serious and two minor). In some instances it was called a "community relations commission" or "human rights commission."

179. Only the Equal Opportunities Commission in New Haven (serious) had the power to subpoena witnesses and enforce compliance with its decisions.

180. Thirteen councils had full-time, paid staff of two or more, responsible to the council itself (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Newark, New Haven, Phoenix, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; six major, five serious, and two minor). In four cities the councils had no paid staff (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Jersey City, and Rockford; one serious and three minor).

Three of the four councils having no paid staff had been relatively inactive in the year prior to the 1967 summer disturbances. Cambridge (serious) held no meetings, and Jersey City (minor) had held only at which they decided their services were not needed during the summer. The council in Rockford (minor), which had not met for over a year, was in the process of being reorganized.

181. Of the 13 councils from which such information was available, five councils reported receiving more than 100 complaints annually (Atlanta, serious, 700 to 800; Detroit, major, 116; Elizabeth, minor, approximately 200; Newark, major, approximately 750; Plainfield, major, approximately 200). Three councils reported receiving 50 to 100 complaints (Cincinnati, major, approximately 50; New Haven, serious, approximately 60; Phoenix, serious, approximately 75). Five councils reported receiving less than 50 (Dayton, serious, 45; Grand Rapids, serious, approximately 35; Milwaukee, major, approximately 40; Tampa, major, 46; and Tucson, minor, 10).

The majority of the complaints from the 12 councils which reported this type of information were in the areas of housing discrimination, building and housing code enforcement, and discrimination in employment and promotion practices.

182. Two years ago in Rockford the 18-member Human Relations Commission was asked to investigate an alleged incident of police brutality but, after a preliminary meeting to discuss the matter, held no further meetings. In the late spring of 1967, the Commission was reorganized with a number of new members.

In Plainfield, city agencies opposed an attempt by the Human Relations Commission to conduct its own investigation of complaints of police brutality prior to the 1967 disorder.

183. Cincinnati, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, and Tucson (three major, three serious, and three minor). Only those in Detroit, New Haven, and Tucson had been in existence more than 2 years prior to the disorder.

Four police departments (Paterson, Detroit, Rockford, and New Haven; one major, two serious, and one minor) had specialized complaint bureaus within the department, and in two cities (Paterson and Detroit) these bureaus had investigative authority.

In Milwaukee there was a police and fire commission consisting of five members. Until recently only property owners were authorized by law to file complaints with the commission. The law has since been amended to permit any registered voter to file complaints, but few complaints have been filed.

184. Eight of the nine, Englewood (minor) expected.

185. Detroit and Newark (both major).

186. We have not attempted to analyze the often substantial social and economic programs of other levels of government. Of necessity, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, 25; Milwaukee, the most general quantitative comparisons, within each of the three cities, of the size of the selected Federal programs, the number of people in need of them, and the number of people in any way reached by them. We have not attempted the far more difficult task of evaluating the efficiency of the programs
or the quality of assistance provided to recipients or its impact on their lives. Qualitative evaluation is the responsibility of many other agencies of the Federal Government and beyond our own mandate. Our evaluation necessarily assumes that all those reached are reached effectively. If the factor of effectiveness were taken into account, the magnitude of the still unmet needs might be even greater than our estimates.

As in "The Pattern of Disadvantage," supra, we have used 1960 census data as the basis for most of our observations as to need. We are keenly aware of difficulties involved in comparing 1967 programs with 1960 needs and have used more recent data wherever available. In most instances the needs were greater in 1967 than in 1960.

Various Federal programs account for their expenditures in different ways and for different periods of time. We have used figures for fiscal year 1967, ending June 30, 1967, or calendar year 1967, as available in each case. We are cognizant of all the difficulties involved in considering only expenditures for 1967 as a measure of Federal efforts to deal with ghetto problems. Much was done in earlier years by these programs and more is being done now. We have generally chosen a single year's funding only as a measure of the level of Federal effort during the most recent period.

The choice of a recent year for measuring Federal expenditures created a further problem, however. The amount of funds authorized or obligated for a particular program is usually higher than the actual disbursements for that program in a given time period, but data on disbursements is available only some time after the period has ended. With the exception of housing and welfare, we have relied upon the higher obligation figures.

