Youth Investment and Development

For more information on the model programs discussed, see Links.

There is evidence that nonprofit youth development initiatives have worked during the hours when high-risk children and youth are not in school and during summer months. We have found youth development programs to work when they are run by local unaffiliated, nonprofit organizations. Scientifically evaluated examples include Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in San Juan, PR, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, MA and Koban, Inc. in Columbia, SC. We also have found youth development programs to work when they are run by local affiliates of national nonprofit organizations. Scientifically evaluated examples include Boys and Girls Clubs of America in Public Housing, the Quantum Opportunities Program and Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America. Do local unaffiliated nonprofits perform better than local affiliates of national nonprofits? In the Eisenhower Foundation's experience, the answer has been yes. Ongoing comparisons are needed to better inform national policy. See the Citations at the end of this section. For more information on carefully evaluated youth development successes, see Publications. Also visit the web sites of the Academy for Educational Development, the American Youth Policy Forum, Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Opportunities Industrialization Center of America, the National Youth Development Information Center, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and Public/Private Ventures.

Local, Unaffiliated Nonprofit Organizations

Illustrations include Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in San Juan, PR, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, MA and Koban, Inc., in Columbia, SC. All have been evaluated by the Eisenhower Foundation. (See: Publications. Also see About the Foundation - and What's New.)

Centro Sister Isolina Ferre

Centro Sister Isolina Ferre combines youth development and community regeneration. Begun in the 1960s in Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico, Centro opened in San Juan in the late 1980s, Centro's founding premise is, "If family and community can be strengthened, and meaningful employment made available, it might be possible to make substantial progress in the struggle against neighborhood crime and violence."

In San Juan, Centro operates in the semi-rural Caimito neighborhood, characterized by a very high dropout rate (averaging 30 percent), high unemployment of close to 50 percent among adults and 80 percent among youth, and extreme poverty in which 70 percent of the families receive public assistance. According to police reports, Caimito constitutes one of the highest delinquency and drug dependence communities in San Juan. Caimito also is the most remote part of San Juan, and so delivery of public services to Caimito has lagged behind the rest of the metropolitan area. For example, the first police station opened in 1985. There is no public health clinic in Caimito. The present-day school system is overloaded, and school violence is common.

In the midst of this environment, Centro is located on a beautiful park-like campus. The campus includes a residential police ministation at its entrance way, a central building with classrooms and administrative offices at the bottom of the palm-tree lined driveway.
that begins with the minstation, a series of A-frame buildings that hold classrooms, workrooms and businesses, a tree nursery and a recreational area.

At any one time, Centro in San Juan has run up to 10 interrelated programs, with a staff of 56. During the day, an alternative school program successfully works with dropouts on school remediation and the acquisition of general education degrees. A computer literacy and office skills training initiative, using the IBM equipment, has students attending 30 hours per week. Adults attend cooking classes and other events. Young mothers can attend classes while their children are cared for in a baby nursery. Immunizations and screenings are provided on-site by the Health Department. After school, a special safe-haven program for 6 to 12 year olds involves many youngsters in arts, remediation, sports, and culture.

Almost all programs are designed to increase the leadership, confidence and competence of community youth, many of whom come to Centro while they still are gang members. The most important innovation at Centro are the "intercessors" or advocates: young, streetwise, paid staff members drawn from the community. The advocates act as intermediaries and mediators among youth in trouble or on the verge of trouble, the community, the schools, the police and the rest of the criminal justice system. The role of advocates proceeds far beyond individual counseling or mentoring. Advocates are charged with "getting to know the youth and his or her peers and family, looking into the school, family and work situation, and understanding the day-to-day behavior of the youth." Advocates involve youth in the full range of developmental programs at Centro including job training, recreation, and tutoring. The police work closely with the intercessors, often calling them when a youth is on the verge of serious trouble. If arrests are made, advocates help youth in the court system.

The police minstation on the campus at its entrance is a pleasant looking 3-level structure modeled after the Japanese "kobans." Residential quarters are on the top floor, minstation offices are on the ground floor and an IBM computer training education center is on the lower level. The police presence helps to protect the IBM equipment and to create a sense of safe-haven security for the entire campus.

