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MISSION STATEMENT

THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION AND
THE CORPORATION FOR WHAT WORKS

Over twenty-five years ago, after the big city riots, the bipartisan President’s National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Riot Commission) concluded, “Our
nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white — separate and unequal.”

The following year, after the assassinations of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, the bipartisan President’s National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence (the National Violence Commission) concluded, “The great-
ness and durability of most civilizations has been finally determined by how they have
responded to challenges from within. Ours will be no exception.”

Since those commissions, the divide between rich and poor has become greater in the
United States and the challenges from within more formidable.

The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation is the private sector continuation of the commis-
sions. It is a nonendowed, nonprofit operating foundation and national intermediary or-
organization.

The Foundation keeps the spirit of the commissions alive. It replicates scientifically
evaluated, multiple solution successes for children, youth, families and the inner city. The
Foundation builds the management, fundraising and staff capacities of the private, non-
profit organizations that carry out so much of what works. And it communicates what
works to citizens, the media and decision makers.

Just as the commissions proposed a national policy of public and private partnerships,
so the Foundation comes together with other institutions to help repair the racial and class
breaches in America, extend family into community, create the full employment job train-
ing and work placement strategy that has disappeared from much of the national debate
in the U.S., encourage private sector initiative at the grassroots and articulate a progres-
ssive role for government. The Foundation is one of the founding members of the National
African American Male Collaboration, the Cultural Environmental Movement, the
Communicating What Works Movement and the National Criminal Justice Commission.
Its initiatives typically match resources between the great foundations — like the W.K.
Kellogg Foundation, Annie E. Casey Foundation, DeWitt Wallace-Reader’s Digest Fund,
Ford Foundation, W.T. Grant Foundation and Center for Global Partnership — and pub-
lic funders — like the U.S. Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Labor,
Health and Human Services and Justice.
**ON THIS REPORT**

The Eisenhower Foundation’s agenda was to observe the Japanese system and bring ideas back to their own communities.

*Wall Street Journal*
January 11, 1989

The Eisenhower Foundation...found that Japan’s community policing techniques work in the United States.

*New York Times*
July 31, 1995

We hope to redirect the youths...and make outstanding citizens of them. If we can do this...the model can be taken to other places.

*Officer Mona Lynch*
Washington, DC Metropolitan Police
Washington Post
December 22, 1994

[Ministation safe havens] can promote economic development and help generate jobs for high risk young people in South Bronx and South Central Los Angeles. *And they’re pretty cheap, aren’t they, relatively speaking? Yes relative to what Americans have done in the past.*

*CBS This Morning*
Interview with Lynn A. Curtis
August 15, 1995

I learned from Eddie Kutanda [of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative] in Boston on my last trip as we discussed the crime bill and anti-crime initiatives.

*Attorney General Janet Reno*
(with President Clinton)
Crime Bill Rally, 1994
Washington, DC

The [Washington, DC koban] is staffed by police officers and several social workers. Together they work to solve drug and domestic problems in the complex while tutoring students and taking neighborhood kids on outings such as Georgetown University basketball games.

*Washington Times*
January 30, 1995

People drop by very casually to the [Philadelphia] koban. After all, it is run by both police and citizens.

*Mainichi Shimbun (Japan)*
February 19, 1994

Although this type of initiative may not be welcomed with open arms by policing traditionalists, an analysis of the end results would surely justify this type of interaction in other cities.

*Field’s Corner Police Commander*
Boston

Volunteering is really good, but people need to have a program to volunteer for, and in order to do that, you have to have dollars.

*Kelly Poljak*
Director of Programs
Campus Boulevard Corporation
North Philadelphia
*New York Times*
April 27, 1997

What people want is something that works. They want to celebrate American successes and American efforts.

*Haynes Johnson*
*Divided We Fall, 1994*
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND ACTION
BY GOVERNMENT AND FOUNDATIONS

1. Adequately funded youth safe havens integrated with police stations that share the same space and that provide multiple solutions to multiple problems should be legislated at federal and local levels. They should be replicated much more widely—with, for example, federal funding from the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Justice and Health and Human Services. Special incentives should be provided to innovative police chiefs.

2. Police and youth development leaders who already have replicated successful youth safehaven/police stations should become national trainers who train their counterparts in new replications across the nation. The training should be funded by a public-private partnership.

3. In unsafe inner city neighborhoods, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services should create job training centers for out-of-school-youth and welfare-to-work that are integrated into safe haven/police stations at the same locations.

4. Legislators and the federal Department of Education should allow the Drug Free Schools and Safe Communities program to incorporate the models in Youth Investment and Police Mentoring.

5. The White House and the National Office of Drug Control Policy should create a new generation of public service and commercial messages based on the “bubble up” grass-roots model of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative’s youth media enterprise, not based on message by traditional, national organizations. Local youth leaders should create and act in the messages.

6. The private foundation community should speak out on the limits of “volunteerism,” “self-sufficiency” and “mentoring.” Foundations should finance more evaluations of the cost-benefits of paid staff (civilian and police) versus unpaid volunteers in youth development, employment training, community development and crime prevention programs. The cost-benefits of “mentors” versus “advocates” (as in San Juan) versus “near peers” (as in Boston) should be evaluated.
7. The private foundation community should finance more evaluations of the cost-benefits of one-on-one “volunteer” mentoring (which has been estimated to actually cost perhaps as much as $5B to $15B per year nationally) versus more proven investments in children and youth (like HeadStart preschool, which will cost about $7B more per year nationally to serve all eligible poor children).

8. Private foundations should facilitate a “small is effective” funding process in which private and public funders invest at least as much in unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations as in more powerful national organizations, which have more ability to lobby for their affiliates.

9. The private foundation community should educate both the public and private sectors that many well conceived and well implemented programs in the private and public sectors work — when they are adequately funded over long enough time.

10. The private foundation community should finance a Communicating What Works movement that makes clear to the average citizen and to decision makers that we know a great deal about what works — and what doesn’t. The need is to replicate what works to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem and to remove the impediments that currently prevent adequate replication from occurring (like the impact of big money on legislation).
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Joy G. Dryfoos

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Youth Investment and Police Mentoring was written by Lynn A. Curtis, President of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation and the Corporation for What Works.

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The manuscript was prepared by Pam J. Green, edited by Cynthia F. Young, and printed by ImaTek.

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At the U.S. Department of Justice, we wish to thank Kathleen Kennedy Townsend (now Lieutenant Governor of Maryland), Laurie Robinson, Sheldon C. Bileck, Nancy E. Gist, and Robert Brown.

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American police departments assigned commanders and officers as in-kind match for most of these replications. The police were crucial for the success we have documented. The Foundation wishes to deeply thank the Chiefs of Police and Superintendents in Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and San Juan.

Soji Teramura shepherded the program over many years, provided leadership, arranged events as the initiative developed, wrote excellent news articles and secured considerable funding. Our appreciation is extended to him.

Isamu Nitta, the National Police Agency of Japan and the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. kindly and wisely sponsored and guided this work as it related to Japanese concepts, especially in the early years as delegations to Japan were planned and carried out.

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Douglas E. Rake orchestrated the delegations, raised the Japan-side funds and provided inspiration with his Public Broadcasting System documentary, Forces of Order, on Japanese policing. David H. Bayley
wrote the book, of the same name, on which the documentary was based, and provided helpful input during our early work.

Elliott L. Richardson, Delwin A. Roy, Kazuo Kumagai, Kazuo Nukazawa, Takeshi Kobayashi and Jun Wada were especially helpful and supportive.

Baltimore Police Commissioner Thomas C. Frazier and Columbia, SC Police Chief Charles P. Austin, Sr. provided crucial guidance and leadership, and were responsible for significant funds raised.

Vesta Kimble directed the original replications. Eddie W. Banks is directing the new generation of replications reported in Section 9, which is being evaluated by David M. Chavis.

Bobby W. Austin and Marilyn Melkonian facilitated funding for the new generation of work, allowed for flexibility of implementation and provided excellent models to emulate. Some of this new work is being done as part of the National African American Male Collaboration.

The front cover of the report shows Officer Charles Nellums of the Little Rock Police Department with Jennifer Purifoy and Keith Williams.

While in keeping with the mission and policy positions of the Eisenhower Foundation, the views in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the positions of funders.
Foreword

Elliott Currie
and
Joy G. Dryfoos
Youth Development and Police Mentoring is a welcome addition to practical, evaluation and management based policy analysis on what works to develop youth and prevent crime in America's cities. The report confirms that development and prevention, when they are done right, can indeed work — and that we have alternatives to ever-harsher sentences and the heedless construction of more and more prisons. The programs described in this report demonstrate, in particular, that linking innovative, community-oriented policing with consistent efforts to reach out to vulnerable youth can bring substantial dividends — even on very modest budgets and in the face of harsh and deteriorating social environments.

But even more importantly, the report teaches us some crucial lessons about the ingredients of success — about what makes development and prevention programs effective, and what may doom them to failure. These lessons are especially important now, because we are increasingly hearing a mixed and often confusing message from government about how to deal with youth and crime. On the one hand, youth development and crime prevention seem, at least rhetorically, to be back on the national agenda. There is much talk of "investing" in children and youth, and a growing recognition that simply pouring more and more resources into incarceration hasn't had the positive effects that some naively expected.

But the emerging rhetoric hasn't been backed by a commitment of resources on anything like the scale that is required. We say we want to invest in youth — but also that we want to shrink government; we say we need effective social programs, but also that we want them to be run on a shoestring and staffed by unpaid volunteers. The Foundation's report, based not on rhetoric but on years of concrete experience on the streets of some of our most impoverished communities, suggests that this approach is likely to be self-defeating.

These programs often worked well — sometimes astonishingly well — despite meager and uncertain funding. But they could not have worked without the paid staff that public funding made possible, and their impact seems to have been significantly weakened when federal funding was cut back. And it is even more clear that expanding and replicating these and other successful programs to match the need cannot even begin to happen without a stable commitment from the public sector.

The basic lesson is simple and unavoidable: development and prevention can work, but only if we take them seriously enough to provide the resources necessary to get the job done. If this report helps to get that lesson across to Congress and the White House, it will have done its own job very well indeed.

Youth Investment and Police Mentoring represents a significant marriage of art and science. In theory, art builds on human ingenuity, that unanalyzable creative power that gives light, color, substance, to our activities. Art carries an almost mystical aura. Science is defined as the systemization of knowledge attained through careful study and observation. Science is objective and impersonal.

We have always had youth development programs, even though we called them other names (like prevention, at-risk...even schools) but they have largely been designed as works of art, loaded with ingenuity, but serendipitous, lacking strong theory, and certainly not backed up by strong evidence that they would succeed. What the Eisenhower Foundation has done here is to introduce science into the art of youth development.
In an intrepid experiment, a number of youth development agencies were able to implement comprehensive programs that included the participation of the police. These efforts were tracked over time, and solid data produced to show that they made a difference in crime rates. Now we have substantial proof that having trained sympathetic police persons on the premises can clearly add significant dimensions to youth development programs.

How do we take this science and use it to stimulate action across the country? How do we convince the decision-makers to invest in effective programs rather than ineffective ones? Based on the dollar estimates in this report ($100,000 for starters), think how far the funds from the Drug Free Schools and Safe Communities program could go toward helping community agencies and schools to add police mentors to their staffs.

Currently, Drug Free Schools gives states almost $600 million to pass on to localities. A big piece of that goes to support DARE, the police run classroom-based drug prevention program. DARE is definitely more art than science; repeated evaluations have shown that the program does not result in lower substance use rates. Students do, however, enjoy meeting the police, and would benefit from entering into more meaningful relationships with them, following some of the ideas used in the programs documented here. From what I have observed visiting Eisenhower programs, the police selected for this duty benefit as well and appreciate the opportunity to provide support services in partnerships with other youth workers.

This publication should encourage policy makers to rely on scientific evidence for program planning in the emerging field of youth development. The critical need among our youth for support and the fierce struggle for resources dictate the most rational and informed decisions possible.
1. Executive Summary
Youth Investment and Police Mentoring reports on 10 years of Eisenhower Foundation programming, evaluation and analysis directed at policy for the truly disadvantaged and the inner city — beginning with a delegation to Japan of American police chiefs and community leaders in the late 1980s. Over this time, the Foundation has raised almost $10M in grants and local matches for the work reported here and related work, past and ongoing.

As the quotes that preface the report suggest, the ideas in Youth Investment and Police Mentoring have been recognized by media across the political spectrum and by street level, federal and international observers.

The report provides new evidence that unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations in partnership with innovative police chiefs, commanders and line officers can replicate the principles underlying successful models. In 4 cities — San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago — a quasi-experimental evaluation design showed serious crime to decline by at least 22 percent and by as much as 27 percent over a minimum of 3 years. Across the 4 cities, the decline in the 4 target neighborhoods where the police-community partnerships were replicated was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or their cities as a whole. Figure 1 shows some of these findings. In a fifth city, Baltimore, a quasi-experimental design showed that program youth had less high risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than comparison youth over 18 months. The differences were statistically significant.

Success was attributable to multiple solutions to multiple problems, solutions that complemented one another in different combinations in different programs. The solutions included safe havens off the street for youth; residential and nonresidential police ministrations, called “kobans” in Japan; counseling of youth by

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**FIGURE 1**

DECLINES IN SERIOUS CRIME IN PROGRAM TARGET NEIGHBORHOODS AND THEIR CITIES, EARLY 1990s

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<th>City</th>
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<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
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<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>-15</td>
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<td>Boston</td>
<td>-20</td>
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<td>Chicago</td>
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**Legend:**
- ■ DECLINE IN SERIOUS CRIME IN PROGRAM TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD
- ■ DECLINE IN SERIOUS CRIME IN CITY

Serious crime = Total of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft as reported to police.

Source: Tables 3, 6, 8 and 10
paid civilian staff, "advocates," "near-peers" and mentors; counseling and mentoring of youth by police; community-based education and remedial education; community organization outreach to schools; youth leadership programs and youth media enterprise; sports as a means of youth development; employment training and placement; joint police-community patrols that sometimes included visits to homes of families in the neighborhood; and problem-oriented policing. We have used the term "community equity policing" to describe how police and nonprofit youth development organizations in these initiatives created a more balanced partnership than in many other such partnerships attempted elsewhere in the past.

Our findings suggest that paid civilian staff and police were more effective with youth than volunteers. It remains to be proven whether one-on-one work with youth is more effective than group work, or some combination. It also remains to be proven whether work with youth by adults is more effective outside of safe haven settings than inside such settings, which have reinforcing interventions. We concluded that the distinction between adult mentors and adult counselors remains unclear in the youth development field and that other concepts may be more cost-beneficial to implement. For example, in the Boston program, "near peers" were very effective. These were counselors just a few years older than program youth. In San Juan, the concept of the "intressor," or "advocate," appeared more effective than the concept of a mentor. Advocates in San Juan mentor youth. But the advocates have roles beyond that. They are trained to mediate among all players — resolving conflicts, or potential conflicts, among youth, police and community. Perhaps most important, they are assertive change agents who address a wide range of issues affecting the community.

Overall, then, our findings cautioned against excessive policy reliance on one-on-one volunteer adult mentoring of youth in non-safe haven settings.

**FIGURE 2**

CHANGES IN SERIOUS CRIME IN PROGRAM TARGET NEIGHBORHOODS —
WITH HIGHER AND LOWER LEVELS OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING, 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>San Juan</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Change in Serious Crime</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN JUAN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHILADELPHIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOSTON</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHICAGO</td>
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**CHANGE IN SERIOUS CRIME FROM YEAR 1 TO YEAR 2 IN THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING TOTALED BETWEEN $180,000 AND $190,000 OVER THESE 2 YEARS. (SAN JUAN INVOLVED AN EXTRA YEAR – SEE APPENDIX 1.)**

**CHANGE IN SERIOUS CRIME FROM YEAR 2 TO YEAR 3 IN THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING TOTALED BETWEEN $37,000 AND $51,000 IN YEAR 3.**

Serious crime = Total of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft as reported by police.

Source: Tables 1, 3, 6, 8, and 10
The report provides evidence that well conceived and well replicated programs work when they are adequately funded. In San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, the programs were more or less fully funded for their first 2 years of operations. Serious crime dropped by an average of 18 percent from Year 1 to Year 2. In the third year, the funder, the U.S. Department of Justice, made sharp cuts, because Department funds needed to be diverted from community crime prevention to other priorities that year. Paid staff members were cut to the bone, and more reliance had to be placed on volunteers. As a result, from Year 2 to Year 3, serious crime dropped by an average of just 3 percent. Figure 2 summarizes these findings, which were statistically significant.

The present volume provides the principal findings and lessons learned from our evaluations. We believe that those findings and lessons have implications for national and local policy for innovative policing, youth development, crime prevention, drug prevention, community development and economic development. The full, final report, published separately under the same title, has more details on the replications. The full report also integrates the findings and lessons into the literature on what works, and what doesn’t, for the truly disadvantaged in America’s inner cities.
2. Youth Investment, Police, Kobans and Safe Havens
Our work began with a look at Japanese police ministations — called “kobans” — in the late 1980s. There are about 1,200 kobans in Tokyo alone.

For the most part, one officer stays at the ministation. A partner undertakes foot patrol, or uses a standard white frame police bicycle. There is some problem-oriented policing. The territory patrolled ranges from a few blocks to a few square miles, depending on the population. The officer on foot patrol is treated like a friend and neighbor. This is reflected in the respectful term that Japanese use for police officers — OH-mawari-san, or Honorable Mr. Walking Around.

Every home, apartment building and business is known to Mr. Walking Around. This is crucial — because Japanese cities usually do not have street names or house numbers that proceed in any logical sequence. Unless a person knows the neighborhood, it often is necessary to find a specific building by inquiring at the nearest kaban.

Kobans serve other functions as well. They are the local lost and founds. Umbrellas are lent out by police. Officers pass the word to neighborhood residents when someone is ill, has a baby or is admitted to a prestigious college.

Most such ministations are non-residential. However, there also are residential kobans — at the outskirts of big cities and in rural areas. A police officer lives above the ministation with his wife and children. During the first day of his assignment, the officer typically will walk door-to-door with his wife. He introduces himself and his wife. They invite residents over to their house for tea. The wife acts as an assistant to the police officer and receives a stipend from the National Police Agency. Typically, the officer and his wife know each of the families in the patrol area by name. This can mean 300 or more families.

To American ideas of community-based and problem-oriented policing, then, Japanese kobans add the notion of highly accessible physical locations from which police operate. Residential or nonresidential, the kobans provide security anchors for their neighborhoods. Kobans are within a 10 minute walk of most residents in a neighborhood.

Several times each year, kaban officers make home visits to each residence in the patrol area. The officer sits with the homeowner and inquires about experiences that are related to crime. Police give tips on crime prevention. They keep detailed records on each household and everyone in it.

Japanese police also mentor neighborhood youth in a variety of ways. Probably the most popular is the teaching of martial arts. Such teaching is not done out of the kobans — which are too small. Rather, it is undertaken at district police stations — which are about the same size as typical American precinct stations. Japanese police believe that martial arts instill self-control and improve self-esteem among young people.

The Japanese police officers who undertake this work are far better trained than in the United States. For example, American police typically are trained for 5-8 months before they begin work. In Japan, police cadets with college degrees (and there are many) are trained for about 12 months. Cadets with high school diplomas are trained for about 18 months. This training is accompanied by a more enriched experience compared to American police. For example, Japanese police are taught English and become computer-literate. Training academy courses include tea ceremony and flower arrangement. When American police chiefs see such courses they often are amused — initially. However, Japanese police supervisors then explain to the Americans that the courses instill a respect for Japanese culture. The Japanese believe that officers on patrol should understand the values of the residents in their neighborhoods. Often, this explanation then motivates American police chiefs to better sensitize cadets at academies back home to the cultures of the different ethnic and racial groups that live within any given neighborhood beat.