187. Institutional training programs administered through local school boards under the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) have been included in these education programs.

188. Two of the programs had no fixed number of trainee positions. The following table further describes these programs.

| NEWARK |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| Programs | Federal funds obligated Jan. 1, 1967 to June 30, 1967 | Enrolled Positions available |
| Essex County Youth and Economic Rehabilitation Commission OIT | $1,087,097 | 200 |
| City of Newark OIT | 267,830 | 500 |
| Food service industry project OIT | 25,449 | 20 |
| Career-oriented preparation for employment | 1,237,769 | 410 |
| Work training program | 246,000 | 200 |
| Mount Sinai Hospital OIT | 15,513 | 68 |
| City of Newark OIT | 236,596 | 500 |
| Chrysler Corp. OIT | 53,623 | 55 |
| Painters District Council No. 10 OIT | 17,274 | 24 |
| United Community Corp. OIT | 292,710 | 100 |
| Feeder's Local No. 9 OIT | 166,298 | 300 |
| Weleinton Corp. OIT | 14,015 | 27 |
| Total | 2,681,853 | 2,840 |

*Source: Field representative of the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, U.S. Department of Labor, and the United Community Corp. Funds were obligated from Department of Labor and Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

190. Need. — The Connecticut State Employment Service estimates there were approximately 145,000 to 150,000 non-agricultural workers in the labor force in New Haven and 12 surrounding towns during the first three-quarters of 1967. The unemployment rate for the same period averaged approximately 3.5 percent.

Programs. — During the first three quarters of 1967 there were 14 manpower programs in New Haven in various stages of operation. These provided $2,150,828 of Federal funds for 1,574 trainees. The number of trainees was not available for one program.

| NEW HAVEN |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| Programs | Federal funds obligated Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 1967 | Enrollment positions available |
| Manpower Division, CPI, administration | $584,227 | None |
| FIVC (out-of-school) | 379,300 | 109 |
| FIVC (in-school) | 370,000 | 500 |
| Neighborhood employment centers | 62,600 | None |
| Elavon Employment Center | 118,000 | 250 |
| Shift center | 51,915 | 250 |
| Basic education | 61,505 | 68 |
| Community Progress, Inc. OIT | 155,766 | 138 |
| Barber shop OIT | 72,733 | 10 |
| Refrigerator and air-conditioning OIT | 12,450 | 13 |
| Health aids program | 33,633 | 76 |
| Adult work training | 727,000 | 65 |
| Foster grandparent | 727,000 | 55 |
| Residential youth center | 155,965 | 78 |
| Total | 2,150,828 | 1,574 |

*Source: Community Progress, Inc. (CPI), the local community action agency. Funds were obligated from appropriations to the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

**Information not available.
191. Need.—There are more than 295,000 students in the Detroit public schools, of whom 43 percent are white and 56 percent Negro. Nearly 60 percent (about 175,000) are educationally disadvantaged within the definition of Title I. Thirty percent of the white students and 84.5 percent of the Negro students are in this group. There are approximately 180,000 functionally illiterate adults in Detroit.

The Detroit school board recently stated that it may cost twice as much to educate a ghetto child as it costs to educate a suburban child and produce the same educational result. The superintendent of Detroit schools has estimated that, to educate inner-city children, as many as $500 or $600 per pupil is needed in addition to the present average State and local expenditure of $565 per pupil.

Programs.—Detroit schools are scheduled to receive about $11 million during the 1967-68 school year under ESEA Title I. Of the estimated 175,000 low-income students, only about 55,000 are direct beneficiaries of Title I programs. Thus, while the $11 million represents $200 per student for the 55,000 direct recipients, 120,000 (69 percent) other educationally disadvantaged students are not participating in the programs.

The adult basic education program is scheduled to receive $241,766 during the 1967-68 school year to serve about 3,900 adults.

Federal funding for public school students from kindergarten through high school for the 1967-68 school year will total $14,514,447. For a student population of 295,000, these funds add an average of about $56 per student to the state and local expenditures of approximately $565 per student.