Over 10 years, several different officers -- male and female -- have lived in the minstation, all with their spouses and families. Non-residential offices, a civilian minstation director and advocates work out of the ground floor offices. The residential officer typically is someone who grew up in the neighborhood and usually tries not to make arrests. This helps engender trust. Arrests are made, but generally by other officers. Minstation police mentor youth, organize sports teams, make visits to schools and residences along with advocates to focus on the needs of specific youth, and are trained by Centro staff and the Puerto Rico Police Academy.

Advocates and police practice problem-oriented policing. For example, when the minstation began and mistrust of police by the community was high, a complaint was made by a family in the neighborhood about a dead cow that was in their yard. Both the City Sanitation Department and the Health Department refused to take away the cow. Finally, the residential koban officer and other koban police brought in a can of gasoline and cremated the cow. This made a great impact on the citizens, who increased their trust in and support of the police as a result of the experience.
Centro in San Juan was begun in the late 1980s. It secured local funds to build the police ministation. The following year, the Eisenhower Foundation subgranted funds from the U.S. Justice Department to Centro and arranged for local matches. Three years of funding were secured. The Justice Department funds were used mainly for the salaries of civilian advocates and their supervisors, and to develop a training curriculum for police at the Puerto Rico Police Academy. Some of those trained then were assigned residential or nonresidential duty at the Centro ministation, and then salaries and benefits were counted as local matches. We measured for serious crime; FBI-defined "Index crime," consisting of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft. Over 4 years (starting when the police ministation was built), serious crime declined by 26 percent in the immediate Centro neighborhood, increased by 3 percent in the surrounding police precinct and declined 11 percent in the city of San Juan as a whole.

Part of the precinct-level increase may have been due to a police crackdown on drug dealers in central San Juan at the time. Some dealers may have relocated to distant Caimito with its steep rugged hills and narrow twisting valleys. It is easier to hide there. If this interpretation has some merit, then the data suggested that, an exodus to Caimito notwithstanding, the police, intercessors and community had some success in keeping dealer-related crime out of the immediate Centro neighborhood of Caimito.

For statistical analysis, the data from San Juan were combined with data from three similar community-police programs (in Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia.) For the aggregate, the reduction in the target neighborhood was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precinct or the city as a whole.

We attributed the success not only to the comprehensive interdependent mix of program solutions, but also to excellent management by an intelligent, no-nonsense, tough, charismatic, caring, politically savvy, problem-solving nun, who assembled a committed, loyal, competent and flexible staff. The director had the skill both to exercise power through personal relationships and to create sound organizational, time, financial and personnel management on a day-to-day basis.

In 1999, the founder of Centro, Sister Isolina Ferre, received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Clinton.

The Dorchester Youth Collaborative

The Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) was established in the late 1970s, in Field's Corner, Dorchester, a low-income, rapidly-changing Boston neighborhood. Today, Field's Corner is racially and ethnically mixed, with large Hispanic, African-American, Asian-American (Vietnamese and Cambodian) and white populations. An extended family safe haven and sanctuary after school and in the summers, DYC provides nontraditional services, activities and advocacy for local youth deemed to be at high risk of delinquency, teen pregnancy, school failure and substance abuse. DYC fills an important prevention gap in Dorchester, between programs for youth who will make it anyway and youth who are deep into the juvenile justice system.

In the early 1990s, the Eisenhower Foundation subgranted 3 years of funds from the Justice Department and matched them against local resources to create an initiative that
combined the civilian counseling, advocacy and prevention that DYC had developed in the 1980s with new roles for police.

Civilian prevention and youth development was led by a full-time, paid Neighborhood Services Coordinator, who also served as counselor for "near-peers." This staffer was an adult, but the near-peers he supervised were younger adults who worked for pay part-time, a minimum of three days per week. These near-peers served as role models for the youth in the program. The near-peers were teenagers 2 to 6 years older than the targeted youth who had already successfully resolved many of the crises that the target youth faced, such as recruitment from gangs and from drug dealers. In groups and one-on-one, the near-peers interacted with youth in positive ways and monitored their behavior. The near-peer concept had been employed by DYC for a number of years, and the new initiative simply extended past operations by adding more.