While Japan’s famous post-war “miracle” usually is defined in economic terms, there also has been a
social miracle in Japan. The Japanese have built a relatively free and most prosperous society which has crime rates far lower than what western nations have come to accept. For example, Tokyo has 20 times the population of Washington, DC but about half as many homicides each year. Japan also has far fewer rapes and robberies per capita — and far fewer police officers, judges and jails.

These differences can be explained in a variety of ways. Japan has a more egalitarian economic structure than the United States — with, for example, the highest income bracket paying about 50 percent in income taxes in Japan compared to about 28 percent in the United States. Japan also has a national commitment to full employment, which is not shared in America — particularly for the truly disadvantaged and structurally unemployed. Japan has strict gun control — imposed by General MacArthur after World War II. There is a traditional respect for authority in Japan, and a widespread sense there that every person has a stake in social harmony. Americans are more likely to question authority and pursue individualism. The koban system and related innovations like home visits also may help explain some of the tremendous disparities in crime between Japan and the United States, in our view.

THE 1988 DELEGATION TO JAPAN

Intrigued, the Eisenhower Foundation has, over the last decade, evaluated how some of the principles underlying the Japanese experience might be merged with American problem-oriented policing and youth development. The Foundation took a number of delegations of American police chiefs, police supervisors and inner-city community leaders to Japan. There, they observed Japanese methods under the sponsorship of the National Police Agency of Japan. When the Americans returned home, the Eisenhower Foundation worked with the youth development organizations and police departments that were on the delegations to replicate Japanese principles and integrate them with home-grown successes indigenous to American communities. This report documents the successes of several cities which were represented on the first Eisenhower delegation to Japan, in 1988.

Thirteen major American cities participated in that delegation. In most cases, decisions on which cities to invite were based on the Foundation locating a nonprofit, community-based, youth development organization that might run a replication in a low income, high crime, neighborhood and a city police department that had the potential to partner with the neighborhood organization in the planning and replication of community/police, Japan/American hybrids.

The 13 cities selected were: Albuquerque, NM; Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Newark, NJ; New York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; San Juan, P.R.; Washington, DC and Wilmington, DE. The delegation to Japan included 6 police chiefs or commissioners, 10 midlevel police commanders, and 7 leaders from community-based, inner-city youth development organizations. We did not have enough funds to include youth development leaders from all cities. In later delegations, we took to Japan the Chicago, IL Police Superintendent; a second Baltimore, MD, Police Commissioner; a second Newark, NJ Police Chief; the police chiefs or directors of Columbia, SC, Des Moines, IA, Honolulu, HI, Little Rock, AR, Memphis, TN, and Phoenix, AZ; and youth development leaders from some of these cities.

After an initial briefing, the delegation was shown examples of police training, early intervention with youth, and koban-based community policing in Tokyo and Osaka. Here are excerpts on what they saw, from an article on the delegation in the New York and Asian editions of the Wall Street Journal:*

*See Reubenfien (1989a) and Reubenfien (1989b).
The Eisenhower Foundation’s agenda was to observe the Japanese system and bring ideas back to their own communities.

In Japan, local police have a close and extensive relationship with community residents. The relationship is fostered by a network of police outposts called kobans, one or two-room offices located in each neighborhood.

The visiting Americans tagged along with the koban police. They watched their Japanese counterparts give people directions, answer mundane requests and make regular visits to residents’ homes to update details on their households — a kind of intrusion many Americans might reject. And they observed that Japanese streets feel safe — partly because the police are so heavily involved in the community.

Often, retired Japanese businessmen volunteer as non-police probation officers, and parents rotate helping the police in sports events for children...

In Japan, drugs and poverty aren’t yet a huge problem, handguns are illegal and police are well-trained and adequately staffed. As a result, Japanese police spend much of their time dealing with incidents that their American counterparts have no time for.

In Japan, two years of police training reinforce a single set of common values. Police are taught not only self-defense, but such cultural skills as tea ceremony and flower arrangement....

THE NEED FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Why were police joined by inner-city youth development organization community leaders on the delegation? In Japan, the community usually trusts the police. In American inner cities, there often is mistrust. Accordingly, the Foundation decided, from the beginning, that variations on Japanese themes probably could be best replicated back home through a collaboration between police and indigenous youth development organizations that were trusted in the community.

In addition, the community groups had experience back home with the principles underlying the other elements which we sought to replicate — like counseling and safe havens where youngsters come after school.

The Foundation hoped that, if youth, community and police leaders could spend time together in Japan, and perhaps get to better appreciate one another, the youth groups conceivably could enhance their effectiveness through police support. The police, we thought, might create more impact in tough neighborhoods by working on a truly equal basis with civilians, and not just by asking for citizen support of police-run programs.

A debriefing was held in Tokyo at the end of the delegation. Delegates with an interest in follow-up back home were encouraged to draft workplans for how the youth development organizations and police might partner in replicating hybrids of Japanese and American successes. The planning was “bubble up” and process oriented. The Eisenhower Foundation did not impose rigid guidelines, but did help guide the process.

After a few months, a national cluster workshop was held in Washington, DC with all delegates. The workshop further developed workplans based on what police and the community groups were prepared to do together.
Most cities eventually carried out replications inspired in part by what was observed in Japan, and then combined with American concepts. Some did it on their own, with minimal involvement of the Eisenhower Foundation. But the Foundation also was committed to raising money for replicating hybrids of Japanese principles and American models, raising funds for technical assistance and evaluation, providing that technical assistance, and evaluating the outcomes over 2 to 3 years of implementation (the minimal length of time which past evaluations by the Eisenhower Foundation usually have found to be necessary to show success).

The following pages report on the evaluations in 5 of the initial delegation cities where such funding, technical assistance and evaluation was possible — San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and Baltimore.

The Foundation received 3 years of funding from the U.S. Department of Justice (Bureau of Justice Assistance) for grants to the police-community ventures in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago.

| TABLE 1 |
| SUMMARY OF FEDERAL FUNDING AND LOCAL MATCHES FOR PROGRAM OPERATIONS IN SAN JUAN, PHILADELPHIA, BOSTON, CHICAGO AND BALTIMORE OVER 3 YEARS |
| YEAR 1 | YEAR 2 | YEAR 3 | TOTAL |
| FEDERAL GRANTS | | | |
| San Juan | $90,000 | $75,000 | $37,500 | $202,500 |
| Philadelphia | $100,000 | $60,000 | $50,850 | $210,850 |
| Boston | $100,000 | $85,000 | $45,500 | $227,500 |
| Chicago | $100,000 | $89,315 | $45,000 | $234,315 |
| Baltimore | $143,741 | $166,606 | $181,670 | $492,017 |

| LOCAL MATCHES | | | |
| San Juan | $63,575 | $78,575 | $60,310 | $202,460 |
| Philadelphia | $179,300 | $201,950 | $125,350 | $506,600 |
| Boston | $249,900 | $211,339 | $86,100 | $547,339 |
| Chicago | $167,800 | $67,109 | $50,215 | $285,124 |
| Baltimore | $26,880 | $16,880 | $16,880 | $60,640 |

| TOTAL | | | |
| San Juan | $153,575 | $153,575 | $97,810 | $404,960 |
| Philadelphia | $279,300 | $261,950 | $176,200 | $717,450 |
| Boston | $349,900 | $296,339 | $128,600 | $774,839 |
| Chicago | $267,800 | $156,424 | $95,215 | $519,439 |
| Baltimore | $170,621 | $183,486 | $198,550 | $552,657 |

Source: See Tables 2, 5, 7, 9 and 11
Most of the funding was for local program operations. For the third year, funding for program operations was sharply cut by the Justice Department — for this program and other grantees in the same community-based crime prevention funding category at the Justice Department — because in that year Justice needed to reallocate funds for other priorities. In what follows, we have tried to document the impact of this drop in funding.

In Baltimore, primary funding for operations came from another source, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Center for Substance Abuse Prevention). Here, funding was constant over 3 years.

The Justice Department grants were implemented locally over 3 years from early 1991 to early 1994. The Department of Health and Human Services grant for Baltimore was implemented locally over 3 years from early 1990 to late 1992. We will simply refer in our tables to Years 1, 2 and 3.

Table 1 summarizes levels of funding to the 5 replications for direct operations over the 3 years of the federal grants. It also summarizes local matching grants. Most matches were in-kind, not cash. Included in the in-kind matches were partial salaries of existing staff from the youth development groups, as well as much of the cost of the police officers assigned to work with the community groups. For the Department of Justice funding, the Eisenhower Foundation was the grant recipient, and subgrants were made both to the youth development groups and police, who had the status of equal partners. For the Department of Health and Human Services funding, the community organization was the grant recipient, and the Eisenhower Foundation received a subgrant for evaluation and technical assistance from that group.

Before and during the years of implementation, funding on the U.S. side also was received by the Eisenhower Foundation from the Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation, the Hitachi Foundation and the U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission. Japan-side funding was received by the Eisenhower Foundation from the Keidanren (the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations), the Mitsubishi Corporation, the Hitachi Corporation, the Toshiba Corporation, the NEC Corporation, the Matsushita Corporation and the Sony Corporation. The funding covered pre-delegation planning, the 1988 delegation, 2 years of planning and development in between the delegation and U.S. federal funding, local site needs assessments and workplan development and some match funding to sites. The funding covered Eisenhower Foundation national cluster workshops, direct hands-on technical assistance, proposal writing, fundraising, communication and support staff work for the 5 community-police partnerships presented in this report. It covered partial early costs of the evaluation. In addition, these funders covered costs of planning the other delegations to Japan, the delegations themselves and followup work by the Eisenhower Foundation — including national cluster workshops, technical assistance evaluation and communication. Some of this funding was applied to the second round of replications (ongoing at the time of this publication) in partnership with the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Center for Global Partnership and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development — as summarized in Section 9. Some of this funding was applied, as well, to technical assistance to other community-police partnerships that undertook local variations on Japanese themes but received no federal funds.

All told, over the 10 years of Eisenhower Foundation work to date on police and youth replications, including the original sites reported here and the new round of ongoing replications, the U.S. Department of Justice committed $1.25M, other public and private national and international funders committed about $5.0M and local matches have amounted to about $3.52M. Hence, for every $1.00 of Justice Department funds about $6.82 has been funded by other sources.

Over the 3 years of local replications at the 5 sites reported on here, the Eisenhower Foundation held annual national cluster workshops in Washington, DC, San Juan and Los Angeles. Community leaders and police chiefs, supervisors and officers attended from the 5 sites and from other cities where similar part-
nships were emerging, some as a result of later delegations to Japan. Most time at these meetings was spent in practical sessions on day-to-day implementation, what was working and what was not, revision and midcourse correction of workplans, exchange of “war stories” on implementation and bonding between community and police representatives. The San Juan workshop had an especially great impact — because San Juan implemented its refinement of a residential koban and, as we shall see, integrated it into the workings of a premier youth and community investment program.
3. *Centro Sister Isolina Ferre and the San Juan Police*
Centro Sister Isolina Ferre is the best example of youth development combined with community regeneration that we have found anywhere in the United States. Begun in the 1960s in Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico, Centro was replicated in San Juan in the late 1980s. Centro’s founding premise is that, “If family and community can be strengthened, and meaningful employment made available, it might be possible to make substantial progress in the struggle against neighborhood crime and violence.”

In San Juan, Centro operates in the semi-rural Caimito neighborhood — characterized by a very high dropout rate (averaging 30 percent), high unemployment of close to 50 percent among adults and 80 percent among youth, and extreme poverty. Seventy percent of the families receive public assistance. According to police reports, Caimito constitutes one of the highest delinquency and drug dependence communities in San Juan. Caimito also is the most remote part of San Juan, and delivery of public services to Caimito has lagged behind the rest of the metropolitan area. For example, the first Caimito police station was opened in 1985. There is no public health clinic in Caimito. The school system is overloaded, and school violence is common.

THE CENTRO REPLICATION

In the midst of this community, Centro has created a beautiful, park-like campus. The campus includes a residential police ministation at the entrance way, a central building with classrooms and administrative offices at the bottom of the palm-tree lined driveway that begins with the ministation, a series of A-frame buildings that hold classrooms, workrooms and businesses, a tree nursery and a recreational area.

In San Juan, Centro runs 10 interrelated programs with a staff of 56. During the day, an alternative school program works with dropouts on school remediation and the acquisition of general education degrees. A computer literacy and office skills training initiative, using donated IBM equipment, has students attending 30 hours per week. Adults attend cooking classes and other events. Young mothers can attend classes while their children are cared for in a nursery. Immunizations and screenings are provided on-site by the Health Department. After school, a special safe haven program for 6 to 12 year olds helps youngsters with homework and involves them in arts, sports and culture.

One building is used for the honey bee project — begun to train high school dropouts and to self-employ them as beekeepers and producers of bee byproducts. In Puerto Rico, pure bee honey is in demand, but it is currently not mass produced locally. The project began with 5 beehives provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The honey and wax processing facilities are located at Centro.

A huge tree nursery, the Horticultural Project, was set up by Centro with support from the Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico, after a hurricane demolished much of the island’s coastal vegetation several years ago. Centro had to promise to produce 100,000 baby trees in its first year as a condition of the grant. In Centro’s semi-rural location, the project has thrived — and serves as a visual affirmation of hope and respect for the community. In 1996, a grant of $500,000 from the Rural Economic and Community Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Agriculture expanded the nursery and generated jobs for 15 Caimito residents. Sales now average $6,000 to $7,000 per week. As of 1997, the ambitious program had produced 600,000 trees for reforestation of the devastated areas.

Almost all Centro programs are designed to increase the leadership, confidence and competence of community youth — many of whom come to Centro while they still are gang members. The most important innovations at Centro are the “intercessors” or “advocates” — young, streetwise, paid staff members drawn from the community. The advocates act as intermediaries and mediators between youth in trouble or on the verge
of trouble and the community, the schools, the police and the rest of the criminal justice system. The role of advocates proceeds far beyond individual “counseling” or “mentoring” — words that remain imprecisely defined in the field of youth development. Advocates are charged with “getting to know the youth and his or her peers and family, looking into the school, family and work situation, and understanding the day-to-day behavior of the youth.” Advocates involve youth in the full range of developmental programs at Centro — including job training, recreation, and tutoring. The police work closely with the intercessors, often calling them when a youth has been detained. If arrests are made, advocates help youth in the court system.

**THE RESIDENTIAL KOBAN**

The police ministration at the entrance to the Centro campus is a pleasant looking 3 level structure modeled after a residential Japanese koban. (See the photo on the back cover of this report.) Residential quarters for a family are on the top floor, ministration offices are on the ground floor and the IBM computer training education center is on the lower level. The police presence helps to protect the IBM equipment and to create a sense of safe haven security for the entire campus.

Several different officers — male and female — have lived in the ministration, all with their spouses and children. Non-residential police officers, a civilian ministration director and advocate work out of the ground floor offices. The residential officer typically is someone who grew up in the neighborhood and usually tries not to make arrests. This helps engender trust. Arrests are made, but generally by the other officers. Ministration police mentor youth, organize sports teams, and make visits to schools and residences along with advocates to discuss problems experienced by youth.

Advocates and police practice problem-oriented policing. For example, when the ministration began and mistrust of police by the community was high, a complaint was made by a family in the neighborhood about a dead cow that was in their yard. Both the San Juan Sanitation Department and the Health Department refused to take away the cow. Finally, the residential koban officer and other koban police brought in a can of gasoline and cremated the cow. This made a great impact on the citizens, who increased their trust in and support of the police as a result of the experience.

To train police, the Centro executive director and other civilians teach a course at the San Juan Police Academy. There has been no formal assessment of this training. But Centro staff have observed changes for the better in the attitudes and behavior of the officers who participated. The San Juan police have agreed. A total of 500 officers have been trained. A training manual was written and distributed. The training process made it easy for Centro staff to be on the screening committee — and to select the most qualified officers for the koban.

We believe that this Centro police training is a potential model for use across the nation. Except possibly for the training done by Professor James P. Comer at Yale University with the New Haven Police, we know of few comparable attempts to train, and retrain, police at the local police academy, employing community leaders as teachers. The other replications reported here were not able to negotiate such comprehensive training at the local police academy. Given the crime reducing success of the Caimito program, documented below, the need for such training cannot be dismissed as feel-good social work. Without such training, new police hired through federal community policing legislation may not have nearly as much impact as with the training.
FUNDING

Centro in San Juan was begun in the late 1980s, and built up an annual budget of about $500,000. It secured local funds to build the police ministation. The following year, the Eisenhower Foundation sub-granted funds from the U.S. Justice Department to Centro and arranged for local matches. Three years of funding was secured. Table 2 shows the amounts. The replication received $90,000 in Year 1, $75,000 in Year 2 and $37,500 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. For the first 2 years, 46 percent of the Justice Department funding was allocated to Centro — mainly for salaries and benefits for advocates, as well as for related operating expenses. Fifty-four percent was allocated to the San Juan police — for partial coverage of salaries of 2 koban police and related benefits, operating expenses and training expenses at the San Juan Police Academy. The percentages were about the same for the second year. However, for the last year, when Justice Department funding dropped from $75,000 to $37,500, all of the Justice funding was allocated to Centro — for staff salaries, benefits and related operating expenses. Over the 3 years, about 65 percent of the total match was covered by Centro and 39 percent by the police.

EVALUATION

The original evaluation design for San Juan — and for the other Justice Department-funded sites — was to combine 1) a process evaluation; 2) a pre-post survey administered to youth in the program and to a comparison group; and 3) pre-post measures of crime reported to police in the immediate neighborhood, the surrounding precinct and the city as a whole.

However, when the Justice Department sharply cut funding in Year 3, the final year, no other funding was available on short notice to cover the drop in Justice Department support. One consequence was that we were unable to undertake the youth survey post-test interviews in San Juan and the other Justice Department sites. Accordingly, the evaluations in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago were completed based on the process information and on the pre-post quasi-experimental design using crime reported to the police in the target neighborhood, precinct and city.

All 4 of these cities were trying to use the Justice Department funds to create change among individual youth (as measured by the youth surveys) as well as community-wide change (as measured by the area-wide police crime statistics). Hence, in these 4 Justice Department cities, we still had valid outcome measures — the crime statistics — in spite of the budget cut. The complete analysis for San Juan is found in Appendix 1 (along with discussions of the other sites).

In San Juan, there were 3 years of funding from the Justice Department. But Centro Caimito completed the residential koban and began some operations the year before Justice Department funding began. Hence, we thought it valid to look at crime over 4 years in San Juan. (Local funders financed the koban. During the year before Justice funding began, there were no funds for civilian operations, but advocates already employed by Centro spent some time on koban-related activities. The police provided an officer as match.)

Crime as reported to the San Juan police was what the FBI in its Uniform Crime Reports calls “Part I Index crime” — a summation of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, auto theft and larceny. Crimes of violence, like criminal homicide, occur with less frequency than crimes of theft, like burglary. The combined measure of the 7 Part I Index crimes, therefore, was relatively more a measure of theft than violence. In this report, we will refer to the 7 offense aggregate simply as “Index crime.”