Detroit* Federal Funds Obligated for 1967-68 School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds designed to assist students in kindergarten through grade 12:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title I (compensatory education projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title II (library materials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title III (supplementary educational projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: Detroit Board of Education.**

192. Need.—There are approximately 75,000 students in the Newark schools of whom 21 percent are whites and 79 percent are Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and others. Approximately 33,000 (44 percent) of these students are from low-income families. In 1960 there were approximately 55,000 functionally illiterate adults in Newark.

Programs.—Newark schools are scheduled to receive about $4 million during the 1967-68 school year under ESEA Title I. Of the estimated 33,000 educationally disadvantaged students, only about 24,000 (72 percent) are direct beneficiaries of the Title I programs. Thus, while $166 per student is spent for programs for the direct recipients, 9,000 educationally disadvantaged students are not receiving the benefits of the programs.

The adult basic education program is scheduled to receive $169,000 during the 1967-68 school year to serve approximately 3,000 students at a cost of about $56 per person.

Federal funding for public school students from kindergarten through high school in Newark during the 1967-68 school year will total $4,554,098. For a student population of 75,000, these funds add an average of approximately $60 per student to the state and local expenditures of about $565.

Newark* Federal Funds Obligated for 1967-68 School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds designed to assist students in kindergarten through grade 12:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title I (compensatory education projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title II (library materials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title III (supplementary educational projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: New Haven Board of Education.** Funds were obligated from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

193. Need.—There are more than 21,000 students in the New Haven public schools, of whom 47.9 percent are whites and 52.1 percent are Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and others. In the middle and senior high schools an estimated 2,500 students are educationally disadvantaged. Of 33 elementary schools, 14 are designated as inner city or target schools for funds under ESEA Title I, and seven others reportedly could have been so designated. More than 50 percent of all elementary students (6,637 of 13,050) are in the 14 target schools. Twenty-two percent of the white students and more than 73 percent of the nonwhite students are in the target schools. There are an estimated 20,000 functionally illiterate adults in New Haven.

Programs.—New Haven schools are scheduled to receive nearly $1 million in the 1967-68 school year under ESEA Title I. Of the 2,500 low-income students in middle and senior high schools, approximately 1,000 are beneficiaries of the programs. Because of the comprehensive nature of the Title I programs in New Haven, all 6,637 students in the 14 target elementary schools are recipients of the programs although not all are educationally disadvantaged. The number of educationally disadvantaged students who do not receive benefits from the programs because they attend the 19 nontarget elementary schools is unknown.

The adult basic education program is scheduled to receive $29,000 during the 1967-68 school year to serve almost 700 persons.

Federal funding for public school students from kindergarten through high school for the 1967-68 school year will total $1,090,260. For a student population of 21,000, these funds add an average of nearly $52 per student to the state and local expenditures of approximately $567 per student.
Development, all units which were characterized by the census as dilapidated or as lacking one or more plumbing facilities. U.S. Bureau of Census, *Measuring the Quality of Housing, An Appraisal of Census Statistics and Methods*, Working Paper No. 25, Washington, D.C., 1967. We have treated as overcrowded all units identified by the census as having more than 1.01 persons per room, in accordance with the definition recently used by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States*, October 1967, p. 57. Since many units are included in both categories, it is not possible to establish a total level of need by adding the numbers of units in the two categories, and we have therefore applied the two standards separately.

195. Need.—In 1960 there were 553,198 housing units in Detroit. Of these, 36,810 were substandard and 45,126 were overcrowded.

**Programs**—Federal funds in the amount of $78,656,000 were expended through September 1967 for housing completed under the first three programs examined. An additional $41,400 were expended through December 1967 under the rent supplements program. BMWIR mortgages in the amount of $4,173,000 were insured by FHA through September 1967. In the 1957-67 period, although no new public housing was constructed, 25 housing units were added as a result of FHA foreclosures. During this period, 346 units were constructed for the elderly and handicapped; families in 62 units were assisted through rent supplements; and mortgages on 325 units were insured under the BMWIR program.

**NEWARK**

(Cumulative through Sep. 30, 1967, except for rent supplements, which are described as of Dec. 31, 1967, Dollar amounts in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds disbursed (thousands $)</th>
<th>Mortgages insured (thousands $)</th>
<th>Maximum number of low-income units or accommodations assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing for elderly and handicapped (completed units)</td>
<td>5,590 (***)</td>
<td>299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban renewal, Title I (all projects)</td>
<td>40,032 (***)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-rent public housing (bond payments on completed projects)</td>
<td>57,385 (***)</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent supplements</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 221, labor market interest rate (BMWIR)</td>
<td>20,308 (***)</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$110,119</td>
<td>$20,308</td>
<td>3,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Housing Authority of the City of Newark.