In addition to help with homework and sporting activities, the priority at DYC was "prevention clubs," which provided structured activity around areas of interest identified by youth. For example, three clubs -- the Center for Urban Expressions (CUE), Extreme Close Up and the Public Speaking Club -- developed youth as actors in local productions, presenters in public service announcements and on commercials, hosts of community service television and radio talk shows, stars of community service videos marketed through Blockbuster Video and KMart, and as the stars of a Hollywood-financed motion picture titled *Squeeze*. There are a number of community-based programs around the nation which are creating such media productions, in which youth communicate to peers as well as to adults, but none has the cutting edge status of the DYC ventures, in our experience. There is a great need for a comprehensive, grassroots national media strategy that communicates to the public that we do know what works. (See: Communicating What Works and Creating Will To Act.) The DYC model is integral to the development of such a national media strategy, in our view. The model is both a program intervention that develops youth and a grassroots venue for communicating what works.

The Clubs served as magnets to draw kids into group and individual relationships with DYC adult staff, nearpeers, and, as we shall see, the police. The relationships allowed youth to deal with personal problems on a day-to-day and sometimes crisis basis, and also to develop individual skills. Some of the skills had considerable glamour attached to them, like becoming successful actors and public speakers. There also were jobs for youth who could not achieve "star" status in glamorous roles. For example, these were jobs in scheduling events, producing the art work that was the backdrop for performance videos and live performances, and setting up stage sets. Such skill building was designed to increase the confidence of program youth. The work skills also were displayed to adults in the community through the performances. As a result, skill building served to increase understanding by adults in the community of the youth, and to reduce the fear the adults had in the youngsters.

DYC staff also concentrated heavily on problem-solving skills. Such skills included resolving conflicts and expressing feelings through words rather than acting them out through, for example, violence. Adult staff and near-peers sought to reduce episodes in which youth would "tear down" each other. Such behavior was particularly common among younger kids who began at DYC and who really didn't know how to fight fairly. Their behavior often was a natural result of the trauma and desensitization they
experienced by being exposed to violence. By contrast, older youth had successfully graduated to making jokes about each other, but not doing it in a negative, "tearing down" way. The older youth could laugh at themselves without becoming defensive or self-defeating. They expressed themselves through love rather than disregard.

In turn, such skill building was related by DYC staff to pre-employment training, employment training and placement. Over the summers, about two-thirds of the targeted youth were placed in summer youth employment programs, coordinated by the City of Boston, a community development corporation and private-sector businesses. During the summer, DYC also functioned like a camp, operating from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. The scheduled activities included pool, bowling, art, Afrocentric and multicultural education, basketball, swimming, breakfast and lunch.

Police then were brought into the process of outreach, counseling, mentoring, and skill development. This was a radical innovation for Field's Corner, because in the past, police had always been viewed as the enemy. Two young African-American officers became, in effect, paid, part time adult staffers and near-peers, making regular visits to the safe haven three times a week. Initially, there was a considerable degree of mistrust by the youth of the police, and vice versa. Yet bonds formed, and the officers ended up counseling youth on personal matters and receiving calls from the young people during off hours. Often relationships became deeper as a result of crises, as when a local teenager was killed and the DYC youth and officers sat down to discuss their feelings.

Nationally, the NBC Today show covered the program in 1994, and the President and Attorney General featured it that same year in a Washington, DC rally at the Justice Department for the Crime Bill. One youth, Eddie Kutanda, was asked to speak:

*I'd like to thank President Clinton and Attorney General Reno for being here. I'd like to introduce community police officers Harold White and Tony Platt. And I'd like to introduce two friends of mine, Tyrone Burton and Fung Du Ung. They're in my acting group, Extreme Close Up, at the Dorchester Youth Collaborative. We do writing and acting. Back in the days, I used to hate the police...Harold and Tony have changed all that."