Working with the San Juan Police, we were able to collect Index crime statistics from 3 geographic areas.
### TABLE 2

**BUDGET SUMMARY, SAN JUAN**

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<th>YEAR 3</th>
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<td><strong>LOCAL IN-KIND AND CASH MATCHES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percent Centro)</td>
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<td>65%</td>
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<td>(Percent San Juan Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percent San Juan Police)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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</table>

Source: Program budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice

The smallest area — the “target area” — was the immediate neighborhood served by the Caimito program. We used police data as closely matched to the geographic area served by the program as the San Juan Police crime reporting system would allow. The second area was the larger police precinct within which the Caimito program was located (after we removed the target neighborhood crime counts from the precinct data). The third area was the City of San Juan as a whole (after we removed the precinct and therefore the target neighborhood crime counts from the city data).*

We followed the same procedures in Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, as discussed in later sections. Appendix 1 describes these procedures in more detail. It also reviews the biases of police statistics, issues in defining target areas, the validity and reliability of the data, methods of statistical analyses, regression artifacts, and how the positive impacts of San Juan and the other programs statistically were related to the level of Justice Department funding.

Index crime declined in the neighborhood targeted by the program in San Juan — as shown in Table 3. The number of Index crimes also declined for the entire city. However, Index crime *increased* in the surrounding police precinct. Part of the precinct-level increase may have been due to a police crackdown on

*There are several ways to define the San Juan years of operation and target areas. These are discussed in Appendix 1. The statistical analysis there shows that our conclusions are not affected if the parameters of the San Juan data are changed. Therefore, we only show the data here that we determined were best suited for the analysis of Centro. Readers who want to see what difference, if any, that the alternatives made in terms of time and target area should look at the analysis in Appendix 1.
drug dealers in central San Juan at the time. Some dealers may have relocated to distant Caimito with its steep rugged hills and narrow twisting valleys. It is easier to hide there. If this interpretation has some merit, then the data suggested that, an exodus to Caimito notwithstanding, the police, advocates and community had some success in keeping dealer-related crime out of the immediate Centro neighborhood of Caimito.

After 4 years of the program’s operation, total Index crime in the program’s target area declined by almost 26 percent, compared to a decline of 11 percent for the city and an increase of about 3 percent for the precinct.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan,
Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago), the improvement in Index crime for the target neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. (See Appendix 1.)

The numbers in Table 3 can be seen graphically in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows San Juan Index crime data over a longer period. This figure shows how the pattern of Index crime changed in the program target neighborhood after the program began in 1990 and how Index crime differed after 1990 among the program target neighborhood, the rest of the police precinct and the city.

The details of Centro’s experience suggest that the extent of Index crime reduction produced by the program depended on the amount of Justice funding. Centro experienced a decline in effectiveness when the Justice Department funding was reduced, with the drop in Index crime produced in the target neighborhood declining from 23 percent during the period of higher Justice Department funding to 4 percent when the budget was cut. (See Table 4, Figure 4 and Figure 5.)

However, Centro differed from the other sites in that the koban program actually began operating a year before the Justice grant was made. The level of Justice Department funding for the pre-Justice year was 0. If we are correct in arguing that Index crime reduction depended on the amount of Justice funding, we would expect to see the program not as effective in the pre-Justice year than it was during the 2 years of higher Justice funding. Table 4 shows this is exactly what happened. The program began operating on a shoestring, and it had no discernable effect on crime when compared to the number of crimes in the year before the program began. During that pre-Justice year, Index Crime increased. Full Justice funding brought a 39 percentage point improvement in the change in the number of Index crimes, and then, as already noted,
FIGURE 4

TRENDS IN INDEX CRIME FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, SURROUNDING PRECINCT AND CITY OF SAN JUAN, 1986-1993

Source: City of San Juan Police

FIGURE 5

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING AND PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME, SAN JUAN TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Tables 2, 3 and 4
when the budget was again lowered, the effectiveness of the program declined.

Table 2 shows that the sharp drop in Justice funding in Year 3 was not compensated for by an increase in local match.

There also was process evaluation evidence from area school teachers that the program influenced youth. The police and the advocates worked with 100 high-risk youth as part of koban operations. Among these youth, school absenteeism often diminished, according to teachers. School staff observed changes in the attitudes of the koban youth — including better language, improved dress, more responsiveness to authority, increased willingness to take on responsibility, and an improved ability and willingness to work. Some of these youth become school leaders. Grades improved among many of these youth.

**MANAGEMENT**

We concluded that much of the reason for the success of Caimito was excellent management. Centro Caimito was run by an intelligent, charismatic, tough, caring, politically savvy problem solving nun who won everyone’s heart. She surrounded herself with many committed, qualified staff members. They carried out their functions with great enthusiasm. In his earlier study of Centro in Ponce, Charles Silberman observed:* 

No community organization can succeed unless people conceive of it as belonging to them. In Puerto Rico, as in most Latin countries, “belonging” is thought of in terms of personal relationships, rather than power and control... To the Puerto Rican, power is derived from, and exercised through, personal relationships rather than through formal organization, and preserving those relationships takes precedence over achieving organizational goals. As a result, mainland Americans often see Puerto Ricans as inefficient, while Puerto Ricans regard mainlanders as cold and impersonal.

The genius of the program director was that she had the skill to both exercise power through personal relationships and to create sound organizational, time, financial and personnel management on a day-to-day basis.

*Silberman (1978).
4. *The Campus Boulevard Corporation and the Philadelphia Police*
Begun in 1978, the nonprofit Campus Boulevard Corporation (CBC) already had a long term working relationship with the Philadelphia Police when Justice Department funding began via the Eisenhower Foundation in the early 1990s. CBC’s mission is to promote neighborhood, commercial and institutional revitalization, as well as to strengthen working relationships among all residents in the community. At the time of the replication, CBC had a budget of about $160,000 per year.

CBC undertook the replication in the Logan neighborhood of North Philadelphia. Logan is poor, with an annual average income of less than $20,000. It is roughly a 20 minute drive from downtown Philadelphia. The neighborhood incorporates 146 blocks, ranging from totally abandoned buildings to blocks fully occupied by home owners. There are approximately 8,000 residents. Most are African-American, although the Asian and Hispanic populations are growing. The neighborhood has a higher density of children and youth than almost any place in Philadelphia. Thirty-four percent of the population is under the age of 18, and the majority of children are high-risk.

### THE CBC REPLICATION AND ITS FUNDING

The CBC replication centered on a former crack house that the police closed down and that was rehabilitated into a nonresidential koban police ministration. Table 5 summarizes the budget for the Philadelphia program over the 3 years of funding. The program received $100,000 in Year 1, $60,000 in Year 2 and $50,850

### TABLE 5

**Budget Summary, Philadelphia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice Department Grants via the Eisenhower Foundation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent CBC)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Philadelphia Police)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local In-Kind and Cash Matches</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent CBC)</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Philadelphia Police)</td>
<td>(84%)</td>
<td>(74%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td>(74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$279,300</td>
<td>$261,950</td>
<td>$176,200</td>
<td>$717,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent CBC)</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(42%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Philadelphia Police)</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(58%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Program budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice
in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. For all 3 years, the entire Justice Department allocation was to CBC — mainly for civilian staff salaries, benefits, travel, equipment and related operating expenses. None of the Justice Department funding was allocated to the Philadelphia Police. Over the 3 years, about 26 percent of the total match was covered by CBC and 74 percent by the police. The police match was mainly for the 3 officers assigned to work at and undertake foot patrols from the minestation. Besides CBC and the police, the third partner to the venture was the Logan Koban Advisory Council. The Advisory Council was composed of both community residents and the police. The Philadelphia Police and the Advisory Council signed a contract to define their roles and responsibilities in the operation of the koban. The Captain of the 35th Police District, where the koban is located, trained civilian Advisory Council members in public safety and law enforcement procedures. In turn, the Advisory Council trained the koban officers and other 35th District officers in human relations and community organizing strategies. The Advisory Council training of police was not as well developed as in San Juan, but it was similar in concept.

THE NONRESIDENTIAL KOBAN

The minestation was the hub of civilian and police activity, and the point of departure for police footpatrols. The Japanese mass daily newspaper, Mainichi Shim bun, observed:* 

People drop by very casually to the Logan koban. After all, it is run by both police and citizens. Police officer visit each household and urge them to have their children immunized. Children can get shots if they come to the koban. A troop of young volunteers depart from the koban to help elderly neighbors prune trees and cut grass. The telephone keeps ringing all the time. “A street light is burned out,” says one caller. “Somebody parked illegally in front of my garage,” says another.

THE LEAD ROLE OF YOUTH

The most prominent activity operating from the minestation was youth development. Because 34 percent, or nearly 3,000 Logan residents, were under the age of 18, virtually everyone in Logan agreed that youth development activities were needed. The Eisenhower grant provided funding for a full-time paid staff member to coordinate youth activities and to manage the koban on a daily basis. Coordinating programs with the City of Philadelphia, this staff member was able to supervise scores of teenagers during summer youth clean-up programs.

One youth activity was the championship East Logan Drill Team. It grew in numbers and status over the 3 years of Eisenhower funding. Funds were raised to travel to Atlanta to perform in the Martin Luther King, Jr. Parade and to Washington, DC in 1994 to perform before the Attorney General of the United States for a National Night Out commemoration. The Attorney General later was made an honorary member of the Drill Team. The Drill Team also became more organized, with an advisory group assisting in fund-raising and planning.

Unlike Centro in San Juan, there was no attempt to create remedial education, youth job training and job placement programs. One-on-one mentoring by police with individual youth was not as intense as in San Juan or Boston — although mentoring by police of youth in groups was as extensive in Philadelphia as it was in San Juan.

*Nikajima (1994).
EVALUATION

Index crime declined in the Logan neighborhood. Index crime also declined for the entire City of Philadelphia and in the surrounding police precinct. However, after 3 years of the program's operation, total Index crime for the city had declined about 11 percent and by less than 4 percent in the precinct, but total Index crime in the Logan target area declined more than 23 percent. This is shown in Table 6 and Figure 6. The drop in Index crime was more than twice as great where the program operated than where it did not operate.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago) the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. See Appendix 1 for details of the design of the evaluation, statistical analyses used, validity and reliability of the data, selection biases and regression artifacts.

As Table 6 and Figure 7 show, Index crime in the Logan neighborhood declined almost 23 percent from

### Table 6

**NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, SURROUNDING PRECINCT, AND THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHILADELPHIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>109,139</td>
<td>97,359</td>
<td>97,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct</td>
<td>8,080</td>
<td>7,065</td>
<td>7,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>629</td>
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<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>101,059</td>
<td>90,294</td>
<td>90,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>7,259</td>
<td>6,432</td>
<td>6,999</td>
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</table>

**CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME OVER 3 YEARS**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
<td>-10.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-23.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME IN TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD WITH HIGHER OR LOWER JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2</td>
<td>-22.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Higher Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lower Justice Department Funding)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The declines for the years of higher Justice Department funding and lower Justice Department funding do not add up to the 3 year total because different baseline years are used for calculating the amount of change.*

Source: City of Philadelphia Police
FIGURE 6


Source: City of Philadelphia Police

FIGURE 7

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING AND PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME, PHILADELPHIA TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Tables 5 and 6
Year 1 to Year 2. Total Justice Department funding for those 2 years was $160,000. But Index crime declined less than 1 percent from Year 2 to Year 3. Justice Department funding was reduced to $50,850 in Year 3. Table 5 also shows that the third year drop in Justice Department funding was not compensated for by an increase in local match.

That Index crime went down more in the area of Philadelphia served by the program than it did for the whole city or in the police precinct surrounding the program area indicates the program was effective in reducing crime. The effectiveness of the program is confirmed by the sensitivity of the program’s effect on Index crime to the program’s level of funding.

After the funding drop from the original levels of about $100,000 per year, the program needed to rely more and more on volunteers. On the relationship between funding and success, the program director concluded, “Volunteering is really good, but people need a program to volunteer for, and in order to do that, you have to have dollars.”

MANAGEMENT

We concluded that sound management and careful oversight were among the reasons for the replication’s success. CBC had the same executive director for most of the program, with a new executive director on board toward the end. Both were good managers and organizers. The first executive director wrote a handbook to guide others in the start-up of a nonresidential koban. The handbook contains practical nuts-and-bolts sections on choosing a location, staffing, equipping the koban, opening the program through a media event that maximizes attention and involvement, operating foot patrols and crime prevention day-to-day, and collecting information to assess needs and evaluate outcomes.

The second executive director brought management skills refined as Director of Economic Development for the City of Camden. Also crucial to the success, in our view, was the Philadelphia Police Precinct Captain assigned to direct work with the ministration and community. He remained in this position throughout the program, did a good job in guiding the officers assigned to the ministration and was a particularly articulate and savvy advocate.

The joint community-police Advisory Council oversaw all activities of the koban ministration. The Council met monthly. It had responsibility for local fundraising, maintaining the physical facility, recruiting volunteer staff and communicating the needs of the neighborhood to the police. Through the Council, community members really were equal partners with CBC and the police. In many other community-police partnerships across the United States, community residents are in a more passive role. This definitely was not the case with the Logan non-residential koban.
5. The Dorchester Youth Collaborative and the Boston Police
The Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) was established in the late 1970s, in Field’s Corner, Dorchester, a low income, rapidly changing Boston neighborhood. Today, Field’s Corner is racially and ethnically mixed, with large Hispanic, African-American, Asian-American (Vietnamese and Cambodian) and white populations. An extended family safe haven and sanctuary after school and in the summers, DYC provides nontraditional services, activities and advocacy for local youth deemed to be at high risk of delinquency, teen pregnancy, school failure and substance abuse. DYC fills an important prevention gap in Dorchester — between programs for youth who will make it anyway and youth who are deep into the juvenile justice system.

THE REPLICATION AND ITS FUNDING

Through the Eisenhower grant of Justice Department funds, the DYC replication built on the youth media enterprise and counseling that DYC pioneered in the 1980s and integrated it with new prevention roles for police.

At the time of the replication in the early 1990s, DYC’s core budget was about $600,000 per year, not counting Justice Department funds. Table 7 summarizes the resources that we added, showing the budget for the 3 years of Justice funding and local matches. The program received $100,000 in Year 1, $85,000 in Year 2 and $42,500 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. For the first 2 years, 65 percent of the Justice funding was allocated to DYC, mainly for staff salaries, benefits and travel. Thirty-five percent was allocated to police, mainly for staff salaries and benefits. For the last year, 76 percent

### TABLE 7

**BUDGET SUMMARY, BOSTON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GRANTS VIA THE EISENHOWER FOUNDATION</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$85,000</td>
<td>$42,500</td>
<td>$227,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent DYC)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Boston Police)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **LOCAL IN-KIND AND CASH MATCHES** |         |         |         |         |
|                                   | $249,900| $211,339| $86,100 | $547,339|
| (Percent DYC)                    | (34%)   | (29%)   | (42%)   | (33%)   |
| (Percent Boston Police)          | (66%)   | (71%)   | (58%)   | (67%)   |

| **TOTAL**                        | $349,900| $296,339| $128,600| $774,839|
| (Percent DYC)                    | (43%)   | (39%)   | (53%)   | (43%)   |
| (Percent Boston Police)          | (57%)   | (61%)   | (47%)   | (57%)   |

Source: Program budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice
of the Justice funding was allocated to DYC and 24 percent to police. Over the 3 years, about 33 percent of the total match was covered by DYC and about 67 percent by the police. The police match mainly covered salaries and benefits of officers and supervisors.

With this funding, the civilian part of the replication was led by a full-time, salaried Neighborhood Services Coordinator, who also served as counselor for “near-peers.” This staffer was an adult, but the near-peers he supervised were younger adults who worked for pay part-time, a minimum of three days per week. These near-peers served as role models for the youth in the program. The near-peers were teenagers 2 to 6 years older than the targeted youth who had already successfully resolved many of the crises that the target youth faced — such as recruitment from gangs and from drug dealers. In groups and one-on-one, the near-peers interacted with youth in positive ways and monitored their behavior. The near-peer concept had been employed by DYC for a number of years, and the new initiative extended past operations by adding more paid near peers.

In addition to help with homework and sporting activities, the priority at DYC was to organize “prevention clubs,” which provided structured activity around areas of interest identified by youth. For example, 3 clubs — the Center for Urban Expressions (CUE), Extreme Close Up and the Public Speaking Club — developed youth as actors in local productions, presenters in public service announcements and on paid commercials, hosts of community service television and radio talk shows, stars of community service videos marketed through Blockbuster Video and K-Mart and, in 1997, the acting leads in a Hollywood-financed motion picture, titled Squeeze. There are a number of community-based programs around the nation which are creating such media productions, in which youth communicate to peers as well as to adults. But none has the cutting edge status of the DYC ventures, in our experience. In our view, there is a compelling need for a comprehensive, grassroots national media strategy that communicates to the public that we do know what works. The DYC model is integral to the development of such a national media strategy, in our view. The DYC model is both a program intervention that develops youth and a grassroots venue for communicating what works.

In the past, public service and paid television announcements on inner city-related issues, like crime and drugs, typically have been by national organizations that have claimed to have an impact but never demonstrated it in a scientific way. Some of the ads also have been racially insensitive. We believe a new generation of television messengers should be bubble up, not top down — created and acted in by youth leaders in local nonprofits, like DYC, that have proven themselves in youth media enterprise. As we shall see, there is scientific evidence backing the success of DYC.

The prevention clubs were racially integrated and bilingual. They were about equally divided among African American, Asian, Hispanic and white youth. The youth really did relate to one another, as any observer who spent a day hanging around the DYC headquarters could attest. There was a constant flow of young people in and out, with hugs, handshakes, amusement and good will. This was a significant achievement in a community which — like all too many others in urban America — was wrecked by frequent racial conflict among its youth. Developing an integrated youth program was an important goal, rarely tried by other agencies, and an important accomplishment. DYC therefore also is an integration model that works — in response to the continuing divisions of race and poverty in America. It sets forth solutions that the national dialogue on race can embrace, turn into action and replicate.

The prevention clubs served as magnets to draw youth into group and individual relationships with DYC adult staff, near-peers and police. The relationships allowed youth to deal with personal problems on a day-to-day and sometimes crisis basis, and also to develop individual skills. Some of the skills had considerable glamour attached to them — like becoming successful actors and public speakers. There also were jobs for youth who could not achieve “star” status in glamorous roles. For example, these were jobs in scheduling
events, producing the art work that was the backdrop for performance videos and live performances, and setting up stage sets. Such skill-building was designed to increase the confidence of program youth. The work skills also were displayed to adults in the community through the performances. As a result, skill building served to increase understanding by adults in the community of the youth, and to reduce the fear the adults had of the youngsters.

DYC staff concentrated heavily on problem-solving skills. Such skills included resolving conflicts and expressing feelings through words rather than acting them out through, for example, violence. Adult staff and near-peers sought to reduce episodes in which youth would “tear down” each other. Such behavior was particularly common among younger kids at DYC, who really didn’t know how to fight fairly. Their behavior often was a natural result of the trauma and desensitization they experienced by being exposed to violence at home and on the street. By contrast, older youth had successfully graduated to making jokes about each other, but not doing it in a negative, “tearing down” way. The older youth could laugh at themselves without becoming defensive or self-defeating. They expressed themselves through love rather than disregard.

In turn, such skill building was used by DYC staff to help with preemployment training, employment training and placement. Over the summers, about two-thirds of the targeted youth were placed in summer youth employment programs, coordinated by the City of Boston, a community development corporation and private-sector businesses. During the summer, DYC also functioned like a camp, operating from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Scheduled activities included pool, bowling, art, Afrocentric and multicultural education, basketball, swimming, breakfast and lunch.