**Middle**-and moderate-income units are included in the totals, particularly in the cases of the BMWIR and elderly and handicapped programs. **Indicates that the column is not applicable or the program was not in existence during the period indicated by the column heading.

196. Need.—In 1960 there were 51,471 housing units in New Haven. Of these, 6,667 were substandard and 4,278 were overcrowded.

**Programs**—Federal funds in the amount of $60,393,000 were expended through September 1967 for housing completed under the first four programs examined. BMWIR mortgages in the amount of $6,045,000 were insured by FHA through September 1967. Of the 2,074 public housing units in New Haven, only 469 were constructed after 1952. Mortgages on 482 units have been insured under the BMWIR program.

**NEW HAVEN**

(Cumulative through Sep. 30, 1967, except for rent supplements which are described as of Dec. 31, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds disbursed (thousands $)</th>
<th>Mortgages insured (thousands $)</th>
<th>Maximum number of low-income units or accommodations assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing for elderly and handicapped (completed units)</td>
<td>0 (***)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban renewal, Title I (all projects)</td>
<td>53,588 (***)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-rent public housing (bond payments on completed projects)</td>
<td>6,095 (***)</td>
<td>469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent supplements</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 221, labor market interest rate (BMWIR)</td>
<td>5,045 (***)</td>
<td>482</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50,393</td>
<td>6,045</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Department of Housing and Urban Development and the New Haven Redevelopment Agency.

**Middle**-and moderate-income units are included in the totals, particularly in the cases of the BMWIR and elderly and handicapped programs. **Indicates that the column is not applicable or the program was not in existence during the period indicated by the column heading.

198. We have not included medical assistance to the aged, because it is not limited to low-income persons.

199. Need.—Of the 1,670,144 residents of Detroit in 1960, 361,348, or 21.6 percent of the city’s population, including 204,820 nonwhites and 156,528 whites, were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

**Programs**—The estimated Federal contribution toward
the four programs totalled $26,169,997. An estimated 69,310 poor persons received assistance. The average annual income of an AFDC family of four in Detroit was $1,752. By contrast, a city worker’s family budget for a moderate living standard for a family of four in Detroit is $8,981 per year, according to the Department of Labor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Wayne County</th>
<th>City of Detroit (estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons assisted (1967 monthly average)</td>
<td>Monthly average payment per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to aged</td>
<td>12,956</td>
<td>$716.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to blind</td>
<td>7,141</td>
<td>90.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to disabled</td>
<td>77,255</td>
<td>48.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98,352</td>
<td>$2,156,458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Michigan Department of Social Services, Research & Program Analysis Section.

200. Need.—Of the 405,220 residents of Newark in 1960, 89,949, or 22.2 percent of the city’s population, including 48,098 nonwhites and 41,851 whites, were members of families with annual income of less than $3,000.

Programs.—The estimated Federal contribution toward the four programs totalled $14,964,647. An estimated 48,319 poor persons received assistance. The average annual income of an AFDC family of four was $2,759. By contrast, the city worker’s family budget for a moderate living standard for a family of four in Northern New Jersey is $10,195, according to the Department of Labor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Essex County</th>
<th>City of Newark (estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons assisted in July 1967</td>
<td>Monthly average payment per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to aged</td>
<td>3,756</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to blind</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>105.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to disabled</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>116.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>51,081</td>
<td>55.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57,384</td>
<td>$6,067,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Essex County Welfare Board.

201. Need.—Of the 152,048 residents of New Haven in 1960, 51,254, or 20.6 percent of the city’s population, including 9,021 nonwhites and 22,233 whites, were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—The estimated Federal contribution toward the four programs totalled $3,869,487. An estimated 12,663 poor persons received assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>New Haven—November 1967 and Estimated Calendar 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons assisted during November 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to aged</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to blind</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to disabled</td>
<td>2,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

202. Data as to funding and persons reached have been obtained from community action agencies (CAA's) in the three cities surveyed. Manpower and employment programs, such as Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Headstart programs have been included in other sections.