The one-on-one and group counseling of youth was complemented by community-based foot patrols in Fields Corner and joint DYC-police planning and neighborhood outreach to businesses and community organizations.

Over the 4 years of Eisenhower evaluation serious (FBI Index) crime declined by 27 percent in the target Field's Corner neighborhood and 20 percent in the surrounding precinct, compared to only 11 percent for the city of Boston as a whole. For statistical analysis, the data from Boston were combined with data from three similar community-police programs (in San Juan, Chicago and Philadelphia). For the aggregate, the reduction in the target neighborhood was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precinct or the city as a whole.

Throughout the program, there were regular planning and management oversight meetings between DYC staff and the Boston police. We concluded that this consistent attention and dialogue was a major factor in the program's success. The safe havens represented by DYC -- and Centro Sister Isolina Ferre -- are the kind of settings

**Koban, Inc.**

Koban, Inc. in Columbia, SC evolved from an Eisenhower Foundation-sponsored trip to Japan by the Columbia police chief in the mid-1990s. The chief observed Japanese-style police ministations, called "kobans." When he returned home, the chief combined the Japanese notion of "koban" with the American concept of a youth safe haven after school. A safe haven-ministration was opened in Gonzales Gardens, a public housing development in Columbia, as part of Eisenhower Foundation national replications funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Columbia replication originally was run via the Columbia affiliate of a national nonprofit organization. Later, a separate local nonprofit organization, Koban, Inc., was created to expand the work.

Core activities for youth at the safe haven-ministration were mentoring, after-school tutoring, and recreational activities that provided educational and skill development opportunities. The activities were provided on a daily basis in a structured environment that included a strict schedule and a standard code of behavior that youth were aware of and observed.

The replication had a dramatic effect on police Index crime reporting. The Eisenhower Foundation evaluation anticipated that reported crime first would increase, as people in the community started to trust police more. Then we anticipated a reported crime drop, as the program took hold. As expected, the year after the safe haven ministation opened, Index crime reported to the police was more than double the average number in the previous 3 years. Then, starting in 1996, the year after the safe haven-ministration opened, reports steadily decreased, even while increasing at the precinct level -- again, as anticipated. Police, residents and crime reports also agreed that there was a dramatic decrease in drug use. From 1995, when the safe haven-ministration opened, to 1998, police reported a 61 percent reduction in drug crimes.

The safe haven-ministration program in Columbia has evolved, and continues to this day. In each location where it was placed, the crime dropped and young people found a welcoming and safe place to study.

The formation of Koban, Inc. and the expansion of the program to more sites are two factors that helped program staff secure significant resources for the continuation and expansion of the program. The program at Gonzales Gardens served as a model to the other sites.

In an article in *Marketplace*, a publication of the Federal Reserve system, much of the success of Koban, Inc. was attributed to the Columbia, SC police chief:

*Columbia Police Chief Charles Austin, a minister and "modern day saint" ... views KOBAN as "more than a crime tool." Austin believes the KOBANs provide community residents "a place to turn for a variety of resources outside traditional law enforcement concerns." This requires that all directors possess the "essentials" according to Austin: a strong value system, a caring spirit, patience, and kindness in dealing with diversity. His
belief in the program is evidenced by his embodiment of all these same traits and his extensive personal involvement; he also serves as the co-Chair of the Eisenhower Foundation Trustee Board and as Chair of the KOBAN Committee. The decrease in Columbia's crime rate has been largely attributed to Austin's leadership.

Austin remains "cautiously optimistic" when it comes to statistics, but is "most encouraged by the improvement of the overall quality of life in the KOBAN communities."

To ... Austin, it's more about souls than statistics... It is the "good feeling impact" that Austin says has the power to outweigh the tangible measurements. He modestly describes himself as "a servant, who feels blessed to have been chosen," and feels it is his obligation to do the best he can do.

Local Affiliates of National Nonprofit Organizations

Notable recent youth development successes among national nonprofit organizations which implement via their local affiliates include the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the Quantum Opportunities Program and Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America.