The safe havens represented by DYC and Centro Sister Isolina Ferre are the kind of settings advocated in the Carnegie Corporation report, A Matter of Time: Risk and Opportunity in the Nonschool Hours.

THE ROLE OF POLICE

Police then were brought into the process of outreach, counseling, near-peering, and skill development. This was a radical innovation for Fields Corner, because, in the past, police had always been viewed as the enemy. Two young African-American officers became, in effect, paid, adult staffers and near peers, making regular visits to the safe haven three times a week. Initially, there was a considerable degree of mistrust by the youth of the police, and vice-versa. Yet bonds formed, and the officers ended up counseling youth on personal matters and receiving calls from the young people during off hours. Often relationships became deeper as a result of crises, as when a local teenager was killed and the DYC youth and officers sat down to discuss their feelings.

Nationally, the NBC Today show covered the program in 1994. The President and Attorney General featured it that same year in a Washington, DC rally at the Justice Department for the 1994 Crime Bill:

**Attorney General Reno** (with President Clinton): I learned from Eddie Kutanda in Boston on my last trip there as we discussed the crime bill and anti-crime initiatives. Eddie is an example to me of the young people of America, people who want to belong, who want to contribute, who want to make a difference — and who need a little bit of support along the way.

**Eddie Kutanda** (of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative): I’d like to thank President Clinton and Attorney General Reno for being here. I’d like to introduce community police officers Harold White and Tony Platt. And I’d like to intro-
duce two friends of mine, Tyrone Burton and Fung Du Ung. They’re in my acting group, Extreme Close Up, at the Dorchester Youth Collaborative. We do writing and acting. Back in the days, I used to hate the police...Harold and Tony have changed all that....

The Field’s Corner Police Commander concluded, “Although this type of initiative may not be welcomed with open arms by policing traditionalists, an analysis of the end results would surely justify this type of interaction in other cities.” As a result of their work with DYC, the police began to reach out to other youth organizations in the area, where similar relationships were developed.

The Boston Peoples’ Tribunal (a coalition of churches, the Black Educator’s Alliance, the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights, and Citizens for Safety) presented its Police and Youth Leadership Award for 1993 to the police mentors and to program youth — for setting a standard of commitment and dedication that improved the community.

The community policing part of the Justice Department-funded initiative was based on work typically done by the Japanese koban officer who is assigned to walk the neighborhood, rather than the officer who stays at the koban. Foot patrols were begun in the summer of 1991. A local television evening magazine did a feature story on them. Police averaged 600-700 patrol hours a month in the target area. Officer presence also was increased at school crossings, bus pick-ups and bus drop-offs.

Police worked with merchants to remove pay phones from premises — because they were used extensively by drug dealers. In problem-oriented ways, police also worked with DYC and landlords in identifying housing units that were used for drug sales. For example, DYC staff identified 3 abandoned houses to police near DYC that were being used for illegal drug activity by addicts. The houses were demolished.

The police and DYC youth participated in a graffiti abatement day. Working with landlords and merchants in the area and using paint donated by the police, participants cleaned up two large walls in the target area. In one location, the names of 3 youth who had been killed were graffitied onto the wall as a way of memorializing them. This led to a larger project in which an African-American mural was designed on this space. The Boston Deputy Superintendent concluded that this graffiti abatement program led to something much larger, a perception by the youth that the police were sensitive to their needs.

**EVALUATION**

Index crime declined in the Field’s Corner neighborhood targeted by the program. Index crime also declined for the entire City of Boston. However, as Table 8 and Figure 8 show, after 3 years of the replication’s operation, total Index crime for the city had declined about 11 percent, but total Index crime in the target area declined 27 percent. Index crime also declined in the surrounding police precinct, down 20 percent.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago), the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhood was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. See Appendix 1 for details of the design of the evaluation, statistical analyses used, validity and reliability of the data, selection biases and regression artifacts.

Table 8 and Figure 9 show that, in the program neighborhood, Index crime declined more than 27 percent from Year 1 to Year 2. Total Justice Department funding for these 2 years was $185,000. But Index crime
**TABLE 8**

**NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, SURROUNDING PRECINCT AND THE CITY OF BOSTON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>BOSTON</strong></td>
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**CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME OVER 3 YEARS**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
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<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
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**CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME IN TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD WITH HIGHER AND LOWER JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2</td>
<td>-27.37</td>
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<td>(Higher Justice Department Funding)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3</td>
<td>+0.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Lower Justice Department Funding)</td>
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*Note: The declines for the years of higher Justice Department funding and the increase for the year of lower Justice Department funding do not add up to the 3 year total because different baseline years are used for calculating the amount of change.*

Source: City of Boston Police

Increased slightly from Year 2 to Year 3. Justice Department funding was reduced to $42,500 in Year 3. Table 7 shows that the third year drop in Justice Department funding was not compensated by an increase in local match. Instead, local match dropped even more precipitously than Justice Department funding.

The greater reduction in Index crime for the area of Boston served by the program than for the whole city or for the surrounding police precinct indicates the program was effective in reducing Index crime. The effectiveness of the program is confirmed by the sensitivity of the program’s effect on Index crime to the program’s level of funding.

Although Index crime did not decline as much in the surrounding precinct as it did in the target area, the decline in Index crime in the surrounding precinct was almost twice as large as the decline in Index crime for the whole city. We conclude that the greater decline in Index crime in the precinct than in the city may have been a beneficial side effect of the program. The impact of the program may have spilled over into nearby communities and reduced their Index crime as well, but not as much as Index crime was reduced in the target Field’s Corner area.
FIGURE 8


Source: City of Boston Police

FIGURE 9

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING AND PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME, BOSTON TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Tables 7 and 8
In addition to the program interventions, we concluded that the success of the Boston replication was due to good management. The replication was well implemented. Especially impressive were the initial planning sessions between DYC and the Boston Police, the ongoing implementation and midcourse correction meetings that were held, and the sustained commitment of the Boston Police at the highest levels as well as at local command levels.
6. Youth Guidance and the Chicago Police
In Chicago, the Eisenhower Foundation used the Justice Department support to fund Youth Guidance. Youth Guidance has been a private, not-for-profit social service agency serving inner city youth in Chicago since 1923. Its historic mission has been to help disadvantaged inner city youth become responsible, productive adults. Since 1968, almost all of the agency’s services have been delivered from within Chicago public schools. Collaboration is with both the school and community agencies. Youth Guidance programs include counseling and creative arts, school-to-work transition, the Comer School Development Program, parental involvement, and wellness. The agency utilizes a variety of cutting edge methods that are continually evaluated and updated. In the early 1990s, the annual budget of Youth Guidance was about $2M.

The program was implemented in the Hyde Park neighborhood. Founded in 1873, Hyde Park is a community of about 20,000 located 7 miles south of Chicago’s Loop and characterized by considerable racial, cultural, economic and age diversity. Its eastern boundary is Lake Michigan. The largest institution in Hyde Park is the University of Chicago, which adds even greater diversity to the neighborhood with its faculty and student population. Although Hyde Park has its share of urban problems, there is nevertheless a small town atmosphere and a strong sense of community pride. In spite of its economic diversity, the neighborhood is predominately middle class.

Hyde Park is surrounded on the north, south and west by poor African-American communities, like Washington Park and Woodlawn, and by public housing projects. Hyde Park’s attractive 53rd Street shopping district, home of the only movie theater on the massive South Side and many fast-food restaurants, has always been a magnet for African-American teenagers from the outside communities looking for a safe hangout from the gang violence of their South Side neighborhoods. During the time of the program, the great majority of these poor African-American youth, aged about 15 to 19, were well behaved. However some of the youth, also about 15 to 19 and also from the surrounding communities, were less well behaved, especially those who traveled in groups. They often intimidated others on the street, and engaged in law breaking behavior, such as vandalizing community businesses, stealing from people on the street and demanding food from people who had just made purchases. In addition, young African-American adults, aged about 19 to 25, came into Hyde Park from the surrounding communities with the intent of robbing and burglarizing in an oasis with money and valuable property. Youth from the Hyde Park neighborhood itself also congregated on 53rd Street. Some were well behaved and some were not.

In the early 1990s, a subcommittee of neighborhood residents began to meet and discuss the increased level of cultural conflict, racial conflict, teen violence and crime on 53rd in the aftermath of the large crowds attending such violent movies as “New Jack City” and “Boyz N the Hood.” The Hyde Park Theater catered almost exclusively to the African-American teenage trade. A great deal of community discussion centered on how police should handle these teenagers on 53rd Street on summer weekend evenings.

THE REPLIATION AND ITS FUNDING

In response, Youth Guidance created a citizen coalition that consisted of itself and 3 nonprofit organizations. The citizens groups were indigenous to Hyde Park, and therefore close to the action. They were the Blue Gargoyle Youth Services Center, the Hyde Park Neighborhood Club and the South Side YMCA.

Based on case management of youth aged 10 to 18 and problem-oriented policing along the 53rd Street commercial strip, the replication was funded over 3 years as shown in Table 9. The program received $100,000 in Year 1, $89,315 in Year 2 and $45,000 in Year 3 from Justice Department funds via the Eisenhower Foundation. The proportion of these amounts allocated to Youth Guidance varied from 65 per-
TABLE 9

BUDGET SUMMARY, CHICAGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GRANTS VIA THE EISENHOWER FOUNDATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percent Youth Guidance)</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$89,315</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>$234,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Chicago Police)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOCAL IN-KIND AND CASH MATCHES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percent to Youth Guidance)</td>
<td>$167,800</td>
<td>$67,109</td>
<td>$50,215</td>
<td>$285,124</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percent to Chicago Police)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$267,800</td>
<td>$156,424</td>
<td>$95,215</td>
<td>$519,439</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Percent Youth Guidance)</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td>(83%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Chicago Police)</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td>(17%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Budget approved by the U.S. Department of Justice

percent in Year 1 to 76 percent in Year 2 and 100 percent in Year 3. The Justice Department funds allocated to Youth Guidance mainly covered salaries and benefits for staff at Youth Guidance, with small subgrants (ranging from $7,500 in the first year to $3,000 in the last year) each to the Blue Gargoyle, Hyde Park Neighborhood Club and the South Side YMCA, for staff salaries. The South Side YMCA also received $7,200 in Year 1 and $7,200 in Year 2 to pay for 100 Y memberships for low-income youth. The Justice Department funds to the police covered foot patrol officer and supervisor salaries and benefits. Over the 3 years, about 40 percent of the total match was covered by Youth Guidance and 60 percent by the police. The police match mainly was for foot patrol officer and supervisor salaries and benefits.

CASE MANAGEMENT

Through case management, solutions were tailored to specific teenagers. Youth were recruited by street outreach workers as well as by staff from the community agencies and from surrounding schools. Recommendations from the schools came from teachers and principals. The planning team reviewed and screened applications of youth who were referred. The goal was to include about 100 at-risk youth at any one point in time. Selection criteria were flexible. But the emphasis tended to be on youth on the verge of serious trouble who, in the opinion of planning team members, could nonetheless still be saved. An example might be a youth with problems in school, but who still attended school. Or a youth might have been picked up for shoplifting and released. For youth who were selected through street outreach, the planning team also was interested in how often they came to the 53rd Street area, how things were going at home and whether they were sincerely interested in the program. Almost all of the youth selected were African-
American. About two-thirds were male. Most were aged 14 to 17.

As teenagers were recruited into the program, they were given a membership to the South Side YMCA and assigned a case manager. Most of the case managers were staff from the Blue Gargoyle, the Hyde Park Neighborhood Club and the South Side YMCA. One case manager was a University of Chicago police officer who also had been trained as a social worker. The case managers played some of the roles of the San Juan advocates, like counseling with youth who already were in trouble with police but who had not been arrested. Throughout the program, there were 3 to 7 case managers at any one time. Each case manager developed a plan of action with each youth. The plan included one-on-one counseling, group counseling and activity somewhat akin to the DYC Prevention Clubs in Boston. In groups, members worked out mutual problems and were organized by age, maturity and gender.

There appeared to be considerably less direct mentoring of high-risk youth by the Chicago City Police than by the police in Boston and San Juan, though the University of Chicago Police case manager did an exceptional job.

Beyond individual and group counseling projects, other strategies were organized around events. For example, a job program was organized each summer, encompassing a wide range of tasks and serving 20 to 40 youth with paying jobs. Among the accomplishments of the summer employment projects was a beautiful African-American cultural mural painted at one end of the 53rd Street commercial strip under a train viaduct. Supervised by a renowned muralist and funded by local business people, the work attracted a great deal of attention at its opening ceremonies, which included the Mayor’s wife and the new Chicago Police Superintendent. The participation by the Superintendent deepened his support of the initiative.

**STREET OUTREACH AND COMMUNITY POLICING**

During each of the 3 summers when the program operated, outreach workers from the youth agencies and foot patrol officers from the Chicago Police Department and the University of Chicago Police walked 53rd Street every Friday and Saturday night. The civilian outreach workers and the police cooperated closely and supported one another.

Using non-threatening conversation, the street workers talked to young people, even known gang members, to identify themselves and convey their purpose. For example, a street worker might say, “How you doing? I’m a street worker from the YMCA (or the Blue Gargoyle or Youth Guidance). I work in a project that tries to keep this area a peaceful crime- drug- and violence-free environment. We need your cooperation. If you see any trouble, just tell people to cool it. There are not a lot of places where kids can come and have 4 movie theaters and all of these shops. We don’t want people clamping down on you.” The street workers sought the cooperation of youth in maintaining what they hoped would be, in effect, a safe haven zone.

This activity can be criticized as merely trying to keep a lid on. But the street workers also tried to identify young people who were able and willing to be involved in case management mentoring. The street workers did not themselves counsel high-risk youth nearly as much as the advocates in San Juan and the near-peers in Dorchester, but the case managers did.

At the same time, the Chicago Police Department and the University of Chicago Police expanded foot patrols during the summer months in the 53rd Street area. Foot patrols increased by 50 percent in the summer of 1992, compared to the summer of 1991. The foot patrol officers did not receive the kind of training by citizens provided by Centro Sister Isolina Ferre at the San Juan Police Academy. But the Eisenhower Foundation did facilitate brief workshops in Chicago on problem-oriented community policing for both Chicago Police Department and the University of Chicago Police, as well as for community members. By
1993, as a result of the program, the entire 21st District became part of the new community policing initiative created by the new Police Superintendent in selected police districts.

**EVALUATION**

As Table 10 and Figure 10 show, Index crime in the target neighborhood declined by 22 percent over the 3 years, while Index crime for the City of Chicago declined by 11 percent.

Index crime in the surrounding Precinct declined by 27 percent — more than the 22 percent in the target neighborhood. This could imply that the Index crime drop vis-a-vis the city was due to some precinct-level effect, rather than due to the Hyde Park program.

**TABLE 10**

NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES FOR THE TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD, SURROUNDING PRECINCT, AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO

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<th></th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
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<td><strong>NUMBER OF INDEX CRIMES</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>City</td>
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<td>299,625</td>
<td>287,910</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precinct</td>
<td>12,816</td>
<td>10,561</td>
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<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>1,193</td>
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<td>City Minus Precinct</td>
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<td>289,064</td>
<td>278,525</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>11,290</td>
<td>9,342</td>
<td>8,192</td>
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**CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME OVER 3 YEARS**

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<td>Target Neighborhood</td>
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**CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME WITH HIGHER AND LOWER JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 to Year 2 in the Target Neighborhood (Higher Justice Department Funding)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2 to Year 3 in the Precinct Minus Target Neighborhood</td>
<td>-12.31</td>
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*Note: The declines for the years of higher Justice Department funding and lower Justice Department funding do not add up to the 3 year total because different baseline years are used for calculating the amount of change.

Source: City of Chicago Police
FIGURE 10


Source: City of Chicago Police

FIGURE 11

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FUNDING AND PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX CRIME, CHICAGO TARGET NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Tables 9 and 10
However, the Hyde Park program appeared to show its own, independent, impact when we looked at the effect of the Justice Department budget cuts. Index crime dropped by 20 percent from Year 1 to Year 2 in the Hyde Park target neighborhood. Total Justice Department funding for these 2 years was $189,315. But Index crime declined by only 2 percent from Year 2 to Year 3 in the Hyde Park neighborhood. Justice Department funding was reduced to $45,000 in Year 3. (See Table 9, Table 10, and Figure 11.) The Year 3 decline in the precinct was 12 percent. If precinct-level effects had been solely responsible for changes in the Hyde Park neighborhood, we might have expected the Year 3 Hyde Park decline to be much closer to the precinct-level decline.

Thus, the effectiveness of the program was confirmed by the sensitivity of the program’s effect on Index crime to the program’s level of funding.

Table 9 shows that the third year drop in Justice Department funding was not compensated by an increase in local match.

Across the 4 cities funded by the Eisenhower Foundation through the Justice Department (San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago) the decline in Index crime for the program neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the cities as a whole or for the surrounding precincts. See Appendix 1 for details of the design of the evaluation, statistical analyses used, validity and reliability of the data, selection biases and regression artifacts. Appendix 1 also discusses how minor variations from the central tendency of the statistics can be ignored. (An example of such a minor variation consists of the Chicago precinct-level Index crime trends discussed above.)

The counseling and mentoring by citizens and police seemed to us to be a key element in the Hyde Park crime drops. About 20 of the youth in case management participated over the entire 3 years of funding. Among these 20, almost all were on their way toward high school graduation and employment by the end of the case management. By contrast, the dropout rates in the 2 high schools which primarily served these youth were extremely high. For example, in 1991, the dropout rate for Hyde Park High School was 44 percent and for Martin Luther King High School was 63 percent. The case management program also gave the police the opportunity to acquire new skills.

**MANAGEMENT**

We found that Youth Guidance managed the program well. However, we are not certain that the grassroots, civilian, nonprofit coalition worked particularly well as a management tool. The key reason was that a great deal of time was spent in meetings among the implementing nonprofit agencies. By contrast, the Justice Department-funded initiatives in San Juan, Philadelphia and Boston concentrated relatively more time on direct service provision. Still, the Chicago program was successful — in part, we concluded, because it carried out multiple solutions. When a battery of solutions is in place, one (here the coalition) might not necessarily work as well as intended. But the other solutions can pick up the slack and lead to positive outcomes.
7. The Baltimore Jobs in Energy Youth Center and the Baltimore Police
For decades, the people of South Baltimore worked at the giant Bethlehem Steel plant and shipyards that line the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. Not long ago, 60,000 well paid workers were employed by Bethlehem Steel. Many of them lived in South Baltimore. But by the mid-1990s, Bethlehem Steel's labor force was fewer than 15,000, and South Baltimore was home to the chronically unemployed. The collapse of South Baltimore's economic base in the 1980s wreaked havoc on family life. Breadwinners found themselves out of work and with few prospects of finding good new jobs.

Created in 1981, the nonprofit Baltimore Jobs in Energy Project (BJEP) set out as a modest response to these economic trends. Its mission was to create jobs for unemployed South Baltimore residents in the home weatherization business. BJEP was a licensed home improvement contractor specializing in energy efficiency. From smaller weatherization jobs, BJEP grew by specializing in comprehensive rehabilitation contracts for nonprofit housing developers, shelters and nonprofit service organizations. From the beginning, BJEP also advocated for fair low-income energy and housing policies by utility companies, banks and government agencies. BJEP's annual budget grew from less than $100,000 in 1982 to over $2M in the late 1980s. At this time, BJEP purchased an old Victorian building, a former police station in South Baltimore. BJEP took over one part of the building. Other parts were rented to other nonprofit organizations. A full scale, nonresidential kaban and youth safe haven were planned. However, the Baltimore Police Commissioner who had been to Japan passed away and his successor had other priorities. But interest in the youth safe haven continued to grow, and eventually resulted in a 3 year grant from the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The grant was to BJEP, which subcontracted to the Eisenhower Foundation for evaluation and technical assistance.