203. Need.—As indicated in the section on “Welfare,” in 1960 there were 361,348 people in Detroit who were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—During fiscal year 1967, Federal funds made available for community action programs, excepting manpower and Headstart, totaled $12,576,923. During that period the CAA estimates that these programs reached approximately 110,000 low-income persons.

**DETOIT, FISCAL YEAR 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Funds obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small business development center</td>
<td>$89,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main grant—4 months</td>
<td>$2,883,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>433,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-year human capital improvement program</td>
<td>46,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business development center</td>
<td>119,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster grandparents</td>
<td>46,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main grant—8 months</td>
<td>3,071,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal services</td>
<td>351,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals and toasts</td>
<td>11,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth service Corp</td>
<td>63,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 summer programs</td>
<td>707,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer programs supplement</td>
<td>249,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals and toasts</td>
<td>31,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult basic education</td>
<td>114,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer programs</td>
<td>938,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource allocation and priority analysis</td>
<td>49,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area training and technical assistance center</td>
<td>783,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive health services</td>
<td>2,859,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood service program planning grant</td>
<td>49,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency loans for families</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12,576,923</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mayor's Committee for Human Resources Development. Funds were obligated from Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.*

204. Need.—As indicated in the section on “Welfare,” in 1960 there were 89,949 people in Newark who were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—During fiscal year 1967, Federal funds made available for community action programs, excepting manpower and Headstart, totaled $1,901,130. During that period the CAA estimates that these programs reached approximately 39,790 low-income persons.

**NEWARK, FISCAL YEAR 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>League youth culture and education program</td>
<td>$16,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Community Corp., central administration</td>
<td>272,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community action (area boards)</td>
<td>480,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS (Spanish information center)</td>
<td>24,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business center</td>
<td>72,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer block recreation program</td>
<td>268,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior citizens</td>
<td>389,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal services</td>
<td>365,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,901,130</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: United Community Corp. Funds were obligated from Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.*

206. Using this material we sought to identify and assign weights to the four types of grievances which appeared to have the greatest significance to the Negro community in each city. We made judgments with regard to the severity of particular grievances and assigned a rank to the four most serious. These judgments were based on the frequency with which a particular grievance was mentioned, the relative intensity with which it was discussed, references to incidents exemplifying the grievance, and estimates of severity obtained from the interviewees themselves. Each priority ranking was weighted by points (four points for the first priority, three for second, two for third, and one for fourth). The points for each grievance for all cities were added to create an intensity ranking. Whenever two grievances were judged to be equally serious for a particular city, the points for the two rankings involved were divided equally (e.g., in case two were judged equally suitable for the first priority, the total points for first and second were divided and each received 3½ points).

Annexed are two sets of charts: Chart I shows the pervasiveness of types of grievances in 12 general categories, each of which is subdivided into several specific categories. Chart II shows only the general categories and indicates the number of times that grievances in each were ranked first, second, third, or fourth in terms of relative severity.

207. Education and recreation were ranked equally; municipal services and consumer and credit practices were also ranked equally.

208. Ibid.

209. Ibid.

210. Ibid.

211. In this survey 437 Negroes from the Detroit disturbance area were asked which of 11 grievances had a “great deal,” “something,” or “nothing” to do with the riot. The grievances which received the most responses of “a great deal” were: (1) police brutality, (2) overcrowded living conditions, (3) poor housing, (4) lack of jobs, (5) poverty, and (6) anger with business people. Interviewees who identified themselves as participants in the riot were singled out for special analysis and chose the same six causes but in a slightly different order. Overcrowded living conditions was first instead of police brutality.

212. We found significant grievances concerning police practices in each of 19 cities. Grievances concerning police practices were ranked first in eight cities, second in four cities, third in none, and fourth in two cities. Although such griev-
ances were present in five other cities, they were not ranked in the first four orders of intensity.

213. Grievances in the employment area were ranked first in three cities, second in seven cities, third in four cities, and fourth in three cities. In only three cities was such a grievance present but not ranked among the highest four levels of intensity.

214. Grievances in the housing area were found in 18 cities and were ranked first in five cities, second in two cities, third in five cities, and fourth in two cities. In four cities where housing was a grievance, it was not ranked in the first four levels of intensity.