Boys and Girls Clubs of America in Public Housing

A Columbia University comparison group evaluation of Boys and Girls Clubs in public housing projects serving youth around the nation found that projects containing a Boys and Girls Club had crime rates 13 percent lower than projects without a Club. Prevalence of drug activity was 22 percent lower in projects with a Club, the evaluation found, while crack presence was 25 percent lower. "The influence of Boys and Girls Clubs is manifest in (youth) involvement in healthy and constructive educational, social and recreational activities," the evaluation concluded. "Relative to their counterparts who do not have access to a Club, these youth are less involved in unhealthy, deviant and dangerous activities."

The Quantum Opportunities Program

Funded by the Ford Foundation, the Quantum Opportunities Program initially involved 4 years worth of intervention (from 1989 to 1993), beginning with entry into high school. Program youth and control group youth were randomly assigned from families on welfare in poor neighborhoods and evaluated in 4 cities: Oklahoma City, OK; Philadelphia, PA; Saginaw, MI; and San Antonio, TX. The Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America implemented the 4 programs.

The year-round Quantum Opportunities initiative operated after regular school hours and during the summer. Program youth received a stipend for community service, money toward college, one-on-one adult mentoring and tutoring, computer skills training and life skills training. The stipends amounted to $1.33 for each hour of participation. For every 100 hours, program youth received $100 bonus payments and an amount equal to their total earnings, which accrued toward college or post-secondary training. The financial rewards became an incentive for students to continue in the program and welcome extra income for financially-strapped families. Over 4 years, students spent an average of
nearly 1,300 hours in program activities. The average cost per participant was $10,600 over 4 years, or about $2,650 per year.

By the end of the program, a Brandeis University evaluation found that 63 percent of the Quantum Opportunities Program participants graduated from high school, 42 percent were enrolled in a post-secondary program, 23 percent dropped out of school, 24 percent had children and 7 percent had arrest records. By contrast, of the control group, 42 percent finished high school, 16 percent went on to post-secondary schools, 50 percent dropped out, 38 percent had children and 13 percent had arrest records.

Importantly, we believe, the Brandeis evaluation concluded:

\[T\]he varying success of the programs in recruiting youngsters has more to do with the quality of the staff, the availability of an effective service concept, and mundane management considerations than the nature of poverty in the community, the characteristics of the children, the service design or other "external" variables.

For example, of the four sites, the most successful was Philadelphia. The difference between Philadelphia and the other sites could not be attributed to the program model, the characteristics of participants or the neighborhood setting. The distinguishing factor appeared to be greater by-in by the host organization in Philadelphia and greater staff commitment at all levels.

With Ford Foundation and Labor Department funds, Quantum Opportunities was then replicated in 5 new sites by the Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America. The results, while still positive, were not as great as with the original sites, and were strikingly different at some sites. In the mean time, the Eisenhower Foundation established Quantum programs in four locations (Columbia SC, Herndon VA, Dover NH and Portland OR).

In response to an article in Youth Today, which judged Quantum to be ‘The Best Youth Program You Cannot Afford.’, the Eisenhower Foundation convened a forum, with participants from each of the three rounds of implementation, including funders and evaluators. The results of this forum suggest that there are several basic steps that can be taken to insure the success of a Quantum program, among them being the dosage level, adherence to the model, and staff training. The success of the four Eisenhower sites, which have just graduated their associates, is testimony to the importance of the findings of the forum and the power of the Quantum Opportunities Program model. When compared to control groups from each location, the associates had significantly higher grades, graduation rates, standardized test scores and lower pregnancy rates and involvement with legal authorities.

**Big Brothers/Big Sisters**

Public/Private Ventures assessed the largest one-on-one mentoring program in the U.S., Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, which currently maintains through its chapters across the nation 75,000 active matches between a volunteer adult and a youngster. Public/Private Ventures undertook a control group evaluation of 959 10 to 16 year olds who applied to Big Brothers/Big Sisters in 1992 and 1993. Sixty percent were boys, and about half were racial minorities. Of the racial minorities, 70 percent were African-American. Almost all lived with one parent. Many were from low-income households.
They were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Pre-post measures were taken 18 months apart. Youth with volunteer mentors met with their mentors for an average of about 12 months. The meetings averaged about 3 times per month and each lasted about 4 hours.