THE REPLICATION AND ITS FUNDING

The CSAP grant provided BJEP with $143,741 for operations in Year 1, $166,606 in Year 2 and $181,670 in Year 3. (Table 11.) Most of the funding was for staff salaries and benefits. Other CSAP funds covered the Eisenhower Foundation evaluation. In-kind and cash matches were at much lower levels than for the Justice Department-funded programs.

THE SOUTH BALTIMORE YOUTH CENTER

The safe haven space was designated the South Baltimore Youth Center. Principal staff consisted of 4 full-time workers paid by the CSAP grant — Program Director, Assistant Director, Arts and Literary Program Coordinator and Administrative Assistant. There were two part-time street workers. The Center also had volunteers — especially Loyola College students, who visited twice a week, took youth on outings, and retreats, held a drug prevention contest and undertook art projects.

Youth aged 11 to 21 came to the Youth Center after school. The Center was open weekdays between 3:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., and very much addressed the recommendations in the Carnegie Corporation report, A Matter of Time. Activities were relatively informal and unstructured. Youth at the Center usually could be observed in a variety of activities: doing homework, playing ping-pong, watching a video, playing games on the personal computer (a favorite activity), shooting pool, or just in conversing with peers, staff or volunteers.

Two hundred youth were involved in trips and some special activities, such as parties, but about 70 youth, aged 14-16, were considered to be the Center’s core “family.” These youth were frequent attenders, or those who could be counted on when they were needed to help. At any one point in time, up to 20 youth were at the Center.

Most of the participants at the Center came from the 10 square block Sharp Leadenhall neighborhood within South Baltimore. Sharp Leadenhall is the most at-risk neighborhood in South Baltimore. In 1990,
Sharp Leadenhall had the highest crime rates within South Baltimore, the highest percentage of single parent households (33 percent), the lowest levels of education (78 percent had less than a high school education), the lowest median household income ($11,285), the highest poverty rate (34 percent), the lowest percentage of homeowners (30 percent), the lowest mean rent ($121 per month) and the highest unemployment rate (20 percent). The neighborhood was about 60 percent African-American and 40 percent white.

**YOUTH LEADERSHIP**

The Youth Center was a magnet. Once there, a young person usually developed a near peer, counseling or mentoring relationship with a staff member. At the Center, youth could do anything within reason. However, the rule was that, if a youth wanted to do something, she or he would have to assume the major responsibility for making it happen — or, generally, it did not happen.

The Center believed that providing teens with opportunities to exercise leadership was essential in helping them grow into fully functional adults. For example, the more senior youth provided leadership for the planning and implementation of a retreat held in the second year of the Center. In addition, before hiring, all potential staff members in the program were interviewed by youth. Youth were an integral part of all major decisions faced by the Center, including the development of by-laws. This was a very contentious process because adult members of the Steering Committee — the council that oversaw the program — wanted to dilute the power of the youth in policy making at the Center.

Over the course of the program, activities developed jointly by youth and staff that seemed to generate enthusiasm included visual arts, literary projects, trips to see other successful youth programs, computer training and summer job training. Center youth also published a newsletter, The Baltimore Sun funded publication. The newsletter featured a Reading Club at the Center, in cooperation with the Mayor’s reading initiative. The newsletter included interviews with the “man on the street” about current events. There were articles and poetry on contemporary issues written by youth at the Center, including essays on drugs, violence and race relations.

A computer room was very popular. Formal computer instruction failed. Staff then made the computers available to youth and waited to see what happened. As might be guessed, computer games became a pop-
ular use of the computers. This helped lead to using the word processing program to do homework. Few of the economically deprived families of South Baltimore can afford a word processor at home. The Center filled this gap, giving the youth of South Baltimore the same kind of educational technological advantage that middle class parents can afford.

Based on its experience and expertise, BJEP was able to organize summer jobs and job training for youth. The Center helped develop positive relationships between youth and supervisors. Kids learned the meaning of work.

**EVALUATION**

The evaluation was based on self-report youth survey questionnaires. The questionnaires were designed by incorporating valid and reliable measures from the evaluation literature, including Eisenhower evaluations. The self report survey questionnaires were administered to 68 participant youth and 132 comparison group youth twice, 18 months apart. The evaluation plan was a quasi-experimental panel design with 3 matched, nonequivalent, untreated comparison groups.*

Our major findings were that participating youth had less high-risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than the comparison youth. These differences were statistically significant. On no measure did the participants perform worse than the comparison youth. The findings are summarized in Table 12. The Center had a positive impact on the youth development of its members and reduced a variety of socially undesirable behaviors. It appears that high-risk behavior decreased among the program youth in direct proportion to the time between surveys. This indicates that not only was there a positive program effect, but that the magnitude of the effect grew with time.

The program demonstrated that crime, delinquency and drug prevention also can be achieved by nonprofit youth development organizations without police partnerships.

**THE UNSTRUCTURED SAFE HAVEN**

The evaluation supported the notion that successful youth development programs have multiple solutions and multiple good outcomes — and that such solutions can flower in an unstructured setting. Being basically unplanned, but responsive to the needs of the youth, the program was virtually guaranteed to generate multiple activities. Being unconstrained by bureaucratic structure, the program could easily, and quickly, move into a variety of activities that addressed the at-risk environment or strengthen the resiliency of participants to socially undesirable behavior.

Thus, we concluded that perhaps the most fundamental reason for the Center's success was its informal structure. The Center's safe haven was less formal in structure than the 4 Justice Department programs (although both the San Juan and Boston initiatives allowed for some unstructured time). Nonetheless, all 5 replications succeeded in terms of program interventions having an impact.

When the staff of the South Baltimore Youth Center said the most important thing they did was to provide a place for the kids to hang out, they did not mean getting kids off the street to make adults happy. They meant providing a setting that allowed for informal interactions and exchanges between adults and youth.

As an informal safe haven, the South Baltimore Youth Center had few rules, and the number of rules declined markedly over time. At the beginning, there were formal by-laws for and membership in the Center. Youth were required to sign in and out at the door of the Center. There was a long list of proscribed behaviors, and violations were supposed to be punished with a fine for each offense. All these formal ele-

*See Baker et al. (1995) for details.
TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME EVALUATION
OF THE SOUTH BALTIMORE YOUTH CENTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) IMPACT MEASURE</th>
<th>(2) PARTICIPANTS WERE BETTER OR WORSE THAN THE COMPARISON GROUP AT:</th>
<th>(3) DID THE PARTICIPANTS IMPROVE OR WORSEN COMPARED TO NON-PARTICIPANTS BETWEEN TIME 1 AND TIME 2?</th>
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</thead>
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<td>TIME 1</td>
<td>TIME 2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Environment of risk</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer culture</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better*</td>
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<td>Better**</td>
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<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future outlook</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer bonding</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family bonding</td>
<td>Better*</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-risk behavior</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol consumption</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs involvement</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious delinquency</td>
<td>Worse*</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor delinquency</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial behavior</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically significant Group X Time difference, p<.05.
*Reflects a very small difference.

Source: See Baker et al. (1995), which also has more explanations of these differences. Also see Appendix 2 in the more detailed version of Youth Investment and Police Mentoring, titled Final Report.

ments were quickly abandoned, either because kids refused to follow the rules, or the rules were counterproductive in that they kept youth away from the Center. At the end, the Center had only 4 rules:

- No drugs
- No fighting
- No shoes on the furniture
- Youth had to enforce the rules

Unlike the original extensive set of rules which were widely violated or ignored, these short rules were followed by all the youth at the Center. In addition, with the Center's lack of structured activities and its "just drop in" philosophy, the typical interaction at the Center was not rigidly time structured. There also
was a strong emphasis on the emotional aspect of adult/youth exchanges.

As the Eisenhower Foundation continues replications, it will be important to work out when and where informal institutions operate best — and with what populations.

**MANAGEMENT**

The founding institution, BJEP, was devoted to economic development. BJEP then gave birth to a youth development organization, housed in the same Victorian building. Over time, after the original BJEP director and the original youth Center director left and each was replaced, a growing incompatibility of institutional goals and staff personalities emerged.

BJEP staff was more interested in business-like economic development through contracts and grants. Center staff was more dedicated to rites of youthful passage, via an unstructured setting. The Eisenhower Foundation has observed such incompatibility before, in the 1980s when we experimented with integrating youth investment programs into the operations of nonprofit groups working in economic development. Sometimes — not always — managers of economic development do not deal well with the more emotionally complicated world of youth development.

The end result of this conflict, and of poor management by BJEP and the Center, was that both BJEP and the Center closed down. The institutional shut down occurred even though the Eisenhower Foundation evaluated the Youth Center’s program as successful. The Foundation tried to mediate, but it had little leverage because it received a subcontract from BJEP. By contrast, with Justice Department sites, the Foundation had fiduciary control. Of the 5 successful replications in this report, the Center was the only program that closed down.

By the time BJEP and the Center ceased operations, a third Baltimore Police Commissioner had been appointed. Dedicated to community policing, he was a member of one of the Foundation’s later delegations to Japan. Afterward, with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development funding which he helped secure for the Foundation, a kōban ministration was begun in Baltimore public housing. This is part of the Foundation’s second generation of replications, summarized in Section 9. Hence, the Foundation came full circle in Baltimore — back to the objectives of the original 1988 delegation to Japan.
8. Lessons
Table 13 summarizes some of the key program components that were present in the replications in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and Baltimore. Table 14 summarizes some of the key process, training, technical assistance and management components in the 5 cities. Mindful of these summaries, we reached some conclusions about the 5 replications. We found that the replications:

1. Demonstrated the effectiveness of multiple solutions carried out by grassroots, unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations.
2. Provided some of the clearest evidence to date that well conceived and well implemented programs work when they are adequately funded.
3. Showed that programs can succeed and innovate when police and grassroots groups partner roughly as equals.
4. Illustrated the limits of volunteerism, self-sufficiency and grassroots community coalitions.
5. Reaffirmed that internal youth development organization capacity and external technical assistance are factors in success.

Consider each conclusion:

1. The replications worked — and demonstrated the effectiveness of multiple solutions carried out by grassroots, unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations.

In San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, the quasi-experimental design showed Index crime to decline by at least 22 percent and at most 27 percent over a minimum of 3 years. Across the 4 cities, the decline in the 4 target neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or their cities as a whole. In Baltimore, the quasi-experimental design showed that program youth had less high risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than comparison youth over 18 months. The differences were statistically significant.

The success of most of these programs has been acknowledged at the national level. The Attorney General brought the Boston and Philadelphia programs to Washington, DC as models that illustrated what was needed in the 1994 crime bill. The Boston program was praised in front of the President by the Attorney General, who became an honorary member of the Drill Team from the Philadelphia program. At about the same time, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development gave the Hispanic Heritage Award to Sister Isolina Ferre, Founder of Centro.

All 5 programs had multiple solutions. The outcome evaluations were not elaborate enough to identify the separate impact of each solution. Rather, the outcome evaluations measured the impact of all the solutions working together in a program. We concluded that the key, complementary interventions, found in different combinations in different replications, were one-on-one and group counseling and mentoring of youth by paid civilians and police to provide social support and discipline, the safe haven and police ministration settings, youth leadership and youth media enterprise, community-based education and remedial education, community-school linkages, employment, sports as part of mentoring, and problem-oriented patrols by police and citizens. Volunteers also were involved.

Our findings did not lend support to the assertion that one-on-one mentoring by volunteers in non-safe haven settings necessarily is the most effective or cost-beneficial intervention for high-risk youth. When the greatest impacts occurred in these replications, paid civilian and paid police staff were more responsible
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City: San Juan</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups by paid civilian staff</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring one-on-one by paid civilian staff</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups or one-on-one by paid police staff</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling and mentoring in groups or one-on-one by volunteers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy by paid staff who mediate among youth, community and police-like intercessors and near-peers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe haven extended family sanctuary off-the-street</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstructured program settings</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-school links, help with homework, remedial education, rites of passage through high school and to college</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment training and job placement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth leadership training or entrepreneurial training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth media enterprise, newspapers, and dramatic productions with a message</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and sports</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police kobans / ministations / drop in centers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented patrols by police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented patrols by police with citizens</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police home visits</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = Presence of component.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>City: San Juan</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had a prior working relationship with</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had a commitment to multiple solutions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to multiple problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had acceptable management and financial</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization had competent paid staff to work with</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth and police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization received group technical assistance by</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth development organization received one-on-one technical assistance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the Eisenhower Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was overseen by a local advisory/planning council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police went to Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and community leaders &quot;bonded&quot; in Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police attended follow-up Eisenhower foundation workshops, especially</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in San Juan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police chief approved the program</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program was overseen day-to-day by competent commander-level police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supervisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police officers who worked with the community day-to-day were competent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and open to learning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 14 (CONTINUED)

SOME KEY PROCESS, TRAINING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND MANAGEMENT COMPONENTS IN THE REPLICATION CITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>SAN JUAN</th>
<th>PHILADELPHIA</th>
<th>BOSTON</th>
<th>CHICAGO</th>
<th>BALTIMORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE POLICE RECEIVED SEPARATE ONE-ON-ONE EISENHOWER FOUNDATION TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION PROVIDED INFORMAL ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TO POLICE</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION PROVIDED MORE FORMAL TRAINING TO POLICE</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PROGRAM SUCCEEDED IN PART BECAUSE OF LOCAL COALITION BUILDING AMONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PROGRAM WAS ABLE TO EASILY RECRUIT AND RETAIN QUALIFIED VOLUNTEERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PROGRAM WAS ABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR YEAR 3 JUSTICE BUDGET CUTS BY INCREASING YEAR 3 LOCAL MATCHES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = Presence of component.
N.A. = Not applicable because police did not implement the replication after the Japan delegation and initial national cluster workshops.

than volunteers. Recruitment of qualified volunteers with time to give was difficult in the low income neighborhoods where the replications were carried out. When volunteers had an effect, they usually (but not always) came from the immediate neighborhood, not from the middle class suburbs. To the extent that they were effective, volunteers were helped by the multiple solutions located at the safe havens. In these replications, we do not believe that counseling by volunteers at just any location would have been as helpful as counseling at the safe haven (although excursions to outside events were part of the mix used by both paid staff and volunteers). For these programs, it was inaccurate and simplistic to conclude that mentoring was a solution separate from the other interdependent solutions. Therefore, we conclude that, independent of other reinforcing interventions, volunteer mentoring should not be oversold.

In our replications, paid civilian youth counselors and mentors earned less than $30,000 per year — usually much less. They mentored in one-on-one and group settings. By contrast, Public/Private Ventures has estimated that it costs about $1,000 per year to screen, train, orient and supervise one volunteer who mentors one youth for a few hours a month.∗ Which approach generates a better cost-benefit ratio? The answer to this question is not entirely clear, in our experience. Nor is it clear that such mentoring is more cost-ben-

eficial than other interventions for the truly disadvantaged, like preschool or employment training.

The youth safe havens where counseling took place in our replications were not just hang-out rooms. For the most part, they were the headquarters of the grassroots nonprofit agencies that received the grants. These grants, and the publicity secured through the agreement of the police to work with the nonprofits as partners, helped the agencies to secure new grants and to build their institutional capacities. As institutions, they were financially empowered to better represent impoverished constituencies in a society where the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer, and the population is becoming more racially segregated.* In modest ways, the nonprofit organizations that were funded had more resources to address broader issues facing the United States. For example, the DYC Clubs promoted racial integration and DYC’s youth media enterprises communicated what works to national audiences through Blockbuster Video and the motion picture, Squeeze. By contrast, initiatives that rely mostly on volunteerism usually do not build much institutional capacity in grassroots organizations.

If adequately funded, nonprofit youth development organizations can change the lives of individuals and also improve the community as a whole. For both individual and community change, we concluded that the San Juan concept of the civilian intercessor, or advocate, may be more effective than the concept of a civilian mentor, based on these replications. Advocates in San Juan mentor youth. But the advocates have roles beyond that. They are trained to mediate among all players — resolving conflicts, or potential conflicts, among youth, police and community. Perhaps most important, they are assertive change agents who address a wide range of issues affecting the community.

We also concluded that the DYC notion of civilian near-peers may be more effective than the concept of civilian adult mentors. DYC has found that the age of a youth counselor is important. High-risk youth tend to be more receptive to role models who are just a few years older, like near-peers, than to grown adults. It can be easier for a risk-taking 15 year old youth in trouble to be influenced by a cool-but-responsible 18 year old than by a 45 year old volunteer.

Accordingly, we believe that too much emphasis on civilian adult mentoring — especially the volunteer variety — can lose sight of concepts that can be more effective, like advocates and near-peers. Future replications would do well to consider civilian staff members who integrate the roles of advocates, near-peers, counselors and mentors.

As part of multiple solutions, police ministrations were integrated with safe havens in 2 replication sites (San Juan and Philadelphia). A third site, Boston, created the police drop-in center at the safe haven — a variation on the koban theme. In all of these places, trust built between youth and police. We concluded from process observations that the problem-oriented patrols by police, often originating in the immediate safe haven locations and extending into the surrounding neighborhood, helped to explain the crime reduction that was documented. We could not identify the effect of patrols separate from the effects of the other interventions. Yet it is difficult to believe that the crime reduction community-wide could have occurred only through the work of civilians and police back at the safe haven locations. The patrols included youth development workers and advocates out with police, in one form or another, at certain times in all 4 of the Justice Department replications. Through such involvement, the police work was integrated more with youth development than is the case with most police foot patrols.

All of the replications were undertaken by unaffiliated inner city nonprofit organizations. Their success led us to caution against a top down national strategy in which reform for high-risk youth in the inner city is undertaken predominantly by national nonprofit organizations — which tend to have more access to

*See the more detailed version of Youth Investment and Police Mentoring, subtitled Final Report.
money and power than unaffiliated grassroots groups. Our experience reasserts the promise of a "bubble up" strategy in which unaffiliated grassroots groups are funded, technically assisted, and encouraged to creatively vary their solutions, based on local circumstances, while still sharing some underlying principles about what works.

2. The replications provided some of the clearest evidence to date that well conceived and well implemented programs work when they are adequately funded.

After demonstration programs in the 1980s which were funded in the "lean and mean" spirit of the times, the Eisenhower Foundation concluded that, for adequate professional staff, support staff, equipment and infrastructure, a nonprofit community-based youth development organization needed somewhere in the range of about $80,000 to $100,000 per year for at least 3 years for an initiative like the kind in this report. Standards remain very imprecise in the fields of youth development and community crime prevention, but experience suggested that such a funding range was a reasonable ballpark estimate.

This was roughly the formula that was implemented with Justice Department funds in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago. Over the first 2 years, the average grant per year at each site was in the $80,000 to $100,000 range. Local matches, especially in terms of police salaries and benefits, added considerably more. By the second year, the decline in Index crime in the 4 target neighborhoods in the 4 cities averaged about 18 percent. The sharp budget cuts came in the third year — and at that time the decline in Index crime in the 4 target neighborhoods averaged just 3 percent. As Appendix 1 details, the differences were statistically significant, with the chances being about 9 out of 10 that the budget cuts seriously impeded crime reduction. Many paid staffers were released, paid less or paid part time. More reliance had to be made on volunteerism. The result was a loss of program impact. The striking earlier reductions in crime were eliminated.