215. Educational grievances were found in 17 cities and were ranked first in two cities, second in two cities, third in two cities, and fourth in three cities. In eight cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

216. Grievances relating to recreation were found in 15 cities and were ranked first in three cities, second in one city, third in four cities, and fourth in none. In seven cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

217. Grievances relating to the political structure were found in 16 cities and were ranked first in two cities, second in one city, third in one city, and fourth in one city. In 11 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

218. Grievances relating to white attitudes were found in 15 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in two cities, and fourth in one city. In 12 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

219. Grievances relating to the administration of justice were found in 15 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in two cities, and fourth in one city. In 12 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

220. Grievances relating to Federal programs were found in 16 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in none, and fourth in none. In 15 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

221. Grievances relating to municipal services were found in 11 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in one city, and fourth in none. In 10 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

222. Grievances relating to unfair commercial practices were found in 11 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in none, and fourth in two cities. In nine cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

223. We surveyed these cities shortly after the disturbances. Consequently, we are not in a position to assess more current events there. As noted elsewhere in this report, the Commission is sponsoring two surveys which will measure the impact of the disorders on the attitudes of whites and Negroes. The surveys are being conducted in 15 cities and four suburban areas, including four of the 20 cities surveyed for this report. The results of these surveys will be published separately and will provide a more complete treatment of the post-disorder situation.

224. We have noted earlier that no immunization took effect for the 25 cities which experienced two or more disorders in 1967. See "Levels of Violence and Damage," at pp. 65-67. Six of the 20 cities we surveyed had more than one disorder: Atlanta (2), Cambridge (2), Cincinnati (3), Dayton (2), Rockford (2), and Tampa (2). Houston had three disorders in 1967. However, the three cities which had campus-related disorders in our sample of 23 have not been included in our examination for the purpose of this section.

225. Bridgeport, Cincinnati, and Tucson (one major and two minor). In Bridgeport, a white segregationist organization had become more active. In Cincinnati and Tucson, new black organizations tended to follow militant separatist policies.

226. In Atlanta, two new groups were formed, one composed largely of white ministers and lay members, and the other of black youths. Reportedly, the latter group is dedicated to the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of riots.

227. In Elizabeth, as a result of its leader's antiriot activities during the disturbances, a relatively moderate religious sect, the Orthodox Moderns, appears to have gained stature in the Negro community.

228. Also, in New Haven, at least two black militant organizations emerged after the riot and seemed to have gained support from members of the moderate Negro community. In addition, an integrated group was formed several months after the riot to protest alleged police harassment and repression of the militant Negro leaders.

In Milwaukee, the NAACP Youth Commandos, a militant but nonseparatist group, appeared to have grown in influence in the Negro community after the riot. Also, a coalition of moderate Negro leaders was formed to develop economic and social programs.

229. Atlanta, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tucson (three major, three serious, and two minor).

In New Haven, the police department opened a storefront office in the disturbance area where citizens could make complaints or seek assistance. The office was also designed to serve as a "cooling-off" center to avoid the need for a trip to the central stationhouse in minor matters such as domestic quarrels.

In Milwaukee, the police department established a police-community relations division.

In Newark, the Negro captain, whose promotion was announced during the riot, has been appointed commanding officer of the fourth precinct in which the disorders of the summer started.

In Paterson, the program for the police-community relations unit has been expanded to include a police-community relations board consisting of seven policemen and nine civilians. The civilians include representatives from the Negro community.

In Rockford, the mayor's commission on human relations planned a workshop on police-community relations to be conducted by experts from city, county, state and federal agencies. Each member of the Rockford Police force was to be required to take 12 hours of instruction.

In Tucson, the police department planned to sponsor an institute of police-community relations, including seminars on the nature of prejudice and on the attitudes of Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and Indians toward the police.

In Plainfield, the police department began actively recruiting Negro officers. The department also republished its complaint procedures.

230. Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Paterson, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (three major, four serious, and two minor).

In Cambridge and Tampa, the local community relations commissions increased their efforts to induce employers to hire more Negroes. Tampa's commission employed a full-time job developer and established a job-training program.

In Grand Rapids, a coalition of public and private organizations began a crash employment program to find 1,000 jobs in 3 months.

In New Brunswick, the business community sought to

345
raise $75,000 for job training; $25,000 of this amount was
contributed by one local pharmaceutical company.

In Phoenix, the antipoverty program initiated a project to
train 2,500 heads of households in ghetto areas.

After the Tampa disturbance, the local antipoverty agency
and area industries sponsored an on-the-job training program,
and the Tampa Merchants Association established a job-
training course.

230. Cambridge, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth,
Milwaukee, Plainfield, Tampa, and Rockford (five major, two
serious, and two minor).

In Cincinnati, the urban renewal agency established a
complaint office in the ghetto. The office, which was open
3 days a week, closed after 30 days of operation. The
mayor said the experiment was abandoned because
citizens had failed to use it.

In Elizabeth, the city council approved the local housing
authority’s request to submit an application to the Federal
Government for 400 low-income apartment units. The mayor
also appointed a Negro to the local redevelopment agency.

In Milwaukee, the city council passed an open-housing
ordinance. However, Negro leaders denounced the ordinance
on the ground that it merely restates the provisions of state
law, which reportedly exclude 66 percent of the housing in
Milwaukee from coverage. The lone Negro council member
voted against the ordinance as “mere tokenism.”

In Plainfield, a Negro was appointed to a 5-year term as
a member of the housing authority.

In Tampa, a block club staged a march on the Tampa
Housing Authority’s offices to publicize complaints against
the authority, such as billing public housing residents for
grasscutting where there is no grass. The authority promised
to consider the charges seriously.

In Rockford, the housing authority is constructing a
75-unit housing development for the elderly in a Negro
slum. The project was planned before the disturbance but
construction began afterward. A community development
corporation was also initiated before the disorder to encour-

age community self-help programs for home improvement,
and local businesses contributed “seed money” to guarantee
improvement loans. The city annexed the pilot project block
in order to provide municipal services and planned to annex
additional blocks as the program expands.

231. Newark is the headquarters office for two of the life
insurance companies in the consortium of 350 which pledged to
set aside $1 billion to finance ghetto housing under FHA
insurance.

232. Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Plainfield, and Rockford
(two major, one serious, and two minor).

The Dayton board of education issued a policy statement
that it would attempt to decrease de facto segregation in
city schools.

Elizabeth’s board of education instituted a program of
free adult basic education.

The Plainfield board of education formalized its practice
of permitting parents to have a third person present when
talking to school officials. It also hired its first full-time
Negro counselor.

233. In Detroit, as aforementioned, the Michigan Bell Tele-
phone Co. plans to “adopt” one of the city’s high schools
and provide funds for special programs.

234. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, and Tampa (two major
and two serious).

In Atlanta, despite united resistance by local Negro leaders,
the administration continued to build “portable” classrooms
for use at predominantly black schools, maintained double
sessions only in Negro schools, and refused to reconsider its
“freedom of choice” desegregation procedures.

In Dayton and Tampa, bond issues for school construc-
tion were defeated. The Tampa referendum was opposed
by local Negroes because most of the money was to be used
in all-white, suburban schools.

Also in Tampa, the interscholastic athletic conference to
which Tampa’s white schools belong refused to admit the
city’s predominantly Negro schools to membership and made
it impossible for the county schools to form a separate con-
ference in which the Negro schools could participate in the
highest class of competition.

235. Atlanta, Elizabeth, New Brunswick, and Tampa (one
major, one serious, and two minor).

In Atlanta, immediately after the disturbance, work began
on a playground for which area residents had been petition-
ing for 2 years.

In Elizabeth, shortly after the disturbance, the recreation
department moved a playground closer to a poor Negro
neighborhood.

In Tampa, a former local high school coach, popular
among Negro youths, was hired as director of youth services
for the neighborhood service centers of the county antipoverty
program.

236. Cincinnati, Englewood, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson
(two major, one serious, and two minor).

257. President of city council in Englewood, member of civil
service commission in Tucson and members of housing au-
thority and board of adjustments in Plainfield (one major
two minor).

In elections for state office, the situation was mixed. A
Negro candidate for State assemblyman from Newark was
elected, but two incumbent Negro legislators from Newark
were defeated. The incumbent Negro assemblyman whose
district included Englewood was defeated by the candidate
who had been mayor of that city during the disorder.

238. Cambridge and New Brunswick (one serious and one
minor).

In Cambridge, the Governor of Maryland appointed a com-

community relations committee immediately after the disturb-
ance.

In New Brunswick, the mayor established an “open door”
policy to facilitate the airing of grievances directly with her.

A human relations commission, planned prior to the dis-
turbance, was established, and several Negroes were ap-
pointed as commissioners.

239. In Tampa, some of the counterpositories known as “White
Hats” were hired by the city’s commission on community rela-
tions to improve communication with ghetto youths. The pro-
gram was recently terminated upon the indictment of several
White Hats on felony charges not connected with the disor-
der.

240. Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, New
Haven, Newark, and Tampa (three major, three serious, and
two minor).

In six of the cities surveyed (Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, New
Haven, Newark, and Tampa) Model Cities applications have
been approved by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.

In Elizabeth and Tampa, new legal services programs,
funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, were insti-
tuted.

A YMHA building, valued at $50,000, near Elizabeth’s
disturbance area was donated for use by the local Commu-
nity Action Agency as a community center.

The County Community Action Agency opened an office in
Englewood.

241. Tampa and Milwaukee (two major).

The nomination to the board of the County Community
Action Agency of the former commander of the Milwaukee
city precinct which includes much of the ghetto area was
contested by Negro residents. The nomination was never voted
on as the nominee moved from the city before a vote was
taken.
In Tampa, a highly publicized controversy arose because a Negro neighborhood worker was fired by a local antipoverty agency. The discharged employee filed charges of racial discrimination in the hiring and job placement practices of the county antipoverty program.

242. Atlanta, Dayton, Elizabeth, and New Brunswick (two serious and two minor).

Elizabeth opened a "little city hall" in the disturbance area.

In New Brunswick, the administration rented an armory for use as a neighborhood center.

243. In Elizabeth, the county legal services agency announced plans for 1-day consumer clinics in various low-income neighborhoods for training and counseling on complaints about credit and other consumer practices.

244. Cincinnati and Detroit (two major).

In Detroit, as stated, CCAC began developing proposals for new businesses in the riot area, including a Negro-owned cooperative food market and a number of other cooperative business ventures.

In Cincinnati, newspapers reported that two Negroes who had long sought financing for a new business center in the disturbance area had succeeded since the disturbance.

245. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Newark, and Tampa (four major and one serious).

In Atlanta, the police and fire departments announced the formulation of a confidential coordinated plan to cope with any future disturbances.

In Cincinnati, voters approved a bond issue to establish a countywide police communications center and command post for normal conditions as well as riot conditions. The new city budget included $500,000 for 50 additional policemen.

In Newark, the city council appropriated $200,000 for the purchase of armored cars, riot guns, helmets, and other riot control equipment.

In Tampa, city and county law enforcement departments prepared a detailed "After-action Report" describing the city's disorder and how it was controlled. The report recommended purchase of riot control equipment and suggested tactical improvements.

246. Dayton, Elizabeth, Paterson, and Tampa (one major, two serious, and one minor).

In Dayton, the organizers of the "White Hats" stated that the group would be used again if another riot occurred. The organizers also stated that they expected city officials to cooperate with them again as they had during the June disorder.

In Elizabeth, there was evidence that city officials planned to ask Negro community leaders to assist in future peacekeeping as they did during the disorder.

In Paterson, the Community Action agency gave a leadership course for Negro teenagers in the hope that the youths will act as counterintenders should the need arise.

247. In Tampa, as indicated above, the "White Hats" program, which had been continued after the disorder, ended with the indictment of several youths on non-riot-connected charges.

248. Also, in Cincinnati, according to unofficial estimates, about 50 percent of the businesses damaged during that city's riot had reopened by mid-December, 1967.

In Dayton, where the total estimated property damage from the June disorder was relatively small, most of the store fronts damaged in the West Dayton business area were repaired.

249. Detroit and Plainfield (two major). In Plainfield, two Negro organizations demanded that any new building be undertaken only after consultation with representatives of the Negro community.

In Detroit, CCAC insisted that no rebuilding be started until Negro citizens of the area decide how they want their neighborhoods redeveloped.