Youth with mentors were 46 percent less likely than controls to initiate drug use and 27 percent less likely to initiate alcohol use during the study period. They were nearly one-third less likely to hit someone and skipped half as many days of school as control youth. They felt more competent about their ability to do well in school and received slightly higher grades by the end of the study. They reported more positive relationships with their friends and parents. These effects were sustained for both boys and girls and across all races.

The evaluation found that, on average, it took about 6 months for trust to develop between a mentor and a youth. In addition, compared to ineffective mentors, effective volunteer mentors were more likely to:

- Involve the youth in deciding how the pair would spend their time together.
- Make a commitment that was consistent and dependable.
- Recognize that for a time the relationship might be one sided and the youth might be silent and unresponsive.
- Pay attention to a youth's need for fun.
- Respect the youth's viewpoint.
- Seek and utilize paid program staff from Big Brothers/Big Sisters.

The evaluation found that, for the most part, effective mentoring relationships did not require same-gender or same-race matches between adults and youth.

The evaluation found that most volunteer mentors and youth cannot be simply matched and left to their own devices. They needed to draw on Big Brothers/Big Sisters paid staff and on the program's permanent infrastructure. In particular, the evaluation found that success required:

- Screening by paid staff to select adults most likely to be good mentors.
- Orientation and training of those screened as the best volunteers.
- Ongoing supervision, monitoring and support of volunteers by paid professional staff.

The mentors were volunteers. But the costs of this support from paid professional staff members who were part of the infrastructure of the organization averaged to about $1,000 per youth per year. The evaluators concluded that this $1,000 per youth was crucial for success.

The evaluation raises crucial issues about replication of success to scale. Public/Private Ventures observes, "By some estimates, there may be anywhere from 5 million to 15 million youth who could benefit from being matched with a mentor -- with about only one-third of a million mentors now in place." Given the limitations of volunteerism it is
legitimate to ask whether 5 to 15 million qualified volunteer mentors who may be needed actually will come forward and be trained. Given the cost of $1,000 per youth per year of effective one-on-one mentoring, will we be able to come up with the $5B to $15B per year that may be the price tag for screening, orientation, training, supervision, monitoring and support? Would alternative uses of such funding -- like the $6B to $7B needed to provide Head Start to all those who qualify, or an effective employment program for out-of-school youth -- be more cost-beneficial? (For more on the limits of volunteerism, see: What Doesn't Work?)

Whether or not volunteers are involved, there also needs to be much more evaluation of mentoring. For example, the comprehensive review for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in 1995 edited by James Howell in collaboration with the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and Developmental Research and Programs, Inc. reached these conclusions on other mentoring programs:

The evidence from the 10 available evaluations [4 with control groups and 6 with comparison groups] consistently indicates that noncontingent, supportive mentoring relationships do not have desired effects on outcomes such as academic achievement, school attendance, dropout, various aspects of child behavior including misconduct, or employment. This lack of demonstrated effect has occurred whether mentors were paid or unpaid and whether mentors were college undergraduates, community volunteers, members of the business community, or school personnel. However, when mentors used behavior management techniques in one small, short-term study, students' school attendance improved. This is consistent with the findings from studies of school behavior management interventions reported earlier. In another larger, longer term experimental evaluation by the same researchers, unspecified mentoring relationships significantly increased delinquency for youth with no prior offenses but significantly decreased recidivism for youth with prior offenses. However, more evaluations with randomized designs are needed to test these preliminary conclusions about mentoring.

The Quantum Opportunities Program, above, used mentoring, but only as part of a number of complementary interventions. Similarly, in the Eisenhower Foundation's evaluations of Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, Koban, Inc., and two other youth development-police partnerships (in Philadelphia and Chicago), we concluded that success was based on a complementary array of multiple solutions to multiple problems, including one-on-one and group counseling and mentoring of youth by paid civilians and police to provide social support and discipline, safe haven and police ministation settings, youth leadership and youth media enterprise, community-based education and remedial education, communityschool linkages, employment, sports as part of mentoring, and problem-oriented patrols by police and citizens.