Eventually, we expect the impact of any inner city intervention to lessen. For example, no program can cut Index crime by 20 percent a year forever. So it is appropriate to ask whether the dramatic change in crime reduction in the third year was only the expected decline in program impact or whether it was the effect of the budget cut. We concluded it was the budget cut. Why? The change was very abrupt. The natural decline in effectiveness, what economists call diminishing marginal returns, is almost always more smooth and gradual. In addition, the decline came too soon in the history of the programs. Much of the first year of a program’s life is spent in organizing and implementing the program. Most programs don’t really become operational or reach optimal performance until the second or third year — or later. We would expect at least a few years of strong program effects before diminishing returns set in. But these programs were pulled up short after their second year of full operation. It appears that the budget cut adversely affected Index crime in these target neighborhoods.

3. The replications demonstrated that programs can succeed and innovate when police and grassroots groups partner roughly as equals.

The Justice Department-funded programs were a form of problem-oriented policing in which police and youth development nonprofit organizations worked roughly as equals. The grassroots organizations had their own budgets. In all cases, the program was run through an advisory and planning council composed of police and civilians who had equal voices.

The police assigned officers as part of the local match and had ultimate control — in that they could have crippled the programs by pulling out. Yet they did not pull out of the Justice Department-funded replications.
A process played out in which trust built, civilians learned from police and police learned from civilians. Police and civilians worked side-by-side — counseling, near-peeking, advocating, mentoring, foot patrolling, teaching sports, consulting teachers at school and consulting parents during home visits. The informal, mutual learning process also included the delegation to Japan and the follow-up workshops (especially in San Juan). In Japan, for example, home visits initially were frowned upon by American police delegates as too intrusive for the United States. But several of the police-community partnerships later found home visits to work back home. In San Juan, there also was more formal training by civilians at the Police Academy. In many ways, the crime-reducing successes of the Justice Department-funded initiatives depended, in our view, on the community, safe haven and koban setting in which officers used their natural intelligence as well as street savvy to improve on what they already knew. Thus, for example, as recounted in Section 3, the koban police recognized that no other agencies would dispose of the dead cow in San Juan — so the police burned it and engendered long-run trust in the community by their common-sense, problem-oriented behavior.

The police took on new roles as counselors and mentors. (The concept of mentor fits police, who might think that the notion of advocate is beyond the mission of the police department and who tend to be older than near-peers.) The police showed that paid public servants can be investors in youth, and that the outcome is not do-gooder social work — but less crime. The notion of paid civil servants — in this case, police — working as mentors may run counter to the reemergence of volunteerism in the 1990s. But can we find anywhere near the number of qualified volunteers who are needed? Based on the findings of Public/Private Ventures,* and given that the country needs $7B more to pay for Head Start for all eligible, can we afford to pay for the $5B to $15B required per year to screen, orient, train and supervise enough new volunteers for all youth who may need them? By contrast, Congress has appropriated significant funds for community police who already are on the streets, and some are quite capable of counseling at-risk youth based on the evidence in our evaluations.

The kind of community equity policing suggested by our replications must secure the initial support of the Police Chief — and often the Mayor — in any city where it is tried, in our experience. For any chance at permanence, such community equity policing ideally needs to run long enough to reduce crime before the Police Chief retires or moves on. Opportunities like cross cultural trips (as Japan) will continue to be needed — to challenge creative chiefs, expand horizons and provide any-from-home opportunities for youth development staff to bond with police. Without interfering with local initiative and creativity, some standardized training materials — written and video — are needed to document success to date and to lay out underlying principles. Local technical assistance and national group workshops ought to continue. National staff are needed to train trainers at local police academies, building on the training experience of Centro at the San Juan Police Academy. National private and public funders might consider revising their funding guidelines to better allow for this kind of community equity policing with youth development agencies. And to allow for new roles by police officers — as, for example, paid civil servant mentors.

In our replications, Police Chiefs agreed up front to relative equity between grassroots organizations and police. It took a very special kind of Police Chief to buy into the process. And it took wise police supervisors at the precinct command level and skillful police officers on the streets to carry out the equality day-to-day.

4. The replications illustrated the limits of volunteerism, self-sufficiency and grassroots community coalitions.

All 5 replications utilized volunteers and found them helpful in the overall effort. The extent of screen-

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ing, orientation and monitoring varied. Some of the sites, like those in Boston and Philadelphia, had difficulty in identifying and retaining qualified volunteers to work with their high risk populations, even though some volunteers were offered stipends. More volunteers were needed in the 4 Justice Department sites when their budgets were cut, but this volunteerism was not able to do much about Index crime.

Among other meanings, “self-sufficiency” often signals that the original funder will pull out of a seed grant after, perhaps, 2 to 4 years, and that other funding streams need to be in place by then to assure program continuity. We applaud the creative self-sufficiency of programs like Delancey Street in San Francisco, and call for long term investments by funders in technical assistance that will help teach others the lessons of Delancey Street.* But we also believe that, for relatively young inner city organizations working with high-risk youth in a national environment in which class and race divides are increasing and domestic funding is being reduced, self-sufficiency is an unrealistic notion. In this vein, we applaud the initiative of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Ford Foundation and other leading foundations in making longer term funding commitments to some community-based programs.

At the time of this report, the site among the 5 that had the most continuity with the replications as originally planned in 1987-1990 was San Juan — and that, in no small part, was due to continued funding by the Eisenhower Foundation, via the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, matched by San Juan police resources. At the other end of the scale, the South Baltimore Youth Center had zero self-sufficiency. It closed down. Among the other sites, the nonprofit organizations that were funded were doing reasonably well. The specific programs that were designed in 1988-1990, however, were operating at more modest levels.

Only one of the 5 replications, Chicago, stressed coalition building among a number of grassroots community organizations, above and beyond the police partnership. We did not find this to be particularly effective. A great deal of time needed to be spent in interagency meetings. Chicago did succeed in terms of outcomes, but we thought that was more a result of direct services than of coalition building. To a lesser extent, the Baltimore program engaged in coalition outreach with other community organizations, but the effort tended to demand a great deal of staff time and resulted in considerably less benefit than direct work with youth.

5. The replications reaffirmed that internal youth development organization capacity and external technical assistance are factors in success.

There were variations among sites, but all the Justice Department-funded programs developed a clear mission; had adequate to superior leadership; involved qualified, flexible and tenacious paid civilian and police staff; and carried out minimally acceptable to more sophisticated management and financial management.

The Baltimore program succeeded in program content, but ultimately failed because of mission conflicts between economic development staff and youth development staff, and because new executive directors were not sufficiently skilled as conflict resolvers, managers and financial managers. The Foundation was a subcontractor for the evaluation only in Baltimore. If the grant had come through the Foundation, or if the Foundation had been more successful is raising more resources for technical assistance for Baltimore, it might have been possible to keep the program alive. As the prime grant recipient, the Foundation might have had more leverage to resolve conflicts and to put in place more qualified staff. This has been effective in work with some other groups. But even with a greater and more effective Eisenhower presence, more positive managerial outcomes would by no means have been assured.

We believe that the Eisenhower Foundation was a needed catalyst and assistor — for the 10 year period over which the replications evolved. The Foundation began planning and raising funds for the Japan delegation in 1987. Several planning trips to Japan were necessary. The 30 member 1988 delegation was very costly, as were 2 later delegations. But they provided information and opportunities to build trust among the Foundation, the police and community leaders. Two years went by between the 1988 delegation to Japan and Justice Department and Department of Health and Human Services funding. The Foundation provided planning technical assistance, applied for operating funds for proposed sites and raised money to keep its own development work moving forward. This work was not just for the sites reported here, but also for other partnerships between police and community groups that matured after the delegations. Once Justice Department funding was obtained, mostly for local operations, the Foundation raised local cash match funds, secured the local in-kind matches from police, raised funds for Eisenhower Foundation technical assistance and evaluation, carried out that assistance and evaluation, submitted the final report to the Justice Department, financed a number of public policy forums and presentations on the experience, and secured the resources to complete and disseminate this evaluation. Toward the end of this process, the Foundation was granted funding for a new round of replications (as discussed in Section 9).

The Foundation provided one-on-one and group technical assistance, led by a national program director who provided day-to-day management and quality control, along with support staff and consultants. Most effective, we thought, were the national cluster workshops, like the one in San Juan, where police and civilians could teach one another, see one of the sites in operation and meet with technical assistors on subjects they had requested beforehand. More was needed, we concluded, for formal training of police, though we did not discount the day-to-day informal learning that occurred as citizens, youth and police worked together.

The Foundation insured that the programs were replications of principles. Police and community leaders were not pressured in Japan, or in later planning, to copy specific Japanese — or American — models. The Foundation can be criticized, perhaps, for too few ground rules when it came to replicating American variations on Japanese themes. However, cross cultural replications are very tricky. Just as good mentors are not overbearing, we found that a more relaxed, but continually attentive process worked best in the long run, especially for the very intelligent, assertive, experienced and independent police and civilian members of our delegations.

* * * * *

Based on the lessons we have summarized at the beginning of this report a Top Ten List of recommendations for policy and action by government and foundations.
9. The Next Generation of Replications
For the next generation of replications, the Eisenhower Foundation wants to test whether such replications can work among at least 3 partners — youth development organizations, police and public housing authorities. Each replication is being run by a nonprofit youth development or community development organization. The public housing agency or community development organization provides space. The space serves both as a youth safe haven and as a police koban. The city police department contributes 2 or 3 officers, who undertake community policing foot patrols and visit families and schools from the safe haven/koban.

Initial funding is from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, the Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (which is supplying the largest portion of national funds) and other matching partners. Initial sites are in Baltimore, (led by the Maryland Boys and Girls Club in Flag House Courts public housing); Columbia, SC (led by Koban Inc. in Gonzales Gardens public housing); Little Rock, (led by the Tomberlin Community Development Center, in Hollingsworth Grove public housing); Memphis, TN (led by the Memphis Boys Club in Le Moyne Gardens public housing); San Juan (led by Centro Sister Isolina Ferre); and Washington, DC (led by the Telesis Corporation at the Paradise at Parkside low income housing development in the Anacostia neighborhood). In Columbia, San Juan and Washington, DC, police live in the neighborhood where they work.

Based on the findings summarized in the present report, most (4 of 6) of the next generation of sites are unaffiliated nonprofit organizations. As a premier low income housing development organization, the Telesis Corporation provides another test of the conditions under which youth development and economic development can be integrated by the same organization.

The police from all cities have been to Japan, and all have been to a workshop in San Juan.

Second generation programs have been asked to replicate the principles that the evaluation suggested were fundamental to the success of the first generation reported here. Because we have more experience, we now have more principles than in our extremely open-ended approach to replication after the original 1988 delegation to Japan. However, the operators of second generation replications nonetheless have been encouraged to vary the details of their programs to fit neighborhood circumstances and so create local ownership.

The main second generation principles are as follows:

- The outcomes of the program are to keep youth aged approximately 6 to 18 in school or alternative schools, keep them out of the criminal justice system, position them for responsible adulthood, and improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods.
- All funding for the program from the Eisenhower Foundation is to a qualified 501(c)(3) youth development or similar organization, devoted to human betterment. The organization has legal, fiduciary responsibility for the program and hires a civilian director. The program is framed as a youth investment and youth development venture, not as a criminal justice initiative.
- Civilian safe haven staff includes some persons who serve as near-peers, as developed by DYC, and some who serve as advocate intermediaries among the community, youth and police, as developed by Centro Sister Isolina Ferre.
- The safe haven is most active from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m., for reasons set forth in the Carnegie Corporation report, A Matter of Time.
- The Police Chief agrees to the program's principles in advance, and assigns
as match at least 2 police officers, who develop a koban that shares space
with or is adjoining to the safe haven. The officers partner with the civilians,
but do not control the program. Officers are carefully selected jointly with
the youth development organization.

• Koban facilities can be residential, nonresidential or both. Even if the koban
is nonresidential, it is encouraged (but not required) that the officers live in
the neighborhood where they serve.

• Police spend about half their time counseling and mentoring youth and
about half their time undertaking community policing on foot or on bicycle,
using the safe haven/koban as home base. Patrol activity includes safe pas-
sage of youth to and from school.

• Civilians and police perform outreach to neighborhood schools and work with
school staff on development of youth who participate in the safe haven/koban.

• Civilians and police must take a 10 unit course in how to counsel and men-
tor youth and how to train other adults to do so.

• Police receive training from civilians in the program, above and beyond
training in the local police academy. A good guide is the training of police
by civilians at Centro Sister Isolina Ferre. The Foundation also has distrib-
uted a training manual and video, which are required to be understood by all
staff before they begin work.

• The Executive Director of the public housing authority agrees to the pro-
gram's principles in advance. The public housing authority provides as min-
imal match adequate space and furniture that is kept in good repair.

• The community supports the youth safe haven/koban. An advisory board is
created, consisting of representatives from the community, youth, police,
civilian staff, public housing authority, business community and schools.

• The advisory board, Program Director, police and public housing authority
leverage additional funds for the program.

• Implementation does not begin and funds to replication sites are not be
released until a strategic workplan, a budget and a contract are completed. The
workplan is informed by the kind of multiple solutions found in this report.

• Programs need to possess or soon develop flexible, caring and tenacious
staff; solid organizational and financial management; and the ability to sus-
tain themselves.

The Eisenhower Foundation is providing technical assistance and the evaluation. At the time of the pre-
sent report, the evaluation is in its early stages. But we can illustrate some initial outcomes. In Memphis,
the koban is located within the Boys Club, across the street from public housing. Citizen and police staff
collaborate in counseling youth and in footpatrols. Group Clubs have been formed in which an adult works
with and counsels up to 15 young people. Workshops on resolving conflicts have been well received. An
initial disappointment has been with the volunteer mentoring promised by an organization of adult profes-
sionals — people who live outside of the neighborhood. Few adult mentors have to date come forth. This
TABLE 15

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME BETWEEN 1995 AND 1996, COLUMBIA, SC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CRIME (FBI PART I INDEX CRIME)</th>
<th>MORE SERIOUS CRIME (FBI PART I INDEX CRIME)</th>
<th>LESS SERIOUS CRIME (FBI PART II CRIME)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC HOUSING NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td></td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITH SAFE HAVEN/KOBAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARISON NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td></td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>+28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE POINT ADVANTAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR THE SAFE HAVEN/KOBAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEIGHBORHOOD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Columbia, SC Police Department

underscores our caution on the limits of volunteerism. Nonetheless, without such middle class volunteerism, during the first year of operations, Index crime declined in the neighborhood — while it increased in the surrounding precinct, in a comparison housing project and in Memphis as a whole.

In Columbia, SC, an apartment in public housing has become both the safe haven and the koban. The housing unit also includes a library and a computer training room. Neither the civilian director nor the police live in the nonresidential facility, but a residential koban will open in another location. Climbing to Success, a youth leadership initiative, appears to be off to a good start, as does case management that includes program staff who consult with teachers. Over 45 community events were organized in the safe haven/koban’s first 18 months of operation. As Table 15 shows, for the first year of operations, the improvement in the crime picture in the target neighborhood has been considerably better than changes in a comparison neighborhood.

In Little Rock, the safe haven and koban also are integrated into a street level apartment in public housing. A year-long after school and summer program is in place that includes job readiness, drug/alcohol education, case management, youth leadership and patrols and mentoring by police. Preliminary findings from self-report youth surveys indicate that program youth have a lower incidence of delinquency and other misbehavior than comparison youth.

Appendix 2 contains newspaper article reprints on some of the initiatives.

THE FUTURE

Future Eisenhower Foundation reports will document the progress of this new generation of replications. We hope that the basic facility, in which space is shared by the youth safe haven and the koban ministration, can become a magnet to attract more and more complementary ventures. We would like these secured locations to become full service, one stop centers for programs that work — including job training, placement and retention as part of welfare reform. The centers can be located in public housing, nonprofit organizations, schools or other locations in low income neighborhoods. The vision is to create human capital neighborhoods, where multiple solutions are comprehensive, interdependent and responsive to local needs. To carry out this vision, we will seek more funding from still other sources, so that the process of successful replication can be accelerated.
Appendix 1: Analysis of FBI Index Crime Data for San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago*

*Appendix 1 was written by Keith A. Baker.
The police in San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago provided the Eisenhower Foundation with Part I Index crime data covering the years the programs operated. Part I Index crime as defined by the FBI consists of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, auto theft and larceny. There are more property crimes than violent crimes, so any composite like the Index summation of all 7 of these crimes is weighted in favor of property crimes. We here will refer to these Part I offenses simply as “Index crime.”

In each city, Index crime data were provided by the police for (1) the neighborhood served by the program, (2) the whole city, and (3) the police precinct surrounding the target neighborhood. We determined whether the program had an impact on Index crime by comparing Index crime in the target neighborhood served by the program to Index crime in the city and then to Index crime in the surrounding police precinct. An effective program will produce greater declines in Index crime in its target neighborhood than declines in Index crime in either of these other areas.

The Index crime data were not uniform. Different cities gave us different levels of detail. To simplify the analytic problems this presents, we only analyzed the most serious crime — Index crime. Presumably, measures of Index crime are comparable across cities. But we make no claim that the Index crime data are perfectly comparable across the 4 sites — except to the extent that each city followed the procedures defining Index crime. However, some inconsistencies in the measurement of Index crime across the 4 cities can be an advantage in the analysis. If we can demonstrate impacts, our confidence in the results increases if the Index crime data are somewhat different from place to place — because the effect of the program presumably is strong enough to overcome any effects the non-comparability of the data might have.

Police crime statistics are well-known as inaccurate measures of the extent of crime because they are affected by both the willingness of the public to report crime and by police practices in recording reports from the public. As long as they are constant over time within each city, these errors do not affect our analysis of change over time. It is reasonable to assume the errors in police Index crime data are constant over the short period covered by our data.

**METHOD**

We looked at the percentage changes in Index crime reported over the 3 years that the programs operated. We compared the change in the program target neighborhood to the change for the city and for the police precinct within which the program was located, after removing the target neighborhood crime counts from the precinct data and after removing the precinct (and target neighborhood) crime counts from the city total. We took the number of crimes in the first year the program operated as the base number of crimes. We used this base crime count to compute the change in subsequent years as a percentage of the base year. For example, if there were 100 crimes in a city in the base year and 88 crimes the next year, crime in the second year was 88 percent of the base year number of crimes, or a decline of 12 percent in the number of crimes (100% - 88% = 12%). If there were 86 crimes in the third year, the third year rate would be 86 percent of the base year number of crimes. If the crime count went up to 112 in the second year, it would be 112 percent of the base. If there were no change in the number of crimes from year to year, our measure of change would be 0.

We used the first year in which the program operated at each site as the baseline year primarily because one site didn’t provide any Index crime data for the years before the program began operation. The programs had only modest operations during the first parts of their first years. Consequently, first year crime data were a mix of the experience under both the program condition and under the condition of very little program, as often is the case with youth development and police initiatives. The only consequence of using
the first program year as the baseline as compared to using the year before as the baseline is to produce a more conservative test of the impact of the program. This is because an effective program might be expected to reduce crime somewhat even in its first year (although not as much as in immediately subsequent years because it takes programs awhile to gear up to maximum effectiveness).

For the analysis of the impact of the Justice Department budget cut in Year 3 of the program, we compared the percentage that Index crime declined between the first and second program years, when funding levels were greater, to the percentage change in Index crime between the second and third program year, when budgets were cut by the Justice Department.

**PROGRAM IMPACT**

We analyzed the total number of Index crimes and did not disaggregate the total into its component crimes — because the number of serious crimes in the target neighborhood was small. Disaggregating would have reduced the stability (reliability) of the data as an estimate of Index crime.

Two statistical analyses were done for each of 3 comparisons to determine the effect of the program. We compared the change in crime over 3 years for:

* The target neighborhood vs. the city
* The target neighborhood vs. the precinct
* The precinct vs. the city

These data were analyzed with two statistical tests, Student’s t and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test.\(^3\)

The third year budget cut let us look at the effect of funding level on Index crime reduction.\(^3\) We compared the change in Index crime between the years of greater funding to the change in Index crime between Year 2 and the final year, of reduced funding.

**SAN JUAN: TWO PROBLEMS**

In terms of analyses, there were 2 problems encountered in San Juan that were not present at the other locations. First, there was a question of which year to use as the start of the Centro program. Centro began full operations a year before the Justice Department grant and a year before the other 3 sites started full program operations. Consequently, we did 2 analyses using different years for the start of Centro. One analysis took as the first year the first year of the program’s operation. The other analysis took as the first year the first year of the Justice grant.

For the purposes of assessing the effects of the Justice Department grant, we limited the analysis to the period covered by that grant, which started in Centro’s second year. For purposes of assessing the impact of the koban/community-based youth program, we used the first year of each project, which, in the case of Centro, was one year earlier than at the other locations.

The second issue in San Juan was defining the program target area. In contrast to San Juan, the police at
**TABLE 1**

ALTERNATIVE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS AND START DATES, SAN JUAN

| WHAT WAS THE      | WHAT WAS THE     | PROGRAM OPERATIONS | JUSTICE DEPARTMENT |
| 813 AND 814       | 1                | 2                  |
| 813               | 3                | 4                  |

the other 3 locations provided data that more closely matched their program's geographic target area. Chicago, for example, sent block level crime reports for the streets within the programs target area.

Centro is located within the Caimito precinct, more or less in the center of police reporting sector 813, which implies the target area was sector 813. However, the patrol area covered by the koban officers was about equally divided between reporting sectors 813 and 814, and covered less than half of either sector. The patrol area implies that both sectors should be used to define the target area. Consequently, we did the analysis twice, once for the target area defined as sector 813 and then for the target area defined as both sectors 813 and 814.

Everything considered, and especially in light of the geography of Caimito, we are inclined to think that the best definition of the target area is 813 and 814 combined.

These issues in San Juan produced 4 data analyses, as seen in Table 1.

**IMPACTS ON INDEX CRIME**

From the start of the programs (4 years for San Juan, 3 years for the other sites) through the end of the 3 year Justice Department grant, crime declined, on average, about 24 percent in the program target neighborhoods, 10 percent in the cities, and 10 percent in the police precinct surrounding the program target neighborhoods. Over the 3 years the Justice-funded program operated, crime declined, on average, 19 percent in the target neighborhoods, 14 percent in the precincts, and 8 percent for the cities.

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the statistical analyses for the aggregated target area data from the 4 cities, the aggregated precinct data from the 4 cities and the aggregated city level data from the 4 cities. Tables 2 and 3 show the results under all the options in Table 1. That is, the aggregated 4 city results are shown under the assumptions of smaller versus larger target neighborhoods for San Juan and under the assumptions of 4 years of data versus 3 years of data for San Juan.

Tables 2 and 3 show that different ways of defining the target neighborhood in San Juan and the year taken in San Juan as the first year of the analysis do not affect the results. There was a statistically significant difference in the percentage decline in Index crime between the program neighborhood and the comparison areas of both the cities and the surrounding police precincts.7,8

Also, there was a statistically significant greater drop in Index crime in the precincts than in the cities.

These results indicate the program was effective in reducing Index crime — because Index crime dropped
TABLE 2

EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAM
RESULTS OF PARAMETRIC STATISTICAL ANALYSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TARGET V. CITY*</th>
<th>TARGET V. PRECINT*</th>
<th>PRECINCT V. CITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>P&lt;</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE YEARS OF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN JUAN DATA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRO IS 1 SECTOR</td>
<td>6.075</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRO IS 2 SECTORS</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR YEARS OF</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN JUAN DATA</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRO IS 1 SECTOR</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>4.169</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRO IS 2 SECTORS</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>.00000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=one-tailed t-test

TABLE 3

EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAM
RESULTS OF NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL ANALYSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TARGET V. CITY*</th>
<th>TARGET V. PRECINT*</th>
<th>PRECINCT V. CITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P&lt;</td>
<td>P&lt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>THREE YEARS OF</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN JUAN DATA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRO IS 1 SECTOR</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
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<td>CENTRO IS 2 SECTORS</td>
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<td>SAN JUAN DATA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRO IS 2 SECTORS</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=one-tailed t-test

more in the target neighborhood than in either the precincts or in the cities.

To explain the meaning of Tables 2 and 3 in more detail, we note that there are 2 types of statistical analyses that differ in the assumptions that have to be made about the nature of the data being analyzed for the statistical test to work correctly. One of these, called parametric statistics, requires more conditions be met. However, if these conditions are met, parametric statistical tests are more powerful than the alternative. (Powerful in this case means the statistical test is able to detect a real difference for a given number of cases.)

The other type of statistics — non-parametric statistical tests — have almost no prior conditions for them
to work. But they are less powerful.

We believe the best procedure is to use both. Then, when drawing conclusions, we don’t have to worry about making errors that could result from either a failure to satisfy the conditions required by parametric statistics or from missing a true effect when using the less powerful non-parametric tests.

To see if it made any difference whether the koban target neighborhood in San Juan was defined by one or two police reporting areas, we compared the results of doing it both ways. We compared the target neighborhood to either the rest of the city or to the rest of its police precinct for the change in crime from each year to the next over the 3 or 4 years for which we had data.

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the analysis. In Table 2, the column “t” gives the value of the statistical test. The column “P<” shows whether the result was significant. (Chances were less than 5 out of 100 that the value of t was an accidental event.)

The first 2 rows of Table 2 tell us that when we use 3 years of San Juan data, we get the same result whether the target neighborhood is defined as 1 or 2 police sectors. In both cases, there was more improvement in Index crime for the target neighborhood than for either the rest of the city or for the rest of the Caimito police precinct. (All values of t were significant.)

The same pattern — all t values are significant — also occurs if we use 4 years of data instead of 3 years.

Table 3 shows the same pattern of results when a non-parametric test rather than the parametric t-test is used.

We then can gain confidence in the conclusion that the program had the desired effect on Index crime in the target neighborhood. This is because the target neighborhood had a statistically significant decline in Index crime when compared to either the rest of the city or to the rest of the police precinct where the target neighborhood was located, but which was not serviced by the program. Moreover, these results were not affected by either the way the target neighborhood was defined or by the number of years taken as the time the program operated.

**IMPACT OF DIFFERENT BUDGET LEVELS**

The Justice Department cut budgets during the last year of the program. The year before the budget cuts, Index crime in the target areas declined an average 18 percent. The year after the budget cuts, Index crime declined only 3 percent. The budget cut was terribly upsetting to program operators and local citizens. However, the sharp cuts at least allowed us to demonstrate clearly the relationship between funding levels and Index crime.

We compared the change in Index crime between the first and second program years, when there was greater funding per year, to the change in Index crime between the second and third years. The Justice Department cut the budgets in the third year. There was a statistically significant difference in the percentage of the base year that Index crime went down in the year before the budget cut compared to the percentage base year Index crime declined during the program year affected by the budget — with the chances being about 9 out of 10 that the budget cuts seriously impeded crime reduction. The statistical test results are in Table 4. The budget cuts resulted in a loss of program impact. Striking reductions in crime were greatly reduced (but not totally eliminated).

Eventually, we would expect the impact of the program to lessen. No program can cut Index crime by 20 percent a year forever. Therefore, was the drop in crime encountered in the third year only the expected
decline in program impact rather than the effect of a budget cut? We think not, for two reasons. First, the change was too abrupt. The natural decline in effectiveness, what economists call diminishing marginal returns, is almost always smooth and gradual. Second, the change came too soon in the program’s history. Much of the first year of a program’s life is spent in organizing and implementing the program. Most programs don’t really become operational until the second or even third year. We would expect at least a few years of strong program effects before diminishing returns set in. But these programs were pulled up short after their second year of full operation. It appears that the budget cut adversely affected crime in these program areas.

**COULD SOMETHING ELSE CAUSE THE DIFFERENCE IN INDEX CRIME THAT WE FOUND?**

Before we can conclude that the programs in the 4 cities were effective, we have to be as sure as we can that only the program intervention could have caused the pattern of changes we found in the Index crime data. Using 2 comparison conditions and 4 different sites around the country rules out many of the threats to validity. Of any remaining threats to validity, the major concern is the “regression artifact” — because a regression artifact could produce exactly the pattern we found of an initial large decline followed by no difference.

The regression artifact works something like this. Data can be divided into 2 parts, a true pattern and a distortion of the truth for a host of reasons that constitute random error in the data. Figure 1 shows 3 lines. One line is a set of random numbers, irrelevant error in the data. The second line shows a true pattern, a value that increases by one at every point on the x-axis. Because we never can directly measure the true patterns, the third line shows what happens when the random pattern and the real pattern are combined. The third line consists of “real data” from which we want to deduce the true pattern.

Suppose the true pattern is increasing crime and we want to find the effects of a crime prevention program. If we start our program at A in Figure 1 and measure the change in crime between A and B, we would

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<td>EFFECTS OF THE JUSTICE BUDGET CUT: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON OF FULL FUNDING TO THE YEAR AFTER THE BUDGET CUT.</td>
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*one-tailed
conclude that crime declined and the program was effective. This is the wrong conclusion. The truth is that, in these data, crime always increases. Hence, the program failed.

How do we know this hypothetical pattern is not what we encountered in this study? How do we know the programs didn’t take advantage of the quirks in the pattern of crime produced by random events?

First, skipping over some boring statistics and oversimplifying a little, the accidental pattern showing program improvement requires only that we pick as our starting point a measure that is inflated by random error. It is necessary that the pre-test data are selected in some way that is tantamount to selecting data inflated by random errors. Given that, it doesn’t matter when we do the post-test for the comparison. Therefore, the question is, did the programs start in a year when crime was unusually high because of the random fluctuation in crime? If they did, then we would expect, for reasons unrelated to the program, that crime would drop.

There are several reasons for concluding that the decline in Index crime found for the Justice Department programs was real and not a statistical quirk. For example, our process evaluation looked at the reasons why the programs began, and none of the programs started in response to an unusual short term increase in Index crime. Index crime in the target areas in Chicago and Philadelphia had been steady for several years. Both the Chicago and Philadelphia programs began in response to growing citizen complaints over an inaccurately perceived fear that Index crime was increasing when in fact it was not.

In addition, the Boston youth program had been in operation for many years before the community police program began, and there were no unusual changes in Index crime, according to the police. In Philadelphia, the police started a community policing program the year before the involvement with the youth program by the police began. If there were regression effects or selection effects, they would have happened the year before the experimental program started.

San Juan is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. Index crime was increasing in Caimito because of police activity in central San Juan. Caimito is the most remote part of San Juan, more than 20 miles from downtown San Juan. Caimito is in the foothills of the mountain chain that forms the central spine of Puerto Rico, and it is an area of steep rugged hills and narrow twisting valleys. When the police cracked down on drug dealers in central San Juan, it appears that the crooks literally took to the hills. They fled to Caimito,
where it is easier to hide. Index crime shot up in Caimito. It dropped dramatically in the program target area, but Index crime continued to climb in the rest of Caimito. If our data were biased by a regression artifact or by the police responding to pockets of exploding Index crime, Index crime would have dropped in all of Caimito, not just in the target area.

The way the target areas were selected also argues against regression or selection effects biasing the data. Sites were selected (1) having a community-based youth development program and (2) police and youth program willingness to work together. Index crime rates were not directly part of the selection process. Indirectly, Index crime affected the site locations in that youth programs are likely to be located in high Index crime areas because that is where high-risk youth live. But these areas are defined by long term high Index crime rates, not by the sudden short term jump that raises the possibility of regression or selection bias.

Further, the youth development programs pre-dated the project. With the exception of Chicago and Boston, community policing in the target area predated the project. Therefore, it is virtually impossible for the selection procedure to create a regression or selection bias in Index crime data.

Regression artifacts or selection biases do not happen out of the blue. Consciously or unconsciously, a decision has to be made to start collecting data at the point marked A in Figure 1. The histories of these programs shows that no such decision was made. Moreover, for all 4 sites, we would have had to experience a large random fluctuation in Index crime in the same year, except in San Juan, where it had to happen a year earlier. The probability that this happened is extremely remote.

OTHER POSSIBILITIES

Sometimes crime statistics collected by the police are affected, either intentionally or unintentionally, by police department policy or by the attitudes of the police. Could changes in police policy or attitudes have produced the results we found? We don't think it very likely. In most sites, the officers assigned to the project were not involved in recording Index crime reports. In 3 of the 4 sites, they worked outside the precinct police station where crimes were reported. (Crimes could be reported through the Philadelphia mini-station. In San Juan, it was police policy that crimes not be reported through the koban. The settings where the police worked in Boston and Chicago were organized to handle crime reports.) In all sites, the program was a small part of precinct operations and almost invisible at the city level. There was no opportunity for the program to bias the collection of Index crime reports.

Inspection of the data suggests that Index crime first dropped and then began to level out. Why should this happen? In addition to the effect of the budget cut, there are other possibilities. First, it could be a temporary glitch in the pattern, so the decline could resume in later years. In other words, there might not really have been a decline in the rate at which crime was declining the program neighborhoods. But this was very unlikely — because the leveling out was statistically significant.

Next, it could be that the effects of such programs are not linear. That is, when the programs were first introduced, they made a (relatively) big initial impact but further gains were incrementally smaller. This is a common pattern — big initial impacts followed by smaller improvements — found in everything from learning (the well known learning curve) to the economist's law of diminishing marginal returns. However, we would not expect a decline in effectiveness in the third year for several reasons. First, we would expect further improvement, not decline, in effectiveness in later years as the developmental effects of the program come into play. Second, it is well established in the experience of the full range of prevention and youth development programs that it takes a year or more — usually more — to get a program up and running. The
Justice Department cut the program's budget at what probably was the most critical point for any program — just when it would be expected to have settled down from its initial growing pains and was ready to roll. Ordinarily, we would expect increasing effectiveness from any program through 3 or more years of operation, not the sudden stop to progress such as we found. As discussed earlier, the budget cut seems by far the most likely explanation of the Index crime data pattern, especially because the same leveling out was found at every site immediately following the budget cut.

CENTRAL TENDENCIES

Customarily, evaluation reports give statistical analyses of central tendencies — i.e. the overall patterns in the data. We did that here. In addition, we also report the data for each separate case because the effects we identified in the statistical analysis are so consistent across the individual program locations that they can be seen in each individual case as well as in the statistical aggregate. It is unusual for social science data to reveal such consistent patterns that they can be clearly seen in every individual case as well as in the aggregate.

In looking at the results for the individual sites, readers should remember not to make too big a point over the few discrepancies where one site deviates from the overall pattern. For example, unlike the other 3 locations, Chicago shows a greater Index crime drop for the part of the police precinct that surrounds the target neighborhood than for the target neighborhood. That is of little consequence — because the program's effect, as determined by statistical analysis, was statistically significant. It is well known and well established that there are variations from case to case in social science data, just as it is correct to say that, on the average, NBA players are taller than the average person even though some NBA players are not.

The big picture is what is important; trivial variations in the overall pattern can safely be ignored.

On the other hand, it is also valuable to look at each individual case rather than only looking at the average to be sure we are not misled by the problem of interpretation illustrated by the old joke about the man laying with his head on a block of ice and his feet in the oven who said, “On average, I’m quite comfortable.”

SUMMARY

Two lines of evidence create a compelling case that the program was effective. First, for the 4 Justice Department sites aggregated, Index crime in the neighborhood served by the programs declined much more than Index crime declined in either the city as a whole or in the police precinct surrounding the target neighborhood. Even with a very small number of cases, there was a significantly greater decline statistically in Index crime in the neighborhoods where the program operated than in either the city or in the surrounding police precinct. Second, we found that the positive impact of the program was related to the level of funding. When the Justice Department cut the program’s budget in the last of the 3 program years, Index crime was reduced much less than it was during the earlier, higher level of funding.
1. Some sites gave us data on the entire precinct within the program operated so we subtracted the crime counts for the target area from these data to get the figures for the surrounding precinct. Some sites gave us data with this subtraction already done.

2. The San Juan project was located in the middle of police sector 813, but the koban officers assigned to the project patrolled about equally in sectors 813 and 814. Therefore, we combined these two sectors to create the target area. The officers' patrol areas covered about 1/3 of each sector, but there is no way to refine the crime data to any geographical area that more closely matches the program target area. Chicago crime data are available by blocks, so the police were able to create an accurate match between crime data and the program target area.

3. If there is bias, then the reported or observed crime rate is the sum of two parts, the true rate of crime and the bias.

   Let the observed rate of crime = c,
   the true rate of crime = C
   and bias in crime statistics = b, a constant,

   The change in crime between two points in time is (since measurement error is constant, it cancels out in the change measure, so, for simplicity, it is omitted in these equations):

   \[ c_2 - c_1 \]

   substituting terms in the equation,

   \[ \text{change in crime} = c_2 - c_1 = (C_2 + b) - (C_1 + b) = C_2 - C_1 \]

   or

   \[ c_2 - c_1 = C_2 - C_1 \], the change in the observed crime rate is the same as the change in the true crime rate, so bias disappears.

   The change in crime rate is an unbiased measure as long as the bias is constant. The bias does not affect the measure of change. Strangely, we may not know accurately what the number of crimes is, but we can get an accurate measure of the change in crime from flawed data.

4. Moreover, even if there were a change in police practice in one or more of the 4 cities, it would not bias the analysis because it would affect both the treatment and control groups.

5. The nonparametric test makes fewer restrictive assumptions about the nature of the data.

6. The budget cut let us test the effect of funding levels as an experimental variable, which is preferable to a correlational analysis of different funding levels.

7. We might note that it takes an exceptionally powerful program effect to produce statistically significant differences with such a small number of cases.

8. Roughly speaking, the chances were only 1 of a 1,000 that the crime data differences resulted from change. Because this probability of an accidental finding is so small (social science research usually considers 1 chance out 20 = 5 out 100 = 50 out of 1,000 to be significant), we can conclude that the program was effective in reducing crime. Put another way, chances are 999 out of 1,000 that the program was effective. There is only 1 chance in 1,000 that the program was not effective.

This is a Baysian interpretation of the analysis, assuming the prior probabilities equal zero. There are a number of advantages to using Baysian analysis in program evaluations. See Baker (1993).
Appendix 2: Selected News Articles on the Next Generation of Replications
D.C. Police Import Japanese Method

NE 'Koban' Aims to Build Trust Between Officers, Community

BY T.R. REID AND LENA H. SUN
WASHINGTON POST STAFF WRITERS

Tokyo police are curious to see whether the D.C. cop on the beat can be converted into an "Honorable Mr. Walking-Around."

Yesterday, the District held a grand opening for its first koban, a Japanese-style police booth, in the sprawling Paradise at Parkside housing complex in Northeast Washington.

Three officers have been working since Halloween in a second-floor office of the complex's community center. It's not exactly a booth, but the hope is that the personal approach to policing will help the city achieve some of the social stability and strong sense of community that give Japan remarkably low crime rates.

The District is one of several U.S. cities that have borrowed the idea, with guidance from the Tokyo police. The koban concept, in turn, is part of a broader American movement toward "community policing," a partnership between police and neighborhood residents. The idea stems from part from Japan's experience with police who are not so much law enforcement officers as all-purpose neighborhood helpers.

Every neighborhood in every Japanese city has its own koban, a small booth or office where the local police officer is based. There are about 1,200 in Tokyo alone.

In Washington, Officers William Jackson, Mona Lynch and Richard Saunders spend their days patrolling Paradise at Parkside, visiting apartments and schools to check on troubled children, organizing basketball teams and even providing tutoring.

"I'm pretty good at math and science, and Officer Lynch can do just about any subject," said Jackson, 31, who grew up in the neighborhood.

"It's a whole different atmosphere," said Lynch, 27. She used to walk a beat in the tough Benning Terrace neighborhood. Each of the officers has an apartment in the complex, and Lynch estimates her commute at "two minutes."

Next month, one officer will work days and two will work from 1 to 9 p.m.

In Japan, one officer generally is in the booth, while a partner roams the territory — a few blocks to a few square miles, depending on the population — on foot or on the standard white-frame police bicycle. The roaming officer is a benign presence in the neighborhood, as reflected in the respectful term people use for police officers: Oh-mawarisan, or Honorable Mr. Walking-Around.

Mr. Walking-Around knows every home, apartment building and business in the area — which is crucial because Japanese cities generally don't have street names or sequential house numbers. Finding a specific building can be impossible without stopping by the nearest koban for guidance.

The koban also serves as the local lost-and-found. Police lend umbrellas, lecture teenagers caught smoking and pass the word to neighbors when someone in the vicinity is ill, has a baby or is admitted to a prestigious college.

Now and then, they also fight crime.

In the event of a robbery or some other offense, people run to the nearest koban or dial 110, the Japanese equivalent of 911, which automatically connects the caller to the local police booth in most cities.

Japan's police officers carry pistols, but an informal Washington Post survey of 12 Tokyo officers turned up only one who had ever drawn — not fired, but drawn — a gun in the line of duty.

That sounds tame compared with what an American police officer faces on some city streets
— and it is.

Japan's famous postwar "miracle" usually is defined in economic terms. But there has been a social "miracle" as well; the Japanese have built a free and prosperous society with crime rates far lower than what Western nations have come to accept.

The District has about twice as many homicides each year as Tokyo — even though Tokyo has 20 times the population. The District, with fewer than 600,000 residents, has had 402 homicides this year; Tokyo has 12 million residents and an average of 200 homicides a year. Japan also has far fewer rapes and robberies per capita — and far fewer police officers, judges and jails.

Just as other countries learned manufacturing and financial lessons from Japan in the 1980s, many Americans are turning to Japan in the 1990s for lessons on creating a safe society. They have found various explanations for Japan's social stability, including an egalitarian economic structure, a national commitment to full employment, the traditional Confucian respect for authority and the widespread sense that every person has a stake in making society work.

But another factor in Japan's success seems to be the community police system, and particularly the citizens' trusting relationship with Oh-mawari-san.

Accordingly, the Washington-based Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation has been taking U.S. police chiefs to Tokyo to observe the koban system. In recent years, about a dozen U.S. cities — now including Washington — have launched koban experiments.

Paradise at Parkside was plagued by violent crime and drugs in the late 1980s, but the crime rate has dropped significantly in recent years. Now the officers hope to turn it into a model.

"We hope to redirect the youths, show them that there are positive things they can get into and make outstanding citizens out of them," Lynch said. "If we can do this, Lincoln Heights can do this, Benning Terrace can do this. The model can be taken to other places."
In Japan-Style Booths, Police are Stationed at Center of Action

BY MICHAEL JANOFSKY

BALTIMORE, July 28 — The little booth sits just off a downtown intersection that once stood at the retail heart of the city, with large department stores, movie theaters and fashionable restaurants. In recent years, with one street a pedestrian mall and the other reserved for buses and commuter trains, the neighborhood has become a collection of specialty shops and stores for the budget-conscious.

But as the neighborhood struggles to stay vibrant without the tourist appeal of other downtown attractions like Oriole Park at Camden Yards and Harbor Place mall, few buildings seem to be as vital to the area’s well-being as the small booth. It is known as a koban, a police substation modeled and named after similar buildings used in Japan as part of that country’s law-enforcement policy of stationing officers among the people they protect.

Baltimore’s Howard Street koban (pronounced: koh-bahn), an air-conditioned booth with bulletproof glass large enough to accommodate two people, was opened in May at a cost of $150,000. Since then, officers assigned to the 10-by-10-foot koban say crimes that were common to the area, like purse snatchings, shoplifting, assaults and robberies, have sharply declined.

And that is in keeping with trends in other cities where the police are using kobans and other Japanese crime-control measures. A report to be published this fall by the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, a private organization that seeks solutions to urban problems, concludes that crime rates in those city neighborhoods dropped by as much as 35 percent.

“They’re a novel way of bringing police officers closer to the community,” said Alfred Dean, an executive with the Police Foundation, a group that studies policing techniques. “With police departments under the gun to control crime and being forced to do more with less, they’re using more nontraditional methods. They’re recognizing that the old methods are ineffective.”

But as more cities turn to innovative ideas for community policing, kobans are gaining in popularity not only as a crime deterrent. They are also proving valuable as a partner to groups leading drives for economic redevelopment and neighborhood revitalization.

“We’re looking for the police to play a role in the total neighborhood redevelopment,” said Lynn A. Curtis, president of the Eisenhower Foundation, which first introduced city police chiefs to kobans on a trip to Japan in 1988. “We then try to mesh the kobans with the work of community development corporations.”

Among the first cities to use a koban were Philadelphia and San Juan, P.R., after officials made the 1988 trip. In Japan, most city neighborhoods are served by kobans of various sizes rather than regional precinct stations, and the police work closely with residents, visiting each house at least once a year. Some Japanese officers assigned to larger kobans live in them with their families.

The Eisenhower Foundation, a Washington-based group named for the brother of the former President, found that Japan’s community policing techniques work in the United States. Its report scheduled for the fall concludes that the rate of reported crime in a residential neighborhood of San Juan, where officers worked with residents from a koban, fell by 35 percent from 1989 to 1993. Similar efforts in a retail section of Philadelphia north of downtown helped drive down the rate of reported crime by 24 percent from 1991 to 1993.

A more recent foundation-sponsored trip to Japan
included officials from Baltimore, Little Rock, Ark.,
Los Angeles, Newark and Columbia, S.C.

Here in Baltimore, city officials have not yet
linked koban officers and local community groups.
But the mere presence of the structure seems to be
deterring crime and easing tensions on the streets.

"It's so visible, and visibility is the key," said
Gary Austin, manager of the Pick 'n' Pay shoe
store just beyond the koban. "It has helped deter
shoplifting and has cut down on some of the loitering
around the rail stop."

In several months, the department plans to
install surveillance cameras around the neighborhood
to allow the koban officer to monitor a
wider area through television screens in the
koban. The city is also studying the possibility of
placing several other kobans in highly populated
neighborhoods.

"People down here love it," Officer Thomas
said. "They say it's good to see you out here, and
teenagers don't congregate the way they used to,
standing on street corners."

Many local merchants said that they believed the
koban concept had made the area safer. But few
people sounded more appreciative of the police
presence than John Mathew Smith, a 36-year-old
photographer.

Waiting for a bus across the street from the
koban recently, a panhandler approached and
asked for 50 cents. When Mr. Smith refused, the
man punched him in the nose.

"I saw the whole thing," said Mr. Thomas, who
was sitting in the koban at the time. He dashed out and
arrested the man on assault charges.
Walking A Beat, Japanese Style

Koban Policing Restores Paradise

BY LARA JAKES

Five years ago, the Paradise at Parkside apartment complex in Northeast didn’t even come close to living up to its name. The community housed one of the District’s largest outdoor drug markets. Afraid to leave their homes, residents remained behind locked doors and boarded windows. Children were scarcely seen and never heard.

“At 5 a.m. the dirt patches were full of people roaming, crackheads looking for drugs,” says Paul Tramontano, who manages the complex.

“We didn’t have community organization,” he says. “People used to park their cars and run to their door. I never saw children out here.”

But when Nation of Islam security cracked down on crime there in 1990, the neighborhood slowly began seeing and seeking a better way of life.

And with the initiation of a police koban on Halloween, residents are beginning to come out from behind their doors to take an active role in keeping the are safe for children.

It’s not exactly paradise, but it’s getting there.

The koban, modeled after a Japanese community policing program, is staffed by three police officers and several social workers. Together, they work to solve drug and domestic problems in the complex while tutoring students and taking neighborhood kids on outings such as Georgetown University basketball games.

“Whatever the problems are, we are pro-active,” says Edward Leftwich, the koban’s director. “Other [community policing programs] just respond, rather than being pro-active to stop crime before it happens.

“But if you intervene at this point, at this time of a kid’s life, maybe he doesn’t become a statistic,” Mr. Leftwich says.

Most Japanese communities have their own koban, a small kiosk manned by a police officer, where people can go to get help or directions. These neighborhoods tend to revolve around their koban, where the officer often teaches karate to youngsters and spreads the word about community events.

“In Japan, new officers walk door to door to introduce themselves to the community,” says Lynn Curtis, president of the Eisenhower Foundation, one of the groups supporting the koban program. “They say, ‘I’m the new officer. This is my wife. Please come over for tea this afternoon.

“When we saw that, we realized that American communities didn’t trust police as much as Japanese communities did,” he says. “The whole purpose is to make the police officers a living part of the community.”

Since 1988, when the Washington-based Eisenhower Foundation began working with police to set up kobans in this country, five have been established in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and, most recently, Washington.

While it’s still early for the Parkside koban, in neighborhoods in the other cities where kobans were set up, crime rates dropped at least 20 percent over a three-year period, Mr. Curtis says.

“In every case the idea is to create an American variation on Japanese themes,” he says. “Paradise at Parkside is very sensitive to that development.

“Facts speak for themselves. We didn’t do this as a quick fix. The dramatic decline in crime is unique in this business because it’s not easy to reduce crime in tough, inner-city neighborhoods,” he says. “So, we’re on to something here.”
Bolstered by a $1 million grant from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, the foundation hopes to open nine new kobans this year: two in Columbia, S.C., and one in Chicago; San Juan; Los Angeles; Baltimore; Little Rock, Ark.; Memphis, Tenn.; and Newark, N.J.

"It seems to be perfect marriage," Mr. Curtis says. "They have a presence of police right in the neighborhood."

It's more than just security, however. The staff at the Parkside koban say they have become role models, surrogate parents and even friends with the children and residents in the complex.

"Since I've been here, I've seen lots of children," says Officer Mona Lynch, one of the three resident officers at the koban.

"The basic problem with children is that they don't see the other side of policing. The only thing they see of police is when [officers] are swinging a stick or coming to lock them away," she says. "The thing is to let children know to not be afraid of us. We try to let them know they have a friend."

Another koban officer, William Jackson, grew up in Parkside and came back after earning his badge to keep an eye on his old stomping grounds. Today, he tutors kids, organizes basketball games and chaperones trips to Baltimore as a way of giving something to the community that was not there before.

"Lots of children here want to do well, but their parents don't have the skills," Officer Jackson says. "That's had an impact. Growing up here, I didn't have anyone to tutor me."

Indeed, Wilbert Hines, 13, could hardly be stopped as he hurried to a tutoring session on his bike recently, with a folder stuffed with science and English homework under his arm.

"The tutors help us out with our homework," he says. "I like math best. It's fun. And the problems they give you are hard, and that's fun, too."

It wasn't so long ago that Wilbert, who has always lived in Parkside, would not dare ride his bike around the courtyard. When he was 8, he says, the area was controlled by thugs "going around beating up people."

"There was a lot of drugs then, but it's quiet now. I ain't never scared anymore. I know mostly everybody 'round here. Some are friendly."

That's in part due to the policing presence in the neighborhood.

"They look at us as they grow up and think of us as role models," says Officer Richard Saunders, the third koban staffer. "We want to keep that concept as the next generation comes to replace us."

"I remember saying to myself, 'I could never live here or raise a family here,'" says Officer Saunders. "'You never saw people just hanging out. Now I do live here. It seems like a happier place to be."

Besides organizing activities, like summer camps and Sega video game tournaments, the officers and the counselors at the koban help both the children and their parents with resumes. The koban sponsors computer training seminars and helps people of all ages apply for jobs.

"We want these kids to be able to compete in today's society and come out as taxpayers," says Alonzo Patterson, an advocate coordinator who promotes self-esteem programs and helps with job training. "We're people who have come out of here and done something productive with our lives."

At Parkside, kids know better than to utter a four-letter word on the basketball court. The neighborhood may be the only one in the city where cursing is a crime.

"We holler at them out the window," says Officer Lynch. "They know us very well."

That community spirit is generated from the koban's small office but is the result of a partnership between several groups — the local Boys and Girls Club, the apartment management and residents who welcome the changes.

"It takes a whole community to raise a child," Mr. Leftwich says. "Something is happening out here — and it's pretty special."
U.S. is importing more than cars from Japan

LR police will try koban in Hollinsworth Grove

BY SHAREESE HAROLD

Little Rock is trying a Japanese approach to police work.

The city's first koban, Japanese for "police box," is being tested in the Hollinsworth Grove public housing complex this fall.

This 18-month project combines police work with social services experts who run programs aimed at curbing crime. If it works, the city's other public housing communities could get kobans.

Little Rock is one of seven U.S. cities that won a $45,000 grant from the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation to open a center that provides police protection and programs like job training and tutoring.

Kobans, introduced to North America after a group of police chiefs visited Japan, have been used in Philadelphia and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Little Rock Police Chief Louie Caudell was introduced to the concept on a 1994 trip to Japan. The city applied for a grant to fund the project, which requires input from the housing authority, the Police Department and a nonprofit agency.

Community-Oriented Police Program officers Charles Nellums and Ann Blackman traveled to Puerto Rico last week with the Rev. William Rufus, to learn how kobans work. The Eisenhower Foundation paid for the trip and the training workshops.

The three will run the koban, which is to open by Nov. 1. It will operate from a 6-bedroom apartment converted into an office and computer training center for Hollinsworth Grove residents.

The Little Rock housing authority donated the apartment, the city donated the officers and the grant is paying Rufus' salary.
The Koban Initiative

Sources join forces to help at-risk kids

BY JOHN BEIFUSS

Eight-year-old Amanda Washington says it can be hard to get a good night's sleep in LeMoyne Gardens.

"Sometimes there's shooting, sometimes there's fighting," he said Saturday. "When I hear the shooting, I think somebody just got shot, or maybe they just want to celebrate something."

An ambitious new program is intended to help put an end to Amanda's sleepless nights. If it's successful, young residents of the South Memphis public housing development will enjoy more productive days as well.

Saturday, the Boys Clubs of Memphis launched "The Koban Initiative," a cooperative venture with the Washington-based Eisenhower Foundation, the Memphis Police Department, the Memphis Housing Authority, and 100 Black Men, a mentoring organization for black young people.

Koban is a Japanese word that refers to the concept of community interdependence and policing. The Koban Initiative seeks to increase the interaction between community-based police officers and black professionals and at-risk youth from 7 to 11 years old.

A police COACT (Community Action) unit already is based in LeMoyne Gardens. Residents say the police presence has cut down on lawbreaking and drug dealing in the neighborhood although crime remains a serious problem.

Under the Koban plan, however, the police presence will be even more interactive: two officers will spend four hours a day working with young people at the Goodwill Boys Club, 903 Walker.

The officers will tutor boys and girls at the club, and work with them on self-esteem, self-presentation, and other aspects of a successful work and home life.

Boys are more likely to befriend the officers at the Boys Club because "it's a relaxed atmosphere," said Brad Baumgardner, president of the five Boys Clubs of Memphis. "Everybody already comes here, and is comfortable being here."

The Goodwill Boys Club has about 500 members, almost all of whom live in the 800-unit LeMoyne Gardens complex.

Currently, the two officers assigned to the Boys Club are Felix Calvi, 37, an 11-year veteran, and Glyneth Davis, 30, who's been on the force 3 years.

"I feel like locking all the people up is no answer," Calvi said. "The solution is to deal with kids when they're young, at 7 years of age, to keep us from having to deal with them in the criminal justice system. That's just common sense."

The organization 100 Black Men also will provide volunteer tutors and coaches.

The Koban Initiative program was developed by the Eisenhower Foundation, a non-profit organization that seeks to improve the quality of life for all Americans.

Koban programs already have been successful in Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia and San Juan, said Lynn Curtis, foundation president, who was in Memphis on Saturday.

"In some ways I think the problem is not so much the boys in the hood as the boys on the hill," Curtis said, referring to Capitol Hill.

He said the nation's prison population has tripled in the past 15 years, yet violent crime among young people continues to increase. He said prison spending grows while Congress cuts funds to inner-city education and job programs.

The Eisenhower Foundation provided a $45,000 grant to the Boys Club for the program, which is slated to last 18 months. After that, officials hope
to be able to raise money to continue the program, if it proves to be a success.

According to the 1996 Memphis and Shelby County Crime Report, commissioned by Guardsmark Inc., early intervention with at-risk youth is vital to curtailing crime. The report recommended that well-coordinated community prevention efforts be established to instill socially positive values in young people at an early age. The Koban Initiative is intended to do just that, Baumgardner said.
Police station offers safe haven, city service

BY BERTRAM RANTIN

Gonzales Gardens residents have a new reason to celebrate.

Members of the Columbia housing community joined with the Columbia Police Department on Friday to officially open the city's first "koban."

"You call this a koban. I call it my refuge, my security and my place of peace," Chandra Scott, a teen-ager from the community, said during Friday's ribbon-cutting ceremonies.

The koban — the Japanese term for police ministration — is a partnership between the Columbia Police Department, the Columbia Housing Authority and the Columbia Urban League. It is the first of several substations planned in the community.

Police Chief Charles Austin said the opening is the realization of a 5-year-old dream.

"This is a tremendous opportunity for all of us to be able to make a number of services available to help the quality of life in this community," Austin said. "We will be able to do more than have a police effort."

In addition to housing police personnel, the koban will provide health care, educational and various city services.

"I really feel good about the process," Austin said.

So do area residents.

Jeremiah Cain, who was at Friday's ceremonies with his 1-year-old son, Shaking, said the new facility will help make the community a better place for his child.

"I want him to grow up being around good people," Cain said. "It will help a lot of kids stay out of trouble. It gives them something to do."

Travis Hagler, an A.C. Flora High School student, said the opening of the koban has created a sense of unity in the area.

"Everyone in the community is coming together," he said.

Friday's featured speaker was Lynn Curtis, president of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation in Washington, which provided a gift to help fund the koban.

Curtis said the center is an example of things that work, adding that too often, greater effort is given to building correctional facilities than providing alternatives for young people.

"It costs more money to go to jail than to go to Yale," Curtis said, citing the high cost of building and maintaining prisons.

Columbia Police officer Albertus Cocklin, who will be stationed at the koban, said he's excited about the potential, particularly for young people.

"We're going to be doing a lot of programs," Cocklin said.

In addition to the Gonzales Gardens site, a residential police koban will be established in the Waverly community, where three officers will work and live. It is expected to open later this summer.


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