The Eisenhower Foundation's findings did not lend support to the assertion that one-on-one mentoring by volunteers in non-safe haven settings necessarily is the most effective or cost-beneficial intervention for highrisk youth. When the greatest impacts occurred in our replications, paid civilian and paid police staff were more responsible than volunteers. Recruitment of qualified volunteers with time to give was difficult in the low income neighborhoods where the replications were carried out. When volunteers had an effect, they usually came from the immediate neighborhood, not from the middle-class
suburbs. To the extent that they were effective, volunteers were helped by the geographic base of the safe haven. In these replications, we do not believe that counseling by volunteers at just any location would have been as helpful as counseling at the safe haven (although excursions to outside events were part of the mix used by both paid staff and volunteers). See:

Publications.

In our replications, paid civilian youth counselors and mentors earned less than $30,000 per year. They mentored in one-on-one and group settings. By contrast, for Big Brother/Big Sister mentoring, the cost is about $1,000 per year to screen, train, orient and supervise one volunteer who mentors one youth for a few hours a month. Which approach generates a better cost-benefit ratio? The answer to this question is not entirely clear, in our experience.

The safe havens where counseling took place in our replications were not just hang-out rooms. For the most part, they were the headquarters of the grassroots nonprofit agencies that received the grants. These grants, and the publicity secured through the agreement of the police to work with the nonprofits as partners, helped the agencies to secure new grants and to build their institutional capacities. As institutions, they were financially empowered to represent impoverished constituencies better in a society where the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. (See The Millennium Breach.) In modest ways, the nonprofit organizations that were funded had more resources to address broader issues facing the United States. For example, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) Clubs promoted racial integration at a time when America is becoming more segregated, and DYC's youth media enterprises communicated what works to national audiences through Blockbuster Video and the motion picture, Squeeze. By contrast, initiatives that rely mostly on volunteerism usually do not build much institutional capacity in grassroots organizations.

If adequately funded, nonprofit youth development organizations can change the lives of individuals and also improve the community as a whole. For both individual and community change, the Centro Sister Isolina Ferre concept of the civilian intercessor, or advocate, appears more effective than the concept of a civilian mentor, based on the Eisenhower youth development-police replications. Advocates in San Juan mentor youth. But the advocates have roles beyond that. They are trained to mediate among all players, resolving conflicts, or potential conflicts, among youth, police and community. Perhaps most important, they are assertive change agents who address a wide range of issues affecting the community.

The Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) Clubs' notion of civilian near-peers also often appeared more effective than the concept of civilian adult mentors. DYC has found that the age of a youth counselor is important. High-risk youth tend to be more receptive to role models who are just a few years older, like nearpeers, than to grown adults. It can be easier for a risk-taking 15 year old youth in trouble to be influenced by a cool-but-responsible 18 year old than by a 45 year old banker or carryout manager.

Accordingly, while the excellent work of Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America must be respected, we believe that too much emphasis on civilian adult mentoring -- especially the volunteer variety -- can lose sight of concepts that can be more effective, like
advocates and near-peers. Future replications would do well to consider civilian staff members who integrate the roles of advocates, near-peers, counselors and mentors.

**Do Local Unaffiliated Nonprofits Perform Better Than Local Affiliates of National Nonprofits?**

In its evaluation of youth development programs, the Eisenhower Foundation has found more success with indigenous, unaffiliated nonprofit organizations than with local affiliates of national nonprofits. Evaluating 10 youth development replication programs over the decade of the nineties, the Foundation found the most successful were Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative and Koban, Inc. Two other replications also performed well, with both hosted by local affiliates of national nonprofits. Yet these host organizations began to dilute the original replication goals after Foundation funding ended. We also found that affiliates of national nonprofits sometimes could impede replications. In one city, the replication first operated out of a local affiliate, which restricted the executive director. After a new unaffiliated nonprofit organization was created, the replication was more creative and successful. In another city, a local affiliate of a national nonprofit originally committed to supply mentors. Later, it reneged on its commitment.

5/ Citations: This section is based on